Today's Stories Behind the Chatter: India, Iraq, and Iran

INDIA: HOLDING BREATH AND CROSSING FINGERS

US intelligence officials are letting it be known that evidence is pointing to the responsibility of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant group formed to pursue the Pakistani cause in Kashmir, for the attack. This assessment is in line with that being put out by Indian officials.

This, of course, ratchets up the temperature in relations between India and Pakistan. The Pakistani Government made clear on Saturday that it had no hand in the Mumbai assault, as President Zardari said, "My heart bleeds for India." Indian suspicions of involvement by the Pakistani military and/or intelligence services continue, however, and Pakistan has indicated that it will move forces towards the border. Islamabad also withdrew the offer to send the Pakistani head of intelligence to assist with the investigation, after opposition party protests, although "a lower-level intelligence official would go to India...at an undetermined time in the future".

On the comment front, The Observer of London, which used to be a paper of editorial sense and dignity, dismisses local and regional issues to proclaim the fight for "democracy" against "jihadists". Juan Cole's heart-felt plea to India not to repeat the mistakes of the Bush Administration, while still caught up in the context of 9/11 and the War on Terror, is far more valuable reading.

IRAQ: THE MANOEUVRES BEGIN ON THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

While the editors of The Washington Post indulge in fatuous back-slapping (the "its success in greatly reducing violence around Iraq", "the new democratic system is gaining its footing", "the Bush administration worked patiently and tirelessly to negotiate the new agreement") and Thomas Friedman reduces the country to "moderate Iraqi Sunnis against Al Qaeda and Iraqi Shiites against pro-Iranian extremists", Sudarsan Raghavan and Saad Sarhan offer one story of note:

Iraq's preeminent Shiite spiritual leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, has expressed concern about the country's security agreement with the United States, saying it gives the Americans the upper hand and does not do enough to protect Iraqi sovereignty.

Meanwhile, a rocket fired into the Green Zone in Baghdad, landing near the United Nations compound, killed two and wounded 15 others.

LAYING OUT THE "CORRECT" IRAN NARRATIVE

In the category of "I say it, therefore it must be true", David Ignatius in The Washington Post:

Iran moves closer every day to becoming a nuclear-weapons power. It views America as an aggressive adversary that wants regime change, no matter what Washington says. Dialogue is worth a try, but Obama and his advisers should start thinking about what they will do if negotiations fail.

Agreement in Iraq: Half-Full, Half-Empty

The optimistic view of the Iraq Parliament's passage --- by 149-35 with 14 abstentions and 77 not present --- of the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States comes from US and British papers that headline passage with "a substantial majority" and "an overwhelming show of hands".

The not-so-optimistic view? Well, that would come from a bit of detailed reading and some basic reflection. Only The Washington Post, at the end of the sixth paragraph of its report, mentions those 77 Parliamentarians who didn't show for the final vote. That means --- and here the Post deserves a bit of credit --- that "just over half" of the members voted for the Agreement.

Interpretation? For that, you have to bypass the glowing headline, "31 December 2011: day the last US soldier leaves Iraq". The politics are far more complex: in effect, the Government of Nouri al-Maliki and leading Shi'a parties, as well as supporting Kurdish parties, have a bit of breathing space because they bought abstentions from Sunni and some uncertain Shi'a members.

Because of those abstentions, the al-Maliki Government can present the vote as a ringing Sadrists, with only recalcitrant Sadrists opposing the Agreement. Had those abstentions been votes against, however, the final tally would have been 149-136, far from the "consensus" demanded by Ayatollah Sistani and some other key political figures in Iraq.

The Government paid a price for the clear victory, giving assurances to Sunnis that they would have input into future legislation. More importantly, at least in the short term, al-Maliki gave way to the Sunni demand for a national referendum on the agreement in the middle of 2009.

Perhaps the most telling comment on that referendum came --- buried in The New York Times report --- from the veteran politician Adnan Pacachi: the referendum will ensure that US leaders are “more careful and they will not make mistakes that will cause the Iraqi people to reject the agreement". In other words, this is a marker that the Obama Administration shows good faith both in drawing down US forces and in not re-interpreting the Agreement, say, for US military operations without Iraqi approval and for the continued use of private contractors immune from Iraqi law.

There is, in other words, a dual negotiation going on here. One is the negotiation between factions in Iraq for influence, notably the Sunni struggle to retain some say in political affairs at national level, and one is the negotiation to limit and possibly remove the American presence. Neither of these negotiations came to an end on Thursday.

Fatuous commentary of the day:

The report in The New York Times maintains:

"Throughout the government’s negotiations on the pact, ...neighboring countries, especially Iran, have been invisible but influential players. As recently as Wednesday night, lawmakers said messages came from Iran expressing disapproval of the political deal that was essential to the pact’s ratification.

But lawmakers nevertheless pushed on with the negotiations, and the final compromise, arrived at less than an hour before the Parliament vote, differed little from the version rejected by the Iranians."

The implication that Iran was the main obstacle to ratification is misleading, ignoring the internal Iraqi dynamics. It also is inaccurate and misses the key point. As Juan Cole documents, Iranian state-run radio indicates Tehran's approval of the Agreement and the associated referendum:

"The agreement of the Iraqi government and parliament with holding a referendum shows that Iraqi officials, who are under pressure from America, will be in a better position to express their views by referring to the general consensus and the support of the Iraqi people, and will be able to free themselves from the pressures of the American statesmen."

Iraq: Not So Fast....

There is a waving of banner headlines in the American and British press today that "Troops leave by end of 2011, US and Iraq agree". It appears that "after months of tense negotiations and public protests, the Iraqi cabinet on Sunday approved a bilateral agreement allowing U.S. troops to remain in this country for three more years."

Well, that's that, then. Americans can prepare for all their boys coming home by the end of 2011. Iraqis can bask in their freedom. Richard Beeston in The Times can even celebrate this great achievement of Bushian foreign policy: "This is a triumph in that it is precisely what the Bush Administration wanted in Iraq – a viable, democratic and independent government capable of making its own decisions and taking on greater responsibility for security."

Hmmm....Why am I a bit hesitant about such a triumph?

Well, a beginning might be to ask why, after so many months of negotiation, the al-Maliki Government has come off the fence and backed the Status of Forces Agreement. Of the reports I read this morning, only The Guardian of London --- drawing on an Associated Press account --- picked up on the catalyst:

On Saturday the leading Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani dropped his opposition to the deal, in a shift that some observers believe paved the way for a Shia bloc in the cabinet to vote in its favour.

Al-Jazeera adds that al-Malaki "dispatched Khalid al-Attiyah and Ali al-Adeeb, two senior Shia legislators to Najaf to secure the support" of Sistani.

As late as Friday, it was reported that the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq --- the largest party in the al-Maliki coalition --- was holding back on approval. Meanwhile, Moqtada al-Sadr at Friday prayers was telling supporters to prepare for resistance against US troops.

Could al-Sadr's open call have pushed Sistani into public acceptance of the deal? Did the Islamic Supreme Council move first, or did they follow Sistani? And what of the nine ministers of the 37-member Cabinet who absented themselves from Sunday's meeting rather than give approval: are they from Sunni factions who now worry about a renewed US-Shi'a alliance against their interests?

I can't answer any of these questions yet. I do know, however, that there's an even bigger one that no one has broached today.

Is the United States really going to abandon more than dozen permanent bases, representing billions of dollars of investment, by the end of 2011? Or will there be interpretations and re-interpretations of the agreement to allow US units --- "trainers", "advisors", "mobile forces" --- to remain in Iraq?

Let's re-visit that headline: "Troops Leave by End of 2011". Here's the exact transcript of President-elect Obama on CBS television last night:

Kroft: Can you give us some sense of when you might start redeployments out of Iraq?

Mr. Obama: Well, I've said during the campaign, and I've stuck to this commitment, that as soon as I take office, I will call in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my national security apparatus, and we will start executing a plan that draws down our troops.

Once more, drawdown is not full withdrawal. As far as I am concerned, the best statement of near-future US policy in Iraq is the report of December 2006 by the Iraq Study Group (member Robert Gates, the current and likely near-future Secretary of Defense), which proposed the retention of 50,000 troops in various guises in the country.