Iran Analysis: More War, No Facts, Blah Blah (Chapter 23)

It's one thing for pontificator Charles Krauthammer to post an "analysis", void of logic and knowledge of Iran, to cheer-lead for threats of military action --- as we have noted often, he has long pushed for war with Tehran.

It's another for "moderate" Washington insiders Steven Simon and Ray Takeyh (with whom I have worked) to turn speculation into the situation on the ground, making military action the centre of attention in their commentary in today's Washington Post: "If Iran came close to getting a nuclear weapon, would Obama use force?"

Iran Media Follow-Up: War, War, War. Blah, Blah, Blah. No Facts. More War. Blah.

The article starts with Politics Fantasyland:

Imagine a moment when President Obama has only two alternatives: prepare to live with a nuclear-armed Iran or embark on the perilous path of military action to stop it.

Imagine that diplomacy has run its course, after prolonged and inconclusive negotiations; that surging international oil prices have undercut the power of economic sanctions against Tehran; and that reliable intelligence says the Islamic republic's weapons program is very close to reaching its goal.

Facing such conditions, would Obama use force against Iran?

Then, once again, we get the war-war meanderings of former Bush Administration official Michael Hayden as Very Significant --- they aren't --- before jacking up Obama's formulaic statement
in an interview with Israeli television (note the audience), "I assure you that I have not taken options off the table."

In limited mitigation, Takeyh and Simon then note the constraints on a possible US push for military action --- the United Nations, European opinion, the need for domestic consensus.

But only limited mitigation: in the end, the two authors come off as Chicken Little soothsayers: "The world imagined here may not constitute destiny --- but it will be hard to escape."

If Takeyh and Simon really wanted to make a contribution, rather than feeding water-cooler chatter (and the bias towards conflict), they might have queried their opening assumption that Iran is close to significant military nuclear capability (it isn't) or even if the regime intends to pursue that capability (unclear, though my personal reading is not at the present).

Takeyh and Simon might have even taken a moment to note the current diplomatic situation in which, far from moving towards a military showdown, both Tehran and Washington are approaching renewed talks over Iran's uranium enrichment.

But that would ruin the drama of the speculation, wouldn't it?

Apologies for appearing harsh on the two authors rather than, say, venting concern and frustration towards a Krauthammer. However, Takeyh and Simon, unless Krauthammer, have experience working inside an Administration. And I also think, unlike Krauthammer, that they are not trying to wish a war into existence.

So, please no more bombs-and-missiles fantasy. If we have to pose as a tough guy, let's try Jack Webb from TV's Dragnet: "Just the facts, Ma'am. Just the facts."

Iran: How "Ahmadinejad v. Paul the Octopus" Became a Global Showdown

It was only a sentence in a very, very long speech.

After a rather slow start --- "if one really makes a big success of it, the middle age will be the period in which what was achieved in youth would be consolidated" --- President Ahmadinejad's talk at the closing ceremony of the Iranian Youth Festival in Tehran last Friday was full of juicy soundbites.

There was the denunciation of a US-led plot "to carry out a military invasion of one or two countries in the Middle East, which are our friends, with the help of...disgraced Israelis". There was the portrayal of a deceitful Russian President Dmitry Medvedev offering support by "perform[ing] at a US show". There was the declaration, "The Iranian nation will crush hundreds of America's propagandist plays with its will and unity."

Little wonder, then, that this sentence initially slipped by with little notice: "Recently in the World Championship [football's World Cup] you saw that those who proclaim to have reached the peaks of history wanted to manipulate people's minds through superstition, an octopus, fortune-telling and such things."

Enter the magic of the German newspaper Bild. On Monday, their intrepid reporters turned Ahmadinejad's aside into the Main Event: "He incites against Israel, against the US and the West in general --- but now the crazy Iranian dictator is going after Paul the Octopus!...For Ahmadinejad, Paul is a symbol of the propaganda and superstitions of the West."

Paul the Octopus, for those who have been away from Planet Earth this summer, was the unexpected star of the 2010 World Cup, picking the winner in all of Germany's matches (including, at great risk to his life, Spain's defeat of the Germans in the semi-final) and then calling the Spanish victory over Holland in the final. He had also allegedly intervened in Iranian politics, calling an ultimate win for opposition figure Mir Hossein Mousavi over the Supreme Leader.

Forget minor events like Ayatollah Khamenei's "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa or the manoeuvres against the Iranian President. Paul v. Mahmoud was the story, sometimes the only story --- once you looked past mythical or real nuclear weapons, of course --- on Iran.

On Tuesday afternoon, the Daily Telegraph of London, which has a penchant for Wacky Ahmadinejad stories (see their superlative "Mahmoud is a Jew" effort), proclaimed, "Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian leader, says Paul the Octopus, the sea creature that correctly predicted the outcome of World Cup games, is a symbol of all that is wrong with the western world." (There was no mention of Bild for its investigative coup.) And by Wednesday, British tabloids such as the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror, as well as the broadsheet The Guardian, were reprinting the story with minor changes in wording (although The Guardian deserves a bonus point for the headline, "West Spreads Evil Tentacles into Iran").

Time magazine picked up the tale --- "[Paul] just calls it like it is — or will be". Rory Fitzgerald at The Huffington Post attempted satire by penning Paul's response: "He...said that he had never before seen such a lack of a sense of humor in a human being, despite the fact that he lives in Germany." Fox News posted the item in its "Science and Technology" section. IsraelPolitik, "The Political Blog of the State of Israel", jumped in, "If Paul the Octopus is on Ahmadinejad’s 'hitlist', no one is safe."

By Wednesday afternoon, there were so many reprints or minor variations of the tale --- all without noting the original Ahmadinejad sentence, all without crediting Bild --- that The Los Angeles Times (which credited The Daily Telegraph) was publishing a round-up.

Is there a moral here? Probably not. It's just a tale of how the world works, when the fatwa of a Supreme Leader --- a Supreme Leader who may be in political trouble --- just can't match up to the scenario of Bad Guy Politician v. Eight-Legged Psychic.

And you don't even need Paul --- or Mahmoud for that matter --- to tell you that.

[Thanks to Borzou Daragahi for sending me a full copy of Ahmadinejad's speech]

Iran Special: Khamenei's "I Am the Rule of the Prophet" Fatwa --- Strength or Weakness? (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

First, a summary of what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed in his fatwa on Tuesday:

*Khamenei is claiming that he is a cleric of the highest rank who possesses all the required credentials to hold the position of “velayat-e-faqih” (Supreme Leader).

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Many Shia clerics and scholars, including the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, believed in 1989 that Khamenei did not have the required religious credentials to permit him to hold the position of Supreme Leader. Other regime officials have said that Khamenei has the credentials, but such claims were made in political speeches. This time the claim is made in the name of a religious edict and by Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that his rule is a direct succession to that of the Prophet and the Shia Imams.

During recent months, as he has been trying to cope with the fallout of the crisis within the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has repeatedly compared himself to the first Shia Imam and his opponents to the Imam’s enemies. Now he is claiming that he is not only the successor of the Imams, but of the Prophet too.

*Khamenei is claiming that he is the ruler of the Muslim of the world.

In the regime's past, political declarations claimed that the Supreme Leader is the leader of all of the world’s Muslims. This time Khamenei is claiming it himself.

The issue? Around 90% of the world’s Muslims are Sunnis. Sunni Islam does not recognize Shia Grand Ayatollahs and the Islamic Republic’s principle of religious jurisprudence. This declaration will not go down well with the Sunnis, especially as it comes from Khamenei himself.

*Khamenei is claiming that obeying his orders is compulsory.

Since very early days of the Islamic Republic, the assumption has been that the order to the Supreme Leader must be obeyed. More than three decades after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khamenei has seen the need to remind everyone of that fact.

(Note: some religious scholars believe that, due to his limited religious credentials, Khamenei does not have the authority to issue fatwas. We will ignore these concerns for now.)

The obvious significance of this fatwa is that Khamenei is saying that his orders must be carried out without failure. This fatwa will make it easier for Khamenei to insist that his wishes are carried out by all factions of the Islamic Republic, for example, in complicated situations like the recent Islamic Azad University crisis. It will be easier to fire officials to be sacked or disqualify candidates from elections. All that will be required is reference to this fatwa.

The not-so-obvious significances?

According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic the Supreme Leader is the highest authority in the country. During the time of Ayatollah Khomeini and since Khamenei came to power, it has always been assumed that the Supreme Leader’s orders must be carried out.

A dramatic demonstration of this was during the reformist-dominated Sixth Majlis (2000-2004). The Parliament was debating a new law that would have revoked the draconian press controls which had been passed by the Fifth Majlis. Khamenei wrote to the Parliament asking for the liberalized press law to be halted, and Mehdi Karroubi, who was then the Speaker, stopped the passage. He cited the order from Khamenei and said it must be obeyed.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to intervene in his capacity as Supreme Leader in many instances. The latest episode came only yesterday with the revelation that two Siatan and Baluchistan MPs, who resigned in protest of the government’s inability to provide effective security for the province, withdrew their resignation on Khamenei’s orders.

Another example: after the vote of confidence over Ahmadinejad’s cabinet last summer, then Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar revealed the Khamenei had ordered MPs to vote Yes, saying that otherwise many ministers would not have obtained the required support. In that instance, even after Khamenei’s intervention, three proposed ministers did not get the vote of confidence.

And another example: the Majlis investigation into allegations of corruption against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi were blocked by an order from Khamenei.

Since last year, Khamenei has been forced to act more as a senior administrator of the Islamic Republic than as a Supreme Leader who is supposed to preside over state affairs. His need yesterday to remind everyone that orders must be obeyed points to an uncertainty he might have about the effectiveness of that administration.

This could mean that Khamenei’s authority is not as solid as it was in the past. For example, last summer President Ahmadinejad refused to follow Khamenei’s order and remove his ally Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai from the post of First Vice President until the order was made public by the Supreme Leader’s office. From the other side of the political spectrum, despite Khamenei’s insistence that the 2009 presidential elections were fair and the elections issue is over, the reformists are refusing to back down and have at times not only disobeyed the Supreme Leader but mocked him too. Then there is the Parliament vote to block the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution decision on Islamic Azad University, asserting the President's control. That vote was in direct contravention of Khamenei’s (and, before him, Khomeini’s) statements that the Majlis should not interfere in the decisions taken by the SCCR.

Over the past year Khamenei has struggled to assert his political authority within the regime. He is being defied by senior figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami. He has been criticised by politicians like Hashemi Rafsanjani and by clerics like Ayatollah Dastgheib. He has found it hard to force them into obeying him.

The same can be said about the general public. During street demonstrations, there have chats of “Death to Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei”. The Supreme Leader has not been able to persuade all of his people to accept his decisions. He has instead been forced into using brute force and detention against his opponents. The regime’s security forces, with naked and gruesome violence, cleared the streets of demonstrators last year, and the intelligence forces have jailed many members of the opposition.

The resulting problem is that Khamenei has not been able to demonstrate that he has any real authority in Iran beyond the use of force by his security personnel. Any seemingly minor incident thus has the potential to become a spiralling crisis. Furthermore, many opposition figures who are in jail are now taking any possible opportunity to challenge his authority (Examples include recent statements by Isa Saharkhiz and Ahmad Ghabel). The regime’s authority is no longer that of its positive qualities, but that of its muscle, and that muscle may be starting to get tired.

On the conservative side there problems too. The conservative-dominated Majlis voted in the case of Islamic Azad University and the SCCR case in contravention of Khamenei’s views. That forced the Supreme Leader to give out two separate orders to Azad University and SCCR and to set up a panel to look into the case.Even the estalbishment of the panel suggests that Khamenei’s opinion is not strong enough for regime insiders to accept his decisions. Leading MP Ali Motahari has said that although he follows the Supreme Leader, he will voice his disquiet about issues too, and another conservative, Morteza Nabavi, has said that many of his colleagues are giving up.

Add to this the failure of the Ahmadinejad Government to cope with many of the problems in the country and, in some cases, its "success" in making matters worse. On 19 June 2009, Khamenei said clearly that he considers Ahmadinejad closer to him than even his decades-old friend Rafsanjani. The starting point of  the incompetence of the Ahmadinejad administration is the demonstration that the Supreme Leader is not able to choose the right people for the right job.

On the religious front, the clerics in Qom have refused to publicly back Khamenei’s post-election decisions. This has led to the Supreme Leader calling them imperceptive confidants and criticising them regularly. In contrast, after the 4 June humiliation of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the clerics were effusive with their support for Hassan's grandfather, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and praised his personal and religious qualities.

In recent months some criticism of Khamenei has been taken to a new level. Last year most of the criticism was directed at specific actions or decisions, but now some of the criticism has become personal to the point of demanding Khamenei’s removal from the post of Supreme Leader --- examples include statements by  (example: statements by Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Saharkhiz, and Ghabel.) This criticism is coming not from an foreign-based opposition that has no allegiance to the Islamic Republic but from former regime insiders with substantial revolutionary credentials.

And the fatwa may not check the criticism. Many high-ranking Shia clerics will probably be upset because Khamenei is saying that, during the age of absence (of the 12th Shia Imam Mahdi), he is the rightful successor of that Imam. Doing so, he is usurping the claim of legitimacy of the Grand Ayatollahs,  that they are here to guide the faithful while the 12th Imam is hidden. And many Shia scholars do not accept the rule of the Jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih) during the age of absence. They assert that any claim of rule by an Islamic state during the period that the 12th Imam is hidden is a false pretence, since a true Islamic state can only be set up by him. Others who try to take this role are impostors.

Last year, the main talk was ofthe  illegitimacy of the Ahamdinejad as president. Now the issue seems to be shifting to the unsuitability of Khamenei for the post of Supreme Leader. This new fatwa may be an attempt at countering the challenges against the Supreme Leader himself. But one is left wondering if it will not backfire as did Khamenei’s message of condolence for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri’s death last year or his fatwa trying to ban Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Fiestival) in March.

But note the difference: if this declaraton backfires, the consequences will be far more dramatic.

Iran Analysis: Voices Raised --- Removing the Supreme Leader (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

In the last 24 hours, three statements have emerged:

Mohsen Kadivar, the cleric and scholar who is now based in the US, has written a lengthy letter, "Impeachment of the Leader", to Hashemi Rafsanjani, in his capacity as head of Assembly of Experts. The letter setting out the factual and legal case that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei should be removed from the post of Supreme Leader.

Kadivar accuses Khamenei of injustice, dictatorship, overthrow of the Islamic Republic and weakening Islam. He says that if the Assembly does not act on this, they will have proven that the Islamic Republic cannot be reformed via legal means. The letter, published in six parts in Rah-e-Sabz, provides substantial evidence in the form of statements by Rafsanjani, Guardian Council head Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, and Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi and the Constitution.

Seminary lecturer and author Ahmad Ghabel, recently released on bail from prison, has written that Khamenei has acted against national security on several occasions, propagated against the regime, and has often published lies with the aim of creating public anxiety. The Supreme Leader has insulted many of the opponents of the establishment’s policies and is acting to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

Ghabel also alleges that Khamenei’s statements are against Islamic teaching and that at times he talks nonsense. Ghabel notes that he is now accused by the courts of acting against national security; reworking this allegation, he says he is guilty of that act, since he voted for Khamenei in Presidential elections in the 1980s.

It is reported that journalist Isa Saharkhiz, detained for 13 months, refused to defend himself in court yesterday. Instead, he called for the removal and trial of Khamenei, since the Supreme Leader has strayed from the Constitution and is acting unjustly.

---

These are direct and bold challenges to Khamenei. They are not just criticisms of some decisions or actions but are calls for removal from office. They are not warnings that the removal might be necessary in the future, but presentations of the case that he should be removed now.

I would not expect any results from these in the near-future, except more pressure on Ghabel and Saharkhiz and more attacks on Kadivar. However, it is worth a close look to see if reformists in Iran are now raising the stakes.

Iran Exclusive: The Plot to Remove Ahmadinejad, Act II

EA sources report that, within the last two weeks, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, key MP and Larijani ally Ahmad Tavakoli, Secretary of Expediency Council and 2009 Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei, and possibly MP Ali Motahari have met to discuss limiting the authority and possibly removing President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from power.

This inner circle are dissatisfied with the performance of the Supreme Leader in the post-election crisis. They are not seeking any change to his position, however; rather they want Ayatollah Khamenei to take a stronger stand against Ahmadinejad and those who support him.

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The group has been encouraging senior clerics to come out publicly against the Government and, critically, they are reaching out to former President Hashemi Rafsanjani to join them.

How did Iran get here? And where is this heading?



The Background

Conservative/principlist dissatisfaction with the Government is now at the centre of political and economic developments in Iran. This, however, is not the first time that its leading representatives have considered making a move against the President.

In January, according to EA sources, Larijani, Rezaei, and Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf met to consider the options. The regime had been rocked by the protests of Ashura (27 December), and the three men believed that the Ahmadinejad Government --- uncertain in its handling of the country's affairs and stained by post-election abuses --- might not be able to withstand the challenge.

The approach considered by the meeting was to chip away at Ahmadinejad's inner circle, targeting advisors such as chief of staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai and former Tehran Prosecutor General Saeed Mortazavi. The group agreed that Ahmadinejad should then be removed, although this should be done "within the framework of the law".

The public face of this effort may have been statements by Abdolhossein Ruholamini, the campaign manager of Rezaei's 2009 Presidential campaign and the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died in Kahrizak Prison after the election. On at least two occasions, Ruholamini declared, "We have much evidence against Mortazavi, against police, against some judges" over Kahrizak, and he called for accountability over the post-election abuses.

The initiative stalled. An approach was apparently made to key opposition figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi to offer support for the effort, but there was no response. Hashemi Rafsanjani --- if he knew of the discussions --- did not move from his cautious public position. Most importantly, the events of 22 Bahman (11 February) gave the impression, perhaps misleading, that the Government had put Ashura behind it and had suppressed the opposition challenge.

THE MOTIVES NOW

This did not mean that the conservative/principlist worries over Ahmadinejad had been quelled; to the contrary, tensions have only increased in recent months. For Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli, the following seem to be significant:

1. The Kahrizak Case

EA sources report that the catalyst for dissatisfaction over the Government's handling of post-election conflict continues to be the Kahrizak Prison abuse case. The decision to hold a closed-door "trial", handing out two death sentences and nine prison terms to nine minor figures, has stoked the anger of many within the Iranian establishment.

Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli want Mortazavi, who was overseeing the detentions at the time, to be held accountable. In addition, they may also want at least one high-ranking figure from the military and intelligence services to take responsibility for Kahrizak.

2. The Battle Between Parliament and President

The struggle between the Majlis and Ahmadinejad;s forces has been developing for a long time. It is now in the open on a daily basis, however, and the stakes were raised,when demonstrations were allegedly organised against the Parliament in the conflict over control of Islamic Azad University.

For Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli and their allies, this may now appear to be more than a question of political influence but of the survival of Parliament as anything more than a token institution.

3. The Downward Spiral of the Economy

EA sources indicate, however, that the most significant issue may be the deterioration in Iran's economy. With signs of difficulty, if not crisis, in industry, the squeeze on the vital energy sectors --- in production, imports, and exports --- rising prices, and the resistance of protests and strikes, Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli are facing not only the erosion of public support for the establishment but of open dissatisfaction.

And all of this occurs before the introduction of subsidy cuts, reportedly in the autumn. The price rise in areas such as food and energy is likely to fuel more anger.

The Strategy?

Two weeks ago, Larijani went to Qom and met senior clerics, including Ayatollahs Makarem-Shirazi, Mousavi-Ardebili, and Safi Golpayegani. His message, according to EA sources, was that his role was "no longer important" in the Iranian system; Ahmadinejad and his circle were imposing themselves on Iran's institutions, suppressing legislative and judicial authority. The Supreme Leader appeared unable to check this imposition.

Larijani also noted a new development, pointing out the harassment of Seyed Hassan Khomeini at the ceremony for his grandfather on 4 June and the attacks on the houses of senior clerics such as Grand Ayatollah Sane'i and the late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri.

Larijani's appeal? Speak out, otherwise the Government would reduce all others to bystanders.

(Significantly, the Supreme Leader went to Qom a few days later to tell those same senior clerics that velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical authority, had to be sustained. He may also have given reassurances that the attacks on clerics would not re-occur. And, since early June, they have not.)

The Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli meeting then appears to have agreed on a "stalking horse" initiative to test support for a move against the President. In January, the speeches came from Ruholamini over Kahrizak; last week, the direct challenge came from Tavakoli in Parliament, as he took on the Government across the spectrum of post-election conflict, corruption, and the economy. Larijani also made a series of pointed, if often coded, references to the "lawbreaking" of the Government.

The Problems

EA readers asked in January, "How exactly would Ahmadinejad be removed?", and this important question remains today. Even though Tavakoli has now publicly raised, for the first time, the process of impeachment, the challenge of getting 2/3 of Parliament's members to support the ousting of the President --- even in this political and economic environment --- may be too great.

And, behind the President, there are other institutions and groups like the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. So far, despite rumours, there has no been of IRGC figures or even senior military commanders breaking from the Government. Can Larijani-Rezaei-Tavakoli and allies afford to take the risk of challenging the might behind Ahmadinejad with their political manoeuvres?

That is why the appeals to senior clerics and to Rafsanjani are significant. Any challenge needs to have a wide base from the political and clerical establishments to present the image of a "majority" now unable to cope with the degraded if not illegitimate rule of a "minority" cluster around the President.

So far, however, Rafsanjani has made no apparent move to talk to the inner group, let alone join them, and no senior cleric has come out in public opposition. (Grand Ayatollah Sane'i and Ayatollah Dastgheib, who are both most vocal and public critics of the Government, are linked so closely to the post-election opposition that they are on the political margins of this contest.)

And there is the issue of the Supreme Leader. At times he may have wavered in his public support of Ahmadinejad but he has never withdrawn it. Barring the unlikely path of impeaching of the President, the likely scenario is that Ahmadinejad is "encouraged" to resign or at least give up much of his executive authority to other branches of the Government.

For all the drama of this news, the prosaic reality is that Ayatollah Khamenei has to come out in criticism of his President. And for that to happen, the Supreme Leader needs to be confronted with a widely-backed appeal from the politicians and clerics.