Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? The EA Discussion

Yesterday an EA reader sent me this thoughtful and challenging comment:

I would like to point out what seems to be an oversight/flaw in your general understanding of the Green movement. By all counts, the vast majority of Iranians who have been out on the streets and questioning the legitimacy of [President] Ahmadi[nejad] and his cohorts, have no sympathy for Mousavi and "his" Green movement.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? A Discussion on (Non)-Violence

They are more being driven by their own frustrations, hopelessness and overwhelming desire to bring change. It is not likely that in any open contest, if given the choice, the majority of Iranians would be in support of the continuation of the Iranian regime as an Islamic Republic with its flawed constitution--the main refrain of [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and [Mohammad] Khatami is that there is nothing wrong with the Islamic Revolution, it is simply the deviation from the path of [Imam] Khomeini that is a problem.

So by focusing on, for example, whether [Ataollah] Mohajerani, [Mohsen] Sazegara or [Mohsen] Makhmalbaf (all figures tainted in the minds of many Iranians for their support of the regime who have only come to the party because there friends are now out of power and they would like to change that, you are missing the point about the magnitude of anger with the regime and all of its supporters over the past 30 years.

The loss inflicted by the Islamic Republic on Iran and Iranians is unfathomable for non-Iranians. The movement in Iran (which is not Green) is a manifestation of 30 years of pain and represents a demand for fundamental change. It would be a huge shame if that change is ultimately represented by Mousavi, Sazegara, Makhbalbaf and their friends....

This was my immediate response:

If you read between the lines, I think you may see our evolving thought that those at the grassroots and prominent figures such as Mousavi should no longer be conflated (I agree fully that --- being on a learning curve here --- we have made that conflation). At the same time, I think our sense has been that there is a synergy of pressure brought by the different aspects, i.e., if a Karroubi or Mousavi made a public move, that might energise the mass movement (and, conversely, that protest such as that on 30 July or Qods Days could bolster the challenge of those figures).

What recent weeks have raised, I think, is the question of whether the challenge still rests on that synergy, as I sense a disillusionment with Mousavi's inability to be visible on occasions such as 13 Aban and his recent manoeuvres and with Khatami's rather vague comments, accompanied by Karroubi's growing caution. How does the mass movement organise itself to maintain a lasting challenge?

My thought --- strictly as an outsider, I have to add --- is that your comment does not necessarily lead to a separation of the grassroots from the political figures. Another EA reader just posted, "The Iranian people were still shouting [their] names during their protests." I do wonder now, however, if waiting for leadership --- given not only specific issues about the figures you mention but the wider political environment in Iran --- means Waiting for Godot.

So, as the demonstrations of 16 Azar (7 December) approach but, more importantly, as the movement passes that marker and six months of resistance, I wonder again, "How now to organise?"

An hour after I drafted this response, another contributing twist: Agh Bahman, via Pedestrian's blog, has put together the thoughts of activists about the strategy for 16 Azar. The immediate concern of "Flowers for Bullets", the strategy advocated by recently-released detainee Emad Bahavar: how to maintain a peaceful and effective Green protest?

We've posted those thoughts in a separate entry.

Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad)

0645 GMT: A busy Wednesday, not only in political updates but in conversations with those who have a window into what is happening in Washington and Tehran. The politics and possibilities are so complex that days will be needed to work through the analysis but:

1. The chief problem for the Green movement vis-a-vis the US is not if there is an envoy --- Mohajerani, Makhmalbaf, Sazegara --- but its lack of a clear policy (how would it take power? what would it do if it held power? is there even a single Movement rather than movements?). Then again, does that matter? In other words, if the Green movement focuses on changing the situation inside Iran, giving the US Government (and everyone else) a different political scene to consider, can "Obama: You're with them or you're with us" be treated as a slogan rather than a pressing concern?

2. The chief problem for the Obama Administration is that its nuclear-first policy of engagement is facing the twin difficulty of 1) an Iranian Government that is too fractured and too weak to accept soon a "third-party enrichment" deal taking uranium outside the country and 2) its self-imposed artificial deadline of December to close off the talks and move to tougher sanctions. No doubt, since the talks are still "live" --- International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohmammad El Baradei, Russia, and Turkey are all pushing Tehran to accept a compromise on the Vienna third-party plan --- the US Government will try to push back the cut-off date into the New Year.

It is unlikely, however, that either Congress or the loud sections of the US media and "think tanks" will be willing to accept even a few months of grace. So Obama and advisors  face either the prospect of getting a sudden break-through in Iran's position (how to get to the Supreme Leader so he will endorse this?) or having to accept a "compromise" sanctions regime (probably financial and banking measures outside the United Nations framework).

And that in turn has consequences, because any rupture in the engagement with Iran will affect US strategy in near-by countries. All together now....Afghanistan.

3. And the problem for the Ahmadinejad Government? Take your pick.

The Green movement, whatever the indecisions and vagaries of prominent figures like Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami and the recent caution of Mehdi Karroubi, won't go away. And the calendar is moving towards 16 Azar (7 December).

Unless the Supreme Leader has an immediate conversion, there will not be a nuclear agreement which both bolsters President Ahmadinejad's legitimacy and gives the impression of Iranian strength.

The "threats within" have resurrected: the Larijanis, Rafsanjani, other Parliamentarians, Ministries who don't like the quest for control of Ahmadinejad (or those allied with him). And they have plenty to work with --- the nuclear dispute, the Government's economic plans, the running sore of the post-election abuses.

The current manoeuvres to ease difficulties are no more than short-term bandages. Allow the most prominent reformists (e.g. Abtahi) to escape their recent sentences and face both the impression of weakness and the risk that those figures will not remain silent. Put them back in prison with "compromise" sentences (2-3 years) and make them martyrs.

And the solutions which sweep away all these little problems? They risk taking down even the symbolic appearance of the Islamic Republic. A Revolutionary Guard public move to assume power, a negotiation to keep rule in the hands of the Supreme Leader (and his family), a new set of the "right" Grand Ayatollahs: any of these bring the pillars of 1979 crashing down.

Problems, problems, problems.....

Iran: Green Message to Obama "Back Us Instead of Dealing With Ahmadinejad"

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama’s Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)
The Latest from Iran (20 November): Manoeuvres in Washington

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UPDATED 1335 GMT: The Washington Times also has a report on the speech. The headline points are the same as those in the Wall Street Journal as is the description of Makhmalbaf, who "has become a spokesman outside Iran for the so-called Green Movement since the country's disputed June 12 presidential
election".

UPDATED 1045 GMT: EA's Mr Smith has done some checking on the important question, raised by our readers, "To what extent does Makhmalbaf represent the Green Movement and Mir Hossein Mousavi?" The response, from those well-connected and well-versed in Iranian politics, is that "Makhmalbaf is not really connected with Mousavi. Nevertheless, Makhmalbaf acts at the least as a roving public ambassador for him."

Earlier this month, we learned of attempts from inside and outside the Green movement to persuade the Obama Administration to back away from an agreement with Tehran on uranium enrichment and the nuclear programme. That effort is in the open this morning.

The Wall Street Journal reveals the Washington mission by Mohsen Makhmalbaf, the filmmaker, "Presidential campaign spokesman for Mir Hossein Mousavi", and "international spokesman for Iran's main opposition movement". Speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he called for "President Barack Obama to increase his public support for Iranian democrats and significantly intensify financial pressure on Tehran's elite military unit, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps".

As for the nuclear discussions, Makhmalbaf said "that Iranian opposition leaders supported U.S. efforts to use diplomacy to contain the nuclear ambitions of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government". He warned, however, that the current talks would not produce an agreement and should be suspended:

If they agree not to pursue a nuclear bomb and start negotiations, they will lose their supporters. Definitely dialogue is better than war. ... But can you continue your dialogue without any results?

Makhmalbaf suggested an agenda beyond the talks, with the targeted economic measures against the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps: "We need certain sanctions that put pressure on the government but not the people. But they must be done quickly, or they won't have an impact."

Most importantly, Makhmalbaf tried to replace the current nuclear-first priority of the Obama Administration with a democracy-first approach:

We definitely want Obama to say he supports democracy...If he doesn't say that, he will lose his support in Iran.

Don't only focus on the nuclear issue and allow the Iranian government to crack down on the people. You need to focus on human rights.

And, although it is not noted by the Journal, I suspect Makhmalbaf's visit had another essential aim. With the speech at the high-profile Carnegie Endowment, he is trying to repair the damage caused by last month's talk by Ataollah Mohajerani, a former Khatami Government minister and associate of Mehdi Karroubi, at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mohajerani's speech, interpreted (wrongly, we think) by some Washington insiders as a Green manifesto, alienated US support because of its "hard-line" statements on nuclear weapons and Iran's position on Israel.

Makhmalbaf avoided those potential pitfalls on Thursday. Doing so, he is reaching out to officials in the State Department, the National Security Council, and Obama's White House (even if the CIA remains hostile to a Green ascendancy). We are not dead. You can work with us.

And now the follow-up: will he get a response?

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama's Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)

The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

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1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID

If anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.

That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.

Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.

Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG

The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.

Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)

This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.

They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.

What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.

Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".

For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.

(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.

While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS

As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).

The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.

Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.

That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.

What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?

It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.

That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)

Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.

4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC

In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".

The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.

But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).

That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.

Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.

But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.

The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

NEW Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
NEW Iran: More on The Political Attack on the National Iranian American Council
The Latest from Iran (14 November): Political Fatigue?

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1740 GMT: Judge for Yourself. We've posted a copy of the IAEA report on Iran's nuclear facilities. In my opinion, it's a slap on the wrist from the Agency for Iran for not declaring the second enrichment facility before September 2009 and for saying it was begun in 2007 (the IAEA goes for 2006). The IAEA also wants an assurance there are no more nuclear surprises out there. But that, in contrast to the overblown press coverage, is about it.

1715 GMT: Iran Human Rights Voices Reports that 48 protesters detained during 13 Aban demonstrations in Shiraz went on trial on 11 November.

1653 GMT: Spin, Spin, Spinning Iran (see 1555 GMT). Some folks somewhere really want to kill off the idea of engagement by putting out the story of an Iran that breaks its agreements in pursuit of The Bomb. They hope to do so by framing the "Iran threat" in the latest International Atomic Energy report on uranium enrichment, before the IAEA discusses it on 26 November.

In The Washington Post: "A senior official said Monday that the U.N nuclear agency believes Iran plans to start enriching uranium at a previously secret facility in 2011. The official said the International Atomic Energy Agency also believes that the site near the holy city of Qom will be able to house 3,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges. The senior international official familiar with a new IAEA report said that number could allow Iran to enrich enough material to be able to arm one nuclear warhead a year. He spoke on condition of anonymity because of the restricted nature of the information."

In Bloomberg News: "The United Nations atomic agency has lost confidence that the Persian Gulf country is telling the whole truth about its nuclear program and isn’t hiding additional secret facilities. Iran’s Qom enrichment facility, revealed in a Sept 21 letter, 'reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared,' the International Atomic Energy Agency said today in a 7-page report obtained by Bloomberg News.

On Al Jazeera: "Iran's belated revelation of a second uranium enrichment site has raised concerns about possible further secret nuclear sites in the country. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) raised its fears in a report obtained by several news agencies on Monday."

1644 GMT: A group of activists have gathered in Shiraz to collect signatures for a statement supporting Grand Ayatollah Ali Mohammad Dastgheib, who has been an outspoken critic of the Iranian Government.

1630 GMT: The Death of the Prison Doctor. Speculation is spreading about Ramin Pourandarjan, the physician on duty at the infamous Kahrizak Prison, who was said last week to have died from a heart attack or stroke.

It is claimed that Iranian security forces did not allow any autopsy and that the funeral of the 26-year-old Pourandarjan took place with security agents present. Pourandarjan had allegedly been detained for leaking patients' files and telling close friends about the abuse of detainees and, after his released, warned against making any further revelations.

1620 GMT: Free the Journalist. More than 50 Iranian writers and journalists have signed an open letter to the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, urging him to release Javad Mahzadeh. Mahzadeh was detained more than a month ago.

1615 GMT: Fearing a Loss of Control? Speaking to reformist members of Parliament, Mehdi Karroubi has urged young protesters to refrain from "violent behaviour". Following similar statements by former President Mohammad Khatami, Karroubi's advice may be an indication that opposition leaders fear an angry and frustrated movement will go further in their demonstrations of resistance.



1555 GMT: Spinning Iran. The political battle over Iran's nuclear programme --- friend or foe? --- is being played out again in the media with the framing of the latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The report is the IAEA's summary of its inspection of the second uranium enrichment site near Qom. Although the IAEA itself has said it found nothing out of the ordinary, others, including sceptics within the agency, are hoping to find suspicious evidence. So they have leaked parts of the report to Reuters, who declare that the project began in 2002, paused in 2004, and resumed in 2006.

Much more interesting, however, is Reuters' headline, unsupported in the article, "Iran revelation could mean more secret sites".

1455 GMT: Russia Keeps Up Pressure. Meanwhile, Moscow --- in its role as the broker for an uranium enrichment agreement and following Sunday's warning by Presidents Obama and Medvedev that a deal needed to be completed soon --- may have just given Tehran a warning slap.

The Russians have announced that the opening of the Bushehr nuclear plant, scheduled for the end of 2009, has been delayed yet again. Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko insisted that the postponement was due to technical difficulties, but --- call us cynics --- the timing of the declaration is a bit more than curious.

1450 GMT: Who's Pushing the Nuke Talks? Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

It can't get much clearer than this:

As the West continues to threaten Tehran with fresh sanctions, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expresses readiness to enhance nuclear cooperation with Western countries.

"The Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to have constructive cooperation with Western countries on nuclear technology," Iranian Student News Agency (ISNA) quoted Ahmadinejad as saying on Monday...."Nuclear rights of the Iranian nation are non-negotiable and our nuclear cooperation and activities will be carried out within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

1435 GMT: Who's Pushing the Nuke Talks Inside Iran? Press TV has an intriguing post, "Turkey Still Wants Role in Iran Nuclear Deal".

The website quotes, from Turkish newspapers, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's statement that Turkey is still happy to serve as the third country in an uranium enrichment deal. Iranian uranium would shipped to Russia for enrichment and then held/reshaped by Turkey as metal plates for uses in Iran's medical research reactor. Davutoglu said, "From our point of view, the door is open. We will store that [uranium] as a kind of a trustee."

That, however, is not the significant part of the story. Rather, it's the fact that it appears at all (and indeed has been at least the second story run by Press TV on these lines in the last few days) despite the rejection by Iranian politicians of the proposal for a Turkey broker, offered by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad El Baradei, almost two weeks ago.

Indeed, Press TV uses Davutoglu to highlight the tension, "The Iranians trust us... but there is a great opposition within Iran. They say the problem is not Turkey, but the fact that the uranium will be taken abroad."

Which raises the question: if the deal was supposedly blocked by Tehran, why does the Turkish possibility keep re-appearing? Could it be that sources close to President Ahmadinejad are ensuring that Press TV keeps the option alive?

Although Tehran has ruled out the participation of third parties in a nuclear fuel deal with the West, Turkey says it is awaiting Iran's response on an offer to store the country's enriched uranium stockpile.
1420 GMT: We're back from our first break since 13 June in 24/7 blogging on the post-election crisis. Just catching up with the latest news inside and outside Iran: meanwhile, we have a new entry updating on the domestic political squabble in the US over the National Iranian American Committee.

Meanwhile, I have used the last 48 hours to review sources for what I hope will be a major re-evaluation of the Obama Administration's approach to the Iranian Government the nuclear talks, and the Green Movement. The aim is to post this tomorrow but here's a teaser:

1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID --- "The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment."

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG --- "What is astounding is how a Washington distraction, an appearance by Ataollah Mohajerani at a conference, became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury and/or fear the Green movement."

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS --- "How can a stricter round of sanctions, if nuclear talks break down, change Ayatollah Khamenei's positions?"