Analysis & Transcript: Clinton and Gates on "What to Do in Afghanistan-Pakistan?" (and Iran)

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CNN, which is desperate to ensure that Christiane Amanpour is The Most Important Broadcaster in the History of the World, has not released the video of Monday's roundtable at George Washington University with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. They have released the transcript, however.

The significance of the discussion is diluted because the first 2/3 of it is one of the worst interviews I have ever read. Forget Amanpour's fawning and gushing about "the annals of recent history", the first few minutes devoted to Clinton and Gates saying We are the Best of Friends, the opening substantive question, "Do you think you can win in Afghanistan?", and the close in which Amanpour says that we have to fight in Afghanistan for "the young people".

Almost nothing of importance is said about Afghanistan, even though the Obama Administration is on the cusp of a decision about another military escalation. There is no critique of what another 40,000 troops would mean, only scare words about Al Qa'eda and the Taliban. The conversation is slanted with the further question, "By scaling back over the next 12 to 18 months, you can win in Afghanistan?", so Clinton and Gates can say, "No", and avoid any specific consideration of the difficulties of escalation.

The only passage of interest is Frank Sesno's challenge that the "non-military" dimension of US efforts is "only a drop in the bucket". Clinton does not refute that point, instead she tellingly shifts the conversation, "In order to operate in many of the places in Afghanistan, you have to have a level of security.So there has to be a commitment to make an area as secure as possible."

Yet, instead of pressing the point that there are issues beyond security, Amanpour and Sesno walked away. There is no reference in the interview to alleged corruption affecting the development efforts. Indeed, the Afghan Presidential election, which took place two months ago and still has not been resolved amidst allegations of fraud, is never mentioned.

The conversation on Iran is far more interesting. Indeed, Clinton dropped in an important revelation when she said that the Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme had produced an aggreement for "third-party enrichment" in principle. That shift from earlier reports of an agreement in practice matches Tehran's account. And beyond the specifics, Clinton offered perhaps the best summary of the US engagement with Iran: "[The talks] buy time."

Clinton was far more close-mouthed on Iran's internal situation, offering only, "We've been very clear in supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people and in speaking out forcefully against the irregularities of their electoral process." However, note further down her confirmation that the State Department did make a significant intervention early in the post-election crisis: "We were told that Twitter just was going to have to shut down for 48 hours to do some upgrades to the software. So we called and said, "Please don't shut down, because this is a major communications loop for people on the streets."

AMANPOUR: Welcome. Welcome to you both.

We've been sort of searching back in the annals of recent history, and we can't really find an example such as this, where two sitting secretaries, in charge of some of the most important briefs at the moment, are sitting on stage in an interview such as this.

So we just wanted to start by asking you, how often do you speak together? What is it like working together? Do you pick up the phone and call each other whenever you like? How does it work?

HILLARY CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE Well, we actually spend a lot of time together, and it is mostly at the White House, in the Situation Room, which is this room that is especially set up for secure conversations, a windowless domain that we spend a lot of time in, and we also talk outside of those formal meetings.

But, you know, Bob has a -- a lot of experience, which I certainly appreciate, and also a good sense of humor, which makes everything a little bit better.

ROBERT GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: You know, most of my career, secretaries of state and defense weren't speaking to one another.

AMANPOUR: Precisely why we are.

FRANK SESNO, CNN SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT: In fact, sometimes it was even worst than that.

GATES: And -- and -- and it could get pretty ugly, actually. And so -- I mean, it's terrific to -- to have the kind of relationship where we can talk together, because the truth of the matter is, if the bureaucracies realize that the principals get along and work together and are on the same page, it radiates downward.

And when people discover it's not career-enhancing to try and set your principal's hair on fire because the other person is doing something horrible, it makes a huge difference, and not just at this level, but all through the bureaucracy and the interagency.

SESNO: So what is it that, by doing this and by sending this signal from the top, that you are trying to change?

GATES: Well, I don't -- I don't think we're trying to prove anything. It's just we get along. We work together well. I think it starts with, frankly, based on my experience, the secretary of defense being willing to acknowledge that the secretary of state is the principal spokesperson for United States foreign policy. And once you get over that hurdle, the rest of it kind of falls into place.

CLINTON: You know, Frank, I think that, you know, when Secretary Gates was given this responsibility in the last administration, he immediately began making clear that we had to have a coherent and unified foreign policy; the instruments of American power in defense, diplomacy and development needed to be working together.

AMANPOUR: So given that you're involved in a very difficult situation right now -- the war in Afghanistan, the place where I've spent a long time -- I want to start by asking you, do you think you can win there? Both of you, I'd like to know whether you think you can win?

CLINTON: Well, I think, Christiane, what we're looking at, as we meet to advise the president, is what do we need to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan, because we see the region as the area of concern, that will, you know, promote American interests and values, protect our country, as well as the allies and other interests that we have around the world?

So I think it's a -- it's a -- a very thoughtful analysis about, what is it we need to do? And -- and we're -- you know, we're trying to look at it from ground up and make sure that we're examining every assumption, because what's important is, is that, at the end of the day, the president makes a decision that he believes in, that he thinks is going to further our core objectives of, you know, protecting our country, preventing attacks on us, trying to protect our interests and our allies. And that's what we're -- we're attempting to do.

AMANPOUR: Secretary Gates, the majority of the American people believe that America can win in Afghanistan. Do you think America can win in Afghanistan?

GATES: Well, from the time I've took this job, I have tried, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, to avoid terms like "winning" and "losing," because they become very loaded in our domestic debate, but they also become loaded around the world. I think the key thing is to establish what our objectives are, and can we achieve our objectives? And the answer to that question is absolutely.

SESNO: Well, let me ask you about our objectives, because back in March, President Obama said several things. He said our clear and focused goal -- that was his term -- was to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida. He said, for the American people, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was the most dangerous place in the world, that Afghanistan was an international security issue of the highest order, and that if the Afghan government were to fall to the Taliban, the country will -- and I'm quoting him here -- "be again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can."

Has any of that changed from then until now in this review?

CLINTON: No.

GATES: I don't think so.

CLINTON: No.

GATES: I think it's important to remember that, as Secretary Clinton said, that the president indicated very explicitly in -- at the end of March that we would revisit the strategy after the election in Afghanistan.

Now, at least a couple of things have happened. One is the new commander has done an assessment and found a situation that -- in Afghanistan that is more serious than we anticipated when the decisions were made in March. So that's one thing to take into account.

The other is, clearly, a flawed election in Afghanistan that has complicated the picture for us.

And so, it seems to me, under these circumstances, and particularly -- I mean, let's be honest. The president is being asked to make a very significant decision. And the notion of being willing to pause, reassess basic assumptions, reassess the analysis, and then make those decisions seems to me, given the importance of these decisions -- which I've said are probably among the most important he will make in his entire presidency -- seems entirely appropriate.

AMANPOUR: So you've both spoken just now very highly of General McChrystal. You've talked about the new commander, his important reassessment, and changes on the ground.

There are obviously two basic choices that you have: either to go all in or to scale back. Some who are talking about scaling back talk about less nation-building, talk about more Predator strikes, perhaps more focus on -- on Pakistan rather than in Afghanistan.

In a public speech in London to military personnel, General McChrystal, when asked about that, flatly stated that it wouldn't work. Can we just show you what he said?

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

GEN. STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL, COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, AFGHANISTAN: No. And the first -- the first reason is, I believe, you have to navigate from where you are, not from where you wish you were. We are in Afghanistan. We've established relationships, expectations both with the Afghan people, the Afghan government, in the region, and I believe Afghanistan has its own value. It's stability now.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: So do you believe that, by scaling back over the next 12 to 18 months, you can win in Afghanistan?

GATES: Well, first of all, I think, as you know, we are not going to talk about where the president ought to go or the options in front of him. I mean, I think I just gave a speech this morning in which I said that the president deserves the candid advice of his senior advisers, both civilian and military, but that advice should be private.

All I will say is, first of all, I think Stan McChrystal is exactly the right person to be the commander in Afghanistan right now. He was my recommendation to the president to lead this effort. And I have every confidence that, no matter what decision the president makes, Stan McChrystal will implement it as effectively as possible.

AMANPOUR: Could I ask you about the nature of private advice? You have said it; others have said it; General Jones said it this weekend. You know that, during the lead-up to the gulf -- to the second Iraq war in 2003, many of the one-star, two-star, other generals and military officials didn't stand up and challenge the premise that only a certain amount of troops were necessary, and that was deemed to have been a big mistake and deemed to have wasted a lot of time, for instance, in Iraq.

Do you not think that General McChrystal must give his honest assessment in public, because of what happened when that honest assessment was not given?

GATES: I think the important thing is for the president to hear the advice of his commanders and to have the advantage of hearing that advice in private. In all the decisions that were made during the surge in Iraq, the president -- I structured a process where the commander in the field, General Petraeus, the then-commander of Central Command, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff each had an opportunity to present their views privately to the president on what ought to be done.

I think that's the way the process ought to work. I think the president -- this president has made it clear he is prepared to spend whatever time is needed in person, not only with the Joint Chiefs and the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but with General McChrystal, to make sure they have had plenty of time to present their views directly to him. That's a commitment he has made to me directly, and I intend to make sure that it's exercised.

AMANPOUR: Could I just ask, Secretary Clinton, what you think about the nature of the debate over the advice?

CLINTON: I think it's important to put this into perhaps some historic perspective. You know, it is unusual for all advice about military matters to be in public for a president.

Now, there is a lot of second-guessing that might go on and historical perspective, but this process that President Obama has put together is, I think, one of the most open, most thorough that I've read about. And it is very much an invitation for everybody to come to the table, and that's what we're doing.

AMANPOUR: We'll be right back with more on this subject right after a break.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: To advance security, opportunity and justice, not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces. We need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers. That's how we can help the Afghan government serve its people and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs.

And that's why I'm ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground. That's also why we must seek civilian support from our partners and allies.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

SESNO: Secretary Clinton, you've heard that, President Obama speaking in March about the need to increase the number of civilians -- the civilian surge it's called -- but the civilian task has been -- or the civilian personnel has been way under-tasked. When you came into office, 300-some-odd civilians. You're trying to move to 1,000 by the end of the year or just under it.

CLINTON: Right.

SESNO: That's a big increase.

CLINTON: Right.

SESNO: But compared to the tens of thousands of the military, it's just a drop in the bucket. Is that really going to change the dynamic? What should the balance be in a conflict zone like Afghanistan if you're going to accomplish the goals that you're out to accomplish?

CLINTON: Well, Frank, I think what we are attempting to achieve is remarkable in a short period of time. As you say, back when the president made those remarks in March, we had about 300 civilians, Americans, in Afghanistan. We will have close to 1,000 by the end of this year.

But it is a kind of a chicken-and-an-egg issue. We want to focus on development, particularly agriculture, rule of law, good governance, economic development, women's empowerment, those kinds of issues. But in order to operate in many of the places in Afghanistan, you have to have a level of security.

So there has to be a commitment to make an area as secure as possible, because, remember, when an American goes in, that person will always be accompanied by, you know, NGOs, Afghans. So the numbers are much bigger than just the direct American hires, because there are a lot of Americans working in Afghanistan who work for charities or nongovernmental organizations.

But our assessment was that, you know, we needed to focus on how to help the people of Afghanistan lift themselves up, have their own opportunities, and it goes hand in hand with our military effort.

SESNO: Secretary Gates, you in many ways launched this conversation a couple of years ago with a speech where you talk -- and you said that we will not kill or capture our way to victory in these places. What should our civilian diplomats be doing that the military is now doing?

GATES: Well, let's -- let's step back, first of all, to that point two years ago when I said -- when I sort of gave my "man bites dog" speech of the secretary of defense, saying there wasn't enough money going to the Department of State.

The reality is, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development were starved for resources for decades. Now, just -- just let me give you an example. Working for me are 2 million men and women in uniform. Secretary Clinton has I think somewhere south of 7,000 foreign service officers. If you took all the foreign service officers in the world, they would barely crew one aircraft carrier. So, you know, just to keep things in perspective.

AMANPOUR: And part of what's happening is that the Afghan people are not getting as much economic development, therefore, not as much help and hope as -- as one might have thought when this started.

So the question I have for you, sir -- both of you, actually -- is that there had been some talk over the weekend about how the United States believes that perhaps Al Qaida has been diminished, the threat from the Taliban is not as great as one might have thought.

So I want to know what you think about the momentum of the Taliban, their long-term prospects, given the fact that today 80 percent of Afghanistan has a permanent Taliban presence, compared to 72 percent a year ago and 54 percent the year before that. They seem to be winning territory rather than losing.

GATES: I -- I can't improve on -- on General McChrystal's assessment that the situation in Afghanistan is serious and deteriorating. And, you know, there are a lot of reasons for it. You have to go back to 2003, 2004, in terms of the Taliban beginning to reconstitute themselves in Pakistan and so on. I mean, that's a historians' debate. We are where we are.

And -- and this -- it kind of goes back to General McChrystal's quote that you aired. You -- you have to start with where you are, not where you wish you were. And -- and the reality is that, because of our inability and the inability, frankly, of our allies, to put enough troops into Afghanistan, the Taliban do have the momentum right now, it seems.

AMANPOUR: And do you believe that should -- not next week or next month -- but should Afghanistan fall to the Taliban again, that it would again become a base for Al Qaida to have its operations there?

GATES: I think -- I think the thing to remember about Afghanistan is that that -- that country, and particularly the Afghan-Pakistan border, is -- is the modern epicenter of jihad. It is where the Mujahideen defeated the other superpower.

And their view is, in my opinion, that they now have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower, which, more than anything, would empower their message and the opportunity to recruit, to fundraise, and to plan operations.

So I think you have to see this area in a historical context in terms of what happened in the 1980s and the meaning of the victory over the Soviet Union in order to understand the importance of this symbiotic relationship between Al Qaida and the Taliban and -- and the other extremists, frankly.

AMANPOUR: So you think they would come back if Afghanistan fell?

GATES: I don't know whether the -- whether Al Qaida would sort of move their headquarters from the FATA to -- back into Afghanistan, but there's no question in my mind that if the Taliban took large -- took control of significant portions of Afghanistan, that that would be added space for Al Qaida to strengthen itself and -- and more recruitment, more fundraising.

But what's more important than that, in my view, is the message that it sends that empowers Al Qaida. Al Qaida, in many respects, is an ideology. And the notion that they have come back from this defeat -- come back from 2002, to challenge not only the United States, but NATO -- 42 nations and so on -- is a hugely empowering message, should they be successful.

AMANPOUR: We'll come back with more from both secretaries right after a break. We'll talk more about Pakistan and Iran.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: Welcome back. We're going to continue our conversation with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

We were just talking about Afghanistan and the Pakistan area -- part of your joint solution, hopefully, to this regional -- regional problems that exist there.

The prime minister, the president, the foreign minister of Pakistan have all said and have all been very worried about short-termism, short- timerism from the United States. They're concerned that, if you pull back, then they will have to bank not on the U.S. again, but on, perhaps, the Taliban, like they did before 9/11.

What do you say to -- to the Pakistani leaders, who are now doing precisely what you asked them to do -- going after the Taliban, after various militants and terrorists in their own -- in their own country?

CLINTON: Well, what we say is that we want to be supportive and provide assistance and we want to ramp that up. Just this -- this last week, a very important piece of legislation, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, that made a commitment to additional aid for Pakistan's civilian government and to deliver services to the people of Pakistan was passed unanimously, on its way to the president to be signed.

And you're right. When we started this review, one of the innovative conclusions we reached was we had to look at both Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Obviously, we had a great commitment in Afghanistan and there had been military assistance and counterterrorism training provided to Pakistan, but there hadn't yet been a commitment by the Pakistani military and the civilian government, like we're seeing now, to go after the extremists that are threatening them, as well as beyond their borders.

And as Bob said, when we partnered with Pakistan to supply the Mujahideen with the weapons and training that they needed to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, once that was accomplished, we left. And Pakistan feels like we left them holding the bag, because all of a sudden they were awash in weapons, they were awash in drugs, they had all of these, you know, jihadists who had been trained up in conjunction with us. And, you know, we know what happened. We saw that occurring in Afghanistan.

So I think it's rightful of the Pakistanis to say, "Well, how long will your commitment be? How much will you be by our side as we take on these threats to us and, by the way, also to you?"

SESNO: I mean, the foreign -- if I may -- the foreign minister of Pakistan said the fact that this is being debated -- meaning this whole policy review -- whether to stay or not to stay, what sort of signal is that sending, he said. Isn't this undermining the very Pakistanis whom you have pressured to lean on their own extremists in the Taliban and fight this fight?

GATES: Well, first of all, I think that there is absolutely no reason for the president not to consider very carefully the next steps in Afghanistan. I had lunch with the Pakistani ambassador last week, and I made absolutely clear to him: We are not leaving Afghanistan.

This discussion is about next steps forward. And the president has some momentous decisions to make. And while there may be some short-term uncertainty on the part of our allies, in terms of those next steps, there should be no uncertainty in terms of our determination to remain in Afghanistan and to continue to build a relationship of partnership and trust with the Pakistanis.

That's long term. That's a strategic objective of the United States for -- for a number of reasons that Pakistan is a strategically important country. So I -- you know, if -- if it makes them nervous that we're talking about this for a couple of weeks, frankly, I think that's a transitory problem.

SESNO: I just want to button one thing up. You were talking earlier about your advice and your comments, your public comments, to keep the advice to the president private and candid. Are you trying to muzzle McChrystal?

GATES: Absolutely not. I -- I have told people on Capitol Hill, the minute the president makes his decisions, we will get General McChrystal back here as quickly as possible and up onto the Hill, because I will tell you, there is no one more knowledgeable and more persuasive on these issues than Stan McChrystal.

But it would put -- I believe it would put General McChrystal in an impossible situation to go up in a hyper-partisan environment to the Hill before the president made his decisions and put the general on the spot. I just think that's wrong. I think it's wrong for General McChrystal, and I think it's wrong for the president. And as far as I'm concerned, in this job, I'll do everything in my power to prevent that until the president has made his decisions.

AMANPOUR: We're going to take a break. But when we come back, we'll talk about Iran with Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: Welcome back. We continue our conversation with the two secretaries sitting here.

I want to know if you can tell us, what precisely was agreed between the U.S., Iran, and the other powers sitting at that table in Geneva? Did they actually agree to ship out their low-enriched uranium?

CLINTON: Well, there were -- there were three agreements: One, that there would be inspections, and those inspections are going forward, and they're going forward quickly of the undisclosed sites that the president and Prime Minister Brown and President Sarkozy announced a little over a week ago in Pittsburgh.

They agreed that, in principle, the Iranians would ship out their LEU for reprocessing to be returned for their research reactor. There will be a team of experts meeting to determine exactly how that will be carried out within 10 days.

And they agreed that there will be another meeting, which means that this process doesn't just drag on without any, you know, continuity.

So we think that, on those three big issues, this was a worthwhile meeting. But as the president has said and I and others have also made clear, this is not by any means a stopping point. There is much more to be done. We expect much more.

We know that the Iranians need to understand that they have run a nuclear program that has violated international rules and Security Council resolutions, which they have to bring, you know, into compliance, making it more transparent and accountable. So we have -- we have work ahead of us, but I think that, on balance, what came out of the meeting in Geneva was positive.

AMANPOUR: Just to follow up on the low-enriched uranium, you know, one Iranian diplomat told the press that actually, no, there wasn't that agreement, and I'm asking you whether there is some miscommunication. Are they just agreeing to buy enriched -- further enriched uranium and not ship theirs out? Or do you understand that they are going to ship the bulk of theirs out?

CLINTON: Well, nothing is finished until it's finished. And there's a meeting of technical experts -- I believe it's October 18th -- to see how to put into action what we certainly believed was an agreement in principle. But there's a lot to be done before that actually happens.

SESNO: Do you think the Iranians actually want to resolve this?

CLINTON: We don't know yet. We don't know.

SESNO: Think this is credible?

GATES: I agree with Hillary. I think -- I think the jury's out. And -- and what we have to do is keep them to tight enough deadlines and specific enough requirements that we have some indication of whether they're serious or not.

SESNO: I mean, there's already -- there's already some substantial criticism of this, that -- that from -- from -- from some who are saying that this is another way for the Iranians to play for time and that, in effect, they're being rewarded for having flouted U.N. resolutions all these years if they can take the uranium that they shouldn't have enriched to begin with, get it sent out, and have it brought back, enhanced, and be able to use in a power plant?

CLINTON: Well, but -- but think about what we're -- what we're seeing here, and that is that the uranium that they have enriched would be used for a research reactor, which everybody knows they've been running, which they are entitled to run, but it would not be used for other purposes.

So, yes, does it buy time? It buys time. It buys time for us to consider carefully their response, the sincerity of their actions, and, you know, we're moving simultaneously on the dual track. I mean, we always said we had a track of engagement, and we have begun that with this process, but we also said we would be working with likeminded nations and convincing others to stand ready with tougher sanctions were we not successful.

AMANPOUR: Can I ask you, Secretary Gates, has your opinion, your intelligence, has anything changed regarding your assessment of whether they're trying to make a nuclear weapon?

GATES: My personal belief all along has been that they have the intention of -- of developing nuclear weapons. Whether they have actually begun that program or not is -- is hard to say, whether they're begun a weaponization program.

But I think, you know, the question is, can we over time or can we in a limited period of time bring the Iranians to a conclusion that -- that Iran is better off without nuclear weapons than with them, and not just in the security sense, but economically and in terms of their isolation in the international community, and so on?

And because -- I mean, my view is, the only long-term solution to this problem, at the end of the day, is the Iranians themselves deciding having nuclear weapons is not in their interest. And if we can't convince them of that, then an array of other options are open.

But our hope, my hope for ever since I took this job has been that -- that we could, through -- through both carrots and sticks, persuade them of a smarter direction for Iran.

AMANPOUR: Isn't the -- the -- I mean, there are basically, I think, three policy options, Iran with some kind of nuclear capability, a nuclear program, but with very strict verification, sanctions to try to get them not to enrich, which so far has not -- have not worked, plenty of holes, plenty of black market, or the military option, which you yourself have cast doubts upon its efficacy.

Isn't the -- the real nub of the debate right now to figure out some kind of way of verifying and inspecting and being able to know if they plan to do something else with their uranium, other than for peaceful purposes, as they claim?

CLINTON: Well, that is, of course, part of the change in calculation that Bob was referring to. We have a very clear objective of trying to persuade the Iranians that their calculation of their security interest and their economic interest should take into account the consequences of sanctions, for example, of increased defensive measures taken in Europe and in the gulf region.

You know, we just worked through this missile defense decision, and, you know, clearly, our new adaptive approach toward missile defense is aimed at protecting our NATO allies and most of Europe from a short- or medium-range Iranian missile.

We have begun to talk with a lot of our other friends and allies about, you know, what they need to feel that they would be adequately protected.

Now, this is not in any way to concede what Iran should do going forward, because some people say, when we talk defensive, that means that we're conceding that they are going to end up with a weapon. No, not at all. We are trying to influence the calculation and the decision as to whether or not they should move toward weaponization.

GATES: Some people have said, in so many words, that I'm kind of wooly-headed in believing that the -- that the Iranians would see not having nuclear weapons as more in their security interest than not.

But the question is, would the Iranians look at that that way if there were proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, if some of their neighbors in the Middle East, beyond those that now have them would develop nuclear weapons? Is that in their interest? Do they think that enhances their national security? I -- I think that's an argument to be made.

AMANPOUR: We're going to continue this line of questioning right after a short break.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: Welcome back. As we continue our conversation, we were talking about Iran and some way of figuring out the way forward about Iran's nuclear program.

I just want to know, is it good enough to have a strict verification protocol -- for instance, the additional protocol under the NPT, or, indeed, you know, to have shipping out of the LEU? Is that good enough, even if it's not perfect?

CLINTON: Well, this is -- this is a question we're not ready to answer because we don't know what the options in front of us are. We don't know what Iran would agree to. We don't know what kind of pressure could be brought to bear in case they don't agree.

So, you know, our goal is, as it always has been, to try to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, which we think would be very destabilizing in the region and beyond, and that's what we're aimed at achieving through this engagement.

SESNO: Want to...

GATES: And what nuclear sites might they be prepared to be transparent about that have not been declared at this point.

SESNO: I want to ask you about, both, one last question about Iran, and that relates to what the message is to the people of Iran who've been in the streets, who have opposed Ahmadinejad, who spoke out, in some cases have been arrested, wounded or worse, standing up to what they see as a stolen election.

Are you concerned that those in Iran who want real political change are going to be somehow forgotten or abandoned or will not be the focus of American comment and -- and action?

CLINTON: No, because I think we've been very clear in supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people and in speaking out forcefully against the irregularities of their electoral process.

SESNO: Let's talk about 21st century diplomacy and how it's changed and -- and what you're doing, because you both addressed this, different terminology that's often used.

In one particular area, information, I want to talk a little bit for a moment here. You call it strategic communication, you call it public diplomacy, but it's connecting with the rest of the world. It's learning back from what others are saying. It's influencing leaders and persuading publics and knocking down myths or propaganda and maybe, in some cases, propagandizing ourselves.

A lot of this is now done by the military. There is no one person in charge of this. How should this very important information battle be waged and who should be in command?

CLINTON: Well, let me give you two quick examples.

SESNO: (inaudible) State Department?

CLINTON: Yes. You know, a -- a battlefield conflict zone requires the military to respond to, you know, rumors, attacks. They have to have a strategic communications effort, but it must be part of a broader national public diplomacy outreach effort.

I'll give you two quick examples. We were just talking about Iran. We learned that during the height of the demonstrations about the election that Twitter was a major source of information for people who were protesting. And we -- and we felt that was a good vehicle, but we were told that Twitter just was going to have to shut down for 48 hours to do some upgrades to the software. So we called and said, "Please don't shut down, because this is a major communications loop for people on the streets."

In Afghanistan, what we've learned since we got in there -- and these great young civilians who work for me in the State Department working with these great young military leaders working in the -- in our armed forces, they realized that we didn't have a secure environment for cell phones to operate.

So we began looking for places we could put up cell towers. We began looking for how we would incentivize businesses in Afghanistan to spread their cell phone coverage. Why? Because the Taliban and their allies use cell phones to intimidate people. We found out that they were running FM - - illegal FM stations literally off the back of motorcycles. And they were telling people, "We're going to behead this person, we're going to do that."

So we are competing in that space. And, you know, obviously, we have to work together, but we have the lead on it, because it needs to stand for more than just our military might. It needs to represent all of our national interests and values.

AMANPOUR: In Afghanistan, the notion of bombing from the air and going after militants from the air has caused a lot of civilian casualties and a huge drop-off for American public support amongst the people there.

Do you think that it's possible to continue using that as a primary weapon against -- against militants, just in terms of its effectiveness? And do you think that it's moral to use that as a primary attack against the militants?

GATES: Well, I think one of the principal changes that General McChrystal has -- has brought -- and I will give General McKiernan credit, his predecessor, for beginning to move away from the use of airpower, and particularly in offensive operations, and I think General McChrystal has underscored this.

And a central element of his strategy in Afghanistan is to get away from the use of airpower and the potential for mistakes that create civilian casualties and that every civilian casualty is a strategic defeat for -- for the countries trying to help the Afghan government and people.

And I would just say this: We will continue to use airpower to defend our own troops. If they are in trouble, we will use airpower to defend them. Where -- where I think General McChrystal has drawn a line is in using airpower in offensive operations.

(END VIDEOTAPE)

AMANPOUR: And on that note, we would like to thank Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates for being with us, Frank Sesno, as well, of course, and all of George Washington University. And I'll be back with a closing thought.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

AMANPOUR: Thank you for joining us for this unique conversation. And we want to leave you now with this thought -- well, actually, with these faces. They're the faces of young people that I've met in Afghanistan, faces that are filled with hope for a decent future. These people tell us that they don't see the U.S. as occupiers, and they say they don't want the Taliban back. And it's the perspective of the Afghan people. It's their perception of who's winning which will most likely decide the outcome of this war.

Go to our Web site, cnn.com/amanpour, for the whole picture gallery and for more of this conversation, including some advice for young Americans from both secretaries.

That's it for now. Thanks for joining us. Goodbye from New York.

Iran: Talks and Legitimacy - Takeyh and Marandi on CNN

The Latest from Iran (6 October): Loud Noises, Quiet Manoeuvres

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On Sunday, CNN's Christiane Amanpour followed up her interview with chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili with a discussion with Dr Seyed Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran and Dr Ray Takeyh, formerly of the US State Department and now with the Council on Foreign Relations.

There is little here in the way of new analysis on the nuclear talks: Marandi is now CNN's "go-to" academic for a view supporting the Iranian Government, and Takeyh will be generally supportive of an Obama strategy of engagement.

The key paragraph instead is on Iran's internal situation. Note how Marandi links Iran's sovereignty to the question of Ahmadinejad's legitimacy, citing two very suspect opinion polls to put his central point. Accept the President and life will be a lot easier:

Iran is quite stable, and unlike what one often hears in the western media, I don't think that the country is in any serious problem.

I think that it's important for the American government to recognize that and to deal with the reality on the ground in Iran. If you'll recall, Terror Free Tomorrow, they had a poll before the elections that showed that Mr. Ahmadinejad was well ahead. And then the more recent University of Maryland poll also showed that he won the elections, or he was far more popular than Mr. Mousavi.

This doesn't go down well in the United States, I know. But I think that the United States, in order to be able to move towards rapprochement, and to be able to deal with Iran, they have to finally come to understand that Iran is not going to go away and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not going to collapse. If they do come to that recognition and they do come to respect the country, then I think that rapprochement would become much more easy, and I think that the Iranians are quite willing to move in that direction.

AMANPOUR: The Iranian government has invited hundreds of journalists, as well as six ambassadors from the so-called Non-Aligned Movement. There are no western countries represented here. Nonetheless, the Iranian government is saying that this is a transparency visit designed to show the world what it claims to be its peaceful nuclear program.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: That was early 2007, at another of Iran's nuclear facilities near the city of Esfahan. So, nearly three years later, will the Geneva talks between Iran and the U.S. lead to a new era of dialogue?

We turn to Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University, and to Ray Takeyh, a former adviser to the Obama administration on Iran.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, if I could go to you first, what is the mood in Iran around these talks? What are people hoping for?

MOHAMMAD MARANDI, PROFESSOR, TEHRAN UNIVERSITY: Well, I think people are mostly hoping that the United States and its allies will change their attitude towards the country. The tone, of course, did change a bit after Obama came to power, but there hasn't been any substantial change in the eyes of the Iranian people with regards to policy towards the country. And this is an appropriate time for the United States to make that change if they're really serious about dialogue, meaningful dialogue with Iran.

AMANPOUR: OK. Stand by for one second.

And Mr. Takeyh, what does the United States expect to get out of this meeting?

RAY TAKEYH, FMR. ADVISER TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ON IRAN: More focus on Iran's nuclear program, particularly the second site that has been -- the clandestine site that was revealed this week, having access to it and having it safeguarded by international inspectors; having Iran essentially accept confidence-building measures in this overall nuclear program; getting some of Iran's accumulated low-enriched uranium out of the country for reprocessing; and establishing a mechanism whereby the dialogue between the two countries can be more systematic, as opposed to episodic that it's been in the past.

AMANPOUR: So, therefore, it should be good news after today, because there has at least, according to all sides, been a development on the inspectors, the IAEA inspectors going, they say.

TAKEYH: Right. That's going to be worked out. And to be fair, the inspectors were going to go in there. After Iran itself declared this facility to the IAEA, it did so with a purpose of actually inviting them to inspect the facilities. So, that might have been the easier part. Getting the overall Iranian nuclear program into some degree of regulation and restraint, that might be tougher.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, in Tehran, do you think and do you believe the government wants broader relations or a different relationship with the United States beyond just these specific talks?

MARANDI: Yes. I think that if the Iranians feel that the Americans are truly serious, then there is indeed a possibility for rapprochement.

Both countries have serious issues in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in Pakistan, that need to be resolved. And in some ways, they do have similar interests.

The problem is that the Iranians, in the past, on a number of occasions, did step forward for rapprochement, and the Americans gave a very negative response. For example, in the past, during the Clinton years, the Iranians allowed Conoco to come and develop oilfields in Iran, and then sanctions were imposed on Iran. And then, when Iran helped in Afghanistan, it was called a part of the access of evil.

So, this time around, I think the Iranians are going to wait to see what the Americans will be doing. They will probably not take the first step forward themselves.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Takeyh, in terms of what Mr. Marandi just raced, the issue of sanctions, what can the United States or should the United States do, or the international community, in terms of how to go forward? Incentives, would there be? And if they impose sanctions, if they chose to, do you think that would make any bit of difference?

TAKEYH: Well, I think for the next couple of months, everyone is going to wait to see how these negotiations evolve, and if you're going to make some sort of a progress, I think, by January. At that time, I think there are going to be serious discussions about a multilateral sanctions regime that may encompass China and Russia, particularly because at that time, you'd be making an assessment about how these talks work, whether Iran is genuine about coming to terms with the international community, with using these talks to stall and delay. That's when the sanctions issue is going to be revisited.

AMANPOUR: But Iran has said clearly that it hasn't worked in the past, it doesn't bow to those kinds of threats.

Another thing that the president of Iran has said -- he was quoted before these talks -- is that it was a way for them to gauge whether they would be treated with respect at these talks, whether there would be a different atmosphere in terms of interpersonal atmosphere across the table as a way forward.

Do you think that the atmospherics were also important today?

TAKEYH: Atmospherics is always important when you're talking about Iran, because as a country, (INAUDIBLE) international respectability, even though its conduct doesn't always merit it. But these particular sessions seem to have been conducted in a civil, respectful tone by both parties.

There was a sidebar discussion between an American representative and an Iranian representative. I don't know what transpired there, but, essentially, there seemed to have been a better atmosphere than perhaps in the previous talks, and certainly in reference to the rhetoric coming out of both capitals during the past week.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, given the political dilemma in Iran today and the continued protests, the continued issues there, what is actually going on in terms of various different factions in Iran today?

MARANDI: Well, one interesting thing is that, with regards to the nuclear program, MPs from all the different factions and political parties in parliament, both the different reformists, as well as the different principalists or conservative factions, they all signed a joint statement supporting Iran's position in the negotiations, which is quite significant. But I think it's also important to note that Iran is quite stable, and unlike what one often hears in the western media, I don't think that the country is in any serious problem.

I think that it's important for the American government to recognize that and to deal with the reality on the ground in Iran. If you'll recall, Terror Free Tomorrow, they had a poll before the elections that showed that Mr. Ahmadinejad was well ahead. And then the more recent University of Maryland poll also showed that he won the elections, or he was far more popular than Mr. Mousavi.

This doesn't go down well in the United States, I know. But I think that the United States, in order to be able to move towards rapprochement, and to be able to deal with Iran, they have to finally come to understand that Iran is not going to go away and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not going to collapse. If they do come to that recognition and they do come to respect the country, then I think that rapprochement would become much more easy, and I think that the Iranians are quite willing to move in that direction.

AMANPOUR: Well, let me put that to Mr. Takeyh.

You were in the State Department, you were on the sort of Iran file. You're no longer there.

What is the possibility of rapprochement beyond just this issue?

TAKEYH: Well, it reflects Iran's conduct on a broad ranges of issues -- its entanglements in terrorism, and obviously the nuclear file being probably the most important issue. But it's contingent on Iran's behavior...

(CROSSTALK)

AMANPOUR: When President Obama came in, he came in with a different language towards Iran.

TAKEYH: That's right.

AMANPOUR: Does that still hold? Does he still want to have reset relations?

TAKEYH: I think so. I think that throughout the discussions that have taken place during the past week regarding some of Iran's conduct, the president and others have always insisted that the diplomatic path is still open and Iran has a possibility of walking through the door if it chooses to. But the door is not going to stay open forever.

AMANPOUR: Does the United States agree with several proposals such as that Iran does not ever react well under threat, that Iran wants to be treated as the power of the region, which it is, by all accounts, a major power in the region?

TAKEYH: I think there's a recognition that Iran is a major power in the region and can exercise its influence. But it's important for that influence to be exercised in a constructive manner.

The Latest from Iran (5 October): The Difficulty of Signals

UPDATED Iran: Rafsanjani Makes A Public Move with “Friendship Principles”
Video: Sharif Uni Protest Against Javad Larijani (4 October)
The Latest from Iran (4 October): Waiting for Developments

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2030 GMT. Harrumph, harrumph. The Financial Times, which is vying with The Times of London to be the at-hand Government channel for "news", uses several hundred words as a backdrop for this fist-shaking from "a senior British government official":

It is important that IAEA inspectors are given access to Qom immediately. We regret that Iran is delaying this until October 25. We see no reason for a delay. What possible reason can there be for it?

Given that the IAEA and even most of the Obama Administration welcomed the agreement, one has to wonder whether this is the same "rogue" British official who gave the FT their recent non-story on "secret Iran nuclear arms plan", whether this is a concerted London effort to play "tough cop" alongside a more conciliatory US, or whether Gordon Brown's Government has decided it really doesn't want meaningful negotiations.

1945 GMT: We're not asleep. It's just a very slow night for news, and we're also suffering from a bit of fatigue after a heavy academic day.

However, I think you can look forward to some new analysis on Hashemi Rafsanjani by the morning. And we're trying valiantly to track down the video of last night's interview on CNN by Christiane Amanpour of Ray Takeyh, formerly of the National Security Council, and Seyed Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran.  (Coincidentally, I've worked with both on academic projects.)

1540 GMT: An EA correspondent hauls me up for being too quick (and optimistic) about the Green movement's web presence. Mir Hossein Mousavi's Kalemeh website has only returned (0510 GMT) in the sense that the original site, www.kalemeh.ir, redirects to a backup, www.kaleme.com, which has not updated since Qods Day.

1500 GMT: Tehran's Prosecutor General has denied the news, reported yesterday, that 20 prominent detainees are soon to be released. He asserted that the cases of the deatinees, including former Vice President Mohammad Ali Abtahi, reformist leaders Abdollah Momeni, Shahab Tabatabaei, and Saeed Shariati, and journalist Mohammad Atrianfar, would be handled within "the process of law".

1400 GMT: More Atomic Tourism. A helpful reader adds to our item (0620 GMT) on the Come Visit Us website for Fordo, the home of Iran's second enrichment facility: "You can also visit an observatory built 3 years ago. Location, location , location."

1350 GMT: Another Loosening of the Net? Following the report that Mousavi website Kalemeh could soon be back on-line (0510 GMT), the Etemade Melli newspaper, linked to Mehdi Karroubi, has been acquitted by a majority jury vote of complaints over its stories. This could pave the way for a resumption of the paper's publication, which was halted this summer.

1320 GMT: Mousavi Welcomed Into the Fold? Khabar Online adds to Pedestrian's excellent piece (see 0600 GMT) on the speech of judiciary official Javad Larijani at Sharif University, which called for an end to animosity against Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi and welcomed Mousavi's "move inside the system".

1300 GMT: Academic Pressures. It's hard to put all together, but stories are piling up of punishment of university students and lecturers for political activity and even for challenges over academic matters. Students across Iran have been summoned to disciplinary offices, and Rooz Online writes of five law professors at Allameh Tabatabai University who have been barred from teaching.

1200 GMT: Still slow on the domestic front in Iran, so one more note on the media lemmings rushing after Sunday's New York Times mis-story on the Iran nuclear programme.

Unsurprisingly, The Times of London takes the prize for turning an already flawed report into a seven-alarm exaggeration: "Iran has the know-how to produce a nuclear bomb and may already have tested a detonation system small enough to fit into the warhead of a medium-range missile." The Times not only uses this as the pretext to reduce Sunday's press conference by IAEA head El Baradei to an afterthought but to give him a good kicking: "He will not be missed by foreign policy hawks in the US who accuse him of acquiescing in years of nuclear prevarication by Iran."

0935 GMT: All the Spin That's Fit to Print. This morning's New York Times on Iran did not repeat its Sunday spectacular of misinformation --- Iran Close to Bomb! --- going for the neutral (and factually correct) headline, "Iran Agrees to Allow Inspectors on Oct. 25".

But you can't get keep a good Government outlet down, so David Sanger (yep, him again) and Nazila Fathi, drop this into Paragraphs 5-6:

Some administration officials expressed private skepticism that Iran would ultimately prove willing to allow the kind of widespread inspections that the United States and its Western allies have in mind. They want the inspections to include several facilities that American and European officials suspect could be part of a string of covert facilities built to supply the newly revealed enrichment center near the holy city of Qum.

Sanger and Fathi fail to offer the corrective that no published US intelligence report puts forth evidence or even speculates that Iran has "a string of covert facilities". No leaked US report makes that claim. Not even the ISIS/IAEA report, which Sanger mangled on Sunday into an imminent warning that Iran had the information for The Bomb, alleges this.

I dread to think what's coming out tomorrow. Maybe it will be "Secret Government Installation for Mega-Giant Atomic Robots".

(P.S. No, it doesn't have to be this way. Simon Tisdall of The Guardian gets taken for a ride by the Sanger-Administration line, but The Associated Press, whose report runs in The Washington Post, gives the story a straightforward treatment with the El Baradei press conference and the public comments of President Obama's National Security Advisor, James Jones. They do not embellish --- and thus distort --- the story with the "on-background" spin of unnamed Administration and European officials.)

0800 GMT: Go Wide. Really Wide. Press TV, in its report on Sunday's press briefing by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, offers an unsubtle signal of the Iran Government' strategy to move negotiations far beyond direct consideration of Tehran's nuclear programme to international and regional issues: "The UN nuclear watchdog Chief, Mohamed ElBaradei, says regional and global stability can only be achieved through total nuclear disarmament."

There is no reference at all in the story to the talks over Iran's uranium enrichment.

0620 GMT: Atomic Tourism. Fancy a different kind of vacation?

The Iranian village of Fordoo, the location of the second enrichment facility, has a website full of information for the wanna-be visitor. It has the latest news --- a reassurance from Press TV that no radioactive material has been moved into the no-longer-secret enrichment plant --- a biography of the village, and an inspirational quote: "The best way to predict the future is making it."

0600 GMT: Yesterday we posted the video of student protests at Sharif University of the speech by high-level Judiciary official Mohammad Javad Larijani. Pedestrian has a fascinating account of the occasion. It includes Larijani's attempts to "bond" with the kids, “I was once a student, I was once a part of your gang. I was part of the same chaos," before dropping the boom on the opposition movement:

I agree with [the] statement [of protesting students that "the coup d'etat government must resign"] very much. But that coup d’état was defeated and the leader of the coup d’état was [Mir Hossein] Mousavi.

There were individuals who were part of the system and participated in the election, but on June 12th, at 11p.m. they turned their backs on the system. Their actions constitute a coup d’état . They took a very harsh tone against the government, accused it of murder, theft, lying, etc. and they used the vocabulary of thugs.

Yet by far the most intriguing passage was Larijani's response to protesting pro-Ahmadinejad students, “We must free our hearts of hate towards Mousavi, [Mehdi] Karroubi.….Because with hate, we can not tell truth from lies.” He added that Mousavi had now "said that he plans to move inside the system and right the wrongs. I think this is a step in the right direction.”

0545 GMT: Another interesting but lower-profile move this weekend. Hossein Taeb, the commander of the Basiji commander, was named a Deputy Director at the Ministry of Intelligence. While some sharper-eyed Iran-watchers noted the development, they did not consider this: given the battle this summer between President Ahmadinejad and other politicians and clerics (including the Supreme Leader?) for control of the Ministry, with the firing of more than 20 high-level officials, who claims a victory with Taeb's appointment?

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi has been appointed as the new commander of the Basiji.

0510 GMT: The most intriguing development inside Iran yesterday was the statement by Hashemi Rafsanjani (see our analysis) setting out guidelines for political activity and also putting specific warnings, such as a "mysterious network" trying to undermine the Islamic Republic and the false or misleading information put out through various outlets.

Decoding Rafsanjani's elaborately framed words, the easy part is that he is telling the Iranian people: in these tense and confusing times, Trust Me. And the Supreme Leader. The one reliable source for the latest on political development are statements from the Expediency Council, which Rafsanjani heads. The one trustworthy politician, by unsubtle implication, is the former President.

But who is Rafsanjani putting off-limits with his reference to a mysterious network? Some might say the reformists, who have gone too far to unsettle the system that Rafsanjani says he will defend through a return to "unity". Others are arguing, persuasively, that the threat comes from elements within the regime, and they have support from the pointed clue about disinformation --- given that the first "National Unity Plan" came out through Fars News Agency, fed to it by person or persons unknown, the former President's most direct challengers probably hold high office somewhere inside the establishment.

Of course, Rafsanjani could be putting both sides on notice with his warnings, even as he elevates himself with his First Amongst Equals relationship with the Supreme Leader. That still leaves the biggest question, as we noted yesterday: what exactly is the plan that he favours?

Meanwhile, the Green movement has been boosted by the return of Kalemeh, the site of Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign. It had been off-line for several days after the Government's crackdown on the  opposition before Qods Day.

Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)

Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks
The Latest from Iran (1 October): From Geneva to “Unity”?

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The Latest from Iran (1 October): From Geneva to "Unity"?

Iran: Mousavi Meeting with Reformists (30 September)
Iran: Karroubi Letter to Rafsanjani (27 September)
Iran Top-Secret: The President’s Gmail Account
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Backs Himself into a Corner
UPDATED Iran: So What’s This “National Unity Plan”?
The Latest from Iran (30 September): Confusion

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1955 GMT: How to Claim Victory. The Times of London slaps the headline, "Iran bows to sanctions pressure to allow inspectors", on its summary of the Geneva talks. Hmm.... There's nothing in the article to suggest an Iranian concession to a meaningful sanctions threat, and having been up-close-and-personal with Press TV tonight, trust me, the Iranians aren't bowing. Posturing, even swaggering a bit, but not bowing.

1945 GMT: And Now Obama. The President has given his seal of approval to the US line: a "constructive start" but if Iran does not live up to its obligations, US will move to "increase pressure". He signalled that Mohammed El Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, will soon visit Iran. "Hard work lies ahead."

1935 GMT: The Deal? Meanwhile, the Western media continues to miss the announcement, enthusiastically proclaimed by Press TV, that officials from Iran and the "5+1" powers will have technical talks on 18 September on "third-party enrichment".

A further signal why this is important: "Russia is ready to further enrich Iran’s uranium stocks for use as fuel in a civilian research reactor, depending on approval from the United Nations, a person familiar with the matter said today."

1920 GMT: Hold the Line. As the US Government prepares to consider its position after today's talks, no doubt in a domestic environment with critics screeching "appeasement", Hillary Clinton amplified the American statement (see 1753 GMT):

It was a productive day, but the proof of that has not yet come to fruition, so we’ll wait and continue to press our point of view and see what Iran decides to do....We want to see concrete actions and positive results. And I think that today’s meeting opened the door, but let’s see what happens.

1830 GMT: Another twist in the line of Foreign Minister Mottaki over the revelation of the second enrichment plant. Having put forward the case of four Iranian officials and scientists who have "disappeared" since 2007 (see 1350 GMT), Mottaki told the Council for Foreign Relations, "We think in Pittsburgh President Obama was misled based on wrong information and wrong analysis. The wrong analysis was provided by the British. Wrong information by certain terrorist groups."

It appears that, even though this issue has been overtaken by today's talks, Mottaki's statement points to a wider strategy: blame the British for being "hard-line" while praising the US as "flexible" and willing to negotiate if they are not misled by their partners (see 1710 GMT).

1723 GMT: In contrast to the forceful moves by the Iranians, the US post-talk statement is, well, weak: "[Undersecretary Burns] addressed the need for Iran to take concrete and practical steps that are consistent with its international obligations and that will build international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of it program."

1715 GMT: This is already a Huge-Win Day for the Iranian Government, and they're looking to make it bigger. European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana has said that Iran has promised to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the second enrichment facility near Qom, possibly "in the next couple of weeks". And chief Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili gets a prime-time platform on CNN with Christiane Amanpour this evening.

1710 GMT: Press TV is positively gushing over today's talks with "progress to some extent". They are noting that there will be not only the renewed high-level talks at the end of the month but a meeting on 18 October to consider "third-party enrichment" of uranium for an Irnaian facility. Interestingly, their correspondent says Britain and France seemed to have a hard line in the talks, but the US was "much more flexible".

1640 GMT: We'll have a full analysis tomorrow on the talks in Geneva but here's a teaser: Crunch Time for Obama?

The Iranians have achieved their primary objective, which is to avoid an immediate condemnation and the threat of sanctions from a "breakdown" of today's discussions. That's why they were so eager to let it be known that another round of talks is planned for the end of October.

But, as we've noted, President Obama will now have to face his domestic critics who will wonder, after his tough talk last week on the "secret nuclear plants", why he is even agreeing to another get-together. The response to that may have been laid out by the lead US official at today's talks, Undersecretary of State William Burns, who told National Public Radio yesterday, “If the talks fail, which I assume they will, because of the Iranians, then I think President Obama will be in a stronger position internationally to argue for stronger sanctions,” and predicted the collapse would occur within a month.

Fair enough. What happens, however, if the Iranians continue to give just enough for the prospect of an agreement but not necessarily a grand resolution by 1 November? Will the US Government collapse the talks just to get the showdown that is being pressed upon Obama?

As I told La Stampa earlier this week, the President is caught between two wings in his Administration. He cannot maintain his balance between them forever.

1610 GMT: Confirmation. Well, the Iranians didn't wait long. The delegation was hardly out the door of the Geneva talks when it informed the Islamic Republic News Agency, "The next round of talks will be held at the end of October."

1515 GMT: And Here's The Spin for The Continuing Talks. A US official is telling journalists in Geneva that the tone has been "civil" but Iran's delegation lacks the "cohesion and confidence" to make a deal.

1510 GMT: Score One for Us Good Guys. We projected that the best result coming out of today's meeting in Geneva would be an agreement to have another meeting. This just in from The Los Angeles Times:

Undersecretary of State William Burns met Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief negotiator, "on the margins" of the nuclear talks this morning, said State Department spokesman Robert A. Wood. The meeting lasted about 30 minutes.

The bilateral session came after Iran and representatives of six great powers convened this morning in a secluded villa on the outskirts of Geneva to try to relieve growing international pressure over Tehran's nuclear program. Burns and Jalil went off as the others ate a seafood buffet lunch, then all of diplomats reconvened in a plenary session and were expected to talk for several more hours this afternoon.

U.S. officials said they expected the session to perhaps lead to another meeting.

1505 GMT: Iranian businessman Bijan Khajehpour was released on bail Wednesday, days after US National Public Radio raised his case in an interview with President Ahmadinejad.

1450 GMT: So Which Congressmen Did Iran's Foreign Minister Meet? Washington TV, drawing from the Islamic Republic News Agency, says that Manouchehr Mottaki was not just seeing the sights in Washington. He met two members of the "Foreign Relations Committee" (presumably in the US Senate). They "asked Mottaki whether Iran would allow access to the [[second enrichment] site, to which he replied that Iran has always cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency and was ready to allow inspectors to visit the site". Mottaki added that Iran would “not give up its rights” under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], but added that Tehran “has no plans to quit the NPT.”

1350 GMT: Espionage Story of the Day. The Arabic newspaper Asharq al-Awsat reports that Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, spekaing with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, has complained about the disappearance of four Iranian officials and scientists, including former Deputy Minister of Defence Alireza Asgari. The newspaper speculates that one of the "kidnapped" quartet may be the source of revelations about Iran's second enrichment facility near Qom.

The story of the missing Iranians has provoked controversy since 2007. Asgari was reported by some sources to have "defected", but Tehran has maintained that he was abducted. Subsequent stories have pointed to an Israeli programme to disrupt Iran's nuclear plans through kidnappings.

1230 GMT: Clerical Movement. Grand Ayatollahs Nasser Makarem-Shirazi and Lotfallah Safi-Golpaygani have met at the latter's house for discussion. It is the first reported meeting of senior clerics after the emergence of a purported "National Unity Plan" and comes a day after Makarem-Shirazi's public call for unity.

1155 GMT: Fars News has posted an article on the morning talks in Geneva, considering subjects and "operational strategies" for the discussions. Saeed Jalili, the Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, led Tehran's delegation in the talks with the "5+1" countries and representatives from the European Union. Under Secretary of State William Burns headed the US team.

1120 GMT: A slow period as we've tended to academic duties. The non-Iranian media is wall-to-wall on the Geneva talks but with precious little to say before a statement is issued after the discussions. Joe Klein of Time takes the Gold Medal for media foolishness with a hot-air "profile", "Ahmadinejad: Iran's Man of Mystery". Its one merit is the irony of Klein's assertion, "The real headline [of meeting Ahmadinejad] was his apparent cluelessness," given that the article is clueless about Iran's nuclear programme, internal politics, and the character of the Iranian President.

The Silver Medal goes to William Broad and David Sanger of The New York Times who, not content with having presented the Administration's portrayal of the "secret nuclear plant" as Qom as Nuclear Bomb Gospel, decide they will write a piece that Iran might have Lots and Lots of such plants. Their evidence? The cryptic words "and others" in a statement from Iran's top nuclear official and, well, that's it really.

0820 GMT: Most Surprising Story of Day (So Far). In contrast to Press TV's "All is Well" story about the reaction to Iran's nuclear programme (0600 GMT), the Iranian Labour News Agency considers the comments of Mohammad El Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and headlines, "IAEA chief: Iran should take US offer".

0815 GMT: Telling Half the Story. The New York Times features an article by Michael Slackman on the regional perspective around the talks on Iran's nuclear programme. The piece begins:

As the West raises the pressure on Iran over its nuclear program, Arab governments, especially the small, oil-rich nations in the Persian Gulf, are growing increasingly anxious. But they are concerned not only with the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran but also with the more immediate threat that Iran will destabilize the region if the West presses too hard, according to diplomats, regional analysts and former government officials.

That seems a balanced assessment of the position of Middle Eastern states. So how does the headline portray this balance?

"Possibility of a Nuclear-Armed Iran Alarms Arabs"

0725 GMT: Reading the Clues for Geneva. CNN is the morning mouthpiece for the White House, repeating without considering the assertions of "three senior U.S. administration officials": "The United States wants a United Nations nuclear watchdog to have unfettered access to Iran’s recently revealed uranium enrichment site." And, if Iran doesn't make the correct response, "then isolation and sanctions are other options": “If it’s not going to succeed then there has to be consequences. They will respond. If not they will pay the price.”

Fox's Major Garrett, bizarrely, converts the same briefing into this lead paragraph: "The United States will not push for sanctions against Iran in Thursday's multilateral talks on its nuclear program in Geneva and is prepared to talk one-on-one with Iranian negotiations if such engagement appears 'useful'."

Those who want to do better than CNN or Fox News can read through the transcript of the State Department's "background briefing". Meanwhile, Reza Aslan cuts through the Administration line and the poor reporting to make the key point, "In short, without a real military option and with no guarantee that sanctions will have any effect, all we are left with—like it or not—is these negotiations"

0620 GMT: What the media is missing, as it is distracted by the Geneva talks, is the significant but still far-from-clear change in Iran's political landscape in the last 48 hours.

All indications are that a plan for political reconciliation --- whether it is in draft or final version --- has been circulating. Yesterday there was the dispute over whether Ayatollah Haeri-Sharazi had branded the plan "a lie", the supporting calls for unity from figures like Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi, and, most importantly, the meeting of Mir Hossein Mousavi with the reformist Parliamentary minority, the Imam Khomeini Line.

Mousavi is clearly working with the notion of a "National Unity Plan", but we're divided here at Enduring America over whether that means Mousavi is reinforcing the Green Wave's challenge to the system or giving up political opposition for a more conciliatory, even accommodating concept of "social movement". Personally, what has disturbed me, putting all the reports together, is the exclusion of Mehdi Karroubi from the process. This feels like a compromise between Mousavi and elements within the regime (to be blunt, Mousavi and Rafsanjani). If true, what that means for the future of President Ahmadinejad is uncertain --- could there even be a vision of a new Government in which Mousavi would have a role? The Supreme Leader, on the other hand, would be in a far stronger position.

We should know more today after Rafsajani and former President Mohammad Khatami meet the Imam Khomeini Line.

0600 GMT: For the world's media, "Iran" will mean little more today than the talks on Tehran's nuclear programme in Geneva. While there are some useful scraps of informaton, most of the coverage relies on generalisations ahead of any meaningful news from Switzerland. Thus, CNN's "IAEA: Iran broke law with nuclear facility" squares off with Press TV's "Exclusive: IAEA letter thanks Iran over notification".

More importantly, almost none of the news outlets are able to read behind the superficial spin from the participating countries. Thus, the emerging picture --- that Washington's high-profile pressure tactics over the "secret nuclear plant" have put the Administration in a corner, as the possibility of significant sanctions recedes --- is missed. So, if Iran does not offer a meaningful concession to US demands today, Obama faces a bigger challenger than Tehran's non-Bomb: the domestic groups who will insist on a punishment that cannot be meted out.