The Latest from Iran (20 August): Grinding to a Halt

The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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1810 GMT: Recognise Us Because We're Really Nice. There have been signs this week that the Ahmadinejad Government would be more flexible in its position on the nuclear programme, and today this came from the Associated Press, via unnamed diplomats:

Iran has lifted a ban and allowed UN inspectors to visit a nearly-completed nuclear reactor. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency visited the reactor in Arak after a year-long ban...Iran agreed last week to expand uranium enrichment monitoring of the site.

1735 GMT: Ahmadinejad and the IRGC Factor. As we wait for the fallout from the President's televised speech on his Cabinet selections, here's how American anlaysts get it right. And wrong.

The appointment of Ahmad Vahidi as Minister of Defense has been noticed because he was commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps in the late 1980s/early 1990s. So, it is said, Vahidi's appointment indicates a consolidation of the relationship between the President and the IRGC in the face of opposition not only from "reformists" but from "conservative" and "principlist" elements.

Right.

And, the analysts continue, this indicates that Ahmadinejad plans to continue and maybe accelerate Iran's material support for pro-Iranian parties and militias in the Middle East.

Wrong.

This, of course, may be a consequence over time of Vahidi's appointment but to assert --- without any evidence --- that the external dimension is more important than the President's manoeuvres in an internal crisis smacks of a view that revolves around Washington, rather than Tehran.

1725 GMT: Worst. Claim. Ever: It's All Hillary's Fault. Iran's police chief of police Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam has said that the "confessions" of political detainees must be authentic because their mastermind, Hillary Clinton, has openly revealed their plans: "Some say that the police has extracted confessions by force, but I tell them: No-one has extracted confession out of Mrs. Clinton, yet she reveals all issues freely."

While Ahmadi-Moqaddam's statement should be called out as a crass cover-up of the state's treatment of prisoners, it does point to the lack of wisdom in Clinton's posturing --- motivated primarily to counter domestic charges that the Administration had stood back from post-election events --- when she told CNN earlier this month that the US Government did much "behind the scenes" for Iranian protesters.

1450 GMT: Reuters has now picked up on the problems for Ahmadinejad's Ministerial appointments in Parliament, adding this quote from Speaker Ali Larijani on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting: "Those nominated by the president for government posts must have sufficient expertise and experience, otherwise a great deal of the country's energy would be wasted."

1410 GMT: Creating Some Political Space? Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking to the Islamic Society of Engineers, has declared that the primary duty of Government is "justice so human beings may perfect themselves" and that it was essential for people to have "economic, cultural, and political mobility".

1340 GMT: Tonight's the Night. After the stop-start process of naming his Cabinet, President Ahmadinejad takes to the national airwaves in a broadcast just after the 9 p.m. news. He may do so with a bit of nervousness: protestors are planning to drown out the President with "Allahu Akhbars", and Ahmadinejad's previous broadcast didn't go so well. Remember his defeat at the hands of the Giant Moth? (If you missed it, here's the video.)

1150 GMT: Another Shot at Ahmadinejad. Jomhoori Eslami reports that an Iranian court has temporarily suspended former First Vice President and current Presdential Chief of Staff Esfandiari Rahim-Mashai for two months because of charges of financial misconduct.

1140 GMT: The Fight Begins? The Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, has warned that at leave five of President Ahmadinejad's choices for Ministers may not receive votes of confidence. Reuters has English-language summary of report.

1100 GMT: No Newspaper is Safe. Even the hard-line "conservative" Kayhan could be banned from newsstands. According to the Iranian Labor News Agency, the same court that banned Etemade Melli has ordered Saeed Mortazavi, the Tehran Prosecutor General, to halt the publication of Kayhan, because of the failure of its editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, to answer two court summons. Shariatmadari was taken to court by Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor Alireza Beheshti and others over the "publication of repeated lies" against the candidate.

0720 GMT: The English-language version of the Iran Parliament website has just released the names of the 18 ministers whom it says were submitted by President Ahmadinejad to the Parliament "on Wednesday". There are no surprises amongst the names, which we revealed in yesterday's updates.

0620 GMT: Reading Another Change. We reported yesterday that the new head of Iran's judiciary, Saeed Larijani, had given a clear thumb-in-the-eye to the President with the appointment of Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, the Minister of Intelligence fired by Ahmadinejad, as Iran's Prosecutor General.

Larijani is also replacing Tehran's chief prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, with Morteza Bakhtiari, the former head of Iran's prison service and former Governor of Isfahan. The timing is a bit curious, since Mortazavi was seen as the legal force behind the prosecution of post-election political detainees, and we are in the middle of the Tehran trials.

So is Larijani asserting his authority against the President? Or is the simple explanatio n that Mortazavi is moving to a post in Ahmadinejad's executive? And will there be an impact, short-term or long-term, on detentions and prosecutions?

0540 GMT: Meanwhile, a foreign-policy breakthrough for the President and his Government received surprisingly little attention. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad was in Tehran for a chat.

The cover story was that Assad came to Iran to broker the release of French national Clotilde Reiss, arrested and still awaiting trial on bail. Iranian state media preferred the image of election legitimacy, quoting Assad's greeting to Ahmadinejad, “I’ve come here today to personally convey my warm congratulations to you and the Iranian nation. I believe what happened in Iran was an important development and a great lesson to foreigners."

The overriding significance, however, is in the Associated Press headline, "Iran’s supreme leader reinforces Syria alliance." Ahmadinejad, who has been ostracised internationally since his trip to Moscow just after the election, will get a symbolic boost; however, it is unclear whether Assad was reinforcing the alliance or holding it in suspension. Before 12 June, it appeared that the Tehran-Damascus relationship was an important influence on questions from the Israel-Palestine dynamic (and the in-fighting within the Palestinian leadership), the situation in Lebanon, and the wider state of play (political and economic) between Iran and Arab States. How much of it that continues while Ahmadinejad's real rather than symbolic legitimacy is still doubted?

0500 GMT: We took a break last night to recharge our batteries and return this morning not to news but to two non-events.

The first non-event was President Ahmadinejad's to formally submit his Ministerial nominations to Parliament by yesterday's deadline. In the morning, all appeared to be almost complete: Mehr News was reporting three names remained to be confirmed, and then Tabnak said only one, the Minister of Justice. At 1:22 p.m. local time, a few hours before the deadline, the English-language site of the Parliament recapped the news.

And then nothing. There was a clue that all was not well when the President's Wednesday night national broadcast was postponed for 24 hours but, otherwise, updates stopped as the deadline came and went. (Press TV's website is still stuck on its Wednesday morning headline, "More Ahmadinejad cabinet nominees revealed".) Then, just after 10 p.m., the Farsi-language version of the Parliament website reported simply, "The letter of the President still has not come."

No one is offering the reason for the delay, but the obvious speculation is that some of the names in the list leaked by the media were unacceptable to members of Parliament. And so we enter today, ready to analyse but with no way forward yet on the questions: will Ahmadinejad make concessions and change some of his selections? Will there be any punishment for his failure to meet the deadline? Will any high-ranking "conservative" or "principlist" MPs come out publicly against the President?

However, it is the other non-event, largely missed by media, which is occupying us this morning. Yesterday the Executive Committee of the Assembly of Experts postponed the next meeting of the Assembly, which was due in about 10-12 days. Our question from yesterday's update, "Who pushed for the delay?", is still unanswered. To get an idea of the stakes involved in this answer, consider the make-up of the Executive Committee: Hashemi Rafsanjani aligned against Ahmadinejead supporters Hashemi Shahroudi (former Head of Judiciary), Mohammad Yazdi (Rafsanjani's foe within the Assembly), Ghorban Ali Dorri Najafabadi (Prosecutor General), and Ahmad Khatami (the hard-line temporary leader of Friday prayers in Tehran).

An EA correspondent offers this assessment, leading to an important but so far overlooked point:

The excuse that the Assembly meeting was delayed because of Ramadan [which starts on Saturday] appears as exactly that, an excuse and nothing more. Parliament will debate and possibly block Ahmadinejad's ministerial nominees well into Ramadan, Government will carry on business, and I am sure the trials will not go into recess for a month.

So what seems to be the case here is someone simply unwilling to have the session happen so soon. The latest letters sent by the former MPs and the Qom ulama [clerics] might have precipitated the case. They either blew the lid off Rafsanjani's machinations or persuaded the Supreme Leader to force a postponement in order to work on the Assembly members and make sure they don't spell trouble for him. At any rate, it just adds to all the shocks that have hit the orderly functioning of state institutions after June 12.

Amidst all the demonstrations, the detentions and trials, and the political machinations, the Iranian Government is effectively suspended. And the longer that situation persists, the more the question emerges: when is there a breaking point, not of showdown in the streets or in the Parliament, but in day-to-day life?

The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

NEW Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel
Text of Latest Karroubi Statement “You Will Not Force Me Into Silence”

The Latest from Iran (18 August): Which Way for the Government?

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1700 GMT: More, Much More on that Assembly of Experts Meeting. The Executive Committee's agenda appears to have been a delay in the next meeting of the Assembly, which was due to take place within the next 10-12 days, for a month because of Ramadan.
This rules out any quick intervention by the Assembly in the political crisis.

But the big question: who asked for the delay? Was it the head of the Committee, Hashemi Rafsanjani, to give himself time for his next moves? Or was it the other members --- former head of judiciary Hashemi Shahroudi, Mohammad Yazdi, Prosecutor General Ghorban Ali Dorri Najafabadi, and Ahmad Khatami --- all of whom are more supportive of President Ahmadinejad?

1605 GMT: The Executive Committee of the Assembly of Experts has met, but there are no details of the agenda or content of the discussion.

1550 GMT: There is still no news on whether the President has formally submitted his Ministerial nomination to Parliament.

1415 GMT: Report that Mohammad Reza Jalaiepour, an activist close to Mohammad Khatami, will be released from detention today. Journalist Zhila Bani Yaghoub has been released on $200,000 bail.

1405 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has written to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani to confirm that he is ready to present his evidence of the abuse of detainees.

1230 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz claims that a group of senior clerics have met the Supreme Leader and criticised the behaviour of his son, Mojtaba, but "to no avail".

1225 GMT: Did the President Miss the Deadline? The official Parliamentary News Agency has an item at 1530 local time (1100 GMT), 30 minutes before the deadline for the President to submit his Cabinet nominations. Aboutourabi Fard, the anti-Ahmadinejad Deputy Speaker, says no letter had been received.

It is now almost an hour after the deadline.

1220 GMT: The new head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, is moving briskly with appointments: Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie has become Prosecutor General, replacing Ghorban Ali Dorri-Najafabadi.

Hmmm....Would this be the same Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie fired as Minister of Intelligence by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a few weeks ago? Perhaps someone should give the President the latest news.

1130 GMT: EA source says that President Ahmadinejad's nationally-televised address, announcing his Ministerial nominations, has been postponed until tomorrow night after 9 p.m. local time.

1055 GMT: The Rah-e-Sabz website, quoting "reliable sources from Tehran", reports that Karroubi is resurrecting his plan from 2005 for the "Saba" satellite channel.

The plan was shelved four years ago after direct intervention by Ali Larijani, then chair of the National Security Council, who deemed the plan "an act against national security". Karroubi then founded the Etemade Melli newspaper to reach the masses.

Now Karroubi is threatening to get serious with the satellite channel should the regime's ban on the newspaper remain in place. Initial launch preparations are underway and "a group of film makers based inside the country" is willing to take part. The headquarters would be set up in another Mideast country (an EA correspondent suggests the United Arab Emirates), and the goal would be to air the "real news" that the state media neglects.

1045 GMT: To the Wire. Mehr News says President Ahmadinejad has still not decided on the appointments of three Ministers. Tabnak, however, says only one post (Justice) is still to be determined for the final submission to Parliament. The names of those Ministers who have been proposed, in both articles, are those posted earlier in Press TV/Fars accounts (see 0900 GMT).

0940 GMT: Saham News claims that a commission is investigating the Mosharekat and  Mojahedin political parties with a view to amending the law to prohibt contacts and exchange of views and information with foreign embassies and acceptance of foreign financial aid. An EA source confirms that this process started about six weeks ago.

0900 GMT: The President's Cabinet? Press TV, citing Fars News Agency, reveals Ministerial nominees. Among the appointments: Manouchehr Mottaki remains as Foreign Minister, Kamran Daneshjou at Science, Research and Technology, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar as Minister of Interior, Mohammad Hosseini leading Ministry of Culture and the Islamic Guidance, and Ahmad Vahidi as Minister of Defense.

0855 GMT: And Yet More Support. The Association of Iran Alumni and Union of Islamic Associations of University Students have declared that they will not abandon Karroubi and other reformist leaders.

0850 GMT: The Green Wave of Support. We reported yesterday on the "reformist" front coming out in support of Mehdi Karroubi's position on abuse of detainees. Norooz have now published the text of the statement from the Islamic Iran Participation Front.

0820 GMT: Clarification on Reformist-Clerics Meeting (0740 GMT). Another EA correspondent explains, "Javad Shahrestani is not an Ayatollah, and most probably not even a mujtahid. He runs sistani.org from Qom and is the person who brought the Internet to the holy city and transformed it into a technology hub. However, he is not high on religious credentials. The fact that people refer to him as 'Ayatollah' underlies the attempt to indicate the higher level of these figures close to the opposition."

0740 GMT: A reader lets us know that the full English summary, provided by a Twitter activist, of Ayatollah Sanei's attack on the regime (full video in separate entry) is now available on the Internet.

0730 GMT: More Opposition Moves. An EA correspondent has verified news we saw yesterday, "The reformists Abdollah Nouri, Gholamhosein Karbaschi [former Mayor of Tehran and top advisor to Karroubi], and other reformists have been having separate meetings with Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Shahrestani, the son-in-law of Ayatollah Sistani [the leading Shia cleric in Iraq]. These reformists have requested that the Shia high clergy become more involved in the current issues of the country."

0650 GMT: We asked moments ago "whether some in the Government have realised that the high-profile hard line may be counter-productive".

Hmmm, maybe not. Hojatoleslam Ali Saeedi, the Supreme Leader's liaison with the Revolutionary Guard, said yesterday, "[The] leaders of the recent unrest are still out of prison." Rounding up those leaders "could be the will of the nation and the media".

Saeedi also defended the regime's high-profile display of "confessions" by figures such as former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi:

These confessions were of utmost importance, since they shed light on the core of "the ordeal" and the rings linked to it....It was not unexpected that the foreigners would take us for the likes of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. However, it was strange that some of our compatriots were deceived by the enemies and played by their rules."

0630 GMT: Deadline day for President Ahmadinejad, as he has to present his selections for Ministerial posts to Parliament. The furour over the President's relations with the legislature, which had peaked with controversies over the 1st Vice President and Ministry of Intelligence, has quieted in the last week, but several key MPs have warned that Ahmadinejad must put forward candidates with expertise and judgement.

On another front, our Enduring America debate over the challenge of Hashemi Rafsanjani continues. After yesterday's spirited discussion between two of our correspondents and our readers, we've posted a sequel with the views of a third EA analyst. There is a clear split in our community on not only Rafsanjani's position but that of the President: some see Rafsanjani playing a clever game as Ahmadinejad loudly struggles, others see the President in the ascendancy. And, thanks to our readers, important factors such as the Revolutionary Guard, the "principlist" political bloc, and the Army have also been brought into the arena.

For me, however, the emerging story yesterday was the clear signal that the Green opposition has not gone away. While the organisation of public protest is still fragmented, many key secular and clerical figures rallied around Mehdi Karroubi's demand that the Government investigate and punish those responsible for abuse of detainees. Karroubi reiterated the protest in his statement, "You Will Not Force Me Into Silence", and Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, and the "reformist" front were among those who offered high-profile endorsements. These complemented the "hot" Internet story of the day, the video of Ayatollah Sane'i's scathing attack on the regime.

As I've said on several occasions, the regime may be keeping the opposition vibrant --- ironically --- by trying to break it with detentions, confessions, and trials. Today's planned 4th trial of post-election political prisoners has been postponed until next Tuesday, raising the question as to whether some in the Government have realised that the high-profile hard line may be counter-productive.

If this is just a pause, however (and one of the rumours yesterday was that politician Saeed Hajjarian would be amongst the defendants), we will not only be considering the President's Cabinet and Rafsanjani's future. The Green Path of Hope, which Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami joined yesterday, may be more than a symbol.

Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel

Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?
The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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Yesterday we posted an exchange between two Enduring America correspondents, Mr Smith and Mr Jones, on the current position and future prospects of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Their full and frank discussion soon took in not only Rafsanjani's fortunes but also those of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Our readers then took the analysis further with a set of thoughtful and challenging comments.

Today a third EA correspondent, Mr Johnson, joins the discussion with his views on both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. I believe that his thoughts and a further exchange with Mr Smith take us a stage farther in consideration of the present and future of the post-election crisis.

JOHNSON: I disagree with the statement of Mr. Smith regarding the body language of Rafsanjani, based upon the small clip that can be observed on the EA website. As an Iranian, I did not find any exhibition of subordinate behavior in Rafsanjani's body language. Did Mr. Smith expect arrogant stiffness and coldness? In Persian society, politeness is a deadlier weapon than an arrogant snub. A consummate politician of the old school like Rafsanjani will never ever stoop to a behaviour that will acknowledge that he has been ruffled by a non-entity like Ahmadinejad. I humbly suggest that Mr. Smith read Sir John Chardin's Travels in Persia, which beautifully demonstrates how such deadly politeness worked in the 17th century. The mechanics are still applicable today.The other side of the coin has not been considered at all. Not only has Rafsanjani not caved in, he has snubbed Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani did not participate in Ahmadinejad's inauguration ceremony, while he did come to the investment of Larijani who is a much lower-ranking official. This shows to everyone in no uncertain terms what Rafsanjani thinks of Ahmadinejad, and of course after planting such a well placed (and well-felt) insult so delicately, Rafsanjani can afford to be graciously polite to such gauche guttersnipe like Ahmadinejad.

In fact it is Ahmadinejad's behavior that supports my interpretation. If this were a ceremony depicting the humilation of Rafsanjani, based upon Ahmadinejad's innate pettiness, I would be sure that he would stay through the whole ceremony savouring the discomfiture of his enemy and his own triumph. The fact that Ahmadinejad came in quickly and left quickly before Rafsanjani's talk points to the fact that he was uncomfortable during the ceremony and that he left before Rafsanjani's speech as a retaliation.

Another issue that must be considered is that Rafsanjani is not looking for reform. Even the freedom of prisoners is not his primary goal. (It can be argued that some of the reformers in prison have been a thorn in his side as much as Ahmadinejad's.) Equating the reform movement with Rafsanjani's politics is a grave mistake; there may be some compatibilities between the two but they are separate issues. Personally, I think that Rafsanjani has been attempting (with some success) to project the image that he is way above the fray and is not getting involved in the political struggle; however, if the establishment is being eroded he will step in, and he will takes pains to couch his disagreements with Ahmadinejad in terms of the survival of the system.

Rafsanjani's reaction to Karroubi's letter again fits this model of an impartial high boss directing the underlings to right a wrong. Possibly his idea is to show to all the powers to be that he is very much the supreme leader. A supreme leader unlike Khamenei who, with his blatant partisanship of Ahmadinejad, has effectively turned the office into a jokeby condoning behavior that absolutely unacceptable.

Mr. Smith also dismisses institutions such as the Assembly of Experts and the opinions of the Grand Ayatollahs. I think that this is a mistake. The opinions of these individuals and others can carry weight in all branches of government, leading to fault-lines and fractures throughout the Iranian political landscape and to a galvanizing of the protest movement. In fact I think that it is these fractures that have prevented the Ahmadinejad and Khamenei factions from having sufficient power to neutralize the opposition. These fractures have become even deeper when one considers the modus operandi of Ahmadinejad: namely, his extreme cronyism in chosing his high level officials (many of whom lack basic credentials for the job), and his extreme reluctance to share power. Both of these issues have led even conservative politicians to worry for their survival: firstly, because they know that, if they do not belong to Ahamdinejad's close circle, they will not be given a political role to play, and secondly, because the inherent incompetence of the Ahmadinejad government is bound to lead the country to ruin. I think that the "carting off of the Assembly of Experts" may lead to even greater fractures that would blow up in the face of any potential "transportation agency".

Mr. Smith also is eloquent about Rafsanjani being lambasted by Ahmadinejad. I think that Mr. Rafsanjani's stock amongst the Iranian public may have increased by these attacks.
Finally, I have an issue with Mr Smith's statement: "However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong". Ahmadinejad is dealing with a potentially intractable Parliament will make trouble for the confidence votes of his Cabinet, he is dealing with a country that is operating at a much lower level of productivity than last year (e.g. the price of food stuffs have risen 50% in the last month, subsidies in foodstuffs have been cut off, etc.); social unrest has been a cause for so much concern that the idea of closing down schools and universities for the fall semester has been floated; Clinton and other Western leaders have stated that "they have no idea who is in charge in Iran", leaving relations in limbo; the dramatic lowering of Iranian prestige in the Muslim world has been caused by the reaction of the Iranian government towards the persecution of Chinese Muslims and huge coverage by Arab media of the allegations of sexual prison torture that make Abu Ghraib sound like the Holiday Inn; and the list goes on.

Mr. SMITH responds:

With all due respect for Mr Johnson, I really think he is greatly underrating Ahmadinejad and exaggerating the extent of Rafsanjani's actions. He should be guarded in his dismissal of Ahmadinejad as someone who has essentially dug his own grave. "Chronic problems" have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's first four years in office, long before the June elections, yet he still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a "joke" and have Khamenei stretch far to support him.

No mention is made of the repeated humiliations Rafsanjani has faced ever since Ahmadinejad brought him up in the TV debate with Mousavi. Quite frankly, it would be an amazing snubbing strategy, by all standards, after the President had leveled his charges of corruption.

Politeness and body language tell it all in Iran, as Mr Johnson rightfully states. For this very reason, Ahmadinejad stepping up on the podium, railing against Rafsanjani and getting off (and away with) it once again --- the ample photo galleries on Iranian news agencies do not show him as "uncomfortable" at all ---- shows the extent of his capacity to overrule etiquette and time-honoured cultural traditions. Once again, that he has done so without facing significant retaliation is telling.

Regarding Rafsanjani's stock within people at large, I hope Mr Johnson's definition of people is not restricted to the Green Wave. My own findings in Tehran before the election pointed to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his "thief" attacks in the Mousavi TV debate. To really generate support amongst the people, Rafsanjani should have inserted continuity to his post-electoral strategy, in the same way Karroubi and Mousavi have done.

As for the Assembly of Experts, Unless they pull off a major stunt in the next meeting, which no one I know believes they will, they will remain irrelevant in the current power struggle. They have been a spent force in all but one key event, the election of Khamenei. The Grand Ayatollahs carry weight, I don't deny that, but it would have been off topic to discuss them in the contours of my discussion with Mr Smith.

I agree with Mr Johnson's points on the perceptions Rafsanjani has of his own role within the system. The issue is whether he can carry these in practice. I have severe doubts.

Mr. JOHNSON replies:

Mr. Smith's views on the flaws and vulnerabilities of Rafsanjani are well-taken and deserve to be considered thoroughly in any analysis of the current situation and political power struggle in Iran. However, I do believe that his viewpoint colours his analysis and leads to implications with which I disagree.

Mr. Smith says "'chronic problems' have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's four years in office, long before the June elections, yet Mr Johnson still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a 'joke' and have Khamenei stretch far to support him". It is Mr. Smith's prerogative to dismiss all problems as merely "leitmotifs" sung by a choir of protest. I am not ashamed to plagiarise a good phrase, so I will take Mr. Smith's colourful Wagnerian analogy further. A high enough cacaphonous frequency of "effective leitmotifs" leads to the composition of "Gotterdammerung", a prospect that I am sure many Iranian politicians across the spectrum are considering very seriously.

I also think that Mr. Smith is placing way too much emphasis upon Ahmadinejad's slights and insults to Mr. Rafsanjani. In experimental science, every instrumental measurement has a signal and a noise. The signal is what is measured when a phenomenon occurs, and noise is the baseline that the instrument measures in the absence of the phenomenon. The issue with quantifying Ahmadinejad's statements is that the language with which he addresses any opponent (real or perceived) involves a heady mixture of snide comments, condescension, arrogance, and maybe an accusation or two thrown in for good measure. This lack of nuance makes it very difficult to assign a value scale to the insults, so it is a challenge to discriminate signal from the noise.

I also think that it should be pointed out that, during the Larijani ceremonies, insults were handed out like candy. If according to Mr. Smith, Ahmadinejad felt that he could insult Rafsanjani with impunity by walking out before his talk, Mr Nateq-Nouri also felt the same way about Ahmadinejad and insulted the President by walking out during his speech. Somehow the frequency of these insults diminishes their effect.

Mr. Smith gently implies that I may be biased by only considering the Green Wave as people. I have tried hard not to do so; however, I thank him for pointing out a potential pitfall. He then demonstrates his point ,using "his findings in Tehran before the election pointing to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his 'thief' attacks in the Mousavi TV debate." May I return the compliment by humbly suggesting that he should be much more critical about the significance of the results of his findings, avoiding a major error that many journalists make. This last year has been a year of elections and polls, and I took the opportunity to consult with many statisticians and sociologists about polling data. The resounding response from these experts was that the significance of the results of most polls is lost when they are subjected to rigorous statistical analysis.

I most emphatically do not intend to cast any aspersions upon the integrity of the findings of Mr. Smith nor his methodology for data collection. I just want to state that it is highly probable that once his findings are analysed rigorously and correctly via statistical methods, they will lose (just like any other poll) any meaningful significance, making it impossible to generalise these findings to the bulk of the population.

The Latest from Iran (18 August): Which Way for the Government?

NEW Text of Latest Karroubi Statement “You Will Not Force Me Into Silence”
NEW Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?
The Latest from Iran (17 August): Waiting for the Next Manoeuvre

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2010 GMT: Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, a critic of the Government throughout the post-election crisis, has called on the judiciary to take the lead in stopping the calamity that has befallen Iran.

1850 GMT: Responding to a reader's question, "Did Etemade Melli newspaper publish today?" No, and according to our sources, it is unlikely to appear for some time.

1610 GMT: Tehran's chief prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi has announced that the fourth Tehran trial has been postponed from tomorrow until next Tuesday to allow defendants' lawyers more time for preparation.

1415 GMT: Forward with the Green Path of Hope. Chief Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti has said, "The central council of the Green Path of Hope will be a small group of five to six, including Mr. Khatami and Mr. Karroubi." Beheshti He added that the party would have a "counselling board consisting of 30 to 40 members" and "monitoring committees".

1340 GMT: Reuters has now published a summary of the Mousavi letter of support for Karroubi (see 1020 GMT): "[The authorities] asked those who were abused and raped in prisons, to present four witnesses [to prove their claim]....Those who committed the crimes were the establishments' agents."

Earth News offers more extracts:

"Those who have committed these crimes are agents of the regime....Does the rulership have no interest in knowing what these agents are doing to the people?....
Your letter on ugly treatments of prisoners have made the pro-government dailies nervous. This indicates that there might even be more horrible abuses of which we are not yet aware....

Do you [in the regime] also want four witnesses to wash off the sin from your hands?...It is expected from the Islamic clergy to fulfil their spiritual duty and only to be afraid of God and not of liars and rapists.

1300 GMT: Reformist groups have also announced their full support for Mehdi Karroubi.

1020 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi has written a letter of support to Mehdi Karroubi over Karroubi's claim of the abuse of detainees, thanking him and calling on others to share his "courage and commitment".

0945 GMT: The report of the arrest of an employee of the Italian Embassy in Tehran now appears to be an incorrect rumour spread by an Iranian blogger. The Italian Foreign Ministry has denied the story.

0930 GMT: The Iranian Labor News Agency has provided a timeline and summary of yesterday's ceremony installing Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary (our correspondent's comment: "Not sure if it's good for him behaving in this way, but Ahmadinejad is treating Rafsanjani like a has-been"):

President Ahmadinejad entered the hall 68 minutes late for the ceremony, scheduled to start at 10 a.m. Police chief Radan, Deputy Majlis Speaker Abotourabi Fard, former IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] head Rahim Safavi, Guardian Council head Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Mohsen Rezaei, and others were in their seats at 9:30. Jannati did not move towards them or Rafsanjani and "sat alone" for a while.

Head of judiciary Hashemi Shahroudi, Sadegh Larijani, the Supreme Leader's Chief of Staff Mohammad Golpaygani, and Hashemi entered the room together at around 10 a.m. Salavats were shouted in direction of Rafsanjani.

Ali Larijani walked in 20 minutess after the start of the ceremony

Sadegh's passage on need to prosecute those who have committed violence (reported on Enduring America yesterday) was "met with congratulatory remarks" by those present in the hall.

Ahmadinejad talked immediately after Sadegh and spoke of the necessity to bring "the holders of power and wealth" to justice, referring to Sadegh's previous remarks (see 0615 GMT).

Ahmadinejad left the room immediately after the end of his speech and did not wait for Rafsanjani's. Rafsanjani did not dwell at all on Ahmadinejad's remarks in his own comments. However, ILNA reiterates that Rafsanjani treated Ahmadinejad with visible respect upon the latter's entry into the hall.

Ali Larijani referred to his brother as "Agha Sadegh" in his speech and stated: "We are all offspring of the seminary and the marjayyat [clerics] who have strayed into the path of government service." His remark were met with laughter.

After the end of the ceremony, lobbying took place between various parties to try to patch up the acrimony between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad.

0850 GMT: Italian media report that an employee of the Italian Embassy in Tehran has been arrested. Iranian reports call the detainee a blogger who has supplied information to foreign media.

The employee's nationality is not known.

0825 GMT: There are indications that the legal file against the Minister of Industry, Ali Akbar Mehrabian, may be "nullified". Mehrabian was convicted last month of taking credit for the invention of "an earthquake safe room" by another scientist.

On Sunday, President Ahmadinejad proposed that Mehrabian retain his post in the new Cabinet.

0820 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz reports, from an "informed source", that Dr.Zabih, the head of the organisation of clerics supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi, and his son have been arrested.

0810 GMT: We've just posted an exchange between two of my colleagues which I think is one of the most important analyses of the post-election situation in Iran: "Is Hashemi Rafsanjani a Spent Force?"

0720 GMT:The head of the special Parliamentary committee on national security, Parviz Sorouri, has asked Mehdi Karroubi to present his evidence of sexual abuse of prisoners to the committee and Parliament. The request is a reversal, as the committee had initially declared that there was no basis for the allegations.

Saham News also reports that the committee will investigate conditions in Evin Prison today and will visit other detention centres, speaking with detainees. Those centres include "unofficial" sites such as Shapour, Eshratabad, and Pasargad.

0658 GMT: Ayatollah Sane'i's scathing attack on the regime, which was made in a speech on 12 August but emerged yesterday in a five-part video (posted on Enduring America in a separate entry), has stung the Government. Both Iran News and Raja News have called the Ayatollah a "shameless" "sinner" and "adulterer" and asked that he be given 80 lashes.

0655 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi's website, Ghalam News, is still down several days after apparently being hacked.

0640 GMT: Hossein Ali Arab, a professor in the School of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Tehran, and Ali Asghar Khodayari, a professor in mineral sciences and former Deputy Chancellor, have been released after two months in detention in Evin Prison.

0630 GMT: So is the new head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, going to be on the front line of the power struggle? Both Jomhoori Eslami and Tabnak are reporting that Larijani is going to remove Tehran's chief prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi.

Mortazavi is considered a member of President Ahmadinejad's camp, who lobbied strongly against Larijani's appointment by the Supreme Leader. That conflict in turn is part of the wider, important struggle for control of the judiciary, which we analysed on Sunday.

0615 GMT: 36 hours to go before the deadline for President Ahmadinejad's submission of his Cabinet choices to Parliament, and there is a good deal of chatter about the possible moves and conflicts.

The President, however, did take time out yesterday for the inauguration of Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary. While the initial images and chatter were about Ahmadinejad's greeting of rival Hashemi Rafsanjani, a later headline offers a different perspective: "If the power-holders and the wealthy are taken to court, then there would be no place left for those who hold lower ranks to commit any wrongdoings."

Since presumably the President isn't suggesting that he should be the "power-holder" arrested, to whom is he referring? Surely it couldn't be "the [very] wealthy" Rafsanjani, despite Ahmadinejad's election charges of corruption against his predecessor?

Iran Debate: Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?

Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel
The Latest from Iran (18 August): Which Way for the Government?

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Throughout yesterday, there was a fascinating (and, I think, important) debate between two of Enduring America's specialists on Iran, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones, about the political fortunes of Hashemi Rafsanjani. The discussion not only considers whether the former President retains a significant influence over the future of the Islamic Republic but also looks at the positions of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Feedback from readers would be welcome, as I believe this may be one of the defining contexts for the outcome of this post-election crisis:

SMITH: I think that Rafsanjani has been giving up his "Godfather" role within the Green movement progressively. If you add up his non-reply to [Mehdi] Karroubi's letter [on abuse of detainees], his embarassing retreat from Friday prayers, and today [appearing with President Ahmadinejad], you get the impression of someone who is deeply distressed but does not feel secure enough to embark on a major confrontation with the state power. It is unnerving in the sense that, as the Mehr photos show [of the Rafsanjani-Ahmadinejad encounter], it is actually Rafsanjani that is adopting a body language geared towards subordination, and not the other way round. The gesture is the single most important "frame" to have come out of elite circles in Iran afte the shoulder kiss of Ahmadinejad to the Supreme Leader during his inauguration.

JONES: But then again, what did Rafsanjani have to gain from replying to Karroubi's letter? That's a hot potato that even [Mir Hossein] Mousavi is wary of handling. I do agree that Rafsanjani is deeply distressed (something his brother made clear), but I'm not sure his "Godfather" role was anything but a superficial and transitory collision of interests. Now Rafsanjani is unsure how his interests are best served and is thus "pausing". This also coincided with the emergence of the Majlis [Parliament]hmin challenging Ahmadinejad, a dynamic in which Rafsanjani was less involved.

I think when he does get around to speaking at Friday Prayers, we will have a much better understanding of his peace of mind and tactical re-appraisal.

SMITH: Rafsanjani's speech on July 17 was quite genuine, as was the distress he vented out through his brother on the Iranian Labor News Agency. But he has realised that Khamenei has gone for brute force and that it's better for himself and his family to back down. So my gut feeling is that there is more than transitory interests here, but he is by now emerging as a spent force. The one and last stand he could/might make is the next Assembly of Experts meeting, whenever that will take place; however, despite all this prodding from former MPs, Grand Ayatollahs, etc. that we have been seeing in the form of all these anonymous letters calling for Khamenei's head, I doubt we shall see Rafsanjani substantiating these.

A passing joke among myself and my Iranian contacts is that the Assembly of Experts communique dismissing Khamenei would not even reach the website of the Assembly before all those septuagenarians are carted away.

JONES: I agree that this pressure will have a lasting legacy. In effect, I think the parameters of Iranian political culture, memory and participation have been extended. In the short term, the regime equates compromise with weakness. In the longer term, such will be the fear of bringing millions of Iranians onto the streets that compromise will be equated with stability (perhaps even survival).

I can think of very few popular movements who have mobilised equivalent support and not gone on to extract or induce significant concessions or changes in the long term.

I guess the extent to which we see Rafsanjani as a spent force depends on our expectations of what he wanted to achieve and how realistic it was he could achieve it. The removal of Ahmadinejad? I don't think was achievable, and Rafsanjani eventually understood this. So, he settled for the effective neutering of Ahmadinejad's 2nd administration, which I think will happen. Khamenei was, in my view, equally never going to be removed. But Rafsanjani ultimately challenged him and is still standing- that's radical in itself. The question is, what has the last 2-3 months cost him? Has it cost Khamenei more or less?

SMITH: I would urge caution on Rafsanjani's capability of neutering Ahmadinejad's administration, but I agree that much has changed in the Iranian political landscape for good in the past two months, regardless of any future progress by the Green movement. However, I am sure that Khamenei has factored in some "cost" or "loss" when agreeing to go by with the hardliners, although I can't say whether he was really ready for this sort of reaction from the people.

As for Rafsanjani, well, he has paid a high price all along. He was lambasted by Ahmadinejad in the debates, has had people extremely close to him such as [Mohammad] Atrianfar, [Mohammad] Qoochani and others thrown into jail and paraded before TV long after his Friday prayer plea for their release, was forced to backtrack when he withdrew from the last Friday prayers [14 August], and today, according to one of the main columnists of Etemade Melli, he "bowed before Ahmadinejad like a servant does in front of his master". So, all in all, I have to stake my claim that he has not emerged in a very good posiition overall, although he has managed to cling on to some of his old powers and be somewhat "radical". But, as Iranian politics have thought us, its better to wait and see, starting from the Assembly of Experts meeting!

JONES: Do you think there was anything Rafsanjani could have done differently? This may be a curious case where none of the current "heavyweights" of the system have come off well, least of all Ahmadinejad (and Khamenei).

Raf's fortunes have ebbed and flowed: he was far more humilated by his loss to Ahmadinejad in 2005 than by the slurs in the 2009 debate. Fact remains, Rafsanjani is still more powerful than Ahmadinejad. The reason being that Ahmadinejad has never challenged the Supreme Leader and was effectively told to shut up and keep out of sight (something Khamenei could not do to Rafsanjani).

I don't think Rafsanjani expected those detained to be released; he wanted it on record that he had called for it. I also think that the mutterings about Rafsanjani are the continuation of old complaints, but the rumblings about Khamenei's suitability as Supreme Leader are something that have never ever come out before, even if they were felt privately by many). As you say, however, we will have to wait and see.

SMITH: I am still unsure of the real extent of Rafsanjani's power. On paper, he is as powerful as it gets, more so given that he survived an attempt to remove him from the leadership of the Assembly of Experts in February, meaning that he could technically count on a majority there.

As for his fortun, you should take the pre-electoral slurs and post-electoral moves as one big package. Not to forget the total sidelining of his concerns, as stated in the letter and three-hour meeting he had with Khamenei right before the elections. A close Rafsanjain associate boasted about the "positive signals" emerging from that meeting to several foreign diplomats, so you can appreciate the sort of "con" Khamenei played on his old associate.

The slurs against Rafsanjani were conducive, according to my own field work and those of others in Tehran before the elections, to a rise of votes for Ahmadinejad, while I will wait for the Assembly of Experts meeting to express my thoughts on his post electoral performance. However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong. True, he is rebuked from all quarters, including the Supreme Leader, every now and then, but he has been remarkably successful in exerting his own viewpoints on the long-term evolution of many affairs of state, including the nuclear file, relations with the West, and the economy. He has driven the economy to shambles yet nobody has really managed to serious "punish" him for that, which is quite astonishing in its own right.