Wednesday
Aug192009
Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel
Wednesday, August 19, 2009 at 7:24
Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?
The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons
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Yesterday we posted an exchange between two Enduring America correspondents, Mr Smith and Mr Jones, on the current position and future prospects of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Their full and frank discussion soon took in not only Rafsanjani's fortunes but also those of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Our readers then took the analysis further with a set of thoughtful and challenging comments.
Today a third EA correspondent, Mr Johnson, joins the discussion with his views on both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. I believe that his thoughts and a further exchange with Mr Smith take us a stage farther in consideration of the present and future of the post-election crisis.
JOHNSON: I disagree with the statement of Mr. Smith regarding the body language of Rafsanjani, based upon the small clip that can be observed on the EA website. As an Iranian, I did not find any exhibition of subordinate behavior in Rafsanjani's body language. Did Mr. Smith expect arrogant stiffness and coldness? In Persian society, politeness is a deadlier weapon than an arrogant snub. A consummate politician of the old school like Rafsanjani will never ever stoop to a behaviour that will acknowledge that he has been ruffled by a non-entity like Ahmadinejad. I humbly suggest that Mr. Smith read Sir John Chardin's Travels in Persia, which beautifully demonstrates how such deadly politeness worked in the 17th century. The mechanics are still applicable today.The other side of the coin has not been considered at all. Not only has Rafsanjani not caved in, he has snubbed Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani did not participate in Ahmadinejad's inauguration ceremony, while he did come to the investment of Larijani who is a much lower-ranking official. This shows to everyone in no uncertain terms what Rafsanjani thinks of Ahmadinejad, and of course after planting such a well placed (and well-felt) insult so delicately, Rafsanjani can afford to be graciously polite to such gauche guttersnipe like Ahmadinejad.
In fact it is Ahmadinejad's behavior that supports my interpretation. If this were a ceremony depicting the humilation of Rafsanjani, based upon Ahmadinejad's innate pettiness, I would be sure that he would stay through the whole ceremony savouring the discomfiture of his enemy and his own triumph. The fact that Ahmadinejad came in quickly and left quickly before Rafsanjani's talk points to the fact that he was uncomfortable during the ceremony and that he left before Rafsanjani's speech as a retaliation.
Another issue that must be considered is that Rafsanjani is not looking for reform. Even the freedom of prisoners is not his primary goal. (It can be argued that some of the reformers in prison have been a thorn in his side as much as Ahmadinejad's.) Equating the reform movement with Rafsanjani's politics is a grave mistake; there may be some compatibilities between the two but they are separate issues. Personally, I think that Rafsanjani has been attempting (with some success) to project the image that he is way above the fray and is not getting involved in the political struggle; however, if the establishment is being eroded he will step in, and he will takes pains to couch his disagreements with Ahmadinejad in terms of the survival of the system.
Rafsanjani's reaction to Karroubi's letter again fits this model of an impartial high boss directing the underlings to right a wrong. Possibly his idea is to show to all the powers to be that he is very much the supreme leader. A supreme leader unlike Khamenei who, with his blatant partisanship of Ahmadinejad, has effectively turned the office into a jokeby condoning behavior that absolutely unacceptable.
Mr. Smith also dismisses institutions such as the Assembly of Experts and the opinions of the Grand Ayatollahs. I think that this is a mistake. The opinions of these individuals and others can carry weight in all branches of government, leading to fault-lines and fractures throughout the Iranian political landscape and to a galvanizing of the protest movement. In fact I think that it is these fractures that have prevented the Ahmadinejad and Khamenei factions from having sufficient power to neutralize the opposition. These fractures have become even deeper when one considers the modus operandi of Ahmadinejad: namely, his extreme cronyism in chosing his high level officials (many of whom lack basic credentials for the job), and his extreme reluctance to share power. Both of these issues have led even conservative politicians to worry for their survival: firstly, because they know that, if they do not belong to Ahamdinejad's close circle, they will not be given a political role to play, and secondly, because the inherent incompetence of the Ahmadinejad government is bound to lead the country to ruin. I think that the "carting off of the Assembly of Experts" may lead to even greater fractures that would blow up in the face of any potential "transportation agency".
Mr. Smith also is eloquent about Rafsanjani being lambasted by Ahmadinejad. I think that Mr. Rafsanjani's stock amongst the Iranian public may have increased by these attacks.
Finally, I have an issue with Mr Smith's statement: "However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong". Ahmadinejad is dealing with a potentially intractable Parliament will make trouble for the confidence votes of his Cabinet, he is dealing with a country that is operating at a much lower level of productivity than last year (e.g. the price of food stuffs have risen 50% in the last month, subsidies in foodstuffs have been cut off, etc.); social unrest has been a cause for so much concern that the idea of closing down schools and universities for the fall semester has been floated; Clinton and other Western leaders have stated that "they have no idea who is in charge in Iran", leaving relations in limbo; the dramatic lowering of Iranian prestige in the Muslim world has been caused by the reaction of the Iranian government towards the persecution of Chinese Muslims and huge coverage by Arab media of the allegations of sexual prison torture that make Abu Ghraib sound like the Holiday Inn; and the list goes on.
Mr. SMITH responds:
With all due respect for Mr Johnson, I really think he is greatly underrating Ahmadinejad and exaggerating the extent of Rafsanjani's actions. He should be guarded in his dismissal of Ahmadinejad as someone who has essentially dug his own grave. "Chronic problems" have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's first four years in office, long before the June elections, yet he still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a "joke" and have Khamenei stretch far to support him.
No mention is made of the repeated humiliations Rafsanjani has faced ever since Ahmadinejad brought him up in the TV debate with Mousavi. Quite frankly, it would be an amazing snubbing strategy, by all standards, after the President had leveled his charges of corruption.
Politeness and body language tell it all in Iran, as Mr Johnson rightfully states. For this very reason, Ahmadinejad stepping up on the podium, railing against Rafsanjani and getting off (and away with) it once again --- the ample photo galleries on Iranian news agencies do not show him as "uncomfortable" at all ---- shows the extent of his capacity to overrule etiquette and time-honoured cultural traditions. Once again, that he has done so without facing significant retaliation is telling.
Regarding Rafsanjani's stock within people at large, I hope Mr Johnson's definition of people is not restricted to the Green Wave. My own findings in Tehran before the election pointed to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his "thief" attacks in the Mousavi TV debate. To really generate support amongst the people, Rafsanjani should have inserted continuity to his post-electoral strategy, in the same way Karroubi and Mousavi have done.
As for the Assembly of Experts, Unless they pull off a major stunt in the next meeting, which no one I know believes they will, they will remain irrelevant in the current power struggle. They have been a spent force in all but one key event, the election of Khamenei. The Grand Ayatollahs carry weight, I don't deny that, but it would have been off topic to discuss them in the contours of my discussion with Mr Smith.
I agree with Mr Johnson's points on the perceptions Rafsanjani has of his own role within the system. The issue is whether he can carry these in practice. I have severe doubts.
Mr. JOHNSON replies:
Mr. Smith's views on the flaws and vulnerabilities of Rafsanjani are well-taken and deserve to be considered thoroughly in any analysis of the current situation and political power struggle in Iran. However, I do believe that his viewpoint colours his analysis and leads to implications with which I disagree.
Mr. Smith says "'chronic problems' have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's four years in office, long before the June elections, yet Mr Johnson still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a 'joke' and have Khamenei stretch far to support him". It is Mr. Smith's prerogative to dismiss all problems as merely "leitmotifs" sung by a choir of protest. I am not ashamed to plagiarise a good phrase, so I will take Mr. Smith's colourful Wagnerian analogy further. A high enough cacaphonous frequency of "effective leitmotifs" leads to the composition of "Gotterdammerung", a prospect that I am sure many Iranian politicians across the spectrum are considering very seriously.
I also think that Mr. Smith is placing way too much emphasis upon Ahmadinejad's slights and insults to Mr. Rafsanjani. In experimental science, every instrumental measurement has a signal and a noise. The signal is what is measured when a phenomenon occurs, and noise is the baseline that the instrument measures in the absence of the phenomenon. The issue with quantifying Ahmadinejad's statements is that the language with which he addresses any opponent (real or perceived) involves a heady mixture of snide comments, condescension, arrogance, and maybe an accusation or two thrown in for good measure. This lack of nuance makes it very difficult to assign a value scale to the insults, so it is a challenge to discriminate signal from the noise.
I also think that it should be pointed out that, during the Larijani ceremonies, insults were handed out like candy. If according to Mr. Smith, Ahmadinejad felt that he could insult Rafsanjani with impunity by walking out before his talk, Mr Nateq-Nouri also felt the same way about Ahmadinejad and insulted the President by walking out during his speech. Somehow the frequency of these insults diminishes their effect.
Mr. Smith gently implies that I may be biased by only considering the Green Wave as people. I have tried hard not to do so; however, I thank him for pointing out a potential pitfall. He then demonstrates his point ,using "his findings in Tehran before the election pointing to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his 'thief' attacks in the Mousavi TV debate." May I return the compliment by humbly suggesting that he should be much more critical about the significance of the results of his findings, avoiding a major error that many journalists make. This last year has been a year of elections and polls, and I took the opportunity to consult with many statisticians and sociologists about polling data. The resounding response from these experts was that the significance of the results of most polls is lost when they are subjected to rigorous statistical analysis.
I most emphatically do not intend to cast any aspersions upon the integrity of the findings of Mr. Smith nor his methodology for data collection. I just want to state that it is highly probable that once his findings are analysed rigorously and correctly via statistical methods, they will lose (just like any other poll) any meaningful significance, making it impossible to generalise these findings to the bulk of the population.
The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
Yesterday we posted an exchange between two Enduring America correspondents, Mr Smith and Mr Jones, on the current position and future prospects of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Their full and frank discussion soon took in not only Rafsanjani's fortunes but also those of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Our readers then took the analysis further with a set of thoughtful and challenging comments.Today a third EA correspondent, Mr Johnson, joins the discussion with his views on both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. I believe that his thoughts and a further exchange with Mr Smith take us a stage farther in consideration of the present and future of the post-election crisis.
JOHNSON: I disagree with the statement of Mr. Smith regarding the body language of Rafsanjani, based upon the small clip that can be observed on the EA website. As an Iranian, I did not find any exhibition of subordinate behavior in Rafsanjani's body language. Did Mr. Smith expect arrogant stiffness and coldness? In Persian society, politeness is a deadlier weapon than an arrogant snub. A consummate politician of the old school like Rafsanjani will never ever stoop to a behaviour that will acknowledge that he has been ruffled by a non-entity like Ahmadinejad. I humbly suggest that Mr. Smith read Sir John Chardin's Travels in Persia, which beautifully demonstrates how such deadly politeness worked in the 17th century. The mechanics are still applicable today.The other side of the coin has not been considered at all. Not only has Rafsanjani not caved in, he has snubbed Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani did not participate in Ahmadinejad's inauguration ceremony, while he did come to the investment of Larijani who is a much lower-ranking official. This shows to everyone in no uncertain terms what Rafsanjani thinks of Ahmadinejad, and of course after planting such a well placed (and well-felt) insult so delicately, Rafsanjani can afford to be graciously polite to such gauche guttersnipe like Ahmadinejad.
In fact it is Ahmadinejad's behavior that supports my interpretation. If this were a ceremony depicting the humilation of Rafsanjani, based upon Ahmadinejad's innate pettiness, I would be sure that he would stay through the whole ceremony savouring the discomfiture of his enemy and his own triumph. The fact that Ahmadinejad came in quickly and left quickly before Rafsanjani's talk points to the fact that he was uncomfortable during the ceremony and that he left before Rafsanjani's speech as a retaliation.
Another issue that must be considered is that Rafsanjani is not looking for reform. Even the freedom of prisoners is not his primary goal. (It can be argued that some of the reformers in prison have been a thorn in his side as much as Ahmadinejad's.) Equating the reform movement with Rafsanjani's politics is a grave mistake; there may be some compatibilities between the two but they are separate issues. Personally, I think that Rafsanjani has been attempting (with some success) to project the image that he is way above the fray and is not getting involved in the political struggle; however, if the establishment is being eroded he will step in, and he will takes pains to couch his disagreements with Ahmadinejad in terms of the survival of the system.
Rafsanjani's reaction to Karroubi's letter again fits this model of an impartial high boss directing the underlings to right a wrong. Possibly his idea is to show to all the powers to be that he is very much the supreme leader. A supreme leader unlike Khamenei who, with his blatant partisanship of Ahmadinejad, has effectively turned the office into a jokeby condoning behavior that absolutely unacceptable.
Mr. Smith also dismisses institutions such as the Assembly of Experts and the opinions of the Grand Ayatollahs. I think that this is a mistake. The opinions of these individuals and others can carry weight in all branches of government, leading to fault-lines and fractures throughout the Iranian political landscape and to a galvanizing of the protest movement. In fact I think that it is these fractures that have prevented the Ahmadinejad and Khamenei factions from having sufficient power to neutralize the opposition. These fractures have become even deeper when one considers the modus operandi of Ahmadinejad: namely, his extreme cronyism in chosing his high level officials (many of whom lack basic credentials for the job), and his extreme reluctance to share power. Both of these issues have led even conservative politicians to worry for their survival: firstly, because they know that, if they do not belong to Ahamdinejad's close circle, they will not be given a political role to play, and secondly, because the inherent incompetence of the Ahmadinejad government is bound to lead the country to ruin. I think that the "carting off of the Assembly of Experts" may lead to even greater fractures that would blow up in the face of any potential "transportation agency".
Mr. Smith also is eloquent about Rafsanjani being lambasted by Ahmadinejad. I think that Mr. Rafsanjani's stock amongst the Iranian public may have increased by these attacks.
Finally, I have an issue with Mr Smith's statement: "However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong". Ahmadinejad is dealing with a potentially intractable Parliament will make trouble for the confidence votes of his Cabinet, he is dealing with a country that is operating at a much lower level of productivity than last year (e.g. the price of food stuffs have risen 50% in the last month, subsidies in foodstuffs have been cut off, etc.); social unrest has been a cause for so much concern that the idea of closing down schools and universities for the fall semester has been floated; Clinton and other Western leaders have stated that "they have no idea who is in charge in Iran", leaving relations in limbo; the dramatic lowering of Iranian prestige in the Muslim world has been caused by the reaction of the Iranian government towards the persecution of Chinese Muslims and huge coverage by Arab media of the allegations of sexual prison torture that make Abu Ghraib sound like the Holiday Inn; and the list goes on.
Mr. SMITH responds:
With all due respect for Mr Johnson, I really think he is greatly underrating Ahmadinejad and exaggerating the extent of Rafsanjani's actions. He should be guarded in his dismissal of Ahmadinejad as someone who has essentially dug his own grave. "Chronic problems" have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's first four years in office, long before the June elections, yet he still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a "joke" and have Khamenei stretch far to support him.
No mention is made of the repeated humiliations Rafsanjani has faced ever since Ahmadinejad brought him up in the TV debate with Mousavi. Quite frankly, it would be an amazing snubbing strategy, by all standards, after the President had leveled his charges of corruption.
Politeness and body language tell it all in Iran, as Mr Johnson rightfully states. For this very reason, Ahmadinejad stepping up on the podium, railing against Rafsanjani and getting off (and away with) it once again --- the ample photo galleries on Iranian news agencies do not show him as "uncomfortable" at all ---- shows the extent of his capacity to overrule etiquette and time-honoured cultural traditions. Once again, that he has done so without facing significant retaliation is telling.
Regarding Rafsanjani's stock within people at large, I hope Mr Johnson's definition of people is not restricted to the Green Wave. My own findings in Tehran before the election pointed to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his "thief" attacks in the Mousavi TV debate. To really generate support amongst the people, Rafsanjani should have inserted continuity to his post-electoral strategy, in the same way Karroubi and Mousavi have done.
As for the Assembly of Experts, Unless they pull off a major stunt in the next meeting, which no one I know believes they will, they will remain irrelevant in the current power struggle. They have been a spent force in all but one key event, the election of Khamenei. The Grand Ayatollahs carry weight, I don't deny that, but it would have been off topic to discuss them in the contours of my discussion with Mr Smith.
I agree with Mr Johnson's points on the perceptions Rafsanjani has of his own role within the system. The issue is whether he can carry these in practice. I have severe doubts.
Mr. JOHNSON replies:
Mr. Smith's views on the flaws and vulnerabilities of Rafsanjani are well-taken and deserve to be considered thoroughly in any analysis of the current situation and political power struggle in Iran. However, I do believe that his viewpoint colours his analysis and leads to implications with which I disagree.
Mr. Smith says "'chronic problems' have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's four years in office, long before the June elections, yet Mr Johnson still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a 'joke' and have Khamenei stretch far to support him". It is Mr. Smith's prerogative to dismiss all problems as merely "leitmotifs" sung by a choir of protest. I am not ashamed to plagiarise a good phrase, so I will take Mr. Smith's colourful Wagnerian analogy further. A high enough cacaphonous frequency of "effective leitmotifs" leads to the composition of "Gotterdammerung", a prospect that I am sure many Iranian politicians across the spectrum are considering very seriously.
I also think that Mr. Smith is placing way too much emphasis upon Ahmadinejad's slights and insults to Mr. Rafsanjani. In experimental science, every instrumental measurement has a signal and a noise. The signal is what is measured when a phenomenon occurs, and noise is the baseline that the instrument measures in the absence of the phenomenon. The issue with quantifying Ahmadinejad's statements is that the language with which he addresses any opponent (real or perceived) involves a heady mixture of snide comments, condescension, arrogance, and maybe an accusation or two thrown in for good measure. This lack of nuance makes it very difficult to assign a value scale to the insults, so it is a challenge to discriminate signal from the noise.
I also think that it should be pointed out that, during the Larijani ceremonies, insults were handed out like candy. If according to Mr. Smith, Ahmadinejad felt that he could insult Rafsanjani with impunity by walking out before his talk, Mr Nateq-Nouri also felt the same way about Ahmadinejad and insulted the President by walking out during his speech. Somehow the frequency of these insults diminishes their effect.
Mr. Smith gently implies that I may be biased by only considering the Green Wave as people. I have tried hard not to do so; however, I thank him for pointing out a potential pitfall. He then demonstrates his point ,using "his findings in Tehran before the election pointing to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his 'thief' attacks in the Mousavi TV debate." May I return the compliment by humbly suggesting that he should be much more critical about the significance of the results of his findings, avoiding a major error that many journalists make. This last year has been a year of elections and polls, and I took the opportunity to consult with many statisticians and sociologists about polling data. The resounding response from these experts was that the significance of the results of most polls is lost when they are subjected to rigorous statistical analysis.
I most emphatically do not intend to cast any aspersions upon the integrity of the findings of Mr. Smith nor his methodology for data collection. I just want to state that it is highly probable that once his findings are analysed rigorously and correctly via statistical methods, they will lose (just like any other poll) any meaningful significance, making it impossible to generalise these findings to the bulk of the population.
