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Entries in Ayatollah Ali Sistani (2)

Thursday
Jul222010

Iran Analysis: The Supreme Leader & the Disappearing Fatwa (Verde)

EA has caught up in a mystery for 36 hours, as Ayatollah Khamenei's dramatic fatwa --- "I am the Rule of the Prophet" --- started to disappear from Iranian state media.

Given the timing of the Supreme Leader's supposed declaration and the religious and political circumstances, what happened and what does it mean? Mr Verde, who put out the initial interpretation of the fatwa (strength or weakness?) on Wednesday, takes a look:

Khamenei’s own site, unlike the case of other fatwas such as the March pronouncement that the Fire Festival is evil, did not publish the “I am the Prophet” fatwa. Instead, in its newsfeed, it had a link to a page announcing the fatwa on another site.

Iran Special: Khamenei’s “I Am the Rule of the Prophet” Fatwa — Strength or Weakness? (Verde)


Issuing of the fatwa in that form was a disaster.

Before explaining, a basic point: most of the statements and claims that Khamenei makes in the fatwa are nothing new. Both the terminology and the substance have been used before by Islamic Republic officials. The only relatively new claim is that he is a successor of the Prophet Mohammad (although he alluded to this before when he was meeting Iranian officials and, to back up his demand that people should follow him, quoted a verse from the Qu'ran that asks Muslims to follow the Prophet). One of the titles that regime officials used to use to describe Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei is “rahba-r moslemin-e jahan” (the leader of the Muslims of the world). Another is “nayebe barhagh-e emam-e zaman” (the rightful successor of the hidden Imam).

Sine all this has been said before, why is the current episode a disaster? Well....

*This time Khamenei, who is the Islamic Republic’s highest authority, is personally making these claims about his status. Up to now he and other regime officials would have had plausible deniability if questioned about these dubious claims, attributing them to low-level people and declaring this is not our official position. Now it is going to be very difficult to give a convincing answer, say to Saudi officials who might have a question or two about claims of being a rightful successor to the Prophet or leader of the Muslims of the world. Similar problems will arise if the Supreme Leader's circle is questioned Shia Muslim scholars and clerics like Iraq's Ayatollah Sistani.

*The fact that Khamenei is making this claim BEFORE any other independent senior clerics and Grand Ayatollahs have made such a declaration suggests that he is trying to grab for himself the position of successor to the Prophet, rather than following the consensus of Shia clerics. If any other Grand Ayatollahs now back up Khamenei’s claims, it will appear as if they were forced into it by the regime.

*Such a fatwa is the same as officially admitting the end of the rule of law and an end to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic.

Challenges to the regime claim that it is taking parts of the Constitution, such as Article 110 which covers the authority of the Supreme Leader, and expanding them to the point where other articles --- people’s right to determine their own destiny, independence of the judiciary, Parliament’s duty to pass legislation --- become useless. Khamenei’s interventions, as in the Islamic Azad University crisis or the corruption case of 1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi, render the rule of law ineffective.

Now Khamenei is saying that he has the right to do as he pleases, not ifs and no buts. He sees no necessity for the constitution and the laws of the land, as he --- the rightful successor to the Prophet and the Imams and the leader of the Muslims of the world --- can decide whenever he wants what should or should not be done. This will lead to charges that the country is being ruled in an arbitrary manner. It will also reduce any elections to the superfluous. If such a fatwa were to stand, then elected officials would become courtiers in Khamenei’s service, not the servants of the people.

*The timing could not have been worse. One of the aims of last week's bombing in southeastern Iran is to create tensions between the Shias and Sunnis there and across Iran. This fatwa only increases the Shia-Sunni tensions.

*This fatwa is a clear sign of the weakness of Khamenei on a personal and a political level. Personally, because he sees the need to elevate himself to the level of the Prophet. Politically, because he may be seeing that his orders are not being obeyed; so he has to use violence to force through his will and has to hide behind the Prophet to make himself look respectable.

Still, Khamenei and his advisors have long held the views that are expressed in the fatwa. Why release it in this dramatic form?

*Perhaps Khamenei is finding it increasing difficult to run the day-to-day affairs of the state, due to insubordination from all quarters, and wanted this fatwa to be the reason for people to follow orders and the threat in case they do not.

*Perhaps this was supposed to be a “private” statement --- like the rumoured fatwa from Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi ordering election manipulation last year --- and it was leaked. If it was leaked officially, then it is a serious miscalculation. If it was leaked unofficially, then Khamenei should be very worried about who would publicise such a sensitive statement.

*Perhaps it is to test the water before an official declaration.

*Perhaps Khamenei is preparing for a big push against the reformists and is trying to claim unquestionable legitimacy for himself.

*Perhaps the Supreme Leader is trying to counter criticism of killings and detentions by saying that this is what the Prophet would have done.

*Perhaps it is, rather in desperation, aimed at pushing back against criticism of Khamenei, only some of which may be in the public domain.

*Perhaps the infighting amongst the conservatives/principalists is to the point where it is worrying Khamenei. He is therefore trying to remind them that he is the top man and they should not forget that.

*Perhaps Khamenei is feeling that he is under pressure not from the reformists but from President Ahmadinejad, who is looking to bypass the Supreme Leader, the conservatives who are upset about the Government's rule, and the traditionalists who are seeing that Ahamdinejad is trying to sideline them.

Thanks to Khamenei’s handling of the post-election crisis, his other option is giving in to the reformists, something he had been desperately tying to avoid for over a decade now. So he is forced to make a very grand declaration in an attempt to defend himself.

*Perhaps this is personal vanity on the part of Khamenei.

I would watch for reactions from the reformists and senior clerics; however, my preliminary assessment is that the public appearance of the fatwa, however it came about, seems to have been big a mistake. I would not be surprised if it was expunged like the misguided declaration on the "sacrilege" of the Fire Festival.
Thursday
Jul012010

The Latest from Iran (1 July): Establishing the Pattern

2025 GMT: Today's All-is-Well Alert: Deputy Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Behrouz Alishiri has said that new UN sanctions have proven futile, as transactions in Iran's investment market have risen 10 percent since the passage of the UN resolution.

Alishiri added that, according to the reports of the International Monetary Fund, foreign investment in Iran rose from $900 million in 2007 to $3 billion in 2009.

NEW Iran Interview: Ahmad Batebi “The Green Movement Goes Underground”
Iran Eyewitness: “Life Continues for People…With the Hope of Change” (Fatemeh)
Iran Special: The Significance of the “Universities Crisis” (Verde)
The Latest from Iran (30 June): Assessing “Crisis”


1925 GMT: Oil Squeeze. Lloyd’s of London, the insurance market, is recognising US sanctions by restricting cover for any ships carrying petroleum to Iran.

1815 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? Well, this weekend, the President will visit Nigeria.

It could be that Ahmadinejad fancies a change of scenery. Perhaps he got one of those special e-mails offering him a lot of money if he helped get the funds of a late President/General/businessman out of the country. Or maybe there is some connection with Nigeria taking over the presidency of the United Nations Security Council.

1805 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Activists report that Narges Mohammadi , the vice-chair of Shirin Ebadi's Center for the Defenders of Human Rights, has been released on $50,000 bail.

1800 GMT: Speaking of Universities and Threats. BBC Persian reports that some applicants for Iran's universities have received a threatening text message warning that, if they participated in post-election protests last year, they will be ineligible for acceptance regardless of their performance on entrance examinations.

The head of the government agency that administers the examinations has harshly criticised the sending of the messages. Iran Unfiltered concludes that this is an example of "hardline" elements of the regime acting without the consent and probably the prior knowledge of officials.

1750 GMT: The Universities Crisis. The dispute between Parliament and President over Islamic Azad University, analysed by EA's Mr Verde yesterday, has finally hit the non-Iranian mainstream press. The Guardian of London offers a summary, framing the battle as "a bitter political battle for control between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his most powerful rival, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani".

1740 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Labour activists claim that the Iranian government has informed the International Labour Organization that Mansour Osanloo, a leader of Tehran's bus union, is due for release.

The Interational Transport Workers Federation and the International Trade Union Confederation have welcomed the news but also insisted that 52 other innocent trade unionists should be freed.

1605 GMT: Cyber-Shelter. Reporters Without Borders has launched the world’s first “Anti-Censorship Shelter” for use by foreign journalists, bloggers, and activists.

The organization said at a gathering in Paris, "At a time when online filtering and surveillance is becoming more and more widespread, we are making an active commitment to an Internet that is unrestricted and accessible to all by providing the victims of censorship with the means of protecting their online information.”

The initiative, pursued with the communications security firm XeroBank, offers free high-speed anonymity services, including encrypted email and web access, to those who use the Shelter Connection through a Virtual Private Network routes traffic across XeroBank's gigabit backbone network. As it passes from country to country, mixed with tens of thousands of other users, it creates a virtually untraceable high-speed anonymity network.

The network will be available not only to users of the Shelter in Paris but also to their contacts anywhere in the world and to all those identified by Reporters Without Borders. They will be able to connect with the XeroBank service through access codes and secured, ready-to-use USB flash drives.

1545 GMT: Larijani "Mans Up". Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani continues to put forth the even-tougher-than-the-President line on international matters.

Speaking at the end of an Islamic Inter-Parliamentary summit in Damascus, Larijani said the Americans' ulterior motive in imposing new sanctions lay not in Tehran but in the West Bank and Gaza: "We are told that Iran's approach toward Palestine is important for them [the US], and they think they can change our will by pressuring us."

Larijani added, "Considering the Zionist regime's plots, countries in the Islamic world should stand beside each other."

1400 GMT: Rewriting the Past for the Present. The head of the Basiji militia, Mohammad Reza Naqdi has announced a new Basij Cyber Army. To introduce this advance in Iranian warfare, Naqdi declared that the Soviet Union was toppled by Iranian martyrs, and those fighters also ensured Zionists are surrounded by Hamas and Hezbollah today.

1220 GMT: Refugee Watch. OMID Advocates have published an extensive, vital study, "Report on the Situation of Iranian Refugees in Turkey".

1125 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Pedram Rafati, a student activist at Amir Kabir University, has been sentenced to two years in prison and fined. Reports claim that the presiding judge, Abolghassam Salavati, threatened Rafati with a longer term if he appeals.

Labour activist Khosro Boukani has been given a two-year sentence.

0945 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Hossein Marashi, former Vice President and relative and ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has returned to jail after a temporary release during his one-year sentence.

Professors and students have demanded the release of Ehsan Abdoh Tabrizi, a Ph.D. candidate at Durham University in Britain. Tabrizi was detained on Ashura during a visit to his relatives.

0935 GMT: Economy Watch. Sadegh Mahsouli, the Minister of Welfare and Social Security, has announced that the  subsidy reduction plan will be implemented in six provinces --- Isfahan, Sout Khorasan, Kermanshah, West Azerbaijan, Bushehr, and Golestan --- from July.

Minister of Housing Ali Nikzad has expressed his concern about a "housing bazaar gone mad", resulting in extremely high rents.

Six million families will receive a basket of goods for Ramadan, with a reduction of 20 percent in price.

0930 GMT: The Battle Within. Fatemeh Bodaghi, the President's deputy for judicial affairs, notes that complaints against member of Parliament Elyas Naderan, a vocal critic of the Government, and (even more politically interesting) Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf are still in court and asks Iran's judiciary why they have not been handled.

0920 GMT: Spinning the Nuclear Talks. What is highlighted in Khabar Online's coverage of the statement by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov: his call for renewed discussions between Russia, the US, France, and Iran.

What's missing: Lavrov's pre-condition that Iran suspend the attempt to enrich uranium to 20 percent.

0915 GMT: A Challenge to Moscow. Iran's Minister of Defense, Ahmad Vahidi, has demanded Russian delivery of S-300 missiles to Tehran. The shipment has been held up for months amidst the international manoeuvres over sanctions and Iran's nuclear programme.

0910 GMT: The Fall-Out from the Attack on Khomeini. Another message from a cleric for Seyed Hassan Khomeini, who was shouted down by regime supporters when he tried to speak at the 4 June for his late grandfather....

That is far from unusual. What is distinctive this time is that the backing comes from a member of the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution, seen as a bulwark of the regime. Hojatoleslam Dr. Ahmad Ahmadi wrote to Hassan Khomeini, "I was stunned when I heard of this ugly uproar."

0755 GMT: The Voices of Women. Zahra Rahnavard has asserted that joining international conventions is the best way to prevent domestic oppression.

Female followers of the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri have asked Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the leading Shi'a cleric in Iraq, to insist on a reopening of Montazeri's offices, recently sealed by Iranian authorities.

0750 GMT: Irony, Sarcasm, or a Message for Ahmadinejad? Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani offered this nugget to the press in a meeting with Bahrain's Foreign Minister on Tuesday, "The strategic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Iraq is the formation of a national unity government with the presence of all political, religious and ethnic groups."

Now, Mr Larijani, is your tongue in your cheek or are you really pushing the idea of "national unity" not only for Iraq but for its neighbours? (And if it is the latter, does Fars News understand what you are doing?)

0745 GMT: Websites for Human Rights. An EA reader brings to our attention CrowdVoice: Tracking Voices of Protest, which included a section with news on "Prisoners of Conscience in Iran".

0735 GMT: Ahmadinejad's Token Sanctions. Iranian state media say that President Ahmadinejad has announced a boycott of Western companies and goods in retaliation against sanctions by the US and UN. Included are Coca-Cola, IBM, Intel, and Nestle.

Hmm.... Not quite sure why Ahmadinejad is presenting this as "new". I certainly couldn't get hold of an evil Coke when I was in Tehran --- instead, I got hooked on the politically correct (and quite tasty) Parsi Cola.
0725 GMT: More on Depression in Tehran. Yesterday we noted the headline, via Iranian Labor News Agency, on a study of the emotional state of Tehran residents: 30% depressed.

Rooz Online offers much more on the study, by Tehran's Aria Strategic Studies Center, and on press coverage. The "30%" refers to severe depression; another 28% claim to suffer from mild depression. The report says concerns about marriage, housing, employment, and income are among those that have caused anxiety and unease among Tehran residents.

The official unemployment is now 14%, with higher rates amongst youth and university graduates.

0710 GMT: Cyber-Development. The International Committee for Human Rights in Iran has launched a podcast. This week's topic: "Will more political prisoners face execution soon?”

0620 GMT: Nuclear Front. Another signal that talks on Iran's uranium enrichment may resume: Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has said Tehran will respond to a Russian proposal to meet with the Vienna Group (US, Russia, and France) after consulting with Brazil and Turkey.  He suggested that the discussions be held in Tehran.

Mottaki offered no comment, however, on the US-Russia-France pre-condition that Iran halt efforts to produce 20% enriched uranium.

0610 GMT: We have posted a feature, "The Green Movement Goes Underground", the third part of Persian2English's interview with activist Ahmad Batebi.

0450 GMT: Wednesday was another day in what seems to be the pattern of Iranian politics, now 12 1/2 months after the disputed Presidential election. Opposition activity was relatively muted, at least on the public front, while the Government tried to deal (or sometimes evaded) a series of conflicts within the establishment.

A follow-up to one of those possible emerging conflicts: Rooz Online have now published an English version of Mohammad Reza Yazdanpanah's lengthy article claiming that pro-Ahmadinejad members of Parliament are turning on the Motalefeh Party, a key group in Iranian politics since 1979, with the Islamic Azad University argument as a catalyst.