The Latest from Iran (31 August): The Debate over the Cabinet

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NEW Iran Debate: How Weak (or Strong) is Ahmadinejad?
The Latest from Iran (30 August): Parliament Discusses the Cabinet

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1840 GMT: The National Iranian American Council has picked up on another extract from the meeting between a Parliamentary special committee on detainees and the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani (see 1410 GMT):

Ayatollah Larijani alluded to the necessity to immediately free some prisoners and punish the agents of the [offenses] at Kahrizak and the dormitories, and that judgments or indictments relating to the post-election events must be accurately based on judicial regulations.

Reading this in conjunction with the news of the release of high-profile detainees, albeit on bail (1650 GMT), NIAC concludes provocatively, "It remains to be seen if Larijani plans to engage in a full-blown offensive against the actions of the IRGC and the Shahroudi-era Judiciary, or if these are token attempts to restore legitimacy in the Islamic judiciary."

1650 GMT: University Chancellor Released. Mohammad Zabihi, whom we reported (1450 GMT) had been in detention for almost two weeks, has been released on bail, although his son is still in prison.

Hamzeh Ghalebi, head of the youth branch of Mousavi’s campaign, has also been released after more than 70 days ago in detention. He was pressed to "confession" and was at one of the Tehran trials, although there were no charges against him in the indictment.

1510 GMT: Amidst the attention to the Parliamentary debate, Fars News hasn't forgotten the real enemies of the State: it is making not-too-subtle insinutations about an alleged trip by Hashemi Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi, to London.

1505 GMT: Surprisingly little on today's Parliamentary deliberations over the Cabinet nominees. So far the focus is on the diffculty faced by Sussan Kesharvarz in becoming Minister of Education.

1450 GMT: I wonder if the Supreme Leader's injunction to academics last night to ensure they prepared students for "soft war" covered this case? The chancellor of Tarbiet Modares University in Qom is reported to have been in detention for almost two weeks.

1430 GMT: The Reform Front Coordination Council has stated its deep sorrow and regret regarding post-election events and emphasised that oppression and crimes committed in the name of “preventing a velvet revolution” or “cutting foreign influence” have damaged the dignity and legitimacy of the Iranian regime.

1410 GMT: An Investigation? Kazzem Jalali, a member of the special Parliament committee studying the conditions of post-election detainees, has said, "The committee had a 1 1/2-hour-long meeting with [head of judiciary] Ayatollah [Sadegh] Larijani and briefed him about the committee's formation process, the studies carried out so far as well as the committee's visits [to detention centers]."

Jalali quoted Larijani as saying, "Those in charge of the post-election incidents should be treated in a decisive, legal and judicial manner. They actually damaged the ruling system's reputation."

On Saturday, Sadegh Larijani named his own panel to investigate allegations of abuse. Members are Iran's Prosecutor General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni Ejeii, Judiciary First Deputy Chief Ebrahim Raeesi and Judiciary advisor Ali Khalafi.

1350 GMT: A Most Symbolic Case. Tehran Bureau, drawing from Mehr News Agency's quoting of an "informed source", reports that the death of Mohsen Ruholamini, a graduate student detained in Kahrizak and then Evin Prisons, "was caused by physical stress, conditions of imprisonment, repeated blows and harsh physical treatment”.

The case has had huge political signficance, as Ruholamini was the son of Abdolhossein Ruholamini, the campaign manager of Presidential candidate Mohsen Rezaei. News of the death galvanized "conservative" and "principlist" opposition to President Ahmadinejad's handling of the post-election crisis.

1345 GMT: The move of Saeed Mortazavi from Tehran Chief Prosecutor to Iran's Deputy Prosecutor General is an illustration of how complex the political situation, and its connections with legal matters, has become and how easy it is to jump to misleading conclusions. We've considered this in a separate analysis.

1300 GMT: A Convergence on "Soft Power"? Heydar Moslehi, the nominee for Minister of Intelligence, has told Parliament that a new security will include a strategy "to improve the intelligence capacity to confront the enemies' soft war."

The language is striking in its similarity to the Supreme Leader's speech to academics yesterday, so does this --- after the fight last month over the sacking of Minister of Intelligence Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie --- symbolise a reconcilation of approach between Ayatollah Khamenei and the President?

Earlier, reformist MP Jamshid Ansari said the Intelligence Ministry should "not be affiliated to one branch of power, just implementing the president's instructions". He added that Moslehi, a former member of the Revolutionary Guard, "does not have a minimum of experience of intelligence work and therefore his presence in this complicated system would not be fruitful".

1015 GMT: Battle Begins. Parleman News is featuring the challenge by reformist MP Jamshid Ansari to the nomination of Heydar Moslehi as Minister of Intelligence. Meanwhile, "conservative" MP Ahmad Tavakoli has continued his assault against President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy.

0915 GMT: The Clerical Challenge. This front of the post-election battle has been quieter during Ramadan, but there are two reminders that the contest is not over. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's latest fatwa declared that the legitimacy of a government is validated through people’s free choice; without that choice, it will have neither legitimacy nor acceptance. He stated, presumably as a slap at the Supreme Leader, that there is no instance in history where a Shi’a Imam has used force to gain power or govern.

A statement from Grand Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani also asserted that people’s choice gives legitimacy to the establishment; if the majority of people wish to protest peacefully, it is the duty of the Minister of the Interior to issue the permit. He also aimed, less subtly, at Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, saying that the Assembly of Experts has the final word on the activities of the Supreme Leader.

0830 GMT: Mediawatch. Credit to Michael Slackman of The New York Times, who has raised his game in recent articles. This morning's report covers both the announcement of Sadegh Larijani, the head of judiciary, that a panel would investigate post-election unrest and the debate in Parliament over the President's Cabinet.

Meanwhile, CNN still hasn't noticed the Parliamentary discussions.

0825 GMT: The Green movement website Mowj-e-Sabz, down last night, is back up with front-page stories including a pronouncement by Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri against the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader and Mehdi Karroubi's declaration that the movement will march on Qods Day, 18 September.

0745 GMT: Looks like there will be some leftover scrapping from yesterday before getting to the votes on the individual Ministers. Reformist members of Parliament have raised President Ahmadinejad's appearance with bodyguards, since it is illegal to carry weapons inside the Majlis chamber.

0710 GMT: This, however, was the most ominous comment in the Supreme Leader's address: "All those who have been the victims of the post-election events must know that the establishment has no intention of making concessions. Just as those individuals who openly confront the establishment are legally and justly dealt with, legal and just punishment will also be mete out to the perpetrators of crimes and atrocities."

Four days after saying that Government official who committed post-election abuses would be held to account, has Khamenei moved back toward his President's line of focusing on the punishment of opposition leaders?

0700 GMT: The Supreme Leader gave a lengthy speech to heads of universities and research centres last night.

Most of the address was devoted to thoughts on research and scientific matters, but Ayatollah Khamenei offered headline comments on the post-election situation, "Students are the young officers fighting on this front who with their thoughts, actions and perceptions are present in the scene and who test the scene and act within its framework but university professors are the commanders of this soft confrontation."

Khamenei explained:

The recent issues have placed the country in front of a determining political test. However, the establishment of the Islamic Republic given its high capabilities was able to overcome the situation....Freedom in the Islamic establishment is a true issue defined within an Islamic framework and the Islamic Republic will never consent to or accept the false freedom sought by the West.

0645 GMT: Once more back to the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, where discussion begins on individual Ministers proposed by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The President had a rough time yesterday, as leading MPs criticised his Administration, lack of policies, and mismanagement. He even suffered ridicule, with jokes from the Speaker, Ali Larijani, and the shouts of "Peach! Peach!" over his professed admiration for his former Minister of Health ("a peach you would like to eat").

Little of that mattered, however, as Parliament was unlikely to deny general support to the Government. The fun starts today, with up to 7 of Ahmadinejad's 21 Ministerial choices in possible trouble. Ten nominees will present themselves to the Majlis today.

UPDATED Iran Debate: How Weak (or Strong) is Ahmadinejad?

The Latest from Iran (30 August): Parliament Discusses the Cabinet

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UPDATED 31 August, 0725 GMT: Enduring America's Chris Emery, formerly known as "Mr Jones", has now made his contribution to what is becoming, I think, one of the most important discussions in the post-election crisis --- see below. Mr Smith has offered a reply.

UPDATED 1145 GMT: Mr Smith has made another intervention in the debate.
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Over the weekend, after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tough talking at Friday prayers in Tehran and as he was submitting his Cabinet choices to Parliament, we have been debating the President's position and future prospects. EA's Mr Smith and Mr Johnson are joined by Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau, whose column sparked the discussion, and Fintan Dunne.

SAHIMI: ....Such fabrications [like those in his Friday speech] are of course meant to present Ahmadinejad as a confident leader. But, in reality, he is weaker and more isolated than ever. True, the right wing is in control, but that control has been achieved first and foremost by the support of the high command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Otherwise, the base of support for Ahmadinejad among the population is extremely narrow, limited to at most 15% of the population.

At the same time,...glaring fissures which have emerged within the conservative and reactionary camp, which poses a growing threat to Iran’s political stability. Even Ayatollah Khamenei and the hardliners around him are well aware of the danger, which explains why they have been gradually retreating over the past few weeks.

First, they acknowledged some of the crimes that have taken place in the detention centers.

Second, they have retreated from linking the reformist leaders with foreign powers, notwithstanding Ahmadinejad’s tired accusations during Friday Prayers.

Third, Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, the former judiciary chief, as a member to the powerful Guardian Council, in preparation for the departure of Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the ultra-conservative secretary-general of the Council, and an ardent supporter of Ahmadinejad. At least compared to Jannati, Shahroudi is a relative moderate.

Fourth, Ahmadinejad’s appointment of Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai as the First Vice President was blocked. Mashai was even barred for two months from holding any governmental position, another tactic to put Ahmadinejad under control.

Fifth, many of the reformists and their supporters, if not their main leaders, have been released from detention.

Sixth, behind-the-scene efforts continue to reach some sort of reconciliation between the reformists and the conservative camp. So far these have failed because the main demand of the reformists, holding a new election, has been rejected.

Seventh, Saeed Mortazavi, the notorious Tehran Prosecutor General and the man implicated in many crimes was sacked.

At the same time, Iran’s uranium enrichment program has stagnated, either by design, or due to technical difficulties, or because of a lack of raw materials (yellow cake) needed for uranium enrichment. Iran has also become more flexible with the International Atomic Energy Agency, allowing more visits to its nuclear sites.....

All are signs of a very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahead, not to mention his complete lack of legitimacy in the eyes of a large majority of Iranian people, even among those who may have supported him before the election.

Even more damaging for Ahmadnejad is that his chief clerical patron, Ayatollah Khamenei, has himself been greatly weakened. The Ayatollah has been openly challenged and strongly criticized by many important clerics. Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the most important Shiite cleric in Iran, openly called him unqualified and his reign illegitimate. Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed himself to be reduced to the leader of one faction in the conservative camp by openly and unabashedly supporting Ahmadinejad. He can no longer pretend that he is above the political fray.

SMITH: [The Tehran Bureau article] lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line: Ahmadinejad is weak, is in trouble, is a lame duck already, etc.

While of course all of us wish that this was the case, the reality appears quite different, as we have seen no real thrust to wrestle him out of office. The Supreme Leader has only rebuked him frontally during the [former First Vice President] Mashai affair and he still has the rather remarkable opportunity of talking from official platforms such as Friday Prayers, saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed.

Granted, he has the same amount, or more, difficulties than any executive leader in the world would have for forming a government, but I would be very cautious in calling Ahmadinejad a has-been and that days may be counted down to his demise. Sadly, I doubt this scenario will happen anytime soon.

We shouldn’t forget that the Supreme Leader, conservative critics of AN like the Larijanis, Ahmad Tavakoli (who happens to be the Larijanis’ cousin), and more have essentially agreed to accept the outcome of the Presidential election as announced by the Interior ministry. Hence, they are simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government, more than mounting a challenge that is really geared towards removing Ahmadinejad from power.

DUNNE: Muhammad Sahimi was too dismissive in describing of Ahmadinejad as "isolated and delusional", and he erred in reducing the regime to the person of the president.

But he was correct to describe Ahmadinejad as "weak". Professor Sahimi accurately catalogs the ongoing obstruction of the hardliners and the very public political fractures. Furthermore he shows the regime is now tellingly reliant on a narrow base of IRGC appointees to fill government posts.

Ahmadinejad/IRGC's core 'hard' support is as low as 12%, with a 'softer' support extending to up to 20% of the population. Because of this, the disputed president's public pronouncements are reductionist and defensive --aimed at his own supporters and the ill-informed. By contrast, most other voices in Iranian politics are addressing the remaining 80%+ of the population.

Despite their hard-line rhetoric, Ahmadinejad/IRGC are unable to crush the reformers. It is going to be far harder to violently suppress any mass public protests in the weeks ahead. And there is a dire political problem looming for this one-legged regime: it's the economy, stupid!

Even a government of national unity would be hard-pressed to dig the Iranian economy out of the mire against the backdrop of deteriorating global finances. A lame duck Ahmadinejad government comprising an ineffectual clique will certainly fail to turn things around. One shudders to contemplate the unspoken financial state of Iran. Currency problems and capital flight are doubtless significant.

As the weeks pass, the economy will join the stolen election as the twin key political issues for the populace. Imagine an opposition rally protesting the economic straits of the people as well as the stolen election. Imagine the regime trying to suppress such a rally.

That the reformers are not already in prison is a victory in itself. Now, a death by a thousand cuts threatens the Iranian regime. That reality explains the government's determined effort to halt such a slow slide by means of show trials --which have backfired.

The reformists could compromise by accepting the current status quo, on condition of substantive electoral reform overseen by a parliamentary process. But from their perspective it might be best to simply allow this regime to stew in their own economic juice until well roasted.

JOHNSON: I find Mr. Smith's assertion that Professor Sahimi's article "lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line" to be both inaccurate (many of Sahimi's statements have been have also been reported here in Enduring America as well as other news-sites), and rather unfair.

Mr. Smith states that there is no thrust to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office. This statement only makes sense if Mr. Smith considers the reformist movement to be irrelevant. I think that there has been a major effort to wrestle Ahmadinejad out of office; and that effort is still going on. The fact that Ahmadinejad has not been able to imprison and/or neutralize the ringleaders of this effort (Khatami, Mousavi and Karroubi), even though he has explicitly demanded it in public, demonstrates the limitations that exist to his power.

Ahmadinejad's pre-Friday prayers speach seems to have a lot of significance for Mr. Smith. I think that it is rather strange that a strong and powerful and confident president of the Islamic Republic of Iran must choose the mid- to low-profile pre-Friday prayers speech, since many of the faithful participating in Friday prayers either eschew or arrive near the end of the speech, to address the country instead of using IRIB [state television]. Did IRIB not give Ahmadinejad broadcasting time? If so, what kind of a strong President is denied this?

Mr. Smith considers the fact that Ahmadnejad is "saying things quite different from what the Supreme Leader says, and still walking out relatively unscathed" as evidence for Ahmadinejad's power. I think this is more a statement of Khamenei's weakness than Ahmadinejad's strength. I think the replacement of [Tehran chief prosecutor] Mortazavi is the real litmus test. If Mortazavi's successor puts an end to the trials and somehow addresses the issues of torture and the secret burials, a tangible limitation of the President's power has been put in place. This would be the first step taken to abort Ahmadinejad's "velvet coup".

Mr. Smith also takes Ahmadinejad's parliamentary troubles lightly. I agree that conservative parliamentarians are "simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government". However I think that the rumblings and confrontations demonstrated by a sizable fraction of conservative MPs with regards to the President demonstrate that these MPs are convinced that: firstly, Ahmadinejad has no intention of giving them any kudoes and power; secondly, Ahmadinejad's plan may have also intended to weaken their power as well as that of the reformists; and thirdly, they may think that all the recent scandals (torture, unmarked graves, etc.) has turned Ahmadinejad into a political hot potato that must be dropped as soon as possibly.

The outcome of the presidential election was accepted by the conservatives in June. Not all of them are necessarily bound to continue to accept that now, especially if rejecting Ahmadinejad is equivalent to their political survival. The upcoming vow of confidence will be a demonstration of how the conservatives feel towards Ahmadinejad's policies.

SMITH: My assertions regarding Ahmadinejad were not so much related to his political "power", rather to his chances of political survival.

I don't deny that he is weak, has severe issues in forming his government, and is prey to all sorts of critics, both conservative and reformist. My considerations are focused, however, on whether Ahmadinejad will survive the storm in the short term and be able to stay in his place. I still believe he will, because the conservatives have too much to lose in terms of legitimacy after substantially endorsing the election results in June. No one, including the Larijanis, has contested the latter yet, and this is quite important in my view.

This is not to deny that friction between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei exists, but again not at boiling point level. Lastly, Ahmadinejad's appearing at Friday prayers was completely to be expected, as it is Government Week in Iran right now, and nearly all Presidents have appeared on the podium on this occasion.

EMERY: I wouldn't necessarily connect all the concessions detailed by Sahimi and Mr Johnson to Ahmadinejad's apparent isolation or weakness. Certainly the "stagnating" nuclear issue is not really evidence of a "very weak Ahmadinejad presidency ahea". I'm also not convinced that Ahmadinejad's inability to have Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani locked up is, as Mr. Johnson suggests, a useful demonstration of the limitations that exist to his power. The absence of such dictatorial powers are inherent in the office of the presidency.

My position is somewhere in between those expressed by Mr Smith and Mr Johnson. I agree with Mr Smith that Ahmadinejad will probably survive attempts to remove him. However, my prediction is for a totally chaotic second term in which Ahmadinejad is unable to achieve anything substantial as the Parliament and judiciary acts increasingly independently from the government (perhaps already seen in the "moving" of Mortazavi and appointment of Ejeie to posts in the judiciary). Increasingly, the question of the Supreme Leader's succession will come to dominate back stage political manoeuvrings.

As such, the real question is not so much whether Ahmadinejad has lost his public legitimacy or whether the Larijanis have or have not questioned the election result. The immediate apparent legacy of the crisis is that the coordination required for an effective legislative program will be almost impossible to achieve. The still-unknown legacy is the extent of the compromises, principally in terms of Iran's justice system, that Khamenei offers to avoid further mass protests. I don't see Ahmadinejad as particularly significant in how that pans out, although the result of the current trials does seem a reasonable litmus test.

The wider point is that Ahmadinejad doesn't actually appear to have much in the way of policies at the moment. Nor does he appear to grasp the enormity of the task in front of him. Ahmadinejad's second term may hang on this failure as much as anything else. Of course, he will now find it much harder to pass the legislation and reforms he thinks will do something about it and his failures will undoubtedly be capitalised on by his opponents. But a lot does depend on the merit of his policies.

Frustration will be hard for Ahmadinejad to take because the economy is where he has exercised more control than any other President. He also believes he has a strong mandate for his economic "vision", for which the SL has publicly stated his broad agreement (again, more than for any previous President). The real test will thus be when Ahmadinejad tries to pass something fiscal.

If Ahmadinejad does appear increasingly irrelevant or lame, then another important question is how he will react. When he appeared almost invisible in the first few weeks of the crisis, he tried to claw back his bureaucratic authority by some high profile sackings and appointments. I think everyone (including the Supreme Leader) was surprised at how brazen he was in trying to re-assert his visibility. It seems he is now emboldened enough to publicly differ with the Supreme Leader on the trials as well.

I don't see the Supreme Leader as likely to publicly remove his patronage from Ahmadinejad, but it could be possible that he will move closer towards an informal triumvirate with the Larijanis. But Ahmadinejad still has some leverage. Any US-Iranian engagement will require his cooperation, in that he will have the ability to de-rail it or at least cause severe problems. The SL will also recognise that there may be a political price to pay, in terms of the overall authority of the regime, for damaging the office of the Presidency. Ahmadinejad's ouster could even bring the IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] onto the streets.

SMITH: I largely concur with Chris Emery on the unstable nature of AN's second term, although I would, once again, exercise caution as to the real extent of Parliamentary opposition to Ahmadinejad. This will become much clearer in the next few days, as the various ministers receive their votes of confidence.

I too can see many avenues of deadlock for Ahmadinejad in his second term, particularly if the reformists attempt to embark on a long-term route that will target the 2012 Parliamentary elections, as they will have to attack the current composition of the Guardian Council and hence try to chip away at the current conservative quasi-monopoly over state power.

I would also be wary to think that Ahmadinejad does not " grasp the enormity of the task in front of him". I haven't seen statements to this effect by him. His second speech in Parliament yesterday, which I followed via live TV, was actually quite well-constructed. He defended, inter alia, his cabinet changes by saying that reshuffles are necessary, or else cabinets could last 50 years and elections would be made worthless. And his points on women and the experience of other members of his cabinet are also quite interesting. My own experience in dealing with him over the years (I have also had the dubious privilege of shaking his hand and asking him a couple of questions during press conferences) leads me to believe that he is more wily and clever than his external appearance makes him out to be.

As to the judiciary, I think we really have to wait till the end of Sadegh Larijani's appointments to see what the state of play is. Mortazavi was shooed out and in the door again in the last few days and the rest of the appointees such as Ejeie are hardliners in their own right, opposed to Ahmadinejad but not really wishing to make concessions to the reformists.

I still remain convinced that the Supreme Leader will pull a stunt by the end of Ramadan and pardon the reformist bigwigs, after the latter have received long prison sentences. Should he be clever, he would arrange for all of them to be carted off to his palace and be offered the pardon there in front of TV cameras. It would discredit them and allow Khamenei to show off his magnanimity, for free.

The Latest from Iran (30 August): Parliament Discusses the Cabinet

NEW Video: The Iftar Protests (30 August)
Iran Debate: How Weak (or Strong) is Ahmadinejad?
Today’s Gold Medal Iran “Expert”: Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post
The Latest from Iran (29 August): The Stakes Are Raised

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2100 GMT: The Mowj-e-Sabz website, which has been a vital source of information (if one reporting for the cause of the Green movement) during this conflict, is down. We're watching to see if it has been hacked out of existence.

1955 GMT: That #CNNFail Thing (see 1445 GMT). CNN staffer Samira Simone tweets from Atlanta, "More trouble for Ahmadinejad's Cabinet picks", linking to a Saturday story in the Los Angeles Times on the disputed Ph.D. of the President's proposed Minister of Higher Education.

Meanwhile, no one on CNN's website seems to have noticed that a debate over "Ahmadinejad's Cabinet picks" took place in the Iranian Parliament today. There is still no advance on their story about the President's speech at Friday prayers.

1915 GMT: Agence France Presse draws on the opinions of two high-profile "conservative" MPs to draw out the challenge to President Ahmadinejad's Cabinet nominees:

"Sixteen nominees have no experience required for the ministries they have been nominated for," said powerful MP Ahmad Tavakoli. "The cabinet lacks harmony in its view when it comes to handling crucial issues such as economic development. The views of candidates nominated to head the economy, oil and commerce ministries contradict that of the agriculture ministry nominee."

Another top conservative, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, said he will "definitely not vote for a few nominees: "Some nominees of four or five ministries have an educational background which is contradictory to their portfolios."

1830 GMT: The news that Saeed Mortazavi, the former Tehran Chief Prosecutor, has been named as Iran's Deputy Prosecutor General, serving under the former Minister of Intelligence, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, has caused consternation. Mohammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau assesses:

The move also provides some clues into [head of Iran judiciary Sadegh] Larijani’s thinking and his views about his tenure at the judiciary. Larijani does not appear to be interested in reforming the system or leaving a positive legacy. Ejeie himself is a hardliner, and both he and Mortazavi are strongly supported by Ayatollah Khamenei. Their appointments signal that the harsh tactics in dealing with the reformist leaders and the people supporting them will continue.

I'm still in "wait and see" mode while an EA correspondent writes, "I think [this] really highlights how things are not quite as they appear in Iran. We were all thinking that Sadegh Larijani is weeding the hard core Ahmadinejad henchment away from top posts, when suddently Mortazavi gets actually promoted. I am not an expert of the Iranian judiciary system, but would venture to say that it is effectively a promotion, although it needs to be seen how he will cope with his boss, Mohseni Ejeie."

1735 GMT: Protestors have gathered in front of the Amir Almomenin Mosque in Tehran. Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mohammad Khatami had planned to join families of detainees for an Iftar (breaking of the Ramadan fast) meal, but the gathering was prohibited by authorities. We've posted video in a separate entry.

1640 GMT: Radio Farda has published a transcript (in Farsi) of President Ahmadinejad's speech in Parliament today.

1635 GMT: The Kargozaran Party, which associated with Hashemi Rafsanjani, has issued a statement of support for Mehdi Karroubi.

1520 GMT: Some urgent re-interpretation might be in order. According to BBC Persian, Saeed Mortazavi was not "fired" as Tehran's chief prosecutor. Instead, he's been moved at the judiciary to Deputy Prosecutor General.

1445 GMT: Credit to Associated Press, who have written a summary of the debate in Parliament, highlighting criticism of Ahmadinejad over the Iranian economy and noting specific hostility to his nominee as Minister of Energy, Massed Mirkazemi. (Unfortunately, they missed the humour of the "Peach" episode --- see 1230 GMT.) Credit also to MSNBC for picking up the story.

CNN continues its recent record of hopelessness: its last Iran story is from Friday, "Ahmadinejad urges stiff punishment for election dissenters".

1230 GMT: The Parliamentary debate has ended for the day. Parleman News has posted a running summary.

The overall headline appears to be that criticism of the Ahmadinejad Government, with principlists MPs pointing to a weak administration and reformists objecting to the lack of a substantial Government programme, will not stop general Parliamentary affirmation. Votes on individual ministers, which start on Monday, will be much trickier for the President.

So Ahmadinejad has avoided an immediate setback, but this does not mean he escaped ridicule. The moment that may capture the political imagination came when some Parliamentarians started shouting, "Peach! Peach!" That is an allusion to Ahmadinejad's television appearance last week, when he compared his former Minister of Health to "a peach I would like to eat".

1145 GMT: Parallel to our live blog coverage of the Parliamentary discussion, we've posted a lively debate --- drawing on the expertise of our Mr  Smith and Mr Johnson as well as blogs from Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau and Fintan Dunne --- on the political position of President Ahmadinejad.

1135 GMT: Parleman News have now posted a summary, via Mehr News, of the first session of Parliament on the Ahmadinejad Cabinet. MPs of the majority principlist bloc have been fierce in their criticism of the President. I still expect Parliamentary approval of the Government, but the estimate of up to 7 ministers being rejected is still prominent.

1125 GMT: Meanwhile Mehdi Karoubi, in a meeting with members of the Etemade Melli party, emphasised that suspending their newspaper or filtering their website will not make them give up and that they will continue their efforts with strong determination. He added that on Quds Day (the last Friday of Ramadan, 18 September) the authorities will witness people’s power once again and will know which side people are supporting.

1100 GMT: There is a Twitter report that tonight's Iftar (breaking of Ramadan fast), in which with Karroubi, Mousavi, Khatami, and families of detainees dined with the Reform Front Coordination Council, has been cancelled by authorities from the Ministry of Intelligence.

(We have now confirmed this via Saham News and the website of Mehdi Karroubi's Etemade Melli party.)

1000 GMT: Parleman News is updating on the Parlimentary speeches, which initially will be over the acceptance of the Cabinet as a whole rather on individual Ministers. Our reading is that while some high-profile critics of President Ahmadinejad, such as Vice Speaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar, are maintaining their denunciation of a "weak" Administration, they will encourage the Majlis to offer its support by voting for the Government.

0835 GMT: An Inauspicious Start? While Press TV summarises Ahmadinejad's speech this morning to Parliament, Parleman News thinks the President may have mis-stepped even before he took the podium. Ahmadinejad showed up with bodyguards, an unprecedented measure that brought protests from reformist MPs.

0830 GMT: We've just read an opinion piece on Iran that was so jaw-droppingly, well, bad that we had to give the author, Jim Hoagland of The Washington Post, his own special space.

0710 GMT: The Secret Burials in Behesht-e-Zahra Cemetery. Hamid-Reza Katouzian, a member of the special Parliamentary committee investigating claims of post-election misconduct, has said that there are unidentified people buried in the cemetery but it is unclear whether there are the 40 protestors whom the opposition claim were interred on orders from security forces.

0700 GMT: Fintan Dunne has joined our debate from yesterday over the claim, launched in the Tehran Bureau, that President Ahmadinejad is "isolated, weak, and delusional".

Muhammad Sahimi was too dismissive in describing of Ahmadinejad...as "isolated and delusional", and erred in reducing the regime to the person of the President. But he was correct to describe Ahmadinejad as "weak"....

The regime is now tellingly reliant on a narrow base of IRGC [Revolutionary Guard] appointees to fill government posts. Ahmadinejad/IRGC's core 'hard' support is as low as 10% with a 'softer' support extending to up to 18% of the population. The disputed president's public pronouncements are reductionist and defensive --aimed at his own supporters and the ill-informed. By contrast, most other voices in Iranian politics are addressing the remaining 80%+ of the population.

Despite their hard-line rhetoric, Ahmadinejad/IRGC are unable to crush the reformers. It is going to be far harder to violently suppress any mass public protests in the weeks ahead. And there is a dire political problem looming for this one-legged regime: it's the economy, stupid!...As the weeks pass, the economy will join the stolen election as the twin key political issues for the populace.

0650 GMT: On the opposition side, there has been a lot of chatter about a report that Mohammad Khatami, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mehdi Karroubi, joining families of political detainees, will attend this evening's Iftar ceremony, when the daily Ramadan fast is broken, with the Reform Front Coordination Council.

0635 GMT: Attention this morning turns to the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, where President Ahmadinejad's 21 Ministerial nominations come up for votes of confidence. The debates and votes are more than referenda on individual Ministers; they are also a key sign of how much support the President retains, especially amongst the majority principlist bloc.

While there have been reports this week that up to 7 of the nominations are in trouble, these are based more on the comments of a couple of highly-placed MPs rather than a survey of Parliamentary opinion. The safest assessment that can be made is that Ahmadinejad's 3 women nominees are unlikely to be approved; beyond that, several other Ministers will rise or fall depending on behind-the-scene manoeuvres and their own presentations to the Parliament.

The Latest from Iran (29 August): The Stakes Are Raised

UPDATED Iran: How the Regime Constructed the “Velvet Revolution”
Iran Video Exclusive: Ministry of Intelligence Proves “Velvet Revolution”
The Latest from Iran (28 August): The President Prays

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1820 GMT: EA correspondent Mr Johnson gives us some guidance on the change of Tehran chief prosecutor:

Regardless of Dowlatabadi's political affiliations, the replacement of Mortazavi is a sign that the establishment considers him to be a liability and perhaps dispensable as a potential scapegoat.

The main issue is whether this change is merely cosmetic or whether the establishment take a proactive approach, namely, scuttle the trials (which can be easily done because all the indictments are so flimsy that none of them can bear any legal scrutiny), and somehow solve the very public and very embarrasing and inflammatory issue of prison tortures and unmarked graves, thereby regaining some semblence of legality and law. The next few days will be extremely inportant.

1755 GMT: A reader strikes back immediately at the security force denials of involvement in post-election raids: "You can't fake live video feed. We've got evidence on several videos that basij attacked dorms in Tehran University," and offers this:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzUhJXTspcw[/youtube]

1740 GMT: This is now looking like a concerted campaign between the President and security force commanders to deny any post-election misdeeds. After Tehran's police chief denied any detainee was killed in Kahrizak prison (0845 GMT), the Revolutionary Guard commander General Mohammad Ali Jafari has said the post-election death toll is 20 Basiji militia and only 9 "opponents and outlaws". Jafari denied that the Basiji were involved in the raids on university dormitories days after the election.

1715 GMT: EA's Iran analyst Mr Smith drops by to take issue with the portrayal by Tehran Bureau of an "isolated, weak, and delusional" Ahmadinejad (1310 GMT):

This lacks sources on just about all the allegations it makes and then essentially parrots the reformist line: Ahmadinejad is weak, is in trouble, is a lame duck already, etc.

While of course all of us wish that this was the case, the reality appears quite different, as we have seen no real thrust to wrestle him out of office. The Supreme Leader has only rebuked him frontally during the [former First Vice President] Mashai affair and he still has the rather remarkable opportunity of talking from official platforms such as Friday Prayers, saying things quite different from what the SL says, and still walking out relatively unscathed.

Granted, he has the same amount, or more, difficulties than any executive leader in the world would have for forming a government, but I would be very cautious in calling Ahmadinejad a has-been and that days may be counted down to his demise. Sadly, I doubt this scenario will happen anytime soon.

We shouldn't forget that the Supreme Leader, conservative critics of AN like the Larijanis, Ahmad Tavakoli (who happens to be the Larijanis' cousin), and more have essentially agreed to accept the outcome of the Presidential election as announced by the Interior ministry. Hence, they are simply jostling for political kudoes and power within the Government, more than mounting a challenge that is really geared towards removing Ahmadinejad from power.

1700 GMT: Back from an afternoon break for a wedding.

After a couple of weeks of indecision, Tehran's Chief Prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi has been replaced by Abbas Jafari Dowlatabadi, head of judiciary in the southern province of Khuzestan.

The Los Angeles Times is framing Dowlatabadi as "a relatively moderate newcomer" and portraying Mortazavi's "firing" as a signal against the trials of political detainees that he oversaw. We're not sure of that interpretation --- any comments would be welcome.

1340 GMT: Our question (0445 GMT): "Does Mehdi Karroubi make another intervention on detentions and abuses?" Karroubi's answer: an open letter to the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, offering to provide documentation and detainees who have suffered abuse.

1323 GMT: The principlist member of Parliament Ali Motahari, who has been highly critical of the Government in recent weeks, has said Ahmadinejad's remarks contest and challenge the Supreme Leader and the President must be held responsible for his deeds and words, particularly on the issue of detentions.

1315 GMT: The reformist party Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution, some of whose members are among the political detainees, have strongly condemned the 4th “show trial” and called it a reminder of the medieval inquisition courts and Stalin-era tribunals. The party emphasised that the staged “trials” and false “confessions” are conspiracies to suspend the reformist parties.

1310 GMT: And, on the same theme, Muhammad Sahimi at Tehran Bureau pays great attention to the "glaring fissures [which] have emerged within the conservative and reactionary camp", albeit with the dramatic presentation of an "isolated, weak, and delusional" Ahmadinejad.

1300 GMT: It's not just Enduring America that is raising questions about the divide between the Supreme Leader and the President in light of their differing speeches on Wednesday and yesterday. The reformist website Rah-e-Sabz has noted the divergences over foreign-inspired revolution and, in particular, Ahmadinejad's denial of any security force responsibility for abuses less than 48 hours after Ayatollah Khamenei promised that anyone guilty of such abuses would be published.

1110 GMT: The Battle over the Cabinet. A prominent "conservative" member of Parliament, Ahmad Tavakoli, has said that 7 of President Ahmadinejad's 21 Ministerial nominees will fail to receive a vote of confidence. Echoing reports from yesterday, Tavakoli said all three women put forth will be rejected because of a lack of executive experience.

1040 GMT: In an interview with Etemad newspaper, Mohammad Hashemi, the brother of Hashemi Rafsanjani, said that Rafsanjani is not planning to quit leading Friday Prayers He also described how security forces beat Rafsanjani's daughter-in-law while arresting her during one of the post-election protests.

0905 GMT: Pretty slow day after yesterday's excitement. No answers to any of our questions at 0445 GMT. Internet chatter is on the call by Human Rights Watch on the new head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, to "tackle rights abuses".

0845 GMT: Nothing Happened Here. More signs of an Ahmadinejad Fightback. After the President's claims yesterday that incidents at detention centres were the fault of the protest movement, rather than the security forces, the Tehran police chief, Azizollah Rajabzadeh, has explained that "no defendants were transferred to the Kahrizak detention centre without a judicial warrant and no defendant was killed" in the prison.

Oh. Well, following on the week's theme --- the Supreme Leader and the President on different pages of the script --- someone might want to tell Ayatollah Khamenei, who has admitted mistakes at Kahrizak and ordered its closure.

0515 GMT: A Follow-Up on "Velvet Revolution". After our analysis yesterday, "How the Regime Constructed the Velvet Revolution", an EA correspondent points to an interview by Ayande News with Hamid Reza Moghadam-Far, the Managing Director of Fars News Agency, and a Mr. Gharebaghi, whom Ayande claim are two of the authors of the Tehran trial indictments. Their views of the "velvet revolution" are posted in an update of the analysis.

0445 GMT: At the risk of being overdramatic, Friday was a day of two statements, that of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to and beyond the audience at Tehran's prayers and that of Mohammad Khatami to and beyond reformist leaders.

The founding assertion of each statement was that the current President/former President was ready to take the post-election crisis to a political and legal showdown with the ultimate public punishment. In Ahmadinejad's case, he was ready to press until the opposition leaders were imprisoned for a long, long time; in Khatami's, he was ready to see the "traitors" ejected from power and positions of responsibility.

What we now await, in an always-shifting conflict but one which continues to be about legitimacy, is the response of others. With respect, the protest movement is mainly an observer, with the next mass demonstration proposed for 18 September, so attention turns to political and religious leaders. Does Hashemi Rafsanjani and his allies break cover, after their recent skirmish over the Tehran trial, and give any support to Khatami? Does Mehdi Karroubi make another intervention on detentions and abuses, and thus those responsibile for them, or wait for a Parliamentary response to his claims? Where is Mir Hossein Mousavi?

And, just to repeat our thought from yesterday, what does the Supreme Leader do now?

UPDATED Iran: How the Regime Constructed the "Velvet Revolution"

The Latest from Iran (28 August): The President Prays
Iran Video Exclusive: Ministry of Intelligence Proves “Velvet Revolution”

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UPDATE 29 August: Ayande News has posted a lengthy audio interview with Hamid Reza Moghadam-Far, the Managing Director of Fars News Agency, and a Mr. Gharebaghi, whom Ayande claim are two of the authors of the Tehran trial indictments. (Ayande also says Reza Seraj, the Head of Student Basij Organization, is a third author of the indictment.)

The interviewee try to distinguish between "velvet" and "colored" revolutions. A "colored" revolution, such as the movements in Ukraine and Georgia in 2004, only intend to change behaviour, whereas a "velvet" revolution intends to overthrow the regime, as in Czechoslovakia. (Significantly, the Tehran trial indictments repeatedly refer to US-sponsored operatives planning their Iranian regime change from a Czech academic institution.) Both men express their unhappiness that Iran's judicial and security systems do not have sufficient powers to deal with the "velvet" revolution.

And the source of the trouble? Samuel Huntington and his 1991 book, The Third Wave of Democratization, which was translated into Persian and apparently became a "manifesto" for reformers.

UPDATE: By coincidence, just after writing this, I discovered that Robert Mackey wrote yesterday of "Iran’s Fear of a ‘Velvet Revolution’" in The Lede blog of The New York Times, referring to Tajbakhsh's testimony briefly. The piece, unfortunately, is not in the print edition of the newspaper.

One of the surprises of this week's 4th Tehran trial was how little attention was paid outside Iran to the testimony of the Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh, who was among the latest set of defendants. The foreign media had featured the situation of French national Clotilde Reiss, a graduate student spending time at Isfahan University, when she “confessed” in an earlier trial, and earlier this year the detention of Iranian-American Roxana Saberi had been headline news. Tajbakhsh, however, was almost invisible, apart from passing references to his status and a couple of paragraphs in the Wall Street Journal.

The episode is far more than a question of the media noting a “foreigner” in jail. Tajbakhsh's testimony illustrated the fundamental pretext of these trials and, indeed, the regime's crackdown on political opposition; paradoxically, it also undermined the pretext.

Because --- Mr Prosecutor, Mr Ahmadinejad, Generals of the Revolutionary Guard --- are academics really at the forefront the “velvet revolution” to overthrow your Islamic Republic?

The claim has been at the heart of the prosecution's case since the indictment at the first trial three weeks ago. We noted then that the efforts for regime change not only involved but were supposedly inspired and led by academics and writers such as Gene Sharp, Abbas Milani, and Mark Palmer, adding a large dose of scepticism to our analysis. It is Tajbakhsh's testimony that illustrates, however, just how far the regime will go and, how with each step, its legal and political case is shakier and shakier.

The opening gambit in Tajbakhsh's “confession” is that “information services” of the US Government and the CIA develop and carry out their schemes with “semi-hidden” activities of academic institutions “such as the [Woodrow] Wilson Center in Washington”, behind the front of their “scientific research, academic seminars, and meetings”, and funders such as the Soros Foundation, for whom Tajbakhsh worked in Iran, and the Carnegie Foundation. The real goal of supposedly neutral study and research is “disturbing public order and creating chaos and fear in society” in the seven-step pursuit of “soft overthrow” of the enemy system.

Beyond the general allegation of the scheme “promoting Western democracy, secularism, and liberalism”, there were few details of Tajbakhsh's activities inside Iran. The headline charge was his meetings with Mohammad Khatami, Iranian President from 1997 to 2005, including an introduction of the leader to George Soros. The contacts had started in 1997, which implied that Khatami was seeking the overthrow of the Government that he was leading, and continued after he left the Presidency. Others named in the “confession” were Mostafa Tajzadeh, a Vice Minister at the Ministry of Interior under Khatami, Gholamhossein Karbaschi, a key Khatami advisor  supporting Mehdi Karroubi during the 2009 Presidential campaign, and journalist Mohammad Atrianfar. There were also meetings with Saeed Hajjarian, the reformist leader whose own “confession” was the headline moment of the 4th trial about developing and using “social capital” for velvet revolution.

As sketchy as these claims are, however, it is Tajbakhsh's “confession” of the foreigners directing his efforts to the level of the fantastic. The relatively little-known Dutch foundation Hivos makes another appearance, after its citation in the indictment of the first trial, to set up subversive media activities. Unsurprisingly, given the regime's denunciation of Britain throughout the crisis, BBC Persian gets a mention.

Then this revelation: one of the networks for this velvet revolution is a discussion list, with “more than a thousand members”, called “Gulf 2000”, led by a former National Security Council staff member in the Carter and Reagan Administrations, now Professor at Columbia University, named Gary Sick. While Tajbakhsh noted that Sick and the list members are not CIA agents, he said,"If I had known about it [G2K's misconduct "proven" in Iranian documents], I would have cut my contacts with it."

“Fantastic” claims, indeed, for the Tajbakhsh's testimony and the claims of velvet revolution now reached all the way to Enduring America. Here I should declare a personal interest. In the last years of the Khatami Presidency, a close colleague unwittingly came close --- if Tajbakhsh's “confession” were true --- to becoming part of the conspiracy. Working with an Iranian university, he drafted a grant request to the Soros Foundation in Tehran to fund the purchase of books and the movement of students and scholars between Iranian and Western institutions. Before the proposal could be submitted, the word came down from higher levels of the Iranian university: Soros, with its promotion of “democracy” and “open society”, was off-limits.

And I am a member of Gulf 2000's misbehaving network. Apparently, amidst discussion of topics from Saudi Prince Turki al-Feisal's recent writings on energy to the political situation in Iraq to Iran's dispute with the United Arab Emirates over islands in the Persian Gulf, I take my place as a velvet revolutionary.

None of this is to belittle the seriousness of events in Iran, both the general political conflict and the specific situation of Kian Tajbakhsh. It does, however, point to the absurdity when politics and academia collide. Far from being the hyper-clever agents of revolution, professors and social scientists find themselves as mute actors in the play of a regime which sees a dispute over a Presidential election as a threat to its survival.