The Latest from Iran (23 August): Is Rafsanjani in An Anti-Ahmadinejad Bloc?

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The Latest from Iran (22 August): A Pause for Ramadan?

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1940 GMT: A slow few hours but there is a story that is threatening to take off.

We reported on Friday, via Norooz that "on both 12 July and 15 July, the bodies of tens of protestors were brought in without any identification, secretly and under strict security [to Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery]. Staff were forced to issue compulsory burial licences, and the bodies were interred in Section 302."

A pro-Ahmadinejad member of Parliament has denied the allegation, so Norooz has published the burial permit numbers to encourage MPs who want to investigate the story.

1525 GMT: Twitter reports that blogger Somayeh Tohidlu has been released from detention after more than two months.

1510 GMT: Mr Smith Begs to Differ. Earlier this week, three of our EA correspondents, assisted by our readers, had an important debate on whether Hashemi Rafsanjani was still an important force in post-elections manoeuvres (Part 1 and Part 2). The events of the last 24 hours bear out the significance of that discussion.

One of the correspondents, Mr Smith, now intervenes on my assessment (1200 GMT), both of Rafsanjani's challenge to the system and on President Ahmadinejad's position:

The widespread belief that the Kargozaran party is representing Rafsanjani's political vision (0700 GMT and 1240 GMT) needs further scrutiny. While it is true that it has always been an association of technocrats closely linked to Rafsanjani, it has never been a mouthpiece for Rafsanjani himself, and It has been subject to multiple internal schisms and divisions. Most recently, Gholamhosein Karbaschi and another leader, Mohammad Ali Najafi, sided with Karroubi in the elections while the rest of the leadership went for Mousavi. This explains why the party has now backed Karroubi, but the labelling "Rafsanjani's party" is a bit too far-fetched.

As for my own reading of Rafsanjani's statement at the Expediency Council, while it is true that it represents once again the essence of what he said at Friday prayers on July 17, I feel that it is a bit thin on real criticism to Ahmadinejadm and the news agencies did not do bad in highlighting the remarks pertaining to Khamenei. Karroubi and Mousavi need a slight tilt of Rafsanjani in their favour now more than ever, and he really risks being confined to rhetorical and mild criticisms of Ahmadinejad if he remains unable to impress some sort of change in direction to the current overhaul of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and other pro-Ahmadinjead parties on government.

On this regard,the head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Majlis [Parliament], Alaeddin Borujerdi, has stated that his commission has no objection to Heydar Moslehi [Intelligence], Ahmad Vahidi [Defense] or Manouchehr Mottaki [Foreign Affairs], and is only perturbed by Mostafa Mohammad Najjar at Interior. Borujerdi revealingly let out that Moslehi has "adequate experience in the IRGC Intelligence Division".

Rooz Online has information on the new Intelligence Ministry actively blocking the release of bailed political prisoners in Evin, an ominous sign of things to come.

1445 GMT: Parleman News reports that President Ahmadinejad's Ministerial choices will come up for votes of confidence in Parliament next Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday.

1340 GMT: More on the Kargozaran Party statement, which may or may not reflect the views of Hashemi Rafsanjani (see 0700 GMT): Friday prayers has become a "tool for issuing threats".

1335 GMT: Assessment or Wish Fulfillment? Kayhan, the "conservative" newspaper, is claiming that, with his statement yesterday, Rafsanjani has taken himself out of the political arena, ruling out any opposition bloc with Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

1225 GMT: Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has ordered MPs to receive the evidence of Mehdi Karroubi on abuse of detainees.

1200 GMT: We Don't Want to Say We Told You So But....

Hashemi Rafsanjani's website has posted a summary of the former President's speech to the Expediency Council, and it bears out our interpretation that Rafsanjani has not backed away from a challenge to President Ahmadinejad. Here's the text, as translated by the Neo-Resistance blog:

In presence of the majority of the members, the head of the Expediency Council, again reiterated that the passage through current problems becomes possible by shift from sensationalism into rationalism and emphasized that the media and different tribunes should prove their loyalty to the Supreme Leader's vision of unity in practice.

....At the beginning of the meeting, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani congratulated the start of the holy month of Ramadan, month of feasting with divinity, month of spiritual self reflection and social justice; and expressed hope that in the spiritual light of this divine month should lead to strengthening unity and conciliation. He pointed out the necessity of increased compassion and unity of the officials with the people, to enable passage of the country through its internal and foreign problems and stressed: "Acting with wisdom, principle and due diligence will make this into an attainable and practical objective."

Hashemi Rafsanjani stated that it was essential to respect the Leader's orders and guidance, creating appropriate situations to abide by the constitution beyond group interests, opposing deviation from the law and confronting the law-breakers from either side, replacing the emotional atmosphere with a rational one, and creating an environment for free criticism, reasoning and providing legal and reasonable responses to fair criticism in the current situation. He added, "If these conditions are met, then the impact of the foreign media which is often tainted by colonial intentions will diminish and attention to local news sources will increase and the confrontations on the surface of the society and between different factions will move to media and internal news sources."

In conclusion, the head of the Expediency Council emphasized that the guidelines of the Supreme Leader with respect to recent arrests, compensation for those whose rights have been violated, and punishment of the outlaws open a way through current problems and said: "All, in any position, must abide by these [principles] and those with tribunes, influence, and media have to avoid divisionism, labelling, and controversy and help unity and reconciliation of the society.

Rafsanjani expressed hope that the independent and elite members of the Expediency Council will be the first to walk in this path.

0700 GMT: With the day starting quietly, we have space to pick up on the significant development from yesterday. Contrary to some initial nervous reactions, the politician under pressure is not former President Hashemi Rafsanjani but (as has been the case for weeks) current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Understandably, given there were limited political activity on the first day of Ramadan, Rafsanjani's statement as he chaired the Expediency Council received immediate and intense attention. The problem is that the immediate and intense reaction, even from skilled analysts at places like the National Iranian American Council, was knee-jerk and misguided, picking up only on Rafsanjani's call for all to unite behind the Supreme Leader.

The former President has never called, before or after the election, for defiance of Ayatollah Khamenei or an overturn of velayat-e-faqih (ultimate clerical authority), and it would be political folly for him to do so now. So of course he is not joining the calls of some senior clerics to consider the invocation of Law 111 against the Supreme Leader's fitness to rule. Indeed, no leading opposition politician --- Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami --- is joining that call.

The political challenge instead is to President Ahmadinejad and the institutions that he and his allies are trying to control. The rest of Rafsanjani's statement buttressed that challenge, albeit in general terms, with its call for justice, adherence by officials to the Constitution, and guidelines for proper conduct in cases such as detentions. As we noted yesterday, that is not far off Mehdi Karroubi's position; the difference is that Karroubi has been high-profile with his specific call, embodied in his 29 July letter to Rafsanjani, for investigation of the abuses of detainees.

Then the Karzogaran Party, which some have identified as "Rafsanjani's party":

Karroubi’s bravery, courage, and his compassionate approach in rooting out the current corruption in the country’s security and judicial apparatuses, is not only worthy of attention and congratulations, but has brought about an invasion of repeated attacks by various people and groups in the name of ‘defending the system’. These behaviors serve as evidence of the ridiculousness of trying to combat reality.

The National Iranian American Council revised its position: Rafsanjani was no longer giving way to the Supreme Leader but was maintaining his challenge to the regime.

Rafsanjani's next substantive step remains to be seen. It is one thing to make a general statement; another to lead or support direct action to undermine or force changes in Government institutions. (That is the real significance of Karroubi's attempt, with his letter, to get Rafsanjani on-side with the inquiry into detainee abuse, with Rafsanjani's initial inaction, and with his subsequent step of sending the letter to both the head of judiciary and the Speaker of Parliament.)

There is more to this story, however, than Rafsanjani. The other signals continue to show an alignment of forces --- "conservative", "principlist", and "reformist" --- pressing against the President. In that context, the shift of the "conservative" newspaper Jomhoori Eslami, is notable, as it stated, "The abuse of detainees is undeniable," and ridiculing the Government's pretext of a foreign-inspired velvet revolution as a "fairy tale".

Coincidentally, Maryam from the excellent Keeping the Change sent us her analysis, which we've posted in a separate entry.

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2035 GMT: We had heard rumours all day about this story but, given its explosive nature, had held off posting without confirmation. It has now appeared on a "reformist site", Norooz, and has been recommended by the Facebook page of Zahra Rahnavard, Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife.

A member of staff of a Tehran cemetery told Norooz that on both 12 July and 15 July, the bodies of tens of protestors were brought in without any identification, secretly and under strict security. Staff were forced to issue compulsory burial licences, and the bodies were interred in Section 302 of the cemetery.

2030 GMT: We had reported earlier on protests last night in Tehran (1015 GMT), but it is only after seeing some video that a reader recommended that we realised quite how powerful those demonstrations, both against President Ahmadinejad and in honour of slain protestors such as Sohrab Arabi and Neda Agha Soltan, were. We have posted the video in a separate entry.

2010 GMT: Follow-up on Kayhan. It looks like the "hard-line" newspaper will escape suspension. Tabnak reports that the Tehran Prosecutor's office has denied accounts that the Media Court ordered Kayhan's temporary closure after its editor twice failed to answer court summons. (An English-language summary is on Tehran Bureau.)

1945 GMT: More extracts from the significant event of the day, Friday prayers in Qom (1445 GMT), where Ayatollah Amini criticised the Government:

You are not one another’s enemy. You are all in favor of the establishment, Islam and the rule of the Just Jurisprudent. Why don’t you, instead of talking to the enemy, talk to one another and find a solution to this disunity?

I am not talking about one party or the other… You, as the elite, must sit down and talk. If injustice has really been done to people, deal with it. If an innocent has been incarcerated, release him. And if someone has been shamed [publicly], apologize to him, and properly deal with those who are really guilty.

How must I advise you to set aside disunity for it to register? We are not enemies and our solidarity is possible. Resolve this issue through dialogue and stop giving the enemy something to talk about.

If you want to mend the situation as caring individuals, end the conflict and prevent it from expanding.

1445 GMT: News is emerging that the significant Friday prayers address was not in Tehran but from Ayatollah Ebrahim Amini in Qom. Amini demanded the release of all innocent prisoners and comforted those who had been unfairly victimised by recent events. Reportedly, the sermon has caused supporters of the pro-Government Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi to back away from plans to protest against Ayatollah Yusuf Sane'i and his now-famous video condemnation of the regime.

Amini's address follows his meeting this week, with other clerics, with the Supreme Leader, reportedly to raise criticisms about the role of Khamenei's son Mojtaba in political affairs.

1130 GMT: Officially, Not a Peach. President Ahmadinejad's office has removed his reference to former Minister of Health Kamran Lankarani as "a peach one wants to eat" (see 1000 GMT) from the official transcript of his televised broadcast.

1030 GMT: Iran Republic News Agency does not mention Jannati's challenge to arrest opposition leaders although it says he pointed out "the consequences of slander".

1025 GMT: Jannati Answers. In our first update (0645 GMT), we advised, "Watch...for how far Jannati pushes for punishment of the "ringleaders" of the protest."

Here's the response from Friday prayers in Tehran: "Riots are our main issue today ... Some people were arrested and some were not. Why weren't the leaders behind the riots arrested? ... Their arrest should be the first thing that the judiciary must do."

1015 GMT: A bit more on the broadcast: a reader points us to this from the Green movement's Mowj-e-Sabz, "There were rooftop protests all over the country and especially the Apadana area in Tehran [the neighbourhood of Sohrab Arabi, who was killed on 15 June but whose death was not confirmed for a month]. People gathered ...in streets in protest and were chanting 'Death to Dictator'. This was in solidarity with Sohrab’s family, as it was also the 40th day anniversary of his martyrdom."

1005 GMT: Ahmadinejad - Compromise or Showdown? There is one clue in last night's Presidential broadcast for this question, highlighted in an EA Soundcheck yesterday. Ahmadinejad said that, if the Ministry of Intelligence had done its job properly, there would have been no post-election conflict.

That's a clear slap at former Minister of Intelligence Ejeie and Iran's judiciary, which has just appointed him as Prosecutor General. But it also is a shot in the ongoing battle over who controls the Ministry, amidst the firing of up to 25 key officials. Look for a response from "conservative" and "principlist" opponents of Ahmadinejad.

1000 GMT: It is a relatively slow news day in Iran. We're awaiting the summary of Ayatollah Jannati's Friday prayer address in Tehran, and there has been surprisingly little reaction to President Ahmadinejad's national broadcast promoting his Cabinet choices.

We'll take advantage of the pause to feature the "hot" story on the Internet about the broadcast, noting the President's remarks about his outgoing Minister of Health, Kamran Lankarani: "In his TV appearance last night, Ahmadinejad praised him as one of the most able administrators of his previous cabinet and said: 'I have a special personal interest in him, a pious and faithful young man. Once I said he is like a peach, one wants to eat him!"

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQUwNDG1Tdc[/youtube]

I leave further interpretation and analysis up to EA readers.

0725 GMT: Picking up on another (largely unreported) story from yesterday. A Parliamentary Commission member has warned that Mir Hossein Mousavi's proposed "Green Path of Hope" political front will not receive a license for public activity.

0700 GMT: Last night's EA Soundcheck podcast includes a lengthy discussion of the pressure on President Ahmadinejad, both from inside the "establishment" and from public protest. General verdict? The President is in a long-term battle. I don't think he'll win, but before that comes the urgent question, will he offer any compromise or press even harder (possibly in co-operation with the Revolutionary Guard) for a showdown?

One clue to an answer: see if next Tuesday's fourth round of trials of political detainees goes ahead and how much publicity it gets in state media.

0645 GMT: With Ramadan starting tomorrow, this could be the last full day for political manoeuvres for the next few weeks. At the same time, nothing can defer the manoeuvres over President Ahmadinejad's submission of his Cabinet choices to the Iran Parliament.

And the challenge may have another dimension. An EA correspondent has reviewed the speech that Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani gave to the Iranian Society of Engineers, mentioned in yesterday's updates. He notes that Larijani offered a response to Mehdi Karroubi's initiative on the abuse of detainees.

On Wednesday, Karroubi sent an official letter to Larijani asking him to arrange a meeting including Ahmadinejad, the head of Iran's judiciary, Mohammad Larijani, the head of the Assembly of Experts and Expediency Council, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the Prosecutor General, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, where Karroubi would produce his graphic evidence of the abuses.

Larijani said yesterday that he is willing to participate in such a meeting, "We do not want to preserve any secrecy in this regard and hide any evidence from the public." So will the Speaker not only willingness but press for the gathering, knowing this could be the issue that bends if not breaks the Ahmadinejad Government?

On the public front, Ayatollah Jannati will lead Friday prayers in Tehran today. Expect a hard-line address continuing the recent theme, after last week's replacement of Hashemi Rafsanjani by Ahmad Khatami, supporting the Supreme Leader and Government and deriding the foreign-inspired protest movement. Watch, however, for how far Jannati pushes for punishment of the "ringleaders" of the protest.

The Latest from Iran (20 August): Grinding to a Halt

The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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1810 GMT: Recognise Us Because We're Really Nice. There have been signs this week that the Ahmadinejad Government would be more flexible in its position on the nuclear programme, and today this came from the Associated Press, via unnamed diplomats:

Iran has lifted a ban and allowed UN inspectors to visit a nearly-completed nuclear reactor. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency visited the reactor in Arak after a year-long ban...Iran agreed last week to expand uranium enrichment monitoring of the site.

1735 GMT: Ahmadinejad and the IRGC Factor. As we wait for the fallout from the President's televised speech on his Cabinet selections, here's how American anlaysts get it right. And wrong.

The appointment of Ahmad Vahidi as Minister of Defense has been noticed because he was commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps in the late 1980s/early 1990s. So, it is said, Vahidi's appointment indicates a consolidation of the relationship between the President and the IRGC in the face of opposition not only from "reformists" but from "conservative" and "principlist" elements.

Right.

And, the analysts continue, this indicates that Ahmadinejad plans to continue and maybe accelerate Iran's material support for pro-Iranian parties and militias in the Middle East.

Wrong.

This, of course, may be a consequence over time of Vahidi's appointment but to assert --- without any evidence --- that the external dimension is more important than the President's manoeuvres in an internal crisis smacks of a view that revolves around Washington, rather than Tehran.

1725 GMT: Worst. Claim. Ever: It's All Hillary's Fault. Iran's police chief of police Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam has said that the "confessions" of political detainees must be authentic because their mastermind, Hillary Clinton, has openly revealed their plans: "Some say that the police has extracted confessions by force, but I tell them: No-one has extracted confession out of Mrs. Clinton, yet she reveals all issues freely."

While Ahmadi-Moqaddam's statement should be called out as a crass cover-up of the state's treatment of prisoners, it does point to the lack of wisdom in Clinton's posturing --- motivated primarily to counter domestic charges that the Administration had stood back from post-election events --- when she told CNN earlier this month that the US Government did much "behind the scenes" for Iranian protesters.

1450 GMT: Reuters has now picked up on the problems for Ahmadinejad's Ministerial appointments in Parliament, adding this quote from Speaker Ali Larijani on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting: "Those nominated by the president for government posts must have sufficient expertise and experience, otherwise a great deal of the country's energy would be wasted."

1410 GMT: Creating Some Political Space? Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, speaking to the Islamic Society of Engineers, has declared that the primary duty of Government is "justice so human beings may perfect themselves" and that it was essential for people to have "economic, cultural, and political mobility".

1340 GMT: Tonight's the Night. After the stop-start process of naming his Cabinet, President Ahmadinejad takes to the national airwaves in a broadcast just after the 9 p.m. news. He may do so with a bit of nervousness: protestors are planning to drown out the President with "Allahu Akhbars", and Ahmadinejad's previous broadcast didn't go so well. Remember his defeat at the hands of the Giant Moth? (If you missed it, here's the video.)

1150 GMT: Another Shot at Ahmadinejad. Jomhoori Eslami reports that an Iranian court has temporarily suspended former First Vice President and current Presdential Chief of Staff Esfandiari Rahim-Mashai for two months because of charges of financial misconduct.

1140 GMT: The Fight Begins? The Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Mohammad Reza Bahonar, has warned that at leave five of President Ahmadinejad's choices for Ministers may not receive votes of confidence. Reuters has English-language summary of report.

1100 GMT: No Newspaper is Safe. Even the hard-line "conservative" Kayhan could be banned from newsstands. According to the Iranian Labor News Agency, the same court that banned Etemade Melli has ordered Saeed Mortazavi, the Tehran Prosecutor General, to halt the publication of Kayhan, because of the failure of its editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, to answer two court summons. Shariatmadari was taken to court by Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor Alireza Beheshti and others over the "publication of repeated lies" against the candidate.

0720 GMT: The English-language version of the Iran Parliament website has just released the names of the 18 ministers whom it says were submitted by President Ahmadinejad to the Parliament "on Wednesday". There are no surprises amongst the names, which we revealed in yesterday's updates.

0620 GMT: Reading Another Change. We reported yesterday that the new head of Iran's judiciary, Saeed Larijani, had given a clear thumb-in-the-eye to the President with the appointment of Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie, the Minister of Intelligence fired by Ahmadinejad, as Iran's Prosecutor General.

Larijani is also replacing Tehran's chief prosecutor, Saeed Mortazavi, with Morteza Bakhtiari, the former head of Iran's prison service and former Governor of Isfahan. The timing is a bit curious, since Mortazavi was seen as the legal force behind the prosecution of post-election political detainees, and we are in the middle of the Tehran trials.

So is Larijani asserting his authority against the President? Or is the simple explanatio n that Mortazavi is moving to a post in Ahmadinejad's executive? And will there be an impact, short-term or long-term, on detentions and prosecutions?

0540 GMT: Meanwhile, a foreign-policy breakthrough for the President and his Government received surprisingly little attention. Syrian President Bashir al-Assad was in Tehran for a chat.

The cover story was that Assad came to Iran to broker the release of French national Clotilde Reiss, arrested and still awaiting trial on bail. Iranian state media preferred the image of election legitimacy, quoting Assad's greeting to Ahmadinejad, “I’ve come here today to personally convey my warm congratulations to you and the Iranian nation. I believe what happened in Iran was an important development and a great lesson to foreigners."

The overriding significance, however, is in the Associated Press headline, "Iran’s supreme leader reinforces Syria alliance." Ahmadinejad, who has been ostracised internationally since his trip to Moscow just after the election, will get a symbolic boost; however, it is unclear whether Assad was reinforcing the alliance or holding it in suspension. Before 12 June, it appeared that the Tehran-Damascus relationship was an important influence on questions from the Israel-Palestine dynamic (and the in-fighting within the Palestinian leadership), the situation in Lebanon, and the wider state of play (political and economic) between Iran and Arab States. How much of it that continues while Ahmadinejad's real rather than symbolic legitimacy is still doubted?

0500 GMT: We took a break last night to recharge our batteries and return this morning not to news but to two non-events.

The first non-event was President Ahmadinejad's to formally submit his Ministerial nominations to Parliament by yesterday's deadline. In the morning, all appeared to be almost complete: Mehr News was reporting three names remained to be confirmed, and then Tabnak said only one, the Minister of Justice. At 1:22 p.m. local time, a few hours before the deadline, the English-language site of the Parliament recapped the news.

And then nothing. There was a clue that all was not well when the President's Wednesday night national broadcast was postponed for 24 hours but, otherwise, updates stopped as the deadline came and went. (Press TV's website is still stuck on its Wednesday morning headline, "More Ahmadinejad cabinet nominees revealed".) Then, just after 10 p.m., the Farsi-language version of the Parliament website reported simply, "The letter of the President still has not come."

No one is offering the reason for the delay, but the obvious speculation is that some of the names in the list leaked by the media were unacceptable to members of Parliament. And so we enter today, ready to analyse but with no way forward yet on the questions: will Ahmadinejad make concessions and change some of his selections? Will there be any punishment for his failure to meet the deadline? Will any high-ranking "conservative" or "principlist" MPs come out publicly against the President?

However, it is the other non-event, largely missed by media, which is occupying us this morning. Yesterday the Executive Committee of the Assembly of Experts postponed the next meeting of the Assembly, which was due in about 10-12 days. Our question from yesterday's update, "Who pushed for the delay?", is still unanswered. To get an idea of the stakes involved in this answer, consider the make-up of the Executive Committee: Hashemi Rafsanjani aligned against Ahmadinejead supporters Hashemi Shahroudi (former Head of Judiciary), Mohammad Yazdi (Rafsanjani's foe within the Assembly), Ghorban Ali Dorri Najafabadi (Prosecutor General), and Ahmad Khatami (the hard-line temporary leader of Friday prayers in Tehran).

An EA correspondent offers this assessment, leading to an important but so far overlooked point:

The excuse that the Assembly meeting was delayed because of Ramadan [which starts on Saturday] appears as exactly that, an excuse and nothing more. Parliament will debate and possibly block Ahmadinejad's ministerial nominees well into Ramadan, Government will carry on business, and I am sure the trials will not go into recess for a month.

So what seems to be the case here is someone simply unwilling to have the session happen so soon. The latest letters sent by the former MPs and the Qom ulama [clerics] might have precipitated the case. They either blew the lid off Rafsanjani's machinations or persuaded the Supreme Leader to force a postponement in order to work on the Assembly members and make sure they don't spell trouble for him. At any rate, it just adds to all the shocks that have hit the orderly functioning of state institutions after June 12.

Amidst all the demonstrations, the detentions and trials, and the political machinations, the Iranian Government is effectively suspended. And the longer that situation persists, the more the question emerges: when is there a breaking point, not of showdown in the streets or in the Parliament, but in day-to-day life?

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1700 GMT: More, Much More on that Assembly of Experts Meeting. The Executive Committee's agenda appears to have been a delay in the next meeting of the Assembly, which was due to take place within the next 10-12 days, for a month because of Ramadan.
This rules out any quick intervention by the Assembly in the political crisis.

But the big question: who asked for the delay? Was it the head of the Committee, Hashemi Rafsanjani, to give himself time for his next moves? Or was it the other members --- former head of judiciary Hashemi Shahroudi, Mohammad Yazdi, Prosecutor General Ghorban Ali Dorri Najafabadi, and Ahmad Khatami --- all of whom are more supportive of President Ahmadinejad?

1605 GMT: The Executive Committee of the Assembly of Experts has met, but there are no details of the agenda or content of the discussion.

1550 GMT: There is still no news on whether the President has formally submitted his Ministerial nomination to Parliament.

1415 GMT: Report that Mohammad Reza Jalaiepour, an activist close to Mohammad Khatami, will be released from detention today. Journalist Zhila Bani Yaghoub has been released on $200,000 bail.

1405 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has written to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani to confirm that he is ready to present his evidence of the abuse of detainees.

1230 GMT: Mowj-e-Sabz claims that a group of senior clerics have met the Supreme Leader and criticised the behaviour of his son, Mojtaba, but "to no avail".

1225 GMT: Did the President Miss the Deadline? The official Parliamentary News Agency has an item at 1530 local time (1100 GMT), 30 minutes before the deadline for the President to submit his Cabinet nominations. Aboutourabi Fard, the anti-Ahmadinejad Deputy Speaker, says no letter had been received.

It is now almost an hour after the deadline.

1220 GMT: The new head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, is moving briskly with appointments: Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie has become Prosecutor General, replacing Ghorban Ali Dorri-Najafabadi.

Hmmm....Would this be the same Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie fired as Minister of Intelligence by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a few weeks ago? Perhaps someone should give the President the latest news.

1130 GMT: EA source says that President Ahmadinejad's nationally-televised address, announcing his Ministerial nominations, has been postponed until tomorrow night after 9 p.m. local time.

1055 GMT: The Rah-e-Sabz website, quoting "reliable sources from Tehran", reports that Karroubi is resurrecting his plan from 2005 for the "Saba" satellite channel.

The plan was shelved four years ago after direct intervention by Ali Larijani, then chair of the National Security Council, who deemed the plan "an act against national security". Karroubi then founded the Etemade Melli newspaper to reach the masses.

Now Karroubi is threatening to get serious with the satellite channel should the regime's ban on the newspaper remain in place. Initial launch preparations are underway and "a group of film makers based inside the country" is willing to take part. The headquarters would be set up in another Mideast country (an EA correspondent suggests the United Arab Emirates), and the goal would be to air the "real news" that the state media neglects.

1045 GMT: To the Wire. Mehr News says President Ahmadinejad has still not decided on the appointments of three Ministers. Tabnak, however, says only one post (Justice) is still to be determined for the final submission to Parliament. The names of those Ministers who have been proposed, in both articles, are those posted earlier in Press TV/Fars accounts (see 0900 GMT).

0940 GMT: Saham News claims that a commission is investigating the Mosharekat and  Mojahedin political parties with a view to amending the law to prohibt contacts and exchange of views and information with foreign embassies and acceptance of foreign financial aid. An EA source confirms that this process started about six weeks ago.

0900 GMT: The President's Cabinet? Press TV, citing Fars News Agency, reveals Ministerial nominees. Among the appointments: Manouchehr Mottaki remains as Foreign Minister, Kamran Daneshjou at Science, Research and Technology, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar as Minister of Interior, Mohammad Hosseini leading Ministry of Culture and the Islamic Guidance, and Ahmad Vahidi as Minister of Defense.

0855 GMT: And Yet More Support. The Association of Iran Alumni and Union of Islamic Associations of University Students have declared that they will not abandon Karroubi and other reformist leaders.

0850 GMT: The Green Wave of Support. We reported yesterday on the "reformist" front coming out in support of Mehdi Karroubi's position on abuse of detainees. Norooz have now published the text of the statement from the Islamic Iran Participation Front.

0820 GMT: Clarification on Reformist-Clerics Meeting (0740 GMT). Another EA correspondent explains, "Javad Shahrestani is not an Ayatollah, and most probably not even a mujtahid. He runs sistani.org from Qom and is the person who brought the Internet to the holy city and transformed it into a technology hub. However, he is not high on religious credentials. The fact that people refer to him as 'Ayatollah' underlies the attempt to indicate the higher level of these figures close to the opposition."

0740 GMT: A reader lets us know that the full English summary, provided by a Twitter activist, of Ayatollah Sanei's attack on the regime (full video in separate entry) is now available on the Internet.

0730 GMT: More Opposition Moves. An EA correspondent has verified news we saw yesterday, "The reformists Abdollah Nouri, Gholamhosein Karbaschi [former Mayor of Tehran and top advisor to Karroubi], and other reformists have been having separate meetings with Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Shahrestani, the son-in-law of Ayatollah Sistani [the leading Shia cleric in Iraq]. These reformists have requested that the Shia high clergy become more involved in the current issues of the country."

0650 GMT: We asked moments ago "whether some in the Government have realised that the high-profile hard line may be counter-productive".

Hmmm, maybe not. Hojatoleslam Ali Saeedi, the Supreme Leader's liaison with the Revolutionary Guard, said yesterday, "[The] leaders of the recent unrest are still out of prison." Rounding up those leaders "could be the will of the nation and the media".

Saeedi also defended the regime's high-profile display of "confessions" by figures such as former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi:

These confessions were of utmost importance, since they shed light on the core of "the ordeal" and the rings linked to it....It was not unexpected that the foreigners would take us for the likes of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. However, it was strange that some of our compatriots were deceived by the enemies and played by their rules."

0630 GMT: Deadline day for President Ahmadinejad, as he has to present his selections for Ministerial posts to Parliament. The furour over the President's relations with the legislature, which had peaked with controversies over the 1st Vice President and Ministry of Intelligence, has quieted in the last week, but several key MPs have warned that Ahmadinejad must put forward candidates with expertise and judgement.

On another front, our Enduring America debate over the challenge of Hashemi Rafsanjani continues. After yesterday's spirited discussion between two of our correspondents and our readers, we've posted a sequel with the views of a third EA analyst. There is a clear split in our community on not only Rafsanjani's position but that of the President: some see Rafsanjani playing a clever game as Ahmadinejad loudly struggles, others see the President in the ascendancy. And, thanks to our readers, important factors such as the Revolutionary Guard, the "principlist" political bloc, and the Army have also been brought into the arena.

For me, however, the emerging story yesterday was the clear signal that the Green opposition has not gone away. While the organisation of public protest is still fragmented, many key secular and clerical figures rallied around Mehdi Karroubi's demand that the Government investigate and punish those responsible for abuse of detainees. Karroubi reiterated the protest in his statement, "You Will Not Force Me Into Silence", and Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani, and the "reformist" front were among those who offered high-profile endorsements. These complemented the "hot" Internet story of the day, the video of Ayatollah Sane'i's scathing attack on the regime.

As I've said on several occasions, the regime may be keeping the opposition vibrant --- ironically --- by trying to break it with detentions, confessions, and trials. Today's planned 4th trial of post-election political prisoners has been postponed until next Tuesday, raising the question as to whether some in the Government have realised that the high-profile hard line may be counter-productive.

If this is just a pause, however (and one of the rumours yesterday was that politician Saeed Hajjarian would be amongst the defendants), we will not only be considering the President's Cabinet and Rafsanjani's future. The Green Path of Hope, which Karroubi and Mohammad Khatami joined yesterday, may be more than a symbol.

Iran: Is Rafsanjani (or Ahmadinejad) A Spent Force? The Sequel

Is Hashemi Rafsanjani A Spent Force?
The Latest from Iran (19 August): Challenges in Parliament and from Prisons

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Yesterday we posted an exchange between two Enduring America correspondents, Mr Smith and Mr Jones, on the current position and future prospects of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Their full and frank discussion soon took in not only Rafsanjani's fortunes but also those of the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad. Our readers then took the analysis further with a set of thoughtful and challenging comments.

Today a third EA correspondent, Mr Johnson, joins the discussion with his views on both Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad. I believe that his thoughts and a further exchange with Mr Smith take us a stage farther in consideration of the present and future of the post-election crisis.

JOHNSON: I disagree with the statement of Mr. Smith regarding the body language of Rafsanjani, based upon the small clip that can be observed on the EA website. As an Iranian, I did not find any exhibition of subordinate behavior in Rafsanjani's body language. Did Mr. Smith expect arrogant stiffness and coldness? In Persian society, politeness is a deadlier weapon than an arrogant snub. A consummate politician of the old school like Rafsanjani will never ever stoop to a behaviour that will acknowledge that he has been ruffled by a non-entity like Ahmadinejad. I humbly suggest that Mr. Smith read Sir John Chardin's Travels in Persia, which beautifully demonstrates how such deadly politeness worked in the 17th century. The mechanics are still applicable today.The other side of the coin has not been considered at all. Not only has Rafsanjani not caved in, he has snubbed Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani did not participate in Ahmadinejad's inauguration ceremony, while he did come to the investment of Larijani who is a much lower-ranking official. This shows to everyone in no uncertain terms what Rafsanjani thinks of Ahmadinejad, and of course after planting such a well placed (and well-felt) insult so delicately, Rafsanjani can afford to be graciously polite to such gauche guttersnipe like Ahmadinejad.

In fact it is Ahmadinejad's behavior that supports my interpretation. If this were a ceremony depicting the humilation of Rafsanjani, based upon Ahmadinejad's innate pettiness, I would be sure that he would stay through the whole ceremony savouring the discomfiture of his enemy and his own triumph. The fact that Ahmadinejad came in quickly and left quickly before Rafsanjani's talk points to the fact that he was uncomfortable during the ceremony and that he left before Rafsanjani's speech as a retaliation.

Another issue that must be considered is that Rafsanjani is not looking for reform. Even the freedom of prisoners is not his primary goal. (It can be argued that some of the reformers in prison have been a thorn in his side as much as Ahmadinejad's.) Equating the reform movement with Rafsanjani's politics is a grave mistake; there may be some compatibilities between the two but they are separate issues. Personally, I think that Rafsanjani has been attempting (with some success) to project the image that he is way above the fray and is not getting involved in the political struggle; however, if the establishment is being eroded he will step in, and he will takes pains to couch his disagreements with Ahmadinejad in terms of the survival of the system.

Rafsanjani's reaction to Karroubi's letter again fits this model of an impartial high boss directing the underlings to right a wrong. Possibly his idea is to show to all the powers to be that he is very much the supreme leader. A supreme leader unlike Khamenei who, with his blatant partisanship of Ahmadinejad, has effectively turned the office into a jokeby condoning behavior that absolutely unacceptable.

Mr. Smith also dismisses institutions such as the Assembly of Experts and the opinions of the Grand Ayatollahs. I think that this is a mistake. The opinions of these individuals and others can carry weight in all branches of government, leading to fault-lines and fractures throughout the Iranian political landscape and to a galvanizing of the protest movement. In fact I think that it is these fractures that have prevented the Ahmadinejad and Khamenei factions from having sufficient power to neutralize the opposition. These fractures have become even deeper when one considers the modus operandi of Ahmadinejad: namely, his extreme cronyism in chosing his high level officials (many of whom lack basic credentials for the job), and his extreme reluctance to share power. Both of these issues have led even conservative politicians to worry for their survival: firstly, because they know that, if they do not belong to Ahamdinejad's close circle, they will not be given a political role to play, and secondly, because the inherent incompetence of the Ahmadinejad government is bound to lead the country to ruin. I think that the "carting off of the Assembly of Experts" may lead to even greater fractures that would blow up in the face of any potential "transportation agency".

Mr. Smith also is eloquent about Rafsanjani being lambasted by Ahmadinejad. I think that Mr. Rafsanjani's stock amongst the Iranian public may have increased by these attacks.
Finally, I have an issue with Mr Smith's statement: "However, in terms of real influence in state decision-making, I would say that Ahmadinejad is going quite strong". Ahmadinejad is dealing with a potentially intractable Parliament will make trouble for the confidence votes of his Cabinet, he is dealing with a country that is operating at a much lower level of productivity than last year (e.g. the price of food stuffs have risen 50% in the last month, subsidies in foodstuffs have been cut off, etc.); social unrest has been a cause for so much concern that the idea of closing down schools and universities for the fall semester has been floated; Clinton and other Western leaders have stated that "they have no idea who is in charge in Iran", leaving relations in limbo; the dramatic lowering of Iranian prestige in the Muslim world has been caused by the reaction of the Iranian government towards the persecution of Chinese Muslims and huge coverage by Arab media of the allegations of sexual prison torture that make Abu Ghraib sound like the Holiday Inn; and the list goes on.

Mr. SMITH responds:

With all due respect for Mr Johnson, I really think he is greatly underrating Ahmadinejad and exaggerating the extent of Rafsanjani's actions. He should be guarded in his dismissal of Ahmadinejad as someone who has essentially dug his own grave. "Chronic problems" have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's first four years in office, long before the June elections, yet he still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a "joke" and have Khamenei stretch far to support him.

No mention is made of the repeated humiliations Rafsanjani has faced ever since Ahmadinejad brought him up in the TV debate with Mousavi. Quite frankly, it would be an amazing snubbing strategy, by all standards, after the President had leveled his charges of corruption.

Politeness and body language tell it all in Iran, as Mr Johnson rightfully states. For this very reason, Ahmadinejad stepping up on the podium, railing against Rafsanjani and getting off (and away with) it once again --- the ample photo galleries on Iranian news agencies do not show him as "uncomfortable" at all ---- shows the extent of his capacity to overrule etiquette and time-honoured cultural traditions. Once again, that he has done so without facing significant retaliation is telling.

Regarding Rafsanjani's stock within people at large, I hope Mr Johnson's definition of people is not restricted to the Green Wave. My own findings in Tehran before the election pointed to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his "thief" attacks in the Mousavi TV debate. To really generate support amongst the people, Rafsanjani should have inserted continuity to his post-electoral strategy, in the same way Karroubi and Mousavi have done.

As for the Assembly of Experts, Unless they pull off a major stunt in the next meeting, which no one I know believes they will, they will remain irrelevant in the current power struggle. They have been a spent force in all but one key event, the election of Khamenei. The Grand Ayatollahs carry weight, I don't deny that, but it would have been off topic to discuss them in the contours of my discussion with Mr Smith.

I agree with Mr Johnson's points on the perceptions Rafsanjani has of his own role within the system. The issue is whether he can carry these in practice. I have severe doubts.

Mr. JOHNSON replies:

Mr. Smith's views on the flaws and vulnerabilities of Rafsanjani are well-taken and deserve to be considered thoroughly in any analysis of the current situation and political power struggle in Iran. However, I do believe that his viewpoint colours his analysis and leads to implications with which I disagree.

Mr. Smith says "'chronic problems' have been the leitmotif of Ahmadinejad's four years in office, long before the June elections, yet Mr Johnson still managed, to quote Mr Johnson, to turn the Supreme Leadership into a 'joke' and have Khamenei stretch far to support him". It is Mr. Smith's prerogative to dismiss all problems as merely "leitmotifs" sung by a choir of protest. I am not ashamed to plagiarise a good phrase, so I will take Mr. Smith's colourful Wagnerian analogy further. A high enough cacaphonous frequency of "effective leitmotifs" leads to the composition of "Gotterdammerung", a prospect that I am sure many Iranian politicians across the spectrum are considering very seriously.

I also think that Mr. Smith is placing way too much emphasis upon Ahmadinejad's slights and insults to Mr. Rafsanjani. In experimental science, every instrumental measurement has a signal and a noise. The signal is what is measured when a phenomenon occurs, and noise is the baseline that the instrument measures in the absence of the phenomenon. The issue with quantifying Ahmadinejad's statements is that the language with which he addresses any opponent (real or perceived) involves a heady mixture of snide comments, condescension, arrogance, and maybe an accusation or two thrown in for good measure. This lack of nuance makes it very difficult to assign a value scale to the insults, so it is a challenge to discriminate signal from the noise.

I also think that it should be pointed out that, during the Larijani ceremonies, insults were handed out like candy. If according to Mr. Smith, Ahmadinejad felt that he could insult Rafsanjani with impunity by walking out before his talk, Mr Nateq-Nouri also felt the same way about Ahmadinejad and insulted the President by walking out during his speech. Somehow the frequency of these insults diminishes their effect.

Mr. Smith gently implies that I may be biased by only considering the Green Wave as people. I have tried hard not to do so; however, I thank him for pointing out a potential pitfall. He then demonstrates his point ,using "his findings in Tehran before the election pointing to Ahmadinejad actually gaining from his 'thief' attacks in the Mousavi TV debate." May I return the compliment by humbly suggesting that he should be much more critical about the significance of the results of his findings, avoiding a major error that many journalists make. This last year has been a year of elections and polls, and I took the opportunity to consult with many statisticians and sociologists about polling data. The resounding response from these experts was that the significance of the results of most polls is lost when they are subjected to rigorous statistical analysis.

I most emphatically do not intend to cast any aspersions upon the integrity of the findings of Mr. Smith nor his methodology for data collection. I just want to state that it is highly probable that once his findings are analysed rigorously and correctly via statistical methods, they will lose (just like any other poll) any meaningful significance, making it impossible to generalise these findings to the bulk of the population.