Agreement in Iraq: Half-Full, Half-Empty

The optimistic view of the Iraq Parliament's passage --- by 149-35 with 14 abstentions and 77 not present --- of the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States comes from US and British papers that headline passage with "a substantial majority" and "an overwhelming show of hands".

The not-so-optimistic view? Well, that would come from a bit of detailed reading and some basic reflection. Only The Washington Post, at the end of the sixth paragraph of its report, mentions those 77 Parliamentarians who didn't show for the final vote. That means --- and here the Post deserves a bit of credit --- that "just over half" of the members voted for the Agreement.

Interpretation? For that, you have to bypass the glowing headline, "31 December 2011: day the last US soldier leaves Iraq". The politics are far more complex: in effect, the Government of Nouri al-Maliki and leading Shi'a parties, as well as supporting Kurdish parties, have a bit of breathing space because they bought abstentions from Sunni and some uncertain Shi'a members.

Because of those abstentions, the al-Maliki Government can present the vote as a ringing Sadrists, with only recalcitrant Sadrists opposing the Agreement. Had those abstentions been votes against, however, the final tally would have been 149-136, far from the "consensus" demanded by Ayatollah Sistani and some other key political figures in Iraq.

The Government paid a price for the clear victory, giving assurances to Sunnis that they would have input into future legislation. More importantly, at least in the short term, al-Maliki gave way to the Sunni demand for a national referendum on the agreement in the middle of 2009.

Perhaps the most telling comment on that referendum came --- buried in The New York Times report --- from the veteran politician Adnan Pacachi: the referendum will ensure that US leaders are “more careful and they will not make mistakes that will cause the Iraqi people to reject the agreement". In other words, this is a marker that the Obama Administration shows good faith both in drawing down US forces and in not re-interpreting the Agreement, say, for US military operations without Iraqi approval and for the continued use of private contractors immune from Iraqi law.

There is, in other words, a dual negotiation going on here. One is the negotiation between factions in Iraq for influence, notably the Sunni struggle to retain some say in political affairs at national level, and one is the negotiation to limit and possibly remove the American presence. Neither of these negotiations came to an end on Thursday.

Fatuous commentary of the day:

The report in The New York Times maintains:

"Throughout the government’s negotiations on the pact, ...neighboring countries, especially Iran, have been invisible but influential players. As recently as Wednesday night, lawmakers said messages came from Iran expressing disapproval of the political deal that was essential to the pact’s ratification.

But lawmakers nevertheless pushed on with the negotiations, and the final compromise, arrived at less than an hour before the Parliament vote, differed little from the version rejected by the Iranians."

The implication that Iran was the main obstacle to ratification is misleading, ignoring the internal Iraqi dynamics. It also is inaccurate and misses the key point. As Juan Cole documents, Iranian state-run radio indicates Tehran's approval of the Agreement and the associated referendum:

"The agreement of the Iraqi government and parliament with holding a referendum shows that Iraqi officials, who are under pressure from America, will be in a better position to express their views by referring to the general consensus and the support of the Iraqi people, and will be able to free themselves from the pressures of the American statesmen."

Iraq: The Breaking-Point Politics Beyond the Surge

For months, I've put forth the paradox surrounding the proposed Status of Forces Agreement between the US and Iraqi Governments. As Washington grows increasingly desperate to get the fig-leaf of the Agreement to underpin its military presence, the political fight over that agreement highlights the mounting irrelevance of US forces.

This week could highlight that paradox. Today the New York Times, close to disgracefully, parades a series of experts (Frederick Kagan, General David Petraeus' former executive officer Peter Mansoor, Petraeus worshipper Linda Robinson, and --- in an act that defines chutzpah --- Donald Rumsfeld) urging us to "stay the military course". James Glanz's Sunday puff-piece in the paper is "In Ramadi, With A Fresh Coat of Paint" .

In Baghdad, however, folks aren't taking their leads from the Times. And I suspect many in the Bush Administration --- though not the President, who is blissfully tripping towards the exit door --- are worrying they aren't taking direction from the US.

On Wednesday, the Iraqi Parliament was convened to support the second reading of the Agreement but was suspended amidst shouting and scuffles. The scene was repeated on Thursday. On Friday, the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his supporters made their show of political force after prayers, as thousands took to the streets to denounce the agreement. A stream of Parliamentarians let it be known that they would be absent from Baghdad this week, as they had decided to fulfil their once-in-a-lifetime obligation to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Perhaps most importantly, the leading clerical figure in Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, declared that he would not support the agreement unless there was a national consensus behind it. Now, as the leading Shi'a parties --- the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Daw'a --- seemed to have swung behind ratification, leading to the Cabinet's vote in favour last weekend, Sistani's statement pointed to the worry that the key Sunni parties would not offer their support.

In mid-week Juan Cole, with his specialist reading of the Arab press and other signs from Iraq, was still predicting that Parliament would narrowly ratify the Agreement; however, he also noted that without clear Sunni backing, Sistani's condition for consensus would not be met. By today, he was being notably cautious. With the Iraqi Parliament postponing the vote again, this time from Monday to Wednesday, Cole wrote, "It is still not clear how the Sunni Arab MPs will vote; without their support, the agreement would likely be seen as a joint Shiite-Kurdish conspiracy."

Absolutely. Here's the twist in the surge that almost no one in the mainstream US media has picked up. The well-trumpeted wonder of the Petraeus strategy was the bolstering of local and regional Sunni groups, the Awakening Council, in provinces outside Baghdad. The unnoted but always-lurking questions was the relationshp of those groups to the national government.

Well, now we're getting the answer. Sunni parties have the perception that, with its desperation to get an Agreement before the UN mandate for the occupation expires on 31 December, Washington has swung again into backing of the Shia-dominated government. It's a cycle that has recurred periodically since 2003, for example, in the debates over the Iraqi constitution in 2005. Meanwhile, there's a minority but very significant Shi'a faction, embodied by but not exclusive to the "Sadrists", who are ready to fight this Agreement to the end, inside Parliament and possibly on the streets.

Which is why the political process had reached the point on Saturday where the Defence and Interior Ministers called a press conference and invoked "the specters of a reborn insurgency, foreign attack and even piracy" if ratification did not occur. This in turn followed a Thursday speech from Prime Minister al-Maliki and, according to some press reports, his threats to resign if Parliament did not act appropriately.

Let's call it forthrightly: if the current Government does not get ratification, it will collapse. And even if it gets a narrow victory, it faces the prospect of a renewed sectarian conflict, at best one of protracted political tension and at worse a return to violence. Hey, even supposed allies may be suspect --- it was reported this weekend that planeloads of weapons from Bulgaria were arriving in Kurdish territory.

Where is the US military in all this? Well, an inadvertent black comedy illustration came in a Thursday story in the Washington Post. The headline portended another good-news surge tale: "U.S. Troops in Baghdad Take a Softer Approach Focus Shifts to Reconciling Factions" . The opening paragraph offered a more pertient, off-script message:

It was billed as a peace concert in war-scarred Baghdad. But after 30 minutes of poetry and patriotic songs, only a scattering of tribal leaders and dark-suited bureaucrats were sitting in the vast expanse of white plastic chairs before a stage painted with doves.

Iraq: Not So Fast....

There is a waving of banner headlines in the American and British press today that "Troops leave by end of 2011, US and Iraq agree". It appears that "after months of tense negotiations and public protests, the Iraqi cabinet on Sunday approved a bilateral agreement allowing U.S. troops to remain in this country for three more years."

Well, that's that, then. Americans can prepare for all their boys coming home by the end of 2011. Iraqis can bask in their freedom. Richard Beeston in The Times can even celebrate this great achievement of Bushian foreign policy: "This is a triumph in that it is precisely what the Bush Administration wanted in Iraq – a viable, democratic and independent government capable of making its own decisions and taking on greater responsibility for security."

Hmmm....Why am I a bit hesitant about such a triumph?

Well, a beginning might be to ask why, after so many months of negotiation, the al-Maliki Government has come off the fence and backed the Status of Forces Agreement. Of the reports I read this morning, only The Guardian of London --- drawing on an Associated Press account --- picked up on the catalyst:

On Saturday the leading Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani dropped his opposition to the deal, in a shift that some observers believe paved the way for a Shia bloc in the cabinet to vote in its favour.

Al-Jazeera adds that al-Malaki "dispatched Khalid al-Attiyah and Ali al-Adeeb, two senior Shia legislators to Najaf to secure the support" of Sistani.

As late as Friday, it was reported that the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq --- the largest party in the al-Maliki coalition --- was holding back on approval. Meanwhile, Moqtada al-Sadr at Friday prayers was telling supporters to prepare for resistance against US troops.

Could al-Sadr's open call have pushed Sistani into public acceptance of the deal? Did the Islamic Supreme Council move first, or did they follow Sistani? And what of the nine ministers of the 37-member Cabinet who absented themselves from Sunday's meeting rather than give approval: are they from Sunni factions who now worry about a renewed US-Shi'a alliance against their interests?

I can't answer any of these questions yet. I do know, however, that there's an even bigger one that no one has broached today.

Is the United States really going to abandon more than dozen permanent bases, representing billions of dollars of investment, by the end of 2011? Or will there be interpretations and re-interpretations of the agreement to allow US units --- "trainers", "advisors", "mobile forces" --- to remain in Iraq?

Let's re-visit that headline: "Troops Leave by End of 2011". Here's the exact transcript of President-elect Obama on CBS television last night:

Kroft: Can you give us some sense of when you might start redeployments out of Iraq?

Mr. Obama: Well, I've said during the campaign, and I've stuck to this commitment, that as soon as I take office, I will call in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my national security apparatus, and we will start executing a plan that draws down our troops.

Once more, drawdown is not full withdrawal. As far as I am concerned, the best statement of near-future US policy in Iraq is the report of December 2006 by the Iraq Study Group (member Robert Gates, the current and likely near-future Secretary of Defense), which proposed the retention of 50,000 troops in various guises in the country.

Iraq: Slouching Towards Limbo

So Iraq, after a break away from the front pages, will be back tomorrow. Dozens of people have been killed in three bombings in Baghdad, one in Baquba, and one in Samarra.

It's a sad reality that Iraq only makes Page 1 now with a series of incident like today's or with a carefully-packaged story by the US military on the state of the "surge". If you're thousands of miles away, there's an eerieness as tragedy makes a brief appearance and is then whisked out the door by the myth of American success. There is nothing in between.

Nothing, for example, in the US press on the quiet but significant British announcement that their soldiers are out by July 2009 and possibly by April. That's right, gone. The withdrawal of the 4100 troops may be spun as a testament to success, since violence in the south is down in recent months, but it is equally likely that the Brits will just slide away with little fanfare. This hasn't been London's fight for some time, and certainly not since Tony Blair stepped down as Prime Minister.

And the "minor" incidents of violence aren't likely be in your breakfast headlines. Consider, for example, this from yesterday:

Baghdad: Around 10 am a roadside bomb targeted a police patrol in the Rubayee street in Zayuna neighborhood (east Baghdad). Six people were injured including two policemen.

Anbar: Around 9 am a female suicide bomber targeted the emergency room of the Amiriat Al-Falluja hospital. One woman was killed and five other people were injured including three women, Falluja police said.

Diyala: Around 9 am a bomb planted in garbage container detonated near the main market in downtown Baquba. One sweeper was killed and five other civilians were injured. A roadside bomb detonated in Khalis market ( north of Baquba). Five people were killed and 8 others were wounded including the district commissioner of Khalis town, Uday Al-Khathran.

Kirkuk: Gunmen riding in a Toyota pick up car kidnapped a policeman who was in his own car in Rashad town (southwest Kirkuk) on Saturday night, police said. Gunmen opened fire on an Iraqi check point in Askari neighborhood of Tuz Khurmatu (south of Kirkuk) around 5 am. Three soldiers were wounded.

Mosul: A roadside bomb detonated in Intisar neighborhood (downtown Mosul city). Two people were injured. Gunmen killed a policeman in front of his house in Ghizlani neighborhood in downtown Mosul. - A suicide car bomber targeted a police patrol in Mansour neighborhood in Mosul city around 5:30 pm. Eleven people were injured including 6 policemen. A roadside bomb targeted an army patrol in Al-Zihour neighborhood in Mosul city. Three soldiers were killed and seven people were injured including four soldiers.

But, maybe most significantly, you'll have to search long and hard for the latest on the proposed Status of Forces Agreement, which the US hopes will be in place when the UN mandate (the current basis for the occupation) expires on 31 December. After months of wrangling, the al-Maliki Government has passed its almost-final verdict on the arrangement: it's going to pass the buck. That is, caught between US insistence on exemption of its soldiers from Iraqi sovereignty and the opposition of much of the Iraqi population to the agreement, the Government will put the proposal to the Iraqi Parliament for a straight up-or-down vote.

No more negotiations, especially with a lame-duck Bush Administration. And given the mobilisation by key Iraqi groups --- the Sadrists, other Shi'a parties, and even some of the Sunnis whom the US has been touting as Awakened Allies, it's highly likely that the Parliament will have enough cover to throw the agreement back at Washington.

This political wrangling doesn't have the drama of "liberation" or an insurgent's bomb. It's far too complex to make for an easy read. And so it will probably continue to hide behind the "surge" tales and superfluous speculation of US troops out by end of 2011, mid-2011, end of 2010? In recent days, only the New York Times has broken cover to put forth any original thinking:

If the agreement is stymied, the United States and Iraq should ask the Security Council to extend its mandate. Or the two countries could agree to let the American forces keep operating until the pact is concluded.

The fact that the process is taking so long is also a reminder that there is no moving forward in Iraq without bringing Iran into the process — something Mr. Bush has fiercely resisted.

But, of course, that quick burst of thought merely stirs up a bit of trouble. Talking to Iran, the enemies next door to the former enemies in Iraq? Surely not.

And so we're likely, even in this time of "Change", to be falling back on more surge, surge, surge and little else (apart from inconvenient quintuple-bombings) for the near-future.