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Entries in Moqtada al-Sadr (2)

Sunday
Nov232008

Iraq: The Breaking-Point Politics Beyond the Surge

For months, I've put forth the paradox surrounding the proposed Status of Forces Agreement between the US and Iraqi Governments. As Washington grows increasingly desperate to get the fig-leaf of the Agreement to underpin its military presence, the political fight over that agreement highlights the mounting irrelevance of US forces.

This week could highlight that paradox. Today the New York Times, close to disgracefully, parades a series of experts (Frederick Kagan, General David Petraeus' former executive officer Peter Mansoor, Petraeus worshipper Linda Robinson, and --- in an act that defines chutzpah --- Donald Rumsfeld) urging us to "stay the military course". James Glanz's Sunday puff-piece in the paper is "In Ramadi, With A Fresh Coat of Paint" .

In Baghdad, however, folks aren't taking their leads from the Times. And I suspect many in the Bush Administration --- though not the President, who is blissfully tripping towards the exit door --- are worrying they aren't taking direction from the US.

On Wednesday, the Iraqi Parliament was convened to support the second reading of the Agreement but was suspended amidst shouting and scuffles. The scene was repeated on Thursday. On Friday, the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his supporters made their show of political force after prayers, as thousands took to the streets to denounce the agreement. A stream of Parliamentarians let it be known that they would be absent from Baghdad this week, as they had decided to fulfil their once-in-a-lifetime obligation to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Perhaps most importantly, the leading clerical figure in Iraq, Ayatollah Sistani, declared that he would not support the agreement unless there was a national consensus behind it. Now, as the leading Shi'a parties --- the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and Daw'a --- seemed to have swung behind ratification, leading to the Cabinet's vote in favour last weekend, Sistani's statement pointed to the worry that the key Sunni parties would not offer their support.

In mid-week Juan Cole, with his specialist reading of the Arab press and other signs from Iraq, was still predicting that Parliament would narrowly ratify the Agreement; however, he also noted that without clear Sunni backing, Sistani's condition for consensus would not be met. By today, he was being notably cautious. With the Iraqi Parliament postponing the vote again, this time from Monday to Wednesday, Cole wrote, "It is still not clear how the Sunni Arab MPs will vote; without their support, the agreement would likely be seen as a joint Shiite-Kurdish conspiracy."

Absolutely. Here's the twist in the surge that almost no one in the mainstream US media has picked up. The well-trumpeted wonder of the Petraeus strategy was the bolstering of local and regional Sunni groups, the Awakening Council, in provinces outside Baghdad. The unnoted but always-lurking questions was the relationshp of those groups to the national government.

Well, now we're getting the answer. Sunni parties have the perception that, with its desperation to get an Agreement before the UN mandate for the occupation expires on 31 December, Washington has swung again into backing of the Shia-dominated government. It's a cycle that has recurred periodically since 2003, for example, in the debates over the Iraqi constitution in 2005. Meanwhile, there's a minority but very significant Shi'a faction, embodied by but not exclusive to the "Sadrists", who are ready to fight this Agreement to the end, inside Parliament and possibly on the streets.

Which is why the political process had reached the point on Saturday where the Defence and Interior Ministers called a press conference and invoked "the specters of a reborn insurgency, foreign attack and even piracy" if ratification did not occur. This in turn followed a Thursday speech from Prime Minister al-Maliki and, according to some press reports, his threats to resign if Parliament did not act appropriately.

Let's call it forthrightly: if the current Government does not get ratification, it will collapse. And even if it gets a narrow victory, it faces the prospect of a renewed sectarian conflict, at best one of protracted political tension and at worse a return to violence. Hey, even supposed allies may be suspect --- it was reported this weekend that planeloads of weapons from Bulgaria were arriving in Kurdish territory.

Where is the US military in all this? Well, an inadvertent black comedy illustration came in a Thursday story in the Washington Post. The headline portended another good-news surge tale: "U.S. Troops in Baghdad Take a Softer Approach Focus Shifts to Reconciling Factions" . The opening paragraph offered a more pertient, off-script message:

It was billed as a peace concert in war-scarred Baghdad. But after 30 minutes of poetry and patriotic songs, only a scattering of tribal leaders and dark-suited bureaucrats were sitting in the vast expanse of white plastic chairs before a stage painted with doves.


Monday
Nov172008

Iraq: Not So Fast....

There is a waving of banner headlines in the American and British press today that "Troops leave by end of 2011, US and Iraq agree". It appears that "after months of tense negotiations and public protests, the Iraqi cabinet on Sunday approved a bilateral agreement allowing U.S. troops to remain in this country for three more years."

Well, that's that, then. Americans can prepare for all their boys coming home by the end of 2011. Iraqis can bask in their freedom. Richard Beeston in The Times can even celebrate this great achievement of Bushian foreign policy: "This is a triumph in that it is precisely what the Bush Administration wanted in Iraq – a viable, democratic and independent government capable of making its own decisions and taking on greater responsibility for security."

Hmmm....Why am I a bit hesitant about such a triumph?

Well, a beginning might be to ask why, after so many months of negotiation, the al-Maliki Government has come off the fence and backed the Status of Forces Agreement. Of the reports I read this morning, only The Guardian of London --- drawing on an Associated Press account --- picked up on the catalyst:

On Saturday the leading Shia cleric, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani dropped his opposition to the deal, in a shift that some observers believe paved the way for a Shia bloc in the cabinet to vote in its favour.

Al-Jazeera adds that al-Malaki "dispatched Khalid al-Attiyah and Ali al-Adeeb, two senior Shia legislators to Najaf to secure the support" of Sistani.

As late as Friday, it was reported that the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq --- the largest party in the al-Maliki coalition --- was holding back on approval. Meanwhile, Moqtada al-Sadr at Friday prayers was telling supporters to prepare for resistance against US troops.

Could al-Sadr's open call have pushed Sistani into public acceptance of the deal? Did the Islamic Supreme Council move first, or did they follow Sistani? And what of the nine ministers of the 37-member Cabinet who absented themselves from Sunday's meeting rather than give approval: are they from Sunni factions who now worry about a renewed US-Shi'a alliance against their interests?

I can't answer any of these questions yet. I do know, however, that there's an even bigger one that no one has broached today.

Is the United States really going to abandon more than dozen permanent bases, representing billions of dollars of investment, by the end of 2011? Or will there be interpretations and re-interpretations of the agreement to allow US units --- "trainers", "advisors", "mobile forces" --- to remain in Iraq?

Let's re-visit that headline: "Troops Leave by End of 2011". Here's the exact transcript of President-elect Obama on CBS television last night:

Kroft: Can you give us some sense of when you might start redeployments out of Iraq?

Mr. Obama: Well, I've said during the campaign, and I've stuck to this commitment, that as soon as I take office, I will call in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my national security apparatus, and we will start executing a plan that draws down our troops.


Once more, drawdown is not full withdrawal. As far as I am concerned, the best statement of near-future US policy in Iraq is the report of December 2006 by the Iraq Study Group (member Robert Gates, the current and likely near-future Secretary of Defense), which proposed the retention of 50,000 troops in various guises in the country.