The Security Myth

In response to Mike’s post, why does Mumbai make the threat from asymmetric attacks any greater than it already is? It has always been there and it always will be unless we choose to live in a complete police state.

Take the case of the airports--because of the attack at Glasgow you now can't drive up to a terminal to drop a passenger off or pick someone up. Yet, there's absolutely nothing to stop someone from walking in with a backup containing an explosive and either leaving it in the terminal or detonating it amongst the passengers lined up to go through security. It's a "soft target." Now airports could institute a measure requiring everyone entering the terminal to be searched but then someone could blow themselves up in the parking lot so that would require a perimeter around the airport with every car being searched but then someone could blow them self up at the checkpoint .... and on .... and on. The only real solution would be to shut down air travel. So society wide there is an illusion of security created by the state to encourage people to go about their daily lives but in reality there is little that could be done to stop a determined terrorist. It’s about containment, not elimination, a point I make in the conclusion to my  book (gratuitous plug).

By the way, for an interesting examination of the faults with U.S. airport security see this from the current issue of The Atlantic.

Agreement in Iraq: Half-Full, Half-Empty

The optimistic view of the Iraq Parliament's passage --- by 149-35 with 14 abstentions and 77 not present --- of the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States comes from US and British papers that headline passage with "a substantial majority" and "an overwhelming show of hands".

The not-so-optimistic view? Well, that would come from a bit of detailed reading and some basic reflection. Only The Washington Post, at the end of the sixth paragraph of its report, mentions those 77 Parliamentarians who didn't show for the final vote. That means --- and here the Post deserves a bit of credit --- that "just over half" of the members voted for the Agreement.

Interpretation? For that, you have to bypass the glowing headline, "31 December 2011: day the last US soldier leaves Iraq". The politics are far more complex: in effect, the Government of Nouri al-Maliki and leading Shi'a parties, as well as supporting Kurdish parties, have a bit of breathing space because they bought abstentions from Sunni and some uncertain Shi'a members.

Because of those abstentions, the al-Maliki Government can present the vote as a ringing Sadrists, with only recalcitrant Sadrists opposing the Agreement. Had those abstentions been votes against, however, the final tally would have been 149-136, far from the "consensus" demanded by Ayatollah Sistani and some other key political figures in Iraq.

The Government paid a price for the clear victory, giving assurances to Sunnis that they would have input into future legislation. More importantly, at least in the short term, al-Maliki gave way to the Sunni demand for a national referendum on the agreement in the middle of 2009.

Perhaps the most telling comment on that referendum came --- buried in The New York Times report --- from the veteran politician Adnan Pacachi: the referendum will ensure that US leaders are “more careful and they will not make mistakes that will cause the Iraqi people to reject the agreement". In other words, this is a marker that the Obama Administration shows good faith both in drawing down US forces and in not re-interpreting the Agreement, say, for US military operations without Iraqi approval and for the continued use of private contractors immune from Iraqi law.

There is, in other words, a dual negotiation going on here. One is the negotiation between factions in Iraq for influence, notably the Sunni struggle to retain some say in political affairs at national level, and one is the negotiation to limit and possibly remove the American presence. Neither of these negotiations came to an end on Thursday.

Fatuous commentary of the day:

The report in The New York Times maintains:

"Throughout the government’s negotiations on the pact, ...neighboring countries, especially Iran, have been invisible but influential players. As recently as Wednesday night, lawmakers said messages came from Iran expressing disapproval of the political deal that was essential to the pact’s ratification.

But lawmakers nevertheless pushed on with the negotiations, and the final compromise, arrived at less than an hour before the Parliament vote, differed little from the version rejected by the Iranians."

The implication that Iran was the main obstacle to ratification is misleading, ignoring the internal Iraqi dynamics. It also is inaccurate and misses the key point. As Juan Cole documents, Iranian state-run radio indicates Tehran's approval of the Agreement and the associated referendum:

"The agreement of the Iraqi government and parliament with holding a referendum shows that Iraqi officials, who are under pressure from America, will be in a better position to express their views by referring to the general consensus and the support of the Iraqi people, and will be able to free themselves from the pressures of the American statesmen."

Mumbai Speculation of the Day

Apologies for going on about The Times of London and their defence correspondent, Michael Evans, but this latest effort at analysis is fully deserving of scorn:

Focus on Westerners suggests al-Qaeda was pulling strings

Shocking as Wednesday nights attacks on Bombay may have been, they were not unprecedented in their audacity or tactics and may have been masterminded by a familiar enemy.

A terrorist group with training camps in Pakistan and strong ties with al-Qaeda as well as a history of mounting attacks in India yesterday became the chief suspect behind the atrocities.

Intelligence and security officials were cautious about making early conclusions but admitted that the scale of the attacks and the planning pointed to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a terrorist group with a long record of violent extremism and previous connections to the Pakistani military's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI).

Lashkar-e-Taiba is definitely not a group whose strings are pulled by Al Qa'eda. It has its own political agenda, elements of which may overlap with the agenda of Osama Bin Laden and Co. but most of which is driven by Pakistani and regional dimensions, in particular the dispute over Kashmir.

Michael Evans and associates are making the perfect storm of terrorism. Lashkar-e-Taiba is tied to both Al Qa'eda and Pakistani intelligence services. And "while planning for Wednesdays attack probably took place in Pakistan, the plotters probably used a local group in Bombay to execute it. Suspicion has fallen on the Indian Mujahidin as that partner."

So what's wrong with this? With the widest possible net to bring in all bad guys, inside and outside of Governments, this type of analysis has little chance of getting to grips with specific local and regional issues and complexities behind these attacks. Evans and Co. trumpet, "Some analysts suggest that Pakistani militant groups have forged closer ties with al-Qaeda because of the continuing fighting with Pakistans Army in the northern tribal areas."

Maybe, just maybe, instead of highlighting "al-Qaeda", the Times correspondents might dwell on the last part of that sentence --- "the continuing fighting with Pakistans Army in the northern tribal areas".

More Questions from Mumbai

There is still isolated fighting in Mumbai. Headline drama has come from the storming of a Jewish cultural centre by Indian commandos, while The Times of India reports that there is still firing at the old section of the Taj Hotel, with at least one assailant possibly holding two more hostages.

The immediate conflict, however, is over, leaving at least 125 dead. Amidst the tragedy and rather empty blustering from British papers of standing side-by-side with India, the question inevitably turns into, "Who and why?"

Almost everything I have read is uncertain speculation. The initial easy response of "Al Qa'eda" has been joined by consideration of Pakistani groups, either supported by factions of the Government or independent of it. The latest wave of possibility, based on reports that some of the assailants spoke Hindi, is that this might be an Indian militant group.

We don't know. And I don't think that the intelligence services --- in India, in Pakistan (unless they indeed are linked to the assailants), in Britain, in the US --- know. All of this pondering is understandable, but at this point it just heightens fear without any sense of resolution.

It would be so much easier if Al Qa'eda had claimed responsibility, as in Michael Evans' masterpiece of irrelevance in The Times --- based on casual chat with "British intelligence sources" --- that Al Qa'eda "might be plotting an attack 'to grab the headlines' before Mr Obama takes over in the White House on January 20". This would have given us the best villain while absolving others (e.g. Pakistani authorities) and ignoring the complexities raised by yet others (Pakistani groups who are not part of Al Qa'eda's master plan).

A media incident this morning illustrates the point too painfully. BBC Radio 4's flagship programme Today has just wet itself with panic after the former head of India's intelligence services none-too-subtly suggested that the attackers are supported by the Pakistani intelligence services and military, acting independently or in defiance of the Zardari Government.

The host immediately went to the BBC's security correspondent to throw cold water on this. Gorden Corera assured everyone that the British Government's counsel was not to rush to judgement. Understandable, I think, given that Foreign Secretary David Miliband was just in Islamabad and proclaiming total confidence in his ally Prime Minister Zardari.

We do not know. But if anyone wants something for consideration, here goes:

Just as the instability in Pakistan feeds from and contributes to the ongoing instability in Afghanistan, so it may be the case that instability in Pakistan --- a central Government which is far from strong, which is being undermined by the situation in the Northwest Frontier, and which now be fragmented --- is contributing to the dramatic instability of the last 48 hours.

Whether that continues is, for me, the important issue. And it is far more important than the inconvenience, offered in the analysis offered by The New York Times this morning, that it "will make the agenda of the new American administration harder".

After Mumbai: Assessing The Threat

Security expert Bruce Schneier has taken issue with the FBI's recent warning that 'al-Qaeda' might be planning to attack the New York subway system this Thanksgiving:

I have no specific details, but I want to warn everybody today that fiery rain might fall from the sky. Terrorists may have discussed this sort of tactic, and while there is no evidence yet that it's in the process of being carried out, I want to be extra-cautious this holiday season. Ho ho ho.

My gut reaction is to agree with him- the announcement seemed like fear mongering at worst, ass-covering at best. But my question is, after Mumbai, do we have the luxury of disregarding such warnings? I don't believe for a minute that the same group who attacked Mumbai is capable of attacking New York, but last night's events were a reminder of just how terrifyingly effective asymmetric warfare can be.

As one Twitter user put it, "Apparently 'highly coordinated' now maps to 'bunch of guys with watches set to the same time.'" How can New York, Mumbai, or any other city, legislate for a group of men armed with light weapons and synchronised watches?

[photo via keerthi]