Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)

EA has caught up in a mystery for 36 hours, as Ayatollah Khamenei's dramatic fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- started to disappear from Iranian state media.

Given the timing of the Supreme Leader's supposed declaration and the religious and political circumstances, what happened and what does it mean? Mr Verde, who put out the initial interpretation of the fatwa (strength or weakness?) on Wednesday, takes a look:

Khamenei’s own site, unlike the case of other fatwas such as the March pronouncement that the Fire Festival is evil, did not publish the “I am the Prophet” fatwa. Instead, in its newsfeed, it had a link to a page announcing the fatwa on another site.

Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Issuing of the fatwa in that form was a disaster.

Before explaining, a basic point: most of the statements and claims that Khamenei makes in the fatwa are nothing new. Both the terminology and the substance have been used before by Islamic Republic officials. The only relatively new claim is that he is a successor of the Prophet Mohammad (although he alluded to this before when he was meeting Iranian officials and, to back up his demand that people should follow him, quoted a verse from the Qu'ran that asks Muslims to follow the Prophet). One of the titles that regime officials used to use to describe Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei is “rahba-r moslemin-e jahan” (the leader of the Muslims of the world). Another is “nayebe barhagh-e emam-e zaman” (the rightful successor of the hidden Imam).

Sine all this has been said before, why is the current episode a disaster? Well....

*This time Khamenei, who is the Islamic Republic’s highest authority, is personally making these claims about his status. Up to now he and other regime officials would have had plausible deniability if questioned about these dubious claims, attributing them to low-level people and declaring this is not our official position. Now it is going to be very difficult to give a convincing answer, say to Saudi officials who might have a question or two about claims of being a rightful successor to the Prophet or leader of the Muslims of the world. Similar problems will arise if the Supreme Leader's circle is questioned Shia Muslim scholars and clerics like Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani.

*The fact that Khamenei is making this claim BEFORE any other independent senior clerics and Grand Ayatollahs have made such a declaration suggests that he is trying to grab for himself the position of successor to the Prophet, rather than following the consensus of Shia clerics. If any other Grand Ayatollahs now back up Khamenei’s claims, it will appear as if they were forced into it by the regime.

*Such a fatwa is the same as officially admitting the end of the rule of law and an end to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

Challenges to the regime claim that it is taking parts of the Constitution, such as Article 110 which covers the authority of the Supreme Leader, and expanding them to the point where other articles --- people’s right to determine their own destiny, independence of the judiciary, Parliament’s duty to pass legislation --- become useless. Khamenei’s interventions, as in the Islamic Azad University crisis or the corruption case of 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, render the rule of law ineffective.

Now Khamenei is saying that he has the right to do as he pleases, not ifs and no buts. He sees no necessity for the constitution and the laws of the land, as he --- the rightful successor to the Prophet and the Imams and the leader of the Muslims of the world --- can decide whenever he wants what should or should not be done. This will lead to charges that the country is being ruled in an arbitrary manner. It will also reduce any elections to the superfluous. If such a fatwa were to stand, then elected officials would become courtiers in Khamenei’s service, not the servants of the people.

*The timing could not have been worse. One of the aims of last week's bombing in southeastern Iran is to create tensions between the Shias and Sunnis there and across Iran. This fatwa only increases the Shia-Sunni tensions.

*This fatwa is a clear sign of the weakness of Khamenei on a personal and a political level. Personally, because he sees the need to elevate himself to the level of the Prophet. Politically, because he may be seeing that his orders are not being obeyed; so he has to use violence to force through his will and has to hide behind the Prophet to make himself look respectable.

Still, Khamenei and his advisors have long held the views that are expressed in the fatwa. Why release it in this dramatic form?

*Perhaps Khamenei is finding it increasing difficult to run the day-to-day affairs of the state, due to insubordination from all quarters, and wanted this fatwa to be the reason for people to follow orders and the threat in case they do not.

*Perhaps this was supposed to be a “private” statement --- like the rumoured fatwa from Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi ordering election manipulation last year --- and it was leaked. If it was leaked officially, then it is a serious miscalculation. If it was leaked unofficially, then Khamenei should be very worried about who would publicise such a sensitive statement.

*Perhaps it is to test the water before an official declaration.

*Perhaps Khamenei is preparing for a big push against the reformists and is trying to claim unquestionable legitimacy for himself.

*Perhaps the Supreme Leader is trying to counter criticism of killings and detentions by saying that this is what the Prophet would have done.

*Perhaps it is, rather in desperation, aimed at pushing back against criticism of Khamenei, only some of which may be in the public domain.

*Perhaps the infighting amongst the conservatives/principalists is to the point where it is worrying Khamenei. He is therefore trying to remind them that he is the top man and they should not forget that.

*Perhaps Khamenei is feeling that he is under pressure not from the reformists but from President Ahmadinejad, who is looking to bypass the Supreme Leader, the conservatives who are upset about the Government's rule, and the traditionalists who are seeing that Ahamdinejad is trying to sideline them.

Thanks to Khamenei’s handling of the post-election crisis, his other option is giving in to the reformists, something he had been desperately tying to avoid for over a decade now. So he is forced to make a very grand declaration in an attempt to defend himself.

*Perhaps this is personal vanity on the part of Khamenei.

I would watch for reactions from the reformists and senior clerics; however, my preliminary assessment is that the public appearance of the fatwa, however it came about, seems to have been big a mistake. I would not be surprised if it was expunged like the misguided declaration on the "sacrilege" of the Fire Festival.

The Latest from Iran (21 July): Khamenei Rattled?

2120 GMT: Back to our lead story today....

Edward Yeranian of Voice of America has picked up on the Khamenei "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa, "Iran's Supreme Leader Says He Represents Prophet Muhammad on Earth".

We are still trying to get to the bottom of whether the fatwa was genuine but has been pulled back from prominence, whether it was released prematurely, or whether it is the outcome of a far-from-ordinary rift within the establishment (to the point of being "disinformation").

We will have a fresh analysis in the morning. Snapshot? Whether the fatwa is genuine or now suspect, the episode does not bode well for Ayatollah Khamenei.

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2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Dr. Akbar Karami, a noted religious scholar, has been released on bail.

Student activist Majid Tavakoli, detained since 7 December, has had his first prison visit in more than three months. Ali Tavakoli, Majid's brother, said that he was allowed to see his brother for 10 minutes from behind a booth.

Ali Tavakoli said Majid's physical appearance was better than before and that he was in excellent spirits.

Majid Tavakoli is serving an 8 1/2-year sentence.

1500 GMT: Economy Watch. Reformist MP Mostafa Kavakebian has warned about rising prices before Ramadan in August and said the Bazaar must control those prices without reliance on more imports.

Kavakebian also said that the sale of 18% of the auto company Saipa --- officially going to employees, unofficially rumoured to a firm associated with the Revolutionary Guard --- will suffer the same fate as the privatisation of Iran Telecom.

1440 GMT: The Revolutionary Guards Document. Arshama3's Blog has re-posted and offered a quick assessment of the leaked document setting out Islamic Revolution Guards Corps procedures for monitoring the Iranian opposition.

1435 GMT: The Clerical Front. Four senior clerics, asked about "teacher-centred lectures", have responded by rejecting the concept and declaring that the seminary must remain independent.

1430 GMT: Electricity Squeeze. Hamshahri alleges that Iran is exporting cheap power to the Herat area in western Afghanistan while the domestic industry and facilities are damaged. The newspaper claims Afghans have made a profit of $2 million while Iran has lost that amount.

1415 GMT: Economic Non-Data. Bank Markazi, Iran's central bank, has again declined to publish the country's rate of growth.

1410 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Azam Vismeh has been released from detention.

1355 GMT: Corruption Watch. Rah-e-Sabz writes that more associates of the Fatemi Street insurance fraud have been summoned to court.

1345 GMT: After the Bombings. MP Zohreh Elahyian, a member of the National Security Council, has said that more control of foreign residents is planned. She blamed problems in border regions on Mossad and CIA "with their dollars".

Elahyian said, "We have full control in the Sistan and Baluchistan region, but this incident proves the long-term planning of the enemy."

1314 GMT: The Oil Squeeze. Trade and shipping source say the owner of a gasoline tanker, believed to be the Libyan-flagged Lia, has refused to allow the vessel to sail to Iran from Turkey.

1310 GMT: Parliament v. President. Is it reconcilation time? There has been a meeting of Government and Majlis representatives after the 20-day vacation of Parliament, and the Government is reportedly sending the legal decisions on its budget and legislation to the Majlis next week.

1305 GMT: Another Bust-Up in the Establishment. Aftab News publishes what appears to be a dramatic story of more tensions between the Government and "hardliners". The President's chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai reportedly claims that Ahmadinejad said Rahim-Mashi would be targeted as a "kafaar" (infidel) within a year. In particular, there would be problems with Hossein Shariatmadari, the managing editor of Kayhan. Rahim-Mashai is quoted, "To Shariatmadari, I'm no Muslim but a spy, monafegh (heretic), and member of the violet coup."

1250 GMT: The Mystery of the Fatwa. We find ourselves caught up in an increasingly murky story over the appearance of the Supreme Leader's fatwa on Tuesday. It is not appearing on Ayatollah Khamenei's "official" sites. It is still up on Iranian Labor News Agency but not on Iran Students News Agency.

An EA correspondent, noting a similar case recently over another purported Khamenei fatwaagainst Motorola's mobile phones and other products because of the company's business with Israel, writes, "Something is fishy about these supposed fatwas....I am not really sure who is running these fatwas and why."

Meanwhile, sociologist Majid Mohammadi assesses the present fatwa and declares that it is a "gravestone on the rule of justice".

1240 GMT: The Guardians. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati has been re-elected as head of the Guardian Council.

1105 GMT: Today's "Western Approach" Story. Now it's the British who are supposedly begging for talks. From Mehr News: "Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami has twice rebuffed the British ambassador’s request for a meeting. On June 27, the British ambassador to Iran sent a letter to Khatami asking if a meeting could be scheduled, but Khatami did not reply to the letter. Later, the British Embassy sent a letter to him via the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and the cleric responded this time but said he did not want to meet the British ambassador."

Mehr does not offer the possible topics for this meeting, and it is unclear why the British would seek out Khatami, who has no official position in Iran's political hierarchy.

1048 GMT: At the Movies. From CNN:

A government-linked film studio in Iran plans to make a movie about the Iranian nuclear scientist who Iranian officials say was kidnapped by U.S. agents, state media reported Tuesday.

According to Iran's semi-official Fars news agency, Sima Film production company has hired a group of film school graduates to write a script about Shahram Amiri. The head of the production company didn't say when the film would be ready.

1045 GMT: Travel Dip. Kalemeh reports that tourism to Iran has dropped 60%.

1030 GMT: Talking Tough. The Supreme Leader has repeated that the intelligence services of the US, Britain, and Israel are to blame for last week's suicide bombings in southeastern Iran: "One of the main goals of the enemies behind the terrorist attack in Iran's southeastern city of Zahedan was to create division and religious discord."

Ali Larijani, at the World Conference of Speakers of Parliament in Geneva, declared that the US lacks the courage to strike Tehran: "Iran is ready for any possible incidents and is well aware of the ongoing developments in the region. If the US makes such a mistake, it will pay dearly."

1000 GMT: Mousavi Latest. Mir Hossein Mousavi, meeting professors in the Islamic Association of Teachers, has spoken about the Green media and the need to counter the propaganda of Iranian state outlets.

0955 GMT: The Khamenei Fatwa. An English translation of the Rah-e-Sabz article on the Supreme Leader's declaration has been posted: "For the first time, and openly, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, in response to a religious letter, has placed himself officially on the saintly level of ‘all-qualified priest’, ‘deputy Imam at the time of the absence [of the 12th Imam]’, ‘the ruling branch of the Imams’, and ‘true all-time deputy to the Prophet’. He pointed out there shall be an absolute obedience to his governmental orders to reveal ‘full commitment to the Supreme Leader’."

0945 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Thomas Erdbrink and Colum Lynch write in The Washington Post, "New Sanctions Crimp Iran's Shipping Business as Insurers Withhold Coverage".

Beyond noting the recent announcement by Lloyd's of London that it is halting coverage of gasoline imports to Iran, Erdbrink and Lynch quote Mohammad Ronaghi, the deputy manager of Iran's Sea Pars, "Iranian-flagged ships are facing problems all over the world as they currently have no insurance coverage because of the new sanctions. Basically, most ports will refuse them entry if they are not covered for possible damages."

The journalists also note the specific difficulties of Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines while carrying this reassurance from its managing director, Mohammad Hussein Dajmar, "These sanctions have not affected us much. The world has many ports. We will sail to those nations that want to do business with us."

0900 GMT: The Push Against Ahmadinejad. The battle within the Iranian establishment is now getting some attention: Robert Tait of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has posted a lengthy overview, "Iranian Conservatives Unite In Bid To Undermine Ahmadinejad".

(A bit of illuminating background to the story. I spoke for about 30 minutes with Tait as he was researching the article. We initially discussed EA's "exclusive" on the discussions between Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, leading MP Ahmad Tavakoli, and Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei over a move against the President.

Tait does not refer directly to the Larijani-Tavakoli-Rezaei talks --- it is difficult to do so without named sources --- but writes instead, with a link back to our article:

One report has even suggested that conservatives have met to plot a way of impeaching Ahmadinejad and remove him from office, although seasoned observers caution that such an outcome is unthinkable without Khamenei's approval -- which is thought unlikely.

As an unseasoned observer, I also told Tait that the discussions, even amongst high-ranking conservatives, had to win over the Supreme Leader: that is a key reason why Larijani and Co. were hoping to bring in senior clerics and Hashemi Rafsanjani.)

0700 GMT: We've posted a quick follow-up note on the US-based media's insistence on hyping the possibility/probability of Israeli military action against Iran as fact rather than speculation.

0555 GMT: Let's start the morning with a bit of perspective.

Tuesday's big story was not the supposed US approach to Tehran for discussions --- which was at most a request by Senator John Kerry to come to Iran and which may or may not have been true and may or may not have been whipped up by Iranian state media.

Tuesday's big story was not a possible Israeli military strike against Iran, which for now exists more on the keyboards of feverish "analysts" who --- from hysteria, speculation, ingenuity, or simple desire for such a strike --- than in any plans in West Jerusalem and Washington.

Tuesday's big story was not Iran's five-point plan for Afghanistan, unfurled at the Kabul Summit by Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki as an attempted sign of Tehran's influence in Central Asia and a counter to Western attention to sanctions and Iran's nuclear programme.

Tuesday's big story was the surprise and then confusion over the Supreme Leader's grab for authority through his fatwa linking his rule to that of the Imams and even Prophet Mohammad. What is the significance? Mr Verde assesses in a special analysis for EA.

Iran's New Guidance: Good, Good Lovin' (But Only at Night)

UPDATE 21 July: A complication (or is it an opportunity?) in our story, as Minister of Health Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi has complained that couples do not want children and are waiting too long to start families. In Tehran and northern Iran, there is even a trend towards no children at all.



May we humbly suggest a reconsideration and a bit of "Afternoon Delight"?

A bit of a setback for Iranian men (and for Iranian women? Read on and decide)....

After Iran's Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance had improved the look of its male population through prescription of the "right" haircuts (think 1980s, like the style worn by men's men and international singing sensation Wham! --- photo at left), the Government has taken away some of the rewards.

A minister in the Ahmadinejad Government said this week  that "matrimonial intercourse" must only take place at special hours during the night to ensure healthy children.

Some in the audience were reportedly "embarrassed" and "surprised", given that the minister's expertise consisted of university study in Industrial Engineering and a Master's degree in Mathematics.

Still, the sexual calculus of the Iran Government means no more Afternoon Delight (cue cheesy 1970s song):

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xROCsagx1pQ[/youtube]

Middle East Inside Line: Turkey-Hamas-Israel, Netanyahu Denies "Map", No Russia Missiles to Iran?

Turkey, Hamas, and Israel: Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, having gone to Damascus for discussions with Syrian President Bashar Assad and Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, also reportedly met Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal on Monday. They spoke about the future of the reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas and the continuation of efforts to lift the siege on Gaza.

Meanwhile, Israel took a  positive step towards Ankara. "In light of the calm in Turkey and the absence of large-scale anti-Israeli demonstrations," Israel's Counter Terrorism Bureau lifted a severe warning to Israelis to avoid travel to Turkey.

Middle East Inside Line: Syria-Turkey-Lebanon Condemn Israel, Netanyahu Map “Gap”, Israel’s Iron Dome System

However, this is not the end of the story. The Israeli Foreign Ministry requested assurances from Turkey that three ships belonging to the Turkish organisation IHH, backer of May's Freedom Flotilla will not be used for another attempt to run the blockade on Gaza. The Turkish daily Hurriyet reported that in past cases, Israel has required assurances only from the organizers rather than the Government.

Israel Denies Map for Talks with Palestine: The Prime Minister's Office stated on Tuesday that Benjamin Netanyahu had not presented a map of a possible border agreement and land swaps in recent discussions over Palestine, as alleged by the London-based Al-Sharq al-Awsat.

Russia Not Selling S-300s to Iran?: According to Interfax, Russian military official Alexander Fomin on Tuesday, without referring to the S-300 by name, but pledged Moscow would desist from supplying “large missile systems” to Iran in accordance with the sanctions backed by Russia at the United Nations.

Israel welcomed Moscow's statement.

Israel's "Close" Relations with Greece: Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou is coming to Israel on Wednesday. This will be the first visit to Israel by a Greek prime minister since Konstantinos Mitsotakis came in 1992.

Ahead of the visit, The Jerusalem Post reports:

People in government said there was no doubt that the recent tension with Turkey has led to a warming of the relationship between Israel and some of Turkey’s historic rivals, such as Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria. The Cypriot and Bulgarian foreign ministers paid visits to Israel earlier this year.

According to one diplomatic official, the Greeks – looking at the Israeli-Turkish, andTurkish-US tensions – are realizing that strategic alliances in the region are changing, and that this might be a good time to get closer to Israel as a way of warming ties with Washington.

When Israel had a close strategic alliance with Turkey, the official said, Athens gave up any thought of forging such an alliance with Israel.

But now the situation with Ankara has changed, and Athens is seeing more opportunities with Israel.

Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

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Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.