The 4th Tehran Trial: The Tehran Bureau Summary

The Latest from Iran (25 August): The Trials Resume
Video: The 4th Tehran Trial (25 August)
The Tehran Trial: The Regime Goes After the Reformists AND Rafsanjani

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At the end of a dramatic and surprising day, perhaps one of the most important since 12 June, Muhammad Sahimi of Tehran Bureau offers a concise summary of the 4th Tehran trial. This picks up on a lot of the developments we've noted in our live blog, bringing them together in one place. Even more importantly, Sahimi notes the goals of the regime that we've identified: 1) to break the reformists through charges of treason; 2) to humiliate Saeed Hajjarian, one of the key figures in the movement; and 3) the objective missed by all others in the Western media, the curbing of Hashemi Rafsanjani:

Stalinist Show Trials, Part Four

The fourth installment of the Stalinesque show trials of the leaders of the reformist movement was held today in Tehran. In this part of the big show, some of the most important reformist leaders were featured, including Dr. Mohsen Mirdamadi, secretary-general of Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), the most important reformist group in Iran; Mohsen Safaei Farahani, Saeed Shariati, Abdollah Ramazanzadeh, Shahabolddin Tabatabaei, and Dr. Saeed Hajjarian, all leading members of the IIPF; Mostafa Tajzadeh, a member of the IIPF and the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organization (IRMO), another leading reformist group; Behzad Nabavi, a leading member of the IRMO, and Hedayatollah Aghaei, a leading member of the Executives of Reconstruction Party (ERP), a reformist group close to former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Also present in court were Dr. Kian Tajbakhsh, who used to work for the George Soros Open Society, and three of the journalists arrested, Jalal Karami, Masoud Bastani, and Mohammad Quchani, a leading reformist journalist and editor of many reformist newspapers that have been closed by the hardliners. [Overall, 42 journalists were arrested, but some were later released]. Mohammad Reza Jalaeipour, who was a leader of the Mir Hossein Mousavi campaign, and a doctoral student at Oxford University in Britain, was also present in court. The court has apparently ordered the release of Quchani and Jalaeipour before the court session took place, but they were still brought to court for an appearance.

Once again, the prosecutor read a long “indictment” that had been prepared by Saeed Mortazavi, Tehran’s notorious Prosecutor General and the Prosecutor of the Revolutionary Court. Once again, the “indictment” was not a legal document, but a political manifesto of the hardliners, almost all of which had been published over the past few years by the daily newspaper Kayhan, the mouthpiece of the security-intelligence apparatus, and Fars News Agency, which operates more like a propaganda machine.

Once again, the reformist leaders were accused of having links with foreign powers, and in particular Britain and the United States, through a variety of channels, from the Open Society to people who are, or were at some point, supposedly members of western intelligence agencies.

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Iran Debate: Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?

Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel
The Latest from Iran (18 August): Which Way for the Government?

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Throughout yesterday, there was a fascinating (and, I think, important) debate between two of Enduring America's specialists on Iran, Mr. Smith and Mr. Jones, about the political fortunes of Hashemi Rafsanjani. The discussion not only considers whether the former President retains a significant influence over the future of the Islamic Republic but also looks at the positions of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Feedback from readers would be welcome, as I believe this may be one of the defining contexts for the outcome of this post-election crisis:

SMITH: I think that Rafsanjani has been giving up his "Godfather" role within the Green movement progressively. If you add up his non-reply to [Mehdi] Karroubi's letter [on abuse of detainees], his embarassing retreat from Friday prayers, and today [appearing with President Ahmadinejad], you get the impression of someone who is deeply distressed but does not feel secure enough to embark on a major confrontation with the state power. It is unnerving in the sense that, as the Mehr photos show [of the Rafsanjani-Ahmadinejad encounter], it is actually Rafsanjani that is adopting a body language geared towards subordination, and not the other way round. The gesture is the single most important "frame" to have come out of elite circles in Iran afte the shoulder kiss of Ahmadinejad to the Supreme Leader during his inauguration.

JONES: But then again, what did Rafsanjani have to gain from replying to Karroubi's letter? That's a hot potato that even [Mir Hossein] Mousavi is wary of handling. I do agree that Rafsanjani is deeply distressed (something his brother made clear), but I'm not sure his "Godfather" role was anything but a superficial and transitory collision of interests. Now Rafsanjani is unsure how his interests are best served and is thus "pausing". This also coincided with the emergence of the Majlis [Parliament]hmin challenging Ahmadinejad, a dynamic in which Rafsanjani was less involved.

I think when he does get around to speaking at Friday Prayers, we will have a much better understanding of his peace of mind and tactical re-appraisal.

SMITH: Rafsanjani's speech on July 17 was quite genuine, as was the distress he vented out through his brother on the Iranian Labor News Agency. But he has realised that Khamenei has gone for brute force and that it's better for himself and his family to back down. So my gut feeling is that there is more than transitory interests here, but he is by now emerging as a spent force. The one and last stand he could/might make is the next Assembly of Experts meeting, whenever that will take place; however, despite all this prodding from former MPs, Grand Ayatollahs, etc. that we have been seeing in the form of all these anonymous letters calling for Khamenei's head, I doubt we shall see Rafsanjani substantiating these.

A passing joke among myself and my Iranian contacts is that the Assembly of Experts communique dismissing Khamenei would not even reach the website of the Assembly before all those septuagenarians are carted away.

JONES: I agree that this pressure will have a lasting legacy. In effect, I think the parameters of Iranian political culture, memory and participation have been extended. In the short term, the regime equates compromise with weakness. In the longer term, such will be the fear of bringing millions of Iranians onto the streets that compromise will be equated with stability (perhaps even survival).

I can think of very few popular movements who have mobilised equivalent support and not gone on to extract or induce significant concessions or changes in the long term.

I guess the extent to which we see Rafsanjani as a spent force depends on our expectations of what he wanted to achieve and how realistic it was he could achieve it. The removal of Ahmadinejad? I don't think was achievable, and Rafsanjani eventually understood this. So, he settled for the effective neutering of Ahmadinejad's 2nd administration, which I think will happen. Khamenei was, in my view, equally never going to be removed. But Rafsanjani ultimately challenged him and is still standing- that's radical in itself. The question is, what has the last 2-3 months cost him? Has it cost Khamenei more or less?

SMITH: I would urge caution on Rafsanjani's capability of neutering Ahmadinejad's administration, but I agree that much has changed in the Iranian political landscape for good in the past two months, regardless of any future progress by the Green movement. However, I am sure that Khamenei has factored in some "cost" or "loss" when agreeing to go by with the hardliners, although I can't say whether he was really ready for this sort of reaction from the people.

As for Rafsanjani, well, he has paid a high price all along. He was lambasted by Ahmadinejad in the debates, has had people extremely close to him such as [Mohammad] Atrianfar, [Mohammad] Qoochani and others thrown into jail and paraded before TV long after his Friday prayer plea for their release, was forced to backtrack when he withdrew from the last Friday prayers [14 August], and today, according to one of the main columnists of Etemade Melli, he "bowed before Ahmadinejad like a servant does in front of his master". So, all in all, I have to stake my claim that he has not emerged in a very good posiition overall, although he has managed to cling on to some of his old powers and be somewhat "radical". But, as Iranian politics have thought us, its better to wait and see, starting from the Assembly of Experts meeting!

JONES: Do you think there was anything Rafsanjani could have done differently? This may be a curious case where none of the current "heavyweights" of the system have come off well, least of all Ahmadinejad (and Khamenei).

Raf's fortunes have ebbed and flowed: he was far more humilated by his loss to Ahmadinejad in 2005 than by the slurs in the 2009 debate. Fact remains, Rafsanjani is still more powerful than Ahmadinejad. The reason being that Ahmadinejad has never challenged the Supreme Leader and was effectively told to shut up and keep out of sight (something Khamenei could not do to Rafsanjani).

I don't think Rafsanjani expected those detained to be released; he wanted it on record that he had called for it. I also think that the mutterings about Rafsanjani are the continuation of old complaints, but the rumblings about Khamenei's suitability as Supreme Leader are something that have never ever come out before, even if they were felt privately by many). As you say, however, we will have to wait and see.

SMITH: I am still unsure of the real extent of Rafsanjani's power. On paper, he is as powerful as it gets, more so given that he survived an attempt to remove him from the leadership of the Assembly of Experts in February, meaning that he could technically count on a majority there.

As for his fortun, you should take the pre-electoral slurs and post-electoral moves as one big package. Not to forget the total sidelining of his concerns, as stated in the letter and three-hour meeting he had with Khamenei right before the elections. A close Rafsanjain associate boasted about the "positive signals" emerging from that meeting to several foreign diplomats, so you can appreciate the sort of "con" Khamenei played on his old associate.

The slurs against Rafsanjani were conducive, according to my own field work and those of others in Tehran before the elections, to a rise of votes for Ahmadinejad, while I will wait for the Assembly of Experts meeting to express my thoughts on his post electoral performance. However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong. True, he is rebuked from all quarters, including the Supreme Leader, every now and then, but he has been remarkably successful in exerting his own viewpoints on the long-term evolution of many affairs of state, including the nuclear file, relations with the West, and the economy. He has driven the economy to shambles yet nobody has really managed to serious "punish" him for that, which is quite astonishing in its own right.