Assassination in Pakistan: Is Blackwater Involved with US Military Hit Squads?

Jeremy Scahill, author of the breakthrough book on Blackwater in Iraq, now casts an eye on the possible involvement of the company, renamed Xe, in the US military's covert operations in Pakistan. He writes in The Nation:

At a covert forward operating base run by the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, members of an elite division of Blackwater are at the center of a secret program in which they plan targeted assassinations of suspected Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, "snatch and grabs" of high-value targets and other sensitive action inside and outside Pakistan, an investigation by The Nation has found. The Blackwater operatives also assist in gathering intelligence and help run a secret US military drone bombing campaign that runs parallel to the well-documented CIA predator strikes, according to a well-placed source within the US military intelligence apparatus.

Coming Soon to Your Country: US Government “Hit Squads”?

The source, who has worked on covert US military programs for years, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has direct knowledge of Blackwater's involvement. He spoke toThe Nation on condition of anonymity because the program is classified. The source said that the program is so "compartmentalized" that senior figures within the Obama administration and the US military chain of command may not be aware of its existence.

The White House did not return calls or email messages seeking comment for this story. Capt. John Kirby, the spokesperson for Adm. Michael Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told The Nation, "We do not discuss current operations one way or the other, regardless of their nature." A defense official, on background, specifically denied that Blackwater performs work on drone strikes or intelligence for JSOC in Pakistan. "We don't have any contracts to do that work for us. We don't contract that kind of work out, period," the official said. "There has not been, and is not now, contracts between JSOC and that organization for these types of services."

The previously unreported program, the military intelligence source said, is distinct from the CIA assassination program that the agency's director, Leon Panetta, announced he had canceled in June 2009. "This is a parallel operation to the CIA," said the source. "They are two separate beasts." The program puts Blackwater at the epicenter of a US military operation within the borders of a nation against which the United States has not declared war--knowledge that could further strain the already tense relations between the United States and Pakistan. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan struck a deal that authorized JSOC to enter Pakistan to hunt Osama bin Laden with the understanding that Pakistan would deny it had given permission. Officially, the United States is not supposed to have any active military operations in the country. Blackwater, which recently changed its name to Xe Services and US Training Center, denies the company is operating in Pakistan. "Xe Services has only one employee in Pakistan performing construction oversight for the U.S. Government," Blackwater spokesperson Mark Corallo said in a statement to The Nation, adding that the company has "no other operations of any kind in Pakistan."

A former senior executive at Blackwater confirmed the military intelligence source's claim that the company is working in Pakistan for the CIA and JSOC, the premier counterterrorism and covert operations force within the military. He said that Blackwater is also working for the Pakistani government on a subcontract with an Islamabad-based security firm that puts US Blackwater operatives on the ground with Pakistani forces in counter-terrorism operations, including house raids and border interdictions, in the North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan. This arrangement, the former executive said, allows the Pakistani government to utilize former US Special Operations forces who now work for Blackwater while denying an official US military presence in the country. He also confirmed that Blackwater has a facility in Karachi and has personnel deployed elsewhere in Pakistan. The former executive spoke on condition of anonymity.

His account and that of the military intelligence source were borne out by a US military source who has knowledge of Special Forces actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. When asked about Blackwater's covert work for JSOC in Pakistan, this source, who also asked for anonymity, told The Nation, "From my information that I have, that is absolutely correct," adding, "There's no question that's occurring."

"It wouldn't surprise me because we've outsourced nearly everything," said Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who served as Secretary of State Colin Powell's chief of staff from 2002 to 2005, when told of Blackwater's role in Pakistan. Wilkerson said that during his time in the Bush administration, he saw the beginnings of Blackwater's involvement with the sensitive operations of the military and CIA. "Part of this, of course, is an attempt to get around the constraints the Congress has placed on DoD. If you don't have sufficient soldiers to do it, you hire civilians to do it. I mean, it's that simple. It would not surprise me."

The Counterterrorism Tag Team in Karachi

The covert JSOC program with Blackwater in Pakistan dates back to at least 2007, according to the military intelligence source. The current head of JSOC is Vice Adm. William McRaven, who took over the post from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who headed JSOC from 2003 to 2008 before being named the top US commander in Afghanistan. Blackwater's presence in Pakistan is "not really visible, and that's why nobody has cracked down on it," said the source. Blackwater's operations in Pakistan, he said, are not done through State Department contracts or publicly identified Defense contracts. "It's Blackwater via JSOC, and it's a classified no-bid [contract] approved on a rolling basis." The main JSOC/Blackwater facility in Karachi, according to the source, is nondescript: three trailers with various generators, satellite phones and computer systems are used as a makeshift operations center. "It's a very rudimentary operation," says the source. "I would compare it to [CIA] outposts in Kurdistan or any of the Special Forces outposts. It's very bare bones, and that's the point."

Blackwater's work for JSOC in Karachi is coordinated out of a Task Force based at Bagram Air Base in neighboring Afghanistan, according to the military intelligence source. While JSOC technically runs the operations in Karachi, he said, it is largely staffed by former US special operations soldiers working for a division of Blackwater, once known as Blackwater SELECT, and intelligence analysts working for a Blackwater affiliate, Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS), which is owned by Blackwater's founder, Erik Prince. The military source said that the name Blackwater SELECT may have been changed recently. Total Intelligence, which is run out of an office on the ninth floor of a building in the Ballston area of Arlington, Virginia, is staffed by former analysts and operatives from the CIA, DIA, FBI and other agencies. It is modeled after the CIA's counterterrorism center. In Karachi, TIS runs a "media-scouring/open-source network," according to the source. Until recently, Total Intelligence was run by two former top CIA officials, Cofer Black and Robert Richer, both of whom have left the company. In Pakistan, Blackwater is not using either its original name or its new moniker, Xe Services, according to the former Blackwater executive. "They are running most of their work through TIS because the other two [names] have such a stain on them," he said. Corallo, the Blackwater spokesperson, denied that TIS or any other division or affiliate of Blackwater has any personnel in Pakistan.

The US military intelligence source said that Blackwater's classified contracts keep getting renewed at the request of JSOC. Blackwater, he said, is already so deeply entrenched that it has become a staple of the US military operations in Pakistan. According to the former Blackwater executive, "The politics that go with the brand of BW is somewhat set aside because what you're doing is really one military guy to another." Blackwater's first known contract with the CIA for operations in Afghanistan was awarded in 2002 and was for work along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

One of the concerns raised by the military intelligence source is that some Blackwater personnel are being given rolling security clearances above their approved clearances. Using Alternative Compartmentalized Control Measures (ACCMs), he said, the Blackwater personnel are granted clearance to a Special Access Program, the bureaucratic term used to describe highly classified "black" operations. "With an ACCM, the security manager can grant access to you to be exposed to and operate within compartmentalized programs far above 'secret'--even though you have no business doing so," said the source. It allows Blackwater personnel that "do not have the requisite security clearance or do not hold a security clearance whatsoever to participate in classified operations by virtue of trust," he added. "Think of it as an ultra-exclusive level above top secret. That's exactly what it is: a circle of love." Blackwater, therefore, has access to "all source" reports that are culled in part from JSOC units in the field. "That's how a lot of things over the years have been conducted with contractors," said the source. "We have contractors that regularly see things that top policy-makers don't unless they ask."

According to the source, Blackwater has effectively marketed itself as a company whose operatives have "conducted lethal direct action missions and now, for a price, you can have your own planning cell. JSOC just ate that up," he said, adding, "They have a sizable force in Pakistan--not for any nefarious purpose if you really want to look at it that way--but to support a legitimate contract that's classified for JSOC." Blackwater's Pakistan JSOC contracts are secret and are therefore shielded from public oversight, he said. The source is not sure when the arrangement with JSOC began, but he says that a spin-off of Blackwater SELECT "was issued a no-bid contract for support to shooters for a JSOC Task Force and they kept extending it." Some of the Blackwater personnel, he said, work undercover as aid workers. "Nobody even gives them a second thought."

The military intelligence source said that the Blackwater/JSOC Karachi operation is referred to as "Qatar cubed," in reference to the US forward operating base in Qatar that served as the hub for the planning and implementation of the US invasion of Iraq. "This is supposed to be the brave new world," he says. "This is the Jamestown of the new millennium and it's meant to be a lily pad. You can jump off to Uzbekistan, you can jump back over the border, you can jump sideways, you can jump northwest. It's strategically located so that they can get their people wherever they have to without having to wrangle with the military chain of command in Afghanistan, which is convoluted. They don't have to deal with that because they're operating under a classified mandate."

In addition to planning drone strikes and operations against suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Pakistan for both JSOC and the CIA, the Blackwater team in Karachi also helps plan missions for JSOC inside Uzbekistan against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, according to the military intelligence source. Blackwater does not actually carry out the operations, he said, which are executed on the ground by JSOC forces. "That piqued my curiosity and really worries me because I don't know if you noticed but I was never told we are at war with Uzbekistan," he said. "So, did I miss something, did Rumsfeld come back into power?"

Read rest of article....

"Let America Be America": An Exit Strategy for Afghanistan

Afghanistan: The Great Lock ‘n Load Swindle
Afghanistan: Karzai’s Victory over the US

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

Another Sunday, another set of articles and punditry setting out the US can "win" the conflict in Afghanistan. The latest spin is that of the US military supporting a series of local militias throughout the country to defeat the Taliban: this, I presume, is more a signal of Washington's careful distancing from the perceived weakness of the Karzai Government to sell a troop escalation. The New York Times packages the spin as a report by Dexter Filkins, while David Ignatius openly backs the initiative in his opinion piece in The Washington Post, "Afghan Tribes to the Rescue?"

In a guest column for Juan Cole's website, William Polk, a former member of the State Department and professor at the University of Chicago, puts forth an alternative: political and economic steps linked to a measured withdrawal of US troops:

In its war in Afghanistan, the United States has come to a crossroads. President Obama will be forced to choose one of four ways ahead. The choices are cruel, expensive and dangerous for our country; so we must be sure that he chooses the least painful, least expensive and safest of the possible choices.

The first possible choice is to keep on doing what we are now doing. That is, fighting the insurgency with about 60,000 American troops and 68,197 mercenaries at a cost of roughly $2,000 a day per person. That is, we now actually have a total complement of over 120,000 people on the public payroll at an overall cost, of roughly $100 billion a year. We can project a loss of a few hundred American soldiers a year and several thousand wounded. Our senior commander in the Central Command, General David Petraeus, tells us that we cannot win that war.

The second possible road ahead would involve adding substantial numbers of new troops. In General Petraeus’s counterinsurgency doctrine, the accepted ratio of soldiers to natives is 20 to 25 per thousand natives.1 Afghanistan today is a country of about 33 million. Even if we discount the population to the target group of Pashtuns, we will must deal with 15 or so million people. So when he and General Stanley McChrystal ask for 40,000, it can only be a first installment. Soon -- as the generals did in Vietnam – they will have to ask for another increment and then another, moving toward the supposedly winning number of 600,000 to 1.3 million. That is just the soldiers. Each soldier is now matched by a supporter, rather like medieval armies had flocks of camp followers, so those numbers will roughly double. Thus, over ten years, a figure often cited, or 40 years, which some of the leading neoconservatives have suggested, would pretty soon, as they say in Congress, involve “talking about real money.” In addition to the Congressionally-allocated outlay, the overall cost to our economy has not yet been summed up, but by analogy to the Iraq war, it will probably amount to upwards of $6 trillion.

Then there are the casualties: we have so far lost about a thousand -- or a quarter as many as in Iraq. Casualties we can count, but the number of seriously wounded keeps growing because many of the effects of exposure to modern weapons do not show up until later. We have no reliable figures yet on Afghanistan. In Iraq at least 100,000 of the one and a half million soldiers who served there suffered severe psychological damage and about 300,000 have reported post-traumatic stress disorder and a similar number have suffered brain injuries. Crassly put, these “walking wounded” will not only be unable fully to contribute to American society but will be a burden on it for many years to come. It has been estimated that dealing with a brain-injured soldier over his remaining life will cost about $5 million. Cancer, from exposure to depleted uranium is, only now coming into full effect. All in all, it is sobering to calculate that 40 percent of the soldiers who served in the 1991 Gulf war – which lasted only a hundred hours – are receiving disability payments. Inevitably, more “boots on the ground” will lead to more beds in hospitals.

General McChrystal has told us that we must have large numbers of additional troops to hold the territory we “clear.” He echoes what the Russian commanders told the Politburo: in a report on November 13, 1986, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev commented that the Russians attempted the same strategy but admitted that it failed. “There is no piece of land in Afghanistan,” he said, “that has not been occupied by one of or soldiers at some time or another. Nevertheless, much of the territory stays in the hands of the terrorists. We control the provincial centers, but we cannot maintain political control over the territory we seize . . . Without a lot more men, this war will continue for a very, very long time.”

The Russian army fought a bloody, brutal campaign, using every trick or tool of counterinsurgency ever identified. The Russians killed a million Afghanis and turned about 5 million into refugees, but after a decade during which they lost 15,000 soldiers and virtually bankrupted the Soviet Union, they gave up and left. General McChrystal says it may take him a decade or more to “win.” But what “winning” means is unclear.

Third, we could marginally increase our troop strength. That is, adding only between 10,000 and 30,000 troops and a comparable number of mercenaries. Not the full complement that General McChrystal has now demanded. This road, according to Petraeus, McChrystal and their acolytes would lead to “mission failure.”

Not meeting the generals’ demands also brings forward the danger to the Obama administration of being charged with putting our soldiers at risk “with one hand tied behind their backs,” a phrase from the acrimonious aftermath of the Vietnam war which even General James Jones, President Obama’s director of the National Security Council, has recently repeated. The potential ugly campaign, against which even Henry Kissinger has warned us, could pose risks to our political culture and even to our legal structure: some military men are already talking about their restiveness in obeying civilian government. “You kind of get used to it after years of service” one Army general said at a convention in Washington last month. Forgetting the constitution, he continued, “We tend to live with it.” Maybe they will or maybe anger will be channeled into a further extension of the military into politics, intelligence and diplomacy.

For the first time that I know of in recent American history, the uniformed military have created what amounts to a pressure group of their own. Generals Petraeus and McChrystal are the leaders but, by influencing or controlling promotions panels, they have fostered the advancement of middle grade and junior officers who agree with them. Some have been brought into a group called “the Colonels’ council.” And numbers of retired senior officers have joined not only in what President Eisenhower called the “military-industrial complex” but have become the opinion-makers on foreign policy in the media. Private soldiers and non-commissioned officers have, at the same time, become a major component of the private armies of such groups as Xe (formerly Blackwater) and form an active part of the constituency of the right wing of the Republican Party.

In the dangerous months and years ahead, if this road is taken, we are apt to hear echoes – particularly in the next presidential election --of the post Vietnam rhetoric that the civilians sold out the military. In short, while this option sounds moderate and “business-like” I believe that it is the worst option for President Obama and, more importantly, for the nation.

Or, fourth, we could Get out.

Read rest of article....

Afghanistan: Obama's Options (From Cage Fighting to Rugs)

Afghanistan Follow-Up: Civil War in the Obama Administration

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

As the Obama Administration near its decision on troop escalation, the White House correspondent of The Onion leaks details of the discussions:

Pressure is mounting on President Obama to make a decision on the future of Afghanistan.

Here are the options currently being considered:

*Not only learn the lessons of Vietnam, but apply them as well

*Visit; act fascinated by their rugs

*Remove every American soldier; see if fighting continues

*Legalize gambling, as that's worked well domestically

*Thunderdome-style battle to the death between Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal and Afghanistan Taliban leader Mullah Omar

*Call the Taliban pretending to be the Prophet Muhammad and tell them to stop ambushing American soldiers

*Announce you're raising troop levels by 15,000, then pull everybody out, then come back with a half million soldiers, in the
process convincing al-Qaeda that you're loco and not to be messed with

*Arm and finance a group of religious fighters

*Back the murderous drug-dealing warlord with the most government officials in his pocket

Afghanistan Follow-Up: Civil War in the Obama Administration

Afghanistan Special: The Obama Administration Breaks Apart Over Military Escalation
Afghanistan Video: Obama Rejects “All Military Options”?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis



UPDATE 1525 GMT: Spencer Ackerman has now retracted his original story that the anti-Eikenberry statement --- "he has a beef with McChrystal" --- came from a National Security Council staffer who was at the NSC meeting on Wednesday, although "my original source for the post stands by the account provided". Pity that Ackerman doesn't then ask the follow-up question: "How bad are relations within the White House over Afghanistan that officials are slinging mud by passing on 'information' from others who were in the high-level discussions?"

Yesterday we reported on the sudden emergence of the rift within the US Government over military escalation in Afghanistan. This was symbolised by the leaking of the call by the US Ambassador,  Karl Eikenberry, for no troop increase because of the instability of the Afghan Government and, more importantly, established by President Obama's reported "rejection" of all four proposals --- ranging from an escalation of 15,000 troops to a fulfilment of US commander Stanley McChrystal's request for 40,000 --- on the table.

24 hours later and the dispute rages on. The immediate reaction was an effort by pro-escalation forces to trash Eikenberry by claiming “he leaked his own cables” because “he has a beef with McChrystal" and alleging that the mess in Afghanistan occurred during Eikenberry's tenure as military commander between 2005 and 2007. Meanwhile, those inside the White House (note, not inside the US Embassy but inside the White House) are maintaining the pressure against an acceptance of any significant troop increase by criticising both sides of the Af-Pak strategy: "Do we have any assurances of what Pakistan will do? At least in Iraq, you had some functioning government there at the time of the surge. In Afghanistan, there is no government there."

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is trying to hold the Administration together with the insistence that a National Security meeting yesterday focused on progress rather than retribution: “I would say it was more, how can we combine some of the best features of several of the options to maximum good effect? So there is a little more work to do, but I think we’re getting toward the end of the process.” Yet Gates also hinted at the growing doubts about the Kabul Government that have first delayed and now jeopardised an acceptance of the McChrystal recommendations, “How do we signal resolve, and at the same time signal to the Afghans, as well as the American people, that this is not an open-ended commitment?”

In the coverage today, however, no one is coming back to the question: who leaked the Eikenberry objections? And no one is picking up on the significance of that leak and the disputes of this week.

The tensions between the White House, other agencies, and the US military have been present since Obama took office in January. Here's the difference now: those tensions may now have become the primary issue, overtaking any specific decision on troop levels in Afghanistan. If the President finally authorises the 40,000, he will be seen as caving in to the pressure of the military, disregarding not only advisors such as Eikenberry but sceptics within his White House. If he refuses escalation or offers only a token increase, he will incur the wrath of commanders who are willing to "spin" against him and their allies in the media ("Obama the ditherer"; "Obama the appeaser"). If he tries to split the difference, he will get the worst of both worlds --- loyalists like Gates will try to prop him up, but Obama will be facing objections (mainly through more leaks) from within the White House and within other departments.

That is why the most significant part of Gates's statement to the press yesterday was not his "Don't Worry, All is On Course for A Decision", but his warning to those out of line in the the Administration: “I have been appalled by the amount of leaking that has been going on in this process....A lot of different places are leaking...[and I am] confident that the Department of Defense is one of them....And frankly if I found out with high confidence anybody who was leaking in the Department of Defense, who that was, that would probably be a career ender.”

Which, in "normal" times, might be enough to put everyone and everything back in line. But Afghanistan --- in symbolism and in political reality --- is beyond normal, and this civil war is now beyond even an Enforcer like Gates.

Afghanistan Special: The Obama Administration Breaks Apart Over Military Escalation

Afghanistan Video: Obama Rejects “All Military Options”?
Afghanistan: The Pentagon (and US Companies) Dig In for “Long War”
Afghanistan: A US-Pakistan Deal? Karzai Stays, Talks with the Taliban
The US in Afghanistan: “The Long War” Still Waits for a Strategy

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

And no, that is not too dramatic a headline.

Twenty-four hours ago, everything was A-OK in the Obama Administration: "Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton [were] coalescing around a proposal to send 30,000 or more additional American troops to Afghanistan." OK, maybe "President Obama remain[ed] unsatisfied with answers he has gotten about how vigorously the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan would help execute a new strategy," but each of the four options on the table provided for some increase in the US military presence. The issues were "how much of Afghanistan the troops would seek to control and different time frames and expectations for the training of Afghan security forces".

And then all that coalescing fell apart.

This morning's New York Times reveals, "The United States ambassador to Afghanistan, who once served as the top American military commander there, has expressed in writing his reservations about deploying additional troops to the country, three senior American officials said Wednesday."

So "the position of the ambassador, Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general, puts him in stark opposition to the current American and NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, who has asked for 40,000 more troops". But even that is merely a dramatic support for a bigger indication of the divisions in the Administration?

Who were the "three senior American officials" who leaked Eikenberry's memorandum?

Presumably Gates, Clinton, and Mullen, given their reported acceptance of most of the McChrystal increase, would not be spreading secrets to undermine the proposal. So is Vice President Joe Biden, who has been held up as the chief opponent of an intensive escalation for "counter-insurgency" with his preference a targeted "counter-terrorism" effort, trying to sabotage the four options? What about special envoy Richard Holbrooke, who has no love for Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai and bitterly fell out with him after the August Presidential election, given Eikenberry's reported "strong concerns about...Karzai’s reliability as a partner and corruption in his government"?

The mystery will be pored over, without an answer, in the next days. Even more important, however, is the apparent effect of the Eikenberry objections on the President. The White House spin, after yesterday's eighth review conference on the Afghanistan options, is that no decision has been taken but that the President is making clear that the US commitment to the Karzai Government is not "open-ended". That's far from a ringing endorsement, either for the US ally in Kabul or for McChrystal's plan.

Indeed, if I was putting 2+2 together to make more than 4, I would add a question for detective journalists, "Who is to say that those 'senior officials' who ensured the Eikenberry memo went public this morning are not on Obama's White House staff?"

For months I expected this political kabuki, for all the appearances of Administration tensions, differing proposals, and persistent doubts, to end in the "compromise" of a troop increase that would meet most of McChrystal's demands. After all, that was the script in March when Obama approved the escalation of 30,000 more US soldiers and support units.

Now, however, that expectation is suspended. I would not go as far as the Associated Press report that the President "has rejected all military options" (see video in separate entry); supporters of a troop increase will not go away quietly, so there are further chapters in this political story.

Instead, Obama is buying himself some time with his trip to Asia, declaring that no decision will be taken before his return to Washington next week, even as those pressing for escalation scream, "Ditherer". Yet there is a glimmer --- if only a glimmer --- that the President may draw the line on the upward spiral of US military intervention.