Iran: The Regime's Knockout Punch? Not Quite.

The Latest from Iran (27 August): Catching Breath
NEW Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Talks, Threats, and Propaganda

The Latest from Iran: Responding to the Trial (26 August)
The Latest from Iran (25 August): The Trials Resume
The 4th Tehran Trial: The Tehran Bureau Summary
Video: The 4th Tehran Trial (25 August)
The Tehran Trial: The Regime Goes After the Reformists AND Rafsanjani

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To appreciate how dramatic the regime's move was on Tuesday with the biggest of the four Tehran trials, in significance if not number of defendants, rewind 12 days to Saturday, 15 August. The regime had dodged a potential bullet the previous day when Hashemi Rafsanjani declined to lead Friday prayers in Tehran, but then it faced a torrent of disturbing news. The Supreme Leader, overruling opposition from the President's camp, pushed through the appointment of Sadegh Larijani as head of Iran's judiciary. The "Karroubi letter", demanding action on the abuse of detainees, was now circulating publicly. Mir Hossein Mousavi announced the "Green Path of Hope". Conservative members of Parliaments and newspapers were criticising key Ahmadinejad allies like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, as doubts circulated over the President's still-to-be-declared Cabinet. Even Ayatollah Khamenei was not above the battle, with a group of clerics and former MPs (who met former President Khatami) raising the invocation of Law 111 to question the Supreme Leader's qualifications for his post.

This was more than a spectre. Only 10 days after the President had been inaugurated, the Ahmadinejad Government faced a challenge to its legitimacy as great as that of the immediate response to the 12 June elections. It might face not only the Green wave but also a renewed judiciary ready to challenge its (ab)use of the legal system for detentions, confessions, and trials, a Supreme Leader who was no longer ready to back Ahmadinejad to the full, and conservative and principlist MPs alienated by stories such as the death of Mohsen Roohulamini. And there was still the haunting question: what would Rafsanjani now do?

So, would the Ahmadinejad regime back down and accept compromise, to the point of crippling its authority? Or would it make an even more aggressive charge to knock back its opponents once and for all?

Tuesday's trial was the answer. This was the equivalent (for our American readers) of "swinging for the fences" in baseball and (for all others) of trying to land a one-punch knockout in the boxing ring. The crushing of the reformists, headlined by the non-Iranian press, was only one goal. This was also the occasion to put away the Rafsanjani challenge for good. It may even have been the declaration to the Supreme Leader that this was no time for his concessions --- token or real --- to the protests inside and outside the Establishment. No more Larijanis in key positions with power, no more apologies for detention centres like Kahrizak Prison.

Was it a knockout? At the end of Tuesday, the Government's challengers looked very wobbly. Apart from the "non-confession" of Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the reformist leaders had been paraded and humiliated. The prosecutor mentioned the death penalty. Saeed Hajjarian had been forced to resign from his political party and to lay out --- as one of Iran's premier political theorists --- the designs of "velvet revolution". Tajzadeh, Aminzadeh, Nabavi, Atrianfar had all been put forth to show that there would be no backing down. (And, as a bonus, here was an Iranian-American, Kian Tajbakhsh, on trial and testifying to the "velvet revolution", linking billionaire George Soros and former President Mohammad Khatami.)

Here were the charges of "corruption", which had been raised by Ahmadinejad against Rafsanjani before the election, not only renewed but redoubled. Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi, nephew, and brother-in-law were all tarred in court for diversion of funds, electoral manipulation, and disinformation. While they were not amongst the defendants, they also faced a death penalty with the ending of their public lives. Mehdi Hashemi's attempts on Tuesday night to get some forum for a rebuttal showed how shaken he was. But was his father?

When we went to bed Tuesday night, it seemed that the referee might --- for the first time in 2 1/2 months, be counting out the opposition.

Yesterday, however, the challengers got off the mat.

Inevitably, there were regime opponents who were never going to be silenced, if only because there is little more that can done to them. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri put out an open letter defying a regime which "is neither Islamic nor republic". For the most part, however, the Green Wave/Path of Hope marked time yesterday. Mohammad Khatami denied the allegations against him, and Hossein Karroubi, describing his own court appearance on Tuesday, represented his father by declaring that the initial meeting with MPs over the detainee abuse inquiry was "very good". Mehdi Karroubi revealed that he had written the head of judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, asking him for“the implementation of the Constitution, the legal defense of freedom and citizenship rights, and the maintenance of legal justice to defend the dignity of the system”.

Instead, the first real twitch came yesterday morning in a small but significant step. The Rafsanjani camp posted the audio of the former President's Saturday statement to the Expediency Council: the call for unity behind the Supreme Leader but also the call for justice and for Government officials to follow the Constitution and proper guidelines. At the time, it appeared to be only a clarification of Rafsanjani's statement but it may have been the prelude (keep reading) to a more dramatic statement.

By the afternoon, Rafsanjani's office was being less subtle. Mehdi Hashemi continued to declare his innocence and then turned "corruption" against Ahmadinejad, declaring that the President, as Mayor of Tehran, had "lost" millions of dollars. More importantly, I suspect, the Rafsanjani camp took the fight to Ahmadinejad's ally and Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, attacking his "hallucinations" and calling on both Rahim-Mashai and Ahmadinejad to back up their criticisms of Rafsanjani in court.

And then last night came the dramatic challenge to the President, from a most unexpected challenger. We had wondered on Tuesday whether the Supreme Leader was behind the fourth trial, especially given the attacks on Rafsanjani. In a speech to student leaders, he gave the answer: the opposition had not been engaged in a foreign-directed "velvet revolution" against Iran. For anyone thinking of more arrests, including leaders like Mousavi and Karroubi (and, less likely but still possible, for those throwing around spurious indictments in trials), “We should not proceed in dealing with those behind the protests based on rumours and guesswork. The judiciary should only give rulings based on solid evidence, not on circumstantial evidence.”

A three-word summary. Back. Off. Mahmoud.

Now it could be that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is playing a very clever double game. He could have allowed the fourth trial to proceed, with the criticisms of Rafsanjani, and then pulled back last night. That way, both Ahmadinejad (enough is enough) and Rafsanjani (you had your warning) would be strongly encouraged to pull back and let the Supreme Leader put the regime's house in order.

I take another view, however, based on the Supreme Leader's signal from 19 June. In that Friday prayer address, the only one he has made since the election, he made clear that he preferred the political views of the President but that he also found Rafsanjani an honourable man and leader. And he specifically criticised Ahmadinejad's pre-election charges of corruption. The message had been given: shake hands, boys.

Rafsanjani may have crossed that line on 17 July when he led prayers, but with his general caution, even circumspection, before and after that speech, I think he has tried to ensure that he did not cross Khamenei. (Once again, note last Saturday's address to the Expediency Council. And note that the audio was released on Wednesday morning, just to make it clear where Rafsanjani stood.) Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, went well over the line. So who has to be pulled back?

On the surface, and if you limit your gaze to the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad (and, behind him, the Revolutionary Guard), and Rafsanjani, the situation is easily repaired. No more sledgehammer allegations of corruption from the Government, and Rafsanjani keeps his distance from the Green opposition.

But this conflict is no longer "on the surface" and it certainly is not just around this trio. The 4th Tehran trial was just the latest, more dramatic assertion of Presidential authority, following detentions, beatings, purges of some ministries, and attempts to control others. So now there are contests within the Establishment: what happens to those 20+ officials who were forced out of the Ministry of Intelligence and who now "supervises" its work? Does Sadegh Larijani, put in by the Supreme Leader, have real authority to "correct" the abuses of the system by the Ahmadinejad camp (and, again, the Revolutionary Guard)?

Already the next public display is upon us. Tomorrow the President, on Government Day, introduces the Friday prayer address in Tehran. No doubt he will point to his dedication and service in upholding the Islamic Republic and no doubt, given that the confirmation votes in Parliament on his Ministers begin on Sunday, he will declared that his Cabinet nominees are just as honourable and dedicated.

Ahmadinejad might win that short-term battle within Parliament (although I think that is far from certain). But, even if he does, that is only one punch in a 15-round contest. His regime connected with a blow on Tuesday, but it was far from a knockout.

Which leaves a warning to Mahmoud: when you thrown a punch that big and don't win immediately, you have to swing even harder next time. Or you have to put your hands up and ask for a referee's decision.

When Democracies Fight: Israel and Sweden, Round 2

Israel and Sweden: When Democracies Fight

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Last weekend, we wrote about an article in the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet by Donald Bostrom, calling for an investigation into numerous claims in the 1990s that Israeli soldiers stole the organs of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and the furious response from Israeli diplomatic circles. Although the Swedish Embassy in Israel distanced itself from the report, the Swedish government. Stockholm refused to condemn the article, saying briefly that Sweden has a “free press".

Israel has maintained its criticism. Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz claimed:

This is an anti-Semitic blood libel against the Jewish people and the Jewish state. The Swedish government cannot remain apathetic… We know the origins of these claims. In medieval times, there were claims that the Jews use the blood of Christians to bake their Matzas for Passover. The modern version now is that the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) soldiers use organs of Palestinian to take money.

Then, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman compared today’s Sweden with the country of the 1940s, telling Sweden’s ambassador on Thursday evening:

It's a shame that the Swedish Foreign Ministry fails to intervene in a case of blood libels against Jews… This is reminiscent of Sweden's stand during World War II, when [it] had failed to intervene as well.

Predictably, politics is now on the streets, with thousands of Israelis signing an online petition to boycott the Swedish furniture retailer IKEA.

What should not be forgotten, as we noted in the earlier article, is that this dispute overlays diplomatic frictions over Israel's policy toward Palestine and possible political advantage in displacing that issue. So expect the rhetorical battle between neo-Holocaust scenarios, in which the Israeli military is victimised,  and the claims of freedom of the press to continue for some time.

The Latest from Iran (25 August): The Trials Resume

NEW The 4th Tehran Trial: The Tehran Bureau Summary
NEW Video: The 4th Tehran Trial (25 August)
The Tehran Trial: The Regime Goes After the Reformists AND Rafsanjani
Iran Interview: Mousavi Advisor Beheshti on The Election
The Latest from Iran (24 August): The 4-D Chess Match

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1940 GMT: Mehdi Hashemi, the son of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has asked for time on state television to refute the charges made against him in today's Tehran trial.

1830 GMT: Press TV English's website is now featuring the testimony of Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh (1500 GMT). It is playing up the angle that Tajbakhsh, who had been with the Soros Foundation in Iran, conspired with former President Khatami and Mohammad-Javad Zarif, the former Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations, from 2006 on "velvet revolution" after a meeting with George Soros: “Because of the support of some officials from the reformist camp…a safe place was created for the cooperation of domestic and foreign forces…and American political parties and non-governmental organisations found a way to start activities in Iran."

1745 GMT: #MediaFail. OK, I've gone for a run, had a shower, grabbed a cup of tea, chatted with the wife, checked out the Israel-Palestine latest, and....

CNN still has not noticed there was a trial in Tehran today. (OK, at 1737 GMT, one of their Twitter feeds did figure out "Iran resumed Tuesday its mass trial of political reformists", but they have yet to get anyone on the website to notice.)

On a related note, I have yet to see one "Western" media outlet recognise that Hashemi Rafsanjani, as well as the "reformists", was targeted in the proceedings today.

1730 GMT: Freelance journalist and blogger Fariba Pajooh has been arrested.

1720 GMT: One Non-Confession. Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, the Deputy Secretary General of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, has been unrepentant after today's trials. He explained that, as he was arrested within 2-3 hours of the election results, he could not have been involved in post-election disturbances. He declared, "I have always been a reformist but I am pro-Islamic Republic."



1550 GMT: Mehdi Hashemi, Hashemi Rafsanjani's son, has issued a short but blunt denial of the charges of money laundering and electoral manipulation levelled at him in the Tehran trial today.

1530 GMT: Days after public allegations that security forces forced the staff of Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery to bury 40 bodies of slain protestors, the managing director of the cemetery has been fired.

1525 GMT: And now Press TV English headlines, "Rafsanjani son implicated in fresh Iran trials". It focuses on the testimony of Hamzeh Karimi with the claim "that the Iranian Fuel Conservation Organization's assets were used to finance Rafsanjani presidential campaign" in 2005: “Mehdi Hashemi believed that election in Iran were financed with government funds. He did not believe in spending private savings for the election. So they step up a system for forgery and document falsification."

1515 GMT: No Doubt About It --- Target Rafsanjani. IRNA's lead story is a long overview of the trial today, and its headline goes after Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi. Another family member, brother-in-law Abdullah Jafar Ali Jasebi, a former University chancellor, is also criticised.

1500 GMT: Bringing Out the American. The next showpiece testimony, presented in Fars News, is that of Iranian-American academic Kian Tajbakhsh, identified as the representative of the Soros Foundation in Iran. (For the regime, "Soros Foundation", with its Open Democracy Project, embodies "velvet revolution".) The objective? Tajbaksh's "evidence" that he had continued meetings with Mohammad Khatami after the latter's departure from office in 2005 apparently links the former President to the foreign efforts at regime change in Tehran.

1440 GMT: The head of the Parliament Research Center, Ahmad Tavakoli, has called for the lifting of the ban on the "reformist" newspaper Etemade Melli and the trying of Tehran's chief prosecutor Saeed Mortazavi in military judge's court for his failure in "restoring public rights and promoting justice and legitimate freedoms" in this case and others.

1400 GMT: The Fightback Begins? Mark  down this date: 18 September. If I'm right, that is the last Friday of Ramadan (if I'm wrong, feel free to correct). It is also Qods Day, which is traditionally a day when Hashemi Rafsanjani leads ceremonies.

Mowj-e-Sabz has just declared that this will also be true this year, with Rafsanjani leading Friday prayers in Tehran and the Green movement preparing to march.

1345 GMT: A Quick Note on Media Coverage. Reuters has been in the lead on "Western" coverage of the trial, though it has little beyond Saeed Hajjarian, and it is still unaware of the regime's accusations against the Rafsanjani family. Al Jazeera English is still stuck with an early-morning overview, as is the BBC.

And CNN International is hopeless. Its Twitter outlet tweeted an hour ago about "the latest on our Iran wire": the story, from 0742 GMT, is on Mehdi Karroubi's allegations of sexual abuse of detainees.

1320 GMT: We were going to post a special analysis tomorrow morning of the significance of today's developments but, frankly, the move against Hashemi Rafsanjani as well as the attempt to break the reformists is so stunning that it cannot be too soon to highlight what may be a defining showdown in this crisis. So we've now published a snap analysis, "The Regime Goes After the Reformists AND Rafsanjani".

1220 GMT: Farhad Tajari, a member of the Parliamentary National Security Committee has told the Islamic Republic News Agency, "After a meeting with [Mehdi] Karoubi yesterday and based on our thorough and complete investigation.....We believe the claims [of sexual abuse of detainees] are baseless."

1215 GMT: Press TV English's website has published its first account of the trial, focusing on the Hajjarian statement, read by fellow Islamic Iran Participation Front member Saeed Shariati. Hajjarian did not admit --- "" have never been involved in cruelty and enmity towards the Iranian nation and the Islamic establishment" --- but expressed "hatred with all the moves that threatened the country's security". He then resigned from the IIPF.

Ominously the prosecutor called for the "maximum punishment", i.e., the death penalty, for Hajjarian.

1145 GMT: An EA correspondent confirms that the lead item on the Islamic Republic News Agency website claims, from today's "confession" of journalist Masoud Bastani, that the now-defunct website www.jomhouriyat.com was a "war room" for attacks against the Ahmadinejad Government and that the idea of claiming fraud in the election was passed to it through Mehdi Hashemi, Rafsanjani's son.

1140 GMT: Meanwhile, more "confessions" in the trial. Fars is now featuring the testimony of Shahab Tabatabai, the head of the youth branch of the Islamic Iran Participation Front. The headline claim is that Mir Hossein Mousavi suffered from the "illusion" that he would win a first-round victory in the Presidential election.

1130 GMT: We're checking the accounts of the trial with the help of correspondents. Here is the latest reading of the allegations linking Mir Hossein Mousavi and Hashemi Rafanjani: "Rafsanjani and Mousavi knew Ahmadinejad was winner when the preliminary count showed Ahmadinejad had a wide lead. They decided to create a 'velvet revolution' and demonstrate 'vote fraud'. Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi, was involved with Saham News, which was coordinating the demonstrations with the BBC, and he was geting paid through the Azad University in the form of a cheque."

1100 GMT: It looks like we read this correctly. Rah-e-Sabz summarises that the indictment and "confessions" implicate Hasemi Rafsanjani's nephew, Ali Hashemi, for stimulating demonstrations and his son, Mehdi Hashemi, for spreading disinformation.

1030 GMT: If our translation is correct, the regime has used the "confessions" of journalists Hamzeh Karami and Masoud Bastani not only to draw the picture of a foreign-directed network for velvet revolution and not only to allege the implementation of this through Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign, but also to implicate Hashemi Rafsanjani's son, Mehdi Hashemi. IRNA also carries an account of the effort "to create doubt and undermine the Ahmadinejad Government's decisions".

1020 GMT: Away from the trial, members of Parliament are holding meetings with President Ahmadinejad's Ministerial nominees in advance of votes of confidence beginning Sunday.

The Press TV article, quoting "principlist" MPs, indicates that the chances of Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, currently Minister of Defence but proposed to move to Interior, depend on his speech to Parliament: “The controversy surrounding Najjar's military background and how it will affect the interior ministry all depends on how he will defend his programs on the voting day in Parliament.” Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki is in better shape, though approval is not certain, and Minister of Industry Ali Akbar Mehrabian may remain if he can provide “an acceptable explanation” about his involvement in a fraud case.

1010 GMT: Fars is featuring more "confessions" from defendants, all of which point towards a foreign-instigated "velvet revolution". One defendant has spoken of the involvement of the US Government-funded Radio Farda and training at a site in Czechoslovakia.

It appears, though we cannot be certain, that at least one of the statements may refer to the involvement of sites connected to Hashemi Rafsanjani and, in particular, his son Mehdi Hashemi in this alleged conspiracy. We are double-checking translations to verify.

0925 GMT: Fars News Agency has now published a set of photographs from the 4th Tehran trial.

0740 GMT: Press TV has also published the general indictment of the defendants, based on their alleged statements, in the 4th Tehran trial. "Before the election, statistical evidence was provided that the difference [between candidates] was so great that [President] Ahmadinejad did not need to cheat"; however, the defendants claimed fraud to implement the "velvet revolution". The had "a direct relationship with the colonial and television networks of the BBC and the advertising propaganda machine of the British regime". Even while the voting was in progress, police closed "illegal networks". (Inadvertently, this claim highlights the significance of the testimony of Mousavi advisor Alireza Beheshti, which we carry today in a separate entry.)

0730 GMT: Fars News Agency has published, from Press TV, the statement of Saeed Hajjarian in the 4th Tehran trial. Hajjarian says he is innocent but apologised for "formidable errors" during and after the election. He then goes into a lengthy exposition of the "Western theory of velvet revolution" as "a serious lesson for all political activists".

0700 GMT: Reuters has first summary in English of the 4th Tehran trial. It lists the defendants we name below but, citing Islamic Republic News Agency, says, "Saaed Hajjarian, a former deputy intelligence minister turned architect of Iran's reform movement, was also among the accused".

0545 GMT: The fourth Tehran trial of post-election political detainees has opened, and there are some high-profile reformist politicians, activists, and journalists and the first Iranian-American to stand trial, Kian Tajbakhsh. According to Fars News, other defendants include Behzad Nabavi, Mohsen Safaei Farahani, Abdollah Ramezanzadeh, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Saeed Shariati, Mohsen Aminzadeh, Mostafa Tajzadeh, Shahab Tabatabai, Masoud Bastani, and Saeed Laylaz.

We're checking to see if Saeed Hajjarian, as rumoured over the last 72 hours, is also being tried today. Hajjarian's lawyer said he was forced to resign from the case was replaced by an attorney appointed by the State.

Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel

Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?
The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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Yesterday we posted an exchange between two Enduring America correspondents, Mr Smith and Mr Jones, on the current position and future prospects of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Their full and frank discussion soon took in not only Rafsanjani's fortunes but also those of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Our readers then took the analysis further with a set of thoughtful and challenging comments.

Today a third EA correspondent, Mr Johnson, joins the discussion with his views on both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. I believe that his thoughts and a further exchange with Mr Smith take us a stage farther in consideration of the present and future of the post-election crisis.

JOHNSON: I disagree with the statement of Mr. Smith regarding the body language of Rafsanjani, based upon the small clip that can be observed on the EA website. As an Iranian, I did not find any exhibition of subordinate behavior in Rafsanjani's body language. Did Mr. Smith expect arrogant stiffness and coldness? In Persian society, politeness is a deadlier weapon than an arrogant snub. A consummate politician of the old school like Rafsanjani will never ever stoop to a behaviour that will acknowledge that he has been ruffled by a non-entity like Ahmadinejad. I humbly suggest that Mr. Smith read Sir John Chardin's Travels in Persia, which beautifully demonstrates how such deadly politeness worked in the 17th century. The mechanics are still applicable today.The other side of the coin has not been considered at all. Not only has Rafsanjani not caved in, he has snubbed Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani did not participate in Ahmadinejad's inauguration ceremony, while he did come to the investment of Larijani who is a much lower-ranking official. This shows to everyone in no uncertain terms what Rafsanjani thinks of Ahmadinejad, and of course after planting such a well placed (and well-felt) insult so delicately, Rafsanjani can afford to be graciously polite to such gauche guttersnipe like Ahmadinejad.

In fact it is Ahmadinejad's behavior that supports my interpretation. If this were a ceremony depicting the humilation of Rafsanjani, based upon Ahmadinejad's innate pettiness, I would be sure that he would stay through the whole ceremony savouring the discomfiture of his enemy and his own triumph. The fact that Ahmadinejad came in quickly and left quickly before Rafsanjani's talk points to the fact that he was uncomfortable during the ceremony and that he left before Rafsanjani's speech as a retaliation.

Another issue that must be considered is that Rafsanjani is not looking for reform. Even the freedom of prisoners is not his primary goal. (It can be argued that some of the reformers in prison have been a thorn in his side as much as Ahmadinejad's.) Equating the reform movement with Rafsanjani's politics is a grave mistake; there may be some compatibilities between the two but they are separate issues. Personally, I think that Rafsanjani has been attempting (with some success) to project the image that he is way above the fray and is not getting involved in the political struggle; however, if the establishment is being eroded he will step in, and he will takes pains to couch his disagreements with Ahmadinejad in terms of the survival of the system.

Rafsanjani's reaction to Karroubi's letter again fits this model of an impartial high boss directing the underlings to right a wrong. Possibly his idea is to show to all the powers to be that he is very much the supreme leader. A supreme leader unlike Khamenei who, with his blatant partisanship of Ahmadinejad, has effectively turned the office into a jokeby condoning behavior that absolutely unacceptable.

Mr. Smith also dismisses institutions such as the Assembly of Experts and the opinions of the Grand Ayatollahs. I think that this is a mistake. The opinions of these individuals and others can carry weight in all branches of government, leading to fault-lines and fractures throughout the Iranian political landscape and to a galvanizing of the protest movement. In fact I think that it is these fractures that have prevented the Ahmadinejad and Khamenei factions from having sufficient power to neutralize the opposition. These fractures have become even deeper when one considers the modus operandi of Ahmadinejad: namely, his extreme cronyism in chosing his high level officials (many of whom lack basic credentials for the job), and his extreme reluctance to share power. Both of these issues have led even conservative politicians to worry for their survival: firstly, because they know that, if they do not belong to Ahamdinejad's close circle, they will not be given a political role to play, and secondly, because the inherent incompetence of the Ahmadinejad government is bound to lead the country to ruin. I think that the "carting off of the Assembly of Experts" may lead to even greater fractures that would blow up in the face of any potential "transportation agency".

Mr. Smith also is eloquent about Rafsanjani being lambasted by Ahmadinejad. I think that Mr. Rafsanjani's stock amongst the Iranian public may have increased by these attacks.
Finally, I have an issue with Mr Smith's statement: "However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong". Ahmadinejad is dealing with a potentially intractable Parliament will make trouble for the confidence votes of his Cabinet, he is dealing with a country that is operating at a much lower level of productivity than last year (e.g. the price of food stuffs have risen 50% in the last month, subsidies in foodstuffs have been cut off, etc.); social unrest has been a cause for so much concern that the idea of closing down schools and universities for the fall semester has been floated; Clinton and other Western leaders have stated that "they have no idea who is in charge in Iran", leaving relations in limbo; the dramatic lowering of Iranian prestige in the Muslim world has been caused by the reaction of the Iranian government towards the persecution of Chinese Muslims and huge coverage by Arab media of the allegations of sexual prison torture that make Abu Ghraib sound like the Holiday Inn; and the list goes on.

Mr. SMITH responds:

With all due respect for Mr Johnson, I really think he is greatly underrating Ahmadinejad and exaggerating the extent of Rafsanjani's actions. He should be guarded in his dismissal of Ahmadinejad as someone who has essentially dug his own grave. "Chronic problems" have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's first four years in office, long before the June elections, yet he still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a "joke" and have Khamenei stretch far to support him.

No mention is made of the repeated humiliations Rafsanjani has faced ever since Ahmadinejad brought him up in the TV debate with Mousavi. Quite frankly, it would be an amazing snubbing strategy, by all standards, after the President had leveled his charges of corruption.

Politeness and body language tell it all in Iran, as Mr Johnson rightfully states. For this very reason, Ahmadinejad stepping up on the podium, railing against Rafsanjani and getting off (and away with) it once again --- the ample photo galleries on Iranian news agencies do not show him as "uncomfortable" at all ---- shows the extent of his capacity to overrule etiquette and time-honoured cultural traditions. Once again, that he has done so without facing significant retaliation is telling.

Regarding Rafsanjani's stock within people at large, I hope Mr Johnson's definition of people is not restricted to the Green Wave. My own findings in Tehran before the election pointed to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his "thief" attacks in the Mousavi TV debate. To really generate support amongst the people, Rafsanjani should have inserted continuity to his post-electoral strategy, in the same way Karroubi and Mousavi have done.

As for the Assembly of Experts, Unless they pull off a major stunt in the next meeting, which no one I know believes they will, they will remain irrelevant in the current power struggle. They have been a spent force in all but one key event, the election of Khamenei. The Grand Ayatollahs carry weight, I don't deny that, but it would have been off topic to discuss them in the contours of my discussion with Mr Smith.

I agree with Mr Johnson's points on the perceptions Rafsanjani has of his own role within the system. The issue is whether he can carry these in practice. I have severe doubts.

Mr. JOHNSON replies:

Mr. Smith's views on the flaws and vulnerabilities of Rafsanjani are well-taken and deserve to be considered thoroughly in any analysis of the current situation and political power struggle in Iran. However, I do believe that his viewpoint colours his analysis and leads to implications with which I disagree.

Mr. Smith says "'chronic problems' have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's four years in office, long before the June elections, yet Mr Johnson still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a 'joke' and have Khamenei stretch far to support him". It is Mr. Smith's prerogative to dismiss all problems as merely "leitmotifs" sung by a choir of protest. I am not ashamed to plagiarise a good phrase, so I will take Mr. Smith's colourful Wagnerian analogy further. A high enough cacaphonous frequency of "effective leitmotifs" leads to the composition of "Gotterdammerung", a prospect that I am sure many Iranian politicians across the spectrum are considering very seriously.

I also think that Mr. Smith is placing way too much emphasis upon Ahmadinejad's slights and insults to Mr. Rafsanjani. In experimental science, every instrumental measurement has a signal and a noise. The signal is what is measured when a phenomenon occurs, and noise is the baseline that the instrument measures in the absence of the phenomenon. The issue with quantifying Ahmadinejad's statements is that the language with which he addresses any opponent (real or perceived) involves a heady mixture of snide comments, condescension, arrogance, and maybe an accusation or two thrown in for good measure. This lack of nuance makes it very difficult to assign a value scale to the insults, so it is a challenge to discriminate signal from the noise.

I also think that it should be pointed out that, during the Larijani ceremonies, insults were handed out like candy. If according to Mr. Smith, Ahmadinejad felt that he could insult Rafsanjani with impunity by walking out before his talk, Mr Nateq-Nouri also felt the same way about Ahmadinejad and insulted the President by walking out during his speech. Somehow the frequency of these insults diminishes their effect.

Mr. Smith gently implies that I may be biased by only considering the Green Wave as people. I have tried hard not to do so; however, I thank him for pointing out a potential pitfall. He then demonstrates his point ,using "his findings in Tehran before the election pointing to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his 'thief' attacks in the Mousavi TV debate." May I return the compliment by humbly suggesting that he should be much more critical about the significance of the results of his findings, avoiding a major error that many journalists make. This last year has been a year of elections and polls, and I took the opportunity to consult with many statisticians and sociologists about polling data. The resounding response from these experts was that the significance of the results of most polls is lost when they are subjected to rigorous statistical analysis.

I most emphatically do not intend to cast any aspersions upon the integrity of the findings of Mr. Smith nor his methodology for data collection. I just want to state that it is highly probable that once his findings are analysed rigorously and correctly via statistical methods, they will lose (just like any other poll) any meaningful significance, making it impossible to generalise these findings to the bulk of the population.

Latest Iran Video: The "Other" Larijani Speaks

The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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A reader points us to this video of Mohammad Javad Ardeshir-Larijani, the secretary of the judiciary's Human Rights Office and brother of the new head of judiciary (Sadegh Larijani) and Speaker of Parliament (Ali Larijani), as he accuses Mir Hossein Mousavi and his supporters of trying to undermine Iran. An English translation follows the video:

LARIJANI: We should note that when someone register for the elections, he fullly agrees with the system itself and the election procedure. Why does someone [like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi] who does not accept the supervisors, rules, and the arbitrators of the election sytem even take part in this race in the first place?

Except that he has a different goal in his mind. Maybe these people felt the need to save Iranians, which has nothing to do with the goals of the election. Who gave these candidates the order and responsibility to lead or to write new statements every second day, which anger and worry people? The voters are being misled and that is a criminal act. The people who pretended to fully accept the "velayat-e-faqih" and the "Path of the Imam (Khomeini)", are now wearing a green scarf, but this is not the path of our Imam. His true path is the system of velayat-e-faqih. Thats what we call the "path of the Imam".

How can they claim that the accept the principles of the Imam but fight everything he stood for? Thats a wrong and bad thing to do and the Iranian people won't forget this bad behaviour. We shouldn't even give the enemy the opportunity to be happy even it is only for one second. They will soon regret this and the people of islam will defeat the enemy.

But why have our friends done that much demage? Why do they not even believe in the simple framework of democratic behaviour?...I feel sad when I read the statements of those experienced men and wonder why they use this kind of harsh language, which makes the enemy so happy. Why are they doing them this favour?

The Supreme Leader has the last word and he already stated how this matter should be treated. Our politicians shouldn't forget that we are responsible to defend and secure the national interest. Its our duty to do so. Even if we see that some injustice has been done to us, we must ignore it for the sake of the national interest, because the national interest is supreme and we all must secure it.