Friday
Nov282008
More Questions from Mumbai
Friday, November 28, 2008 at 8:22
There is still isolated fighting in Mumbai. Headline drama has come from the storming of a Jewish cultural centre by Indian commandos, while The Times of India reports that there is still firing at the old section of the Taj Hotel, with at least one assailant possibly holding two more hostages.
The immediate conflict, however, is over, leaving at least 125 dead. Amidst the tragedy and rather empty blustering from British papers of standing side-by-side with India, the question inevitably turns into, "Who and why?"
Almost everything I have read is uncertain speculation. The initial easy response of "Al Qa'eda" has been joined by consideration of Pakistani groups, either supported by factions of the Government or independent of it. The latest wave of possibility, based on reports that some of the assailants spoke Hindi, is that this might be an Indian militant group.
We don't know. And I don't think that the intelligence services --- in India, in Pakistan (unless they indeed are linked to the assailants), in Britain, in the US --- know. All of this pondering is understandable, but at this point it just heightens fear without any sense of resolution.
It would be so much easier if Al Qa'eda had claimed responsibility, as in Michael Evans' masterpiece of irrelevance in The Times --- based on casual chat with "British intelligence sources" --- that Al Qa'eda "might be plotting an attack 'to grab the headlines' before Mr Obama takes over in the White House on January 20". This would have given us the best villain while absolving others (e.g. Pakistani authorities) and ignoring the complexities raised by yet others (Pakistani groups who are not part of Al Qa'eda's master plan).
A media incident this morning illustrates the point too painfully. BBC Radio 4's flagship programme Today has just wet itself with panic after the former head of India's intelligence services none-too-subtly suggested that the attackers are supported by the Pakistani intelligence services and military, acting independently or in defiance of the Zardari Government.
The host immediately went to the BBC's security correspondent to throw cold water on this. Gorden Corera assured everyone that the British Government's counsel was not to rush to judgement. Understandable, I think, given that Foreign Secretary David Miliband was just in Islamabad and proclaiming total confidence in his ally Prime Minister Zardari.
We do not know. But if anyone wants something for consideration, here goes:
Just as the instability in Pakistan feeds from and contributes to the ongoing instability in Afghanistan, so it may be the case that instability in Pakistan --- a central Government which is far from strong, which is being undermined by the situation in the Northwest Frontier, and which now be fragmented --- is contributing to the dramatic instability of the last 48 hours.
Whether that continues is, for me, the important issue. And it is far more important than the inconvenience, offered in the analysis offered by The New York Times this morning, that it "will make the agenda of the new American administration harder".
The immediate conflict, however, is over, leaving at least 125 dead. Amidst the tragedy and rather empty blustering from British papers of standing side-by-side with India, the question inevitably turns into, "Who and why?"
Almost everything I have read is uncertain speculation. The initial easy response of "Al Qa'eda" has been joined by consideration of Pakistani groups, either supported by factions of the Government or independent of it. The latest wave of possibility, based on reports that some of the assailants spoke Hindi, is that this might be an Indian militant group.
We don't know. And I don't think that the intelligence services --- in India, in Pakistan (unless they indeed are linked to the assailants), in Britain, in the US --- know. All of this pondering is understandable, but at this point it just heightens fear without any sense of resolution.
It would be so much easier if Al Qa'eda had claimed responsibility, as in Michael Evans' masterpiece of irrelevance in The Times --- based on casual chat with "British intelligence sources" --- that Al Qa'eda "might be plotting an attack 'to grab the headlines' before Mr Obama takes over in the White House on January 20". This would have given us the best villain while absolving others (e.g. Pakistani authorities) and ignoring the complexities raised by yet others (Pakistani groups who are not part of Al Qa'eda's master plan).
A media incident this morning illustrates the point too painfully. BBC Radio 4's flagship programme Today has just wet itself with panic after the former head of India's intelligence services none-too-subtly suggested that the attackers are supported by the Pakistani intelligence services and military, acting independently or in defiance of the Zardari Government.
The host immediately went to the BBC's security correspondent to throw cold water on this. Gorden Corera assured everyone that the British Government's counsel was not to rush to judgement. Understandable, I think, given that Foreign Secretary David Miliband was just in Islamabad and proclaiming total confidence in his ally Prime Minister Zardari.
We do not know. But if anyone wants something for consideration, here goes:
Just as the instability in Pakistan feeds from and contributes to the ongoing instability in Afghanistan, so it may be the case that instability in Pakistan --- a central Government which is far from strong, which is being undermined by the situation in the Northwest Frontier, and which now be fragmented --- is contributing to the dramatic instability of the last 48 hours.
Whether that continues is, for me, the important issue. And it is far more important than the inconvenience, offered in the analysis offered by The New York Times this morning, that it "will make the agenda of the new American administration harder".
tagged Mumbai, Mumbai attacks in India & Pakistan, War On Terror
Mumbai, Mumbai attacks in India & Pakistan, War On Terror
Reader Comments (4)
It may not matter whether Pakistan had any involvement. It could matter whether India believes Pakistan had involvement or chooses to believe that Pakistan had involvement and thus make a political issue out of it. That also could relate to Indian internal politics. Either way, it could be a huge mess.
Another 'question'- I've just seen this on the BBC's live updates:
"0928 Claims that Britons were among the attackers in Mumbai are being investigated by the UK Foreign Office. The Indian news channel, NDTV, earlier reported that the gunmen had included "British citizens of Pakistani origin"."
Press Assoc report is here:
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ukpress/article/ALeqM5j-h-BCh2mQaTXIXqSc0F4PMPX8Iw
South Asian governments are fond of finding a scapegoet, and Indian government behavior following the Mumbai crises is no exception to its earlier behavior in number of terrorist incidents. The fact of the matter is, vulnerabilities within the sytem of governance, societial makeup and a pattern of interations within a state,generate a whole lot of "dissaisfied actors/groups", who find violence as a best option to use.
Just 48 hours before the Mumbai trajic happenings both India and Pakistan concluded the Joint Counter-terrorism sitting in Islamabad. The declaration that came out promised to interact on regular and coordinated basis. I think, the Mumbai Case can be made a litmus test of this commitment, provided there is an exchange of information with one another and not labelling one (here, Islamabad) as "Aggressor" in the beginning.
The fact of the matter is, it is the people of South Asia that are paying the price of Indo-Pak Mutual suspicion while politicians and so-called strategists sell these happenings for their own (narrow) agendas.
Shabana --- Thank you for great comment. I did not know about the Joint Counter-Terrorism gathering....