The Latest from Iran (29 July): 22% Support?

1935 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Activist Hoda Saber, who was mysteriously taken by unknown persons on Saturday, has called his family from Evin Prison. The reason for arrest is unknown.

International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran updates on the transfer of 15 political prisoners, including student activist Abdollah Momeni and journalist Bahman Ahmadi Amoui, to solitary confinement in Evin Prison. (We have previously reported that 10 detainees were transferred.) The 15 are protesting the “unsuitable treatment of prisoners and their families by prison authorities and Ward 350 officers on visitation days; lack of health and welfare facilities; as well as suspension of visitation privileges of several prisoners.”

NEW Iran Analysis: Twisting & Turning to Prove the Leader is Supreme (Verde)
NEW Iran: How “Ahmadinejad v. Paul the Octopus” Became a Global Showdown
Iran Analysis: The Hardliners Take on Ahmadinejad
Latest Iran Video: Ahmadinejad on Afghanistan, Sanctions, & the US (26 July)
The Latest from Iran (28 July): A Presidential Target?

1730 GMT: Sporting Moment. Kodoom reports on triumph turned into trouble....

Hossein Askari, riding for the Tabriz Petrochemical Cycling Team, won the Tour of Qinghai Lake in China.  However, according to Ali Zangiabadi, the director of the Iranian Cycling Federation, Askari will face disciplinary action in Iran after he popped the cork from a champagne bottle in his victory celebration.



1720 GMT: Academic Corner. The Educational Testing Service has announced that it is resuming registrations in Iran for TOEFL (Teaching of English as a Foreign Language) and GRE (Graduate Record Examination) tests.

The examinations, which are vital for many Iranian students who wish to study abroad, were suspended two weeks ago after tighter U.N. Security Council restrictions on financial transactions involving Iran led to ETS's banking arrangements being discontinued. Students wishing to take the tests may now register through Iran's National Organization of Educational Testing or mayn use credit/debit cards issued by banks that are not prohibited under UN or US sanctions.

1530 GMT: Solving the Oil Squeeze? Three Russian state-controlled oil companies may begin delivering gasoline to Iran in a month, the head of the Iran Commission of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce & Industry has said. Talks are being held on a “working level” and the first delivery may take place in late August or September.

1500 GMT: Karroubi Answers. Mehdi Karroubi has offered a response to Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council (see separate entry): "If I am an intriguer, then you are in league with those who stole the people's votes....What you called sedition was an election which was as usual engineered by you and think tanks led by you or others like you at the Ministry of Interior and Guardian Council."

1420 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Iranian activists have posted an updated letter, addressed to the Supreme Leader, requesting commutation of the death sentences of Jafar Kazemi (see 1110 GMT) and Mohammad Ali Haj Aghaei, both arrested during post-election protests and accused of "mohareb" (war against God).

Radio Zamaneh has now posted an English text of the news of Kazemi's sentence.

1410 GMT: Oil Squeeze. Reports indicate that Iran shipped around 9 million barrels of crude oil to China in June, a fall of 13.1 million barrels from last year.

1400 GMT: Water Watch. The Los Angeles Times updates on the reports that water in parts of Tehran are contaminated with high levels of toxic nitrate.

The article reports that the Ministry of Power has handed out free bottles of water to an underprivileged suburb south of the city. The Water and Sewage Waste Organization has recently dug new wells to expand the water supply. However, Minister of Health Marziyeh Vahid Dastjerdi announced that the amount of nitrate found in the drinking water in parts of Tehran exceeded the appropriate level, posing a serious threat to city-dwellers’ health.

1310 GMT: Mousavi Watch (1988 Edition). An EA correspondent checks in:

"The big news today is Enqelab Eslami, the Paris newspaper of former President Abulhassan Bani-Sadr, is allegedly re-leaking the full contents of the letter that Mousavi wrote to Ayatollah Khamenei in 1988 explaining his sudden resignation as Prime Minister. (The resignation was refused by Khomeini, who forced Mousavi to stay on.)

The contents, which I am trying to verify, are amusing: Mousavi decries his total lack of control or even information over events surrounding Iranian foreign policy and activities. For example, he states that he received word through the press that Iranian pilgrims have been apprehended in Jeddah carrying firearms or that the Speaker or Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, exchanged letters with the Prime Minister of Japan and Mousavi only got wind of it when both sides finished the exchange.

Essentially this is a strong accusation against the un-constitutional accumulation of powers by Khamenei. Enqelab Eslami first leaked the letter in 1988, prior to Khomeini's death. It now republishes iafter Mousavi's threat to reveal all, (see the letter posted on EA).

Now the ball's firmly in Mousavi's own court: he either needs to deny the veracity of the claims or confirm the letter...."

1140 GMT: Mousavi Watch. Kalemeh has a short report of Mir Hossein Mousavi's meeting this morning with members of the Assembly of Teachers and Researchers of Qom.

1110 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. An Iranian activist reports that he death sentence of political prisoner Jafar Kazemi has been upheld by an appellate court.

Kazemi, arrested last September during protests, was convicted of "mohareb" (war against God) for connections with Mujahedin-e-Khalq, a charge that he has denied. He was also in prison for nine yers during the 1980s.

Reporters Without Borders has condemned the "abuse" of detained journalist Abdolreza Tajik and other political prisoners, “It is time for United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay to press the Iranian authorities to accept a visit from the UN special rapporteur on torture, so that he can investigate the allegations of mistreatment in Iranian prisons.”

This week the Tajik family wrote Iran’s head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, that the journalist said during a prison the privisit that he had been “dishonoured” and that he demanded to see his lawyer, Mohammad Sharif, and Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi.

1005 GMT: Oil Squeeze. The New York Times summarises Iran's announcement that it will increase domestic gasoline production by converting two petrochemical plants so they can produce gasoline by processing benzene.

Minister of Oil Masoud Mirkazemi's all-is-well alert was that Iran would become a net exporter of gasoline by 2015. Other scientists say, however, that gasoline from benzene will burn poorly with more impurities than regular gasoline, damaging engines.

0955 GMT: Security Escalation. Aftab News reports that 7000 bases for Basij militia are to be constructed, including 100 in Zanjan Province.

0930 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Add Australia to the list of countries ramping up restrictions on Tehran. Following the UN, US, and European Union measures, Canberra has tightened restrictions on Iranian oil and gas groups and companies for the first time and has banned trade of weapons and related material, including anything that could be used for development of nuclear, missile, chemical or biological capability.

0755 GMT: We have posted an analysis by Mr Verde, considering the significance of a speech by Ayatollah Jannati, the head of the Guardian Council, "Twisting & Turning to Prove the Leader is Supreme".

0600 GMT: While we catch up with "other" news, we open today with a feature, "How 'Ahmadinejad v. Paul the Octopus' Became a Global Showdown".

The President may also want to take note of a recent poll conducted by the Iranian Student Polling Agency in which 56 percent of participants believe his popularity has declined over the past year while only 22 percent believe it has increased.

As readers know, we are cautious about any poll carried out inside Iran, but the ISPA, which surveyed 1172 people is is linked to Jahad Daneshgahi, an academic body which in turn is overseen by the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, headed by President Ahmadinejad.

Two-thirds of the respondents in the poll believe that dissatisfaction with the government remains widespread, if largely covert. Only 18% think that the government was able to control post-election protests.

Perhaps the most striking finding, however, is this: 80% said that economic issues such as inflation, lack of affordable housing, and unemployment are their main priorities. Lack of political and social freedoms was named by only 7%, weakening Islamic values concerned 6%, and international threats such as military attacks or economic sanctions was cited by 4% percent.

The Latest from Iran (22 July): Confusing Regime

2125 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert. Iran's police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam has declared that there is no smuggling of gas and oil across Iran's borders.

Then again, maybe all is not well: despite there being no smuggling, Ahmadi-Moghaddam has said the budget for border defence is inadequate.

2115 GMT: Religious Difficulties. Mohammad Nasser Saghaie Biriya, the President's religious advisor has resigned, allegedly because of divisions over the enforcement of hijab.

Saghaie Biriya is a disciple of Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who has been seen as Ahmadinejad's religious mentor.

NEW Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)
Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.
Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verd
The Latest from Iran (21 July): Khamenei Rattled?

2100 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Detained student activist Arsalan Abadi has been sentenced to six years in prison by an appellate court. Abadi, arrested during the Ashura protests on 27 December, had originally been given a nine-year term.

2055 GMT: Regime v. Rafsanjani. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami has tried to put former President Hashemi Rafsanjani in his place, saying that his position is still the same as it was on 19 June last year, when the Supreme Leader tried to close off debate over the result of the Presidential election. Khatami said Rafsanjani's s future depends on Ayatollah Khamenei's decisions and the elections for the head of Expediency Council, the position Rafsanjani currently holds.

1945 GMT: Prohibiting Remembrance. Back from a break to catch up with this news from Wednesday....

The National Front of Iran has announced that security forces pressured the organisation into cancelling its public events. The head of the National Front was that any gathering in 7th Tir Square and boarding the bus to travel to Baboyeh Cemetery is prohibited.

On 21 July 1953, demonstrators protested the dismissal of the nationalist Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, and were killed inby security forces of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The victims were laid to rest in Baboyeh.

1310 GMT: Scattering the Students. Rah-e-Sabz reports that Tehran University's dormitories will be evacuated this summer, with students distributed across the city.

1245 GMT: Economy Watch. Reformist MP Mohammad Reza Khabbaz has declared that excessive imports will break the back of domestic production.

1000 GMT: (Refuting the) Rumour of the Day. MP Qodratollah Alikhani identifying the mis-information put out by Javan, the newspaper linked to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, dismisses its latest tale that Green leaders met in a hotel sauna.

0954 GMT: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Film Expert. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has announced that a High Council for Cinema, led by the President, has been established.

An EA correspondent ponders, "What would be the titles of the films considered by this Council?"

0945 GMT: Education Corner. The licence of the Islamic Association at the University of Kashan has been revoked by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education is reportedly sending religious missonaries to 3000 girls' schools in Tehran.
0855 GMT: Sanctions. MP Mohsen Nariman has challenged the Government's official line: "Claiming that sanctions have no effects is political propaganda."

0810 GMT: Staying on Point. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is continuing to ensure that his credentials on foreign policy are not in question, saying on Wednesday that the Iran-Brazil-Turkey declaration on a uranium swap is the only solution to the nuclear issue and adding that sanctions are sure to result in failure.
0805 GMT: Getting the Right Clerics in Place. According to Rooz Online, Seyed Reza Taghavi, the head of policy for Friday Prayers, has said 60 Friday Prayer clerics will be "retired" this summer.

0705 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Journalist Azam Visemeh after her release from detention yesterday:



0700 GMT: In the Bazaar. Nejat Bahrami, writing for insideIRAN, analyses, "Bazaari Criticism of Ahmadinejad Bursts into the Open":

Another factor that can bring the bazaar and the opposition closer to each other is the role of the government. Mistakes made by the government and their impact should never be underestimated. Continuation of failed economic policies by the Ahmadinejad administration and further pressure on Iran by the international community can further intensify the economic crisis in Iran and alienate some parts of this important, influential group of merchants.

0655 GMT: Sanctions Watch. Two overviews of interest this morning....

Shayan Ghajar writes in insideIRAN, "Sanctions Open Iran to Russian, Chinese Firms", while Ardalan Sayami's analysis in Rooz Online is that "Sanctions Turn the Government to the Private Sector".

0635 GMT: A Clue on the Fatwa? Personally, I believe that the first audience for the Supreme Leader's supposed fatwa on Tuesday was the senior clerics of Qom, some of whom have been unsettled throughout the post-election crisis and many of whom were roused to anger by the June attacks on Seyed Hassan Khomeini and on the houses of Grand Ayatollah Sane'i and the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. (Using this line of reasoning, a possible reason for the "disappearance" of the fatwa is that it was not received well by those clerics.)

Support for this interpretation comes in Rah-e-Sabz, which posts a provocative account of Ayatollah Khamenei's recent journey to Qom and his meetings with the clerics.

0605 GMT: Perhaps the most spirited response to our coverage since Tuesday of the Supreme Leader's alleged fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- has come from a reader who say, "Nothing new, he has simply reiterated the meaning of the velayat-e-faqih [clerical supremacy] as originally articulated by the late Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini....It is not always good to murky the water as you like doing here."

With respect, I beg to differ. While the content of Ayatollah Khameini's declaration has its precendents, it has not taken on the form of a fatwa, at least not under this Supreme Leader. And, as always, the distinction lays in timing, context, and developments: Why now? To what end? And what has happened to the fatwa, which has "disappeared" from many Iranian state outlets?

Mr Verde takes another look in an analysis.

Meanwhile....

Mousavi's Latest

Almost lost in the confusion over the Supreme Leader's statement --- did he or didn't he? --- was Mir Hossein Mousavi's intervention in a meeting with professors.

Mousavi, unwittingly intersecting with the presentation of and uncertainty over Khamenei's words, condemned “fabrication” and “distortion” of truth by the Government and stressed that “systematic lies” are the signs of the “decline” of a system. He said the media of the Green Movement should make every effort to “unravel” these lies and counter the “ominous phenomenon": “We must provide our people with a truthful analysis of every situation that the government represents through lies; even though our possibilities are not as much as the authoritarian government.”

Mousavi also spoke about the recent bombings in southeastern Iran, declaring that the problems of the ethnic groups in the border regions must be a priority and maintaining that terrorism can only be confronted through “development coupled with justice".

Power Crisis

Tabnak reports that electricity prices for farmers will increase 10-fold.

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)

EA has caught up in a mystery for 36 hours, as Ayatollah Khamenei's dramatic fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- started to disappear from Iranian state media.

Given the timing of the Supreme Leader's supposed declaration and the religious and political circumstances, what happened and what does it mean? Mr Verde, who put out the initial interpretation of the fatwa (strength or weakness?) on Wednesday, takes a look:

Khamenei’s own site, unlike the case of other fatwas such as the March pronouncement that the Fire Festival is evil, did not publish the “I am the Prophet” fatwa. Instead, in its newsfeed, it had a link to a page announcing the fatwa on another site.

Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Issuing of the fatwa in that form was a disaster.

Before explaining, a basic point: most of the statements and claims that Khamenei makes in the fatwa are nothing new. Both the terminology and the substance have been used before by Islamic Republic officials. The only relatively new claim is that he is a successor of the Prophet Mohammad (although he alluded to this before when he was meeting Iranian officials and, to back up his demand that people should follow him, quoted a verse from the Qu'ran that asks Muslims to follow the Prophet). One of the titles that regime officials used to use to describe Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei is “rahba-r moslemin-e jahan” (the leader of the Muslims of the world). Another is “nayebe barhagh-e emam-e zaman” (the rightful successor of the hidden Imam).

Sine all this has been said before, why is the current episode a disaster? Well....

*This time Khamenei, who is the Islamic Republic’s highest authority, is personally making these claims about his status. Up to now he and other regime officials would have had plausible deniability if questioned about these dubious claims, attributing them to low-level people and declaring this is not our official position. Now it is going to be very difficult to give a convincing answer, say to Saudi officials who might have a question or two about claims of being a rightful successor to the Prophet or leader of the Muslims of the world. Similar problems will arise if the Supreme Leader's circle is questioned Shia Muslim scholars and clerics like Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani.

*The fact that Khamenei is making this claim BEFORE any other independent senior clerics and Grand Ayatollahs have made such a declaration suggests that he is trying to grab for himself the position of successor to the Prophet, rather than following the consensus of Shia clerics. If any other Grand Ayatollahs now back up Khamenei’s claims, it will appear as if they were forced into it by the regime.

*Such a fatwa is the same as officially admitting the end of the rule of law and an end to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

Challenges to the regime claim that it is taking parts of the Constitution, such as Article 110 which covers the authority of the Supreme Leader, and expanding them to the point where other articles --- people’s right to determine their own destiny, independence of the judiciary, Parliament’s duty to pass legislation --- become useless. Khamenei’s interventions, as in the Islamic Azad University crisis or the corruption case of 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, render the rule of law ineffective.

Now Khamenei is saying that he has the right to do as he pleases, not ifs and no buts. He sees no necessity for the constitution and the laws of the land, as he --- the rightful successor to the Prophet and the Imams and the leader of the Muslims of the world --- can decide whenever he wants what should or should not be done. This will lead to charges that the country is being ruled in an arbitrary manner. It will also reduce any elections to the superfluous. If such a fatwa were to stand, then elected officials would become courtiers in Khamenei’s service, not the servants of the people.

*The timing could not have been worse. One of the aims of last week's bombing in southeastern Iran is to create tensions between the Shias and Sunnis there and across Iran. This fatwa only increases the Shia-Sunni tensions.

*This fatwa is a clear sign of the weakness of Khamenei on a personal and a political level. Personally, because he sees the need to elevate himself to the level of the Prophet. Politically, because he may be seeing that his orders are not being obeyed; so he has to use violence to force through his will and has to hide behind the Prophet to make himself look respectable.

Still, Khamenei and his advisors have long held the views that are expressed in the fatwa. Why release it in this dramatic form?

*Perhaps Khamenei is finding it increasing difficult to run the day-to-day affairs of the state, due to insubordination from all quarters, and wanted this fatwa to be the reason for people to follow orders and the threat in case they do not.

*Perhaps this was supposed to be a “private” statement --- like the rumoured fatwa from Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi ordering election manipulation last year --- and it was leaked. If it was leaked officially, then it is a serious miscalculation. If it was leaked unofficially, then Khamenei should be very worried about who would publicise such a sensitive statement.

*Perhaps it is to test the water before an official declaration.

*Perhaps Khamenei is preparing for a big push against the reformists and is trying to claim unquestionable legitimacy for himself.

*Perhaps the Supreme Leader is trying to counter criticism of killings and detentions by saying that this is what the Prophet would have done.

*Perhaps it is, rather in desperation, aimed at pushing back against criticism of Khamenei, only some of which may be in the public domain.

*Perhaps the infighting amongst the conservatives/principalists is to the point where it is worrying Khamenei. He is therefore trying to remind them that he is the top man and they should not forget that.

*Perhaps Khamenei is feeling that he is under pressure not from the reformists but from President Ahmadinejad, who is looking to bypass the Supreme Leader, the conservatives who are upset about the Government's rule, and the traditionalists who are seeing that Ahamdinejad is trying to sideline them.

Thanks to Khamenei’s handling of the post-election crisis, his other option is giving in to the reformists, something he had been desperately tying to avoid for over a decade now. So he is forced to make a very grand declaration in an attempt to defend himself.

*Perhaps this is personal vanity on the part of Khamenei.

I would watch for reactions from the reformists and senior clerics; however, my preliminary assessment is that the public appearance of the fatwa, however it came about, seems to have been big a mistake. I would not be surprised if it was expunged like the misguided declaration on the "sacrilege" of the Fire Festival.

Change for Iran: How Twitter Has Made a Difference (Example 3,461)

There has been another spate of commentary belittling the place of Twitter --- usually through a misunderstanding of social media, activism, and politics --- in the post-election crisis in Iran. Often the analysis has come from "experts" who have had no involvement in the use of Twitter. Indeed, they have had no apparent interaction with those who have used the medium to follow events, disseminate information, and maintain links despite the efforts of the Iranian Government to cut off communications.

Amidst this commentary, I read this entry posted last week on "The Contrapuntal Platypus" from a person whose experience of Iran was changed by Twitter, and by one particular Twitter user from inside the country, in June 2009:

To the tweeter known only as @Change_for_Iran,

….You’ll probably never read this.

I don’t even know if you’re still alive, although more than a year after you tweeted for the last time, I continue to pray for your safety. I don’t know if you’re still in Iran, or were forced to flee as many students were, or perhaps lie imprisoned somewhere in the depths of Evin. I can only hope against all odds that you are safe.

Today is 18 Tir (9 July), the 11-year anniversary of the brutal 1999 invasion of the student dormitories. I find myself thinking of you today, because it was your tweets the night of June 14 [2009]  –-- the night history repeated itself and students were again attacked and killed in their dormitories –-- that brought me to #iranelection and to the Sea of Green.

******

I had been following the leadup to Iran’s 2009 election for weeks before on various news outlets: the buildup of support for Mousavi, the crowds of people –-- both young and old, male and female, religious and secular --– all wearing green, the color of hope. The unpredecented voter turnout on election day. The excitement and anticipation for a new future: one of tolerance and openness rather than repression and secrecy.

And then, of course, the result, hastily announced and incomprehensible. The backlash of disbelief and shock. Then the protests began, building day after day.

As the crisis escalated, I read on The Guardian website that the best sources of breaking news were the Iranian students posting updates on Twitter. I was intrigued, but held back from investigating first-hand. It was, I vaguely sensed, something that I could far too easily spend hours doing. Besides, I had always heard that Twitter was a pointless, egotistical social medium, good only for navel-gazers intent on telling the world what they had for breakfast. Far better to get my updates sifted through the convenient filter of a news website.

Until the night the dormitories were attacked. Then I knew I couldn’t bear to remain at a “safe” distance any longer. I had to see the confict as it unfolded for myself.

Read rest of article....

Iran Analysis: Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani Criticises Supreme Leader? (and What Could It Mean?)

And now a report which may or may not be significant in Iran's evolving political struggle.

Very significant.

Yesterday I noticed an item on the opposition site Green Voice of Freedom: "Grand Ayatollah Safi [Golpayegan] to Supreme Leader: 'You have lost your earthly life, and I am concerned about your heavenly life'".

Iran Exclusive: The Plot to Remove Ahmadinejad, Act II

If true, that would be about the coldest and most direct slap-down a senior cleric could give Ayatollah Khamenei. He stands accused of failing --- through miscalculation or ineptitude --- to uphold both religious and political responsibilities in leading the Iranian people, to the point where he may not even be worthy of Allah's forgiveness.

And there is no doubt, from GVF's summary, that this negligence is linked to the post-election crisis. The website adds that Golpayegani recently refused to meet the President when Ahmadinejad came to Qom.

Could the report be true? It claims "informed sources". Those sources are unnamed, and I have yet to find a corroborating report.

However, one EA correspondent notes, "I know many of the senior clerics have similar criticisms of Khamenei." Another writes, "As long as no official denial is published, you can be sure that it is true. Safi Golpayegani has a perfectly run website (mostly Mosque news), and his adepts would have posted it."

Then there is the possible connection to the wider story that EA posted this weekend, "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad". In that analysis, we wrote that the backing of senior clerics was essential if the planners --- Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, top MP Ahmad Tavakoli, and Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen Rezaei --- were to proceed. We added ,"No senior cleric has come out in public opposition."

Before posting the story, I asked a key EA source, "Which senior cleric would be most significant if he made a statement against the President?" The reply: "Safi".

Well, we now have a claim that "Safi" is pressing the Supreme Leader. It is too early to claim truth, yet alone assess impact, but this is potentially a big development for the "earthly life" of President Ahmadinejad as well as Ayatollah Khamenei.