The Latest from Iran (22 October): Unsteady as She Goes

NEW Really?! Israel & Iran in Direct Talks on Nuclear Weapons
Iran’s Nukes: Text of IAEA Head El Baradei Statement (21 October)
The Latest from Iran (21 October): Room for a Challenge?

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2020 GMT: Rah-e-Sabz has named 18 of the people arrested this evening.

1915 GMT: Tonight's Arrests. A group had gathered at the house of Shahabbedin Tabatabei, a detained member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front to pray for his release. Security forces entered the home. They asked 4 everyone's cell phone and filmed them, handcuffed the men, and took away several people.

Among those detained were Tabatabei's wife, Mohammad-Reza Jalaiepour, who was detained earlier in the post-election crisis, Mehrak Mirabzadeh, Faezeh Abtahi, and Saeed Nourmohammadi. Mirabzadeh and Abtahi were later released.

1800 GMT: Iranian activists on Twitter are reporting that a number of high-ranking Islamic Iran Participant Front members have been arrested, and in some cases re-arrested after previous post-election detentions, this evening.

1655 GMT: The reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front of the Islamic Revolution has condemned the sentences against political activists. It has God’s promise that no Government or country can survive with such acts; as Prophet Mohammad said, “A state can survive with infidelity but not with tyranny and oppression."

The IIPF added that the coup forces have shown that their only use of religion is to justify despotic and authoritarian actions, issuing unjust sentences against some of the most loyal children of the revolution and the country. (English summary via Mousavi Facebook page)

1640 GMT: More than 2500 students at Sharif University have signed an open letter protesting disciplinary action against their classmates for political activity.

1630 GMT: Heads-Up Announcement. I just finished a 45-minute interview with Fintan Dunne of Sea of Green Radio on Afghanistan and Iran. The broadcast should be available this evening.

1530 GMT: Failure of Day. Earlier this week, we reported on a success for the Green Wave at the Iran Media Fair, when the "hard-line" Kayhan newspaper was forced to remove a guestbook and take down a flag after they were inscribed and decorated with pro-Mousavi slogans and green ribbons.

On the other side, a stand set up by the Ministry of Islamic Guidance to collect names for a complaint against Mousavi did not do very well. So poorly, in fact, that it was taken down.

1300 GMT: Fars Makes Up Clinton Quotes. I'm  not sure if this is another signal that Iran will sign the enrichment deal --- given the image of a US making concessions to a "peaceful" Tehran --- or really bad propaganda.

Fars News is currently leading with the story, "Clinton: Iran's nuclear program is peaceful", quoting her from an interview with The New York Times. Which would be fine, except it bears no resemblance to the truth. In the article in the Times, the summary of the Secretary of State's remarks --- actually made in a speech to the US Institute of Peace --- is "Iran and North Korea must take decisive action to curb their nuclear programs, and not just talk about doing so, if they expected to enjoy an easing of global pressures".

1240 GMT: Will Iran Sign the Uranium Enrichment Deal? Yes.

At least that's the clue offered by Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the Iranian Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Vienna talks are a new chapter in cooperation between Iran and the other participating states….We will be waiting to see whether they will stay true to their words and promises. The International Atomic Energy Agency will be a witness to the other states' behaviors when it comes to technical cooperation on using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

So there's Tehran's spin: We are the ones in control of this process, putting "the West" to the test on the nuclear issue.

You won't see this in Western media yet --- they're distracted for the moment by the tangential comments of Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar that the deal "is not acceptable to us". Bahonar has no role in the nuclear negotiations; his words only come into play if the Parliament decides to resist the Government's engagement with Washington.

1145 GMT: Not Going to Let It Go. The "US linked to Jundallah bombing" narrative lives on. Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has repeated his claims from Sunday that this is an American connection to the attack in southeastern Iran that killed at least 41 people: "Unfortunately, a trace of the US crimes can be seen in the latest events in our country. Although [the US] has denied any involvement in the terrorist attack, it is not enough and not unacceptable to us. They should explain why such things are taking place."

I have to say I'm surprised, given the context of this week's talks in Vienna on Iran's uranium enrichment. Perhaps Larijani is maintaining political pressure on Washington. But is that a prelude to walking away from the draft agreement? Is it to maintain a tough public stance, even as Iran accepts the arrangement?

Even more curious, and complicating the questions above, is that Larijani is the only front-line politician to complement the Revolutionary Guard's criticism of Washington. So is the Speaker speaking for the Ahmadinejad Government or cutting an independent path?

0825 GMT: The Shark Surfaces. Fararu News reports that Hashemi Rafsanjani has spoken with scholars at the Qom seminary.

He emphasized the principles of Islam and the Islamic Revolution to deal with the country's "many fundamental problems". The Iranian system was sound but, unfortunately, certain operations had raised public and international concerns. It was important, therefore, that all institutions and individuals respected and upheld the Constitution. And, to support that, there must be "free and uncensored information of events and issues", without lies and distortions.

Nothing unusual or dramatic in those general statements. What may be more significant, as we watch Qom's evolving interest in a resolution to post-election disputes, is the timing of Rafsanjani's encounter.

0600 GMT: In contrast to events in Vienna, where Tehran and the "West" neared an agreement on uranium enrichment, a quieter Wednesday in Iran. There were reports of scattered demonstrations, but rumours of a confrontation between President Ahmadinejad and students at Tehran University never turned into reality.

The quest by pro-Ahmadinejad members of Parliament to put pressure on Mir Hossein Mousavi through a formal complaint appeared to run aground in confusion. For the moment, the Revolutionary Guard continues to be preoccupied with the aftermath of the Sistan-Baluchestan bombing.

On the opposition side, movement is still restricted by the Government's formal and informal measure, but a drip-feed of news continues as the calendar moves towards 13 Aban (4 November). Mehdi Karroubi, meeting the members of the Defenders of Human Rights and the National Peace Council, strongly criticised the measures trying to cut off his communications with the people, such as the shutdown of his newspaper and official website, the arrest of his close allies, and the closure of his office. He assured the audience that he was ready for any further regime moves, e.g. that would be taken against him. The Government's ignorance of the rights of the people made the situation worse, and the Green movement would continue until those rights are reinstated. (English summary available via Radio Zamaneh)

The report of a forthcoming meeting between senior clerics and members of Parliament over the proposed National Election Committee promises another front in the challenge to the President and possibly the Supreme Leader. And reformists took heart from the announcement that former President Mohammad Khatami had won the inaugural Global Dialogue Prize, given for cultural and intercultural research in global communication and cooperation.

One item from the prisons: Mostafa Tajzadeh, the former deputy Minister of Interior, told his wife during a visit that he was unaware of the process of his Detained since June, he remained defiant: " Let [the regime] say whatever they want in an unchallenged environment and in our absence; there is no doubt that there will be an opportunity for the people to hear our side of the story! "

The Latest from Iran (19 October): Beyond Bombings, The Pressure on the Government

NEW Iran Snap Analysis: Mousavi’s Webcast Takes “National Unity” Beyond Politics
NEW Iran Discussion: The Bombings, Jundallah, and the US
NEW Video: Mousavi’s First Post-Election Webcast (18 October)
NEW Video: Larijani on The Bombings, Jundallah & The US (18 October)
Iran Newsflash: National Unity Plan Submitted to Supreme Leader

Iran: The Great Supreme Leader Health Mystery
Video: Blame on Sunni Group Jundallah, US For Bombing
The Latest from Iran (18 October): Today’s Bombings

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1910 GMT: In case you're wondering why, after the initial media distractions (0825 and 1355 GMT), there were no updates on today's talks between Iran and the "5+1" powers over uranium enrichment....

Well, there was precious little to report, as all delegations stayed tight-lipped. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammad El Baradei, offered some general encouragement, praising "a good meeting....We are off to a good start," but saying only that talks would resume Tuesday morning.

This was always the most likely outcome, since details of uranium enrichment and the logistics of transport and processing can be surprisingly complex. However, it appears that some of the international media were expecting the drama of either an agreement or a breakdown within hours, if not minutes. That foiled expectation produced the day's alternative high point, the tragi-comedy of CNN's Matthew Chance sinking from excitement into chilly whimpering:

1. just did first live shot....talks not even started yet, but lot of anticipation
2. ok talks finally begun
3. gonna do live right now
4. freezing out here...
5. jeez..all day silence... now the talks have broken up....

1840 GMT: Clerical Hope. Grand Ayatollah Sane'i, meeting members of the Qom branch of the “Green Path of Hope”, has said different views should not lead to division and should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation. He asked, however, how one can speak to a Government that calls people agents of traitors and foreigners and that insults the families of martyred heroes. (English summary on Mousavi Facebook site)

1815 GMT: Khamenei Speaks (or At Least His Official Site Does). Back from an academic break to find the official statement from the Supreme Leader on the Sunday bombings: "The Islamic system shall not withhold any energy to defend the region and the people" against the terrorists and enemies "backed by arrogant governments".

1555 GMT: Supreme Leader Speaks? Reuters reports, from Press TV, that Ayatollah Khamenei has said that Iran will "punish" those responsible for Sunday's bombings and that enemies "can't harm the unity" amongst Iranians. It is unclear, however, whether the Supreme Leader's statement was in a message on his website or in a public appearance.

1545 GMT: Political Terms. We have been referring to Jundallah in the last 48 hours as a "Sunni group", but my impression is that a more accurate description would be "Baluch insurgent group", reflecting the regional emphasis of its objectives. Any comments most welcome.

1505 GMT: We have moved our snap analysis of Mir Hossein Mousavi's webcast on "National Unity" to a separate entry.

1435 GMT: Here They (the Revolutionary Guard and the "Western" Media) Go Again. A predictable if ridiculous escalation in the Iran v. US narrative. The commander of the Revolutionary Guard, General Jafari, makes his comments to Iranian journalists denouncing the US, Israel, and Pakistan in Sunday's bombings by Jundallah and promises to "retaliate" (see 0850 GMT). Reuters turns Jafari not only into the Ahmadinejad Government but all of Iran, as in its headline, "Iran Threatens Britain and US After Guard Bombing".  The Guardian gives a token nod to Islamabad but does no other reporting beyond Reuters' declaration with its  "Iran blames Pakistan and west for deadly suicide bombing: Iran vows revenge".

None of the "Western" journalists, to our knowledge, take any notice of last night's Cabinet meeting, which distanced itself from criticism of the US. Indeed, no one seems to bother to ask, "If Iran really blames the US for this act, why is it negotiating with Washington at the Vienna talks today?"

1355 GMT: A Non-Threat. Let's hope the Western press don't swallow this (frankly ridiculous) media bait on today's enrichment talks. Press TV is featuring the declaration, from "a source close to the meetings", "Iran Rejects 'Direct Talks' with France in Vienna".

Since Iran is not speaking directly to France but to the "5+1" powers, this is the reddest of red herrings having no significance whatsoever.

1345 GMT: Montazeri E-Mails the BBC. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri has responded to a series of questions from the BBC on the Iranian Government and the Islamic Regime. After a rather fatuous start, "What is your view of claims that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is in contact with the Hidden Imam and that his government is working for the return of the Mahdi?", the interview produces Montazeri's declaration, "Due to the short-sightedness, ineptitude and lack of wisdom, as well as arrogance and neglect of the demands of the majority of the people by a small inefficient minority, many of the initial ideals of the revolution have not been fulfilled." And he repeats his warning to the Supreme Leader:

As, in my view, the government will not achieve legitimacy without the support of the people, and as the necessary and obligatory condition for the legitimacy of the ruler is his popularity and the people's satisfaction with him; therefore, the present dissatisfaction - which is unfortunately increasing - will have a direct bearing on the legitimacy of the ruling establishment, unless the wiser figures in the nation can think of a solution by changing the current policies, and can remove the causes of the dissatisfaction of the majority of the people, and deal with the people with kindness, mercy, compassion and humility.

1315 GMT: Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have each issued statements condemning Sunday's bombings.

1230 GMT: Another Post-Election Prison Sentence. Hedayat Aghaei, a senior member of the Kargozaran Party, has been sentenced to five years in prison for "disrupting the public order by provoking people to riot, propagating against the Islamic republic...and acting against national security”.

The twist in the tale is that Kargozaran has been seen more as a party linked to Hashemi Rafsanjani, raising the question of how much this is a symbolic move against the former President.

1045 GMT: Where is Khamenei? At the risk of re-igniting rumours and speculation, a question: is it unusual for no statement or appearance from the Supreme Leader given the death toll from yesterday's bombings in Sistan-Baluchestan?

1040 GMT: Hammihan News reports that journalist Masoud Bastani, detained in early July, has been sentenced to six years in prison.

0850 GMT: The Government's Disarray Continues. President Ahmadinejad may want to get a hold of his Revolutionary Guards commander, General Mohammad Ali Jafari. Jafari has upset the Cabinet's attempts to damp down talk of US-first responsibility for the Sunday bombings, telling journalists that Washington and Israel are behind the attack and claiming links of Jundallah head Abdolmalek Rigi with US and Pakistani intelligence services.

0840 GMT: The Pakistani Government has denied any link to Sunday's bombing in southeastern Iran. "Pakistan is not involved in terrorist activities ... we are striving to eradicate this menace," Foreign Ministry Spokesman Abdul Basit told the Daily Times newspaper .

Pakistani President Asif Zardari has called Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to offer his condolences and reaffirm Pakistan’s commitment to fighting extremists.

0825 GMT: As the technical discussions between Iran and the "5+1" powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) open in Vienna, Tehran is throwing up a lot of chaff to divert the media. Following yesterday's assertion that Iran was not looking for third-party enrichment but would seek to buy high-enriched uranium from the US and other countries, a spokesman for Iran's nuclear energy authority declared this morning, "If the talks do not bring about Iran's desired result ... we will start to further enrich uranium ourselves."

Don't be distracted. The main proposal on the table is still the US-developed plan, after Iranian signals in June, for 80 percent of Iran's low-enriched uranium to be processed to 19.75 percent in Russia. (Here's our reminder of the details of the plan and negotiations.) That is the message between the lines of this report from Press TV, under the cover of "local enrichment", "The United States is considering ways to officially announce that it has agreed to Iran's demand to locally enrich uranium, sources say. The US has held private meetings with its European allies in order to inform them about the decision."

0815 GMT: EA's Mr  Smith and Chris Emery met up last night for a chat about the Sunday bombing, Jundallah, and the allegations of US involvement. The outcome is in a separate entry.

0725 GMT: The effects of yesterday's bombings in southeastern Iran still resonate, with people inside and outside the Government trying to assess the political as well as "security" effects. The immediate impression is that the regime is in a bit of disarray, both from the shock of losing six senior Revolutionary Guard commanders and from the symbolic significance of a suicide attack inside Iran.

The immediate reaction of the Revolutionary Guard and, more interestingly, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani (see separate video) was to blame "foreign elements" such as the US Government for the attacks, but this only caused further political complications. With an Iranian delegation meeting American counterparts and representative of the other "5+1" countries today for technical talks on uranium enrichment, the aggressive line risked a breakdown of engagement and, thus, the threat of harsher economic sanctions on Iran.

So the Ahmadinejad Cabinet, reviewing the situation last night, re-focused Tehran's strategy. blaming Pakistan and pressuring it to co-operate in the pursuit of Jundallah, the insurgent group blamed for the bombings. Given the complexity of Pakistani politics and its own tangled internal situation, that pressure is unlikely to lead to a resolution in the near-future.

But this is the only start of the bombings' political effects.

No doubt the Government will gather itself to put the attacks within the context of post-election "disturbances" by the opposition, but this is not the easiest of propositions. Jundullah is a political light-year away from the nature and content of the Green movement, and of course no one in the opposition is going to offer any public sympathy for violence against Iranian officials or the military, even the Revolutionary Guard.

So, while Ahmadinejad and advisors try to re-align the security situation, internal politics, and their international manoeuvres, there is a space for others to take advantage. And, indeed, yesterday's "other" events may prove more significant than the Baluchestan bombing. The revelation that the National Unity Plan has now gone to the Supreme Leader for consideration (see separate entry) establishes that, despite all the pressure from Ahmadinejad supporters to contain and even sabotage the Plan, a cross-section of groups --- and, yes, former President Hashemi Rafsanjani --- have persisted. We are still in the dark about the details of the Plan, but it has long been clear that its proposals for system reform, first and foremost in the short-term, will put limits and possibly pressure on Ahmadinejad.

So it is far more than notable that Mir Hossein Mousavi made his own intervention yesterday, for the first time using an Internet interview (see separate video) to set out his political vision and call on the Iranian people to persist in their efforts for change. Most importantly for now, he opened by aligning himself with the National Unity Plan while, at the same time, encouraging the Green movement to use "virtual media" to ensure its voice was heard.

Iran Snap Analysis: Mousavi's Webcast Takes "National Unity" Beyond Politics

Latest Iran Video and Full English Text: Mousavi’s First Post-Election Webcast (18 October) 

The Latest from Iran (19 October): Beyond Bombings, The Pressure on the Government
The Latest from Iran (18 October): Today’s Bombings

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Beyond Establishment Politics to "Unity"? Thanks to EA reader Megan and the Facebook site linked to Mir Hossein Mousavi, we now have a full translation of Mousavi's remarks in his first Webcast.

It is a significant move. How significant I can't tell yet, not because Mousavi was vague --- to the contrary, his position is now clear -- but because he is trying to move beyond the framework of "standard" politics within the Iranian system.

First, the specifics. In the alleged (and now largely discredited) draft of the National Unity Plan published in late September by Fars News, the central committee including a Mousavi representative. No way, said Mousavi in the interview. He had never been in discussions about a National Unity Plan, although he knew about the initiative of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, the ideas of Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, and the interest of other well-meaning individuals.

Indeed, Mousavi does not see the primary role for himself (and presumably the Green movement) as part of the Plan. Instead, "National Unity" for him has a second meaning --- it is a social movement, beyond political parties, encompassing and furthering the ideals of the Iranian nation and the Islamic Revolution. This "expression of national will", despite all the obstacles put up by the Government, will be triumphant.

All well and good, but that leaves a pretty big immediate question. Given that the Plan has now been submitted to the Supreme Leader for consideration and thus approval, does Mousavi accept it if all parties involved decide to proceed? Does he dare reject it? Or does he, as I suspect he will, stand aside from it with the declaration that "National Unity" transcends any political arrangements?

Iran: A Beginner's Guide to the Economy, Past and Present

The Latest from Iran (16 October): Rumours and Drama, Khamenei and Karroubi
Latest Iran Video: Selling Ahmadinejad’s Economic Plan (13 October)

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EA's newest correspondent, Mohammad Khiabani, introduces us to the economics preceding and accompanying the post-election situation:

The subsidy system that exists in Iran --- one that benefits both individuals and industry by lowering costs of basic daily goods but is highly inefficient and unfair in the distribution of those benefits ---- was never meant to be permanent. It was an expansion of a earlier set of food and energy subsidies that began under the Pahlavi dynasty, as part of the old regime's economic and social policy.

During the 1980s war with Iraq and the US embargo, when Mir Housain Mousavi was Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic (and not too ideologically different from the Revolutionary Guard in his political positions), the subsidy system expanded into a general distribution network that kept consumption in Iran at decent levels. This involved government-run food centers throughout the country, price controls, nationalization of foreign trade, multiple currency exchange rates, and a rationed goods program. Just as in the Battle of London during WWII, when the average Londoner's nutrition levels went up even while the city was being bombed by the Luftwaffe, the effect of this network in Iran was to equalize the consumption of goods. This helped raise the lower classes' living standards even while Iran's wealth declined from the Pahlavi days of its oil-fueled economic "miracle".

However, since the late 1980s, the Iranian regime has slowly dismantled this system. First it opened up to foreign trade, then it aligned its currency rates, then it allowed foreign investment in small parcels, and it finally attempted to tackle the biggest problem of readjusting the prices of basic goods so that they adjust according to market fluctuations. This is a noble goal, because the richest Iranians get the most benefit from the subsidies of food, energy, and gasoline, simply because they consume more of everything. The Islamic Republic has also, in conjunction with slow economic liberalization, expanded the social safety net for its population over the last 20 years, with a combination of decentralized primary health centers in rural and urban areas, large social insurance funds that operate under the category of "non-governmental" organizations, and initiatives to give everyone at least some form of pension and health insurance.

This long process, seen up close, looks like chaos. But if you step back, it has an odd logic to it, and it has contributed to comparatively good standards of living in Iran versus other middle-income countries, as measured by life expectancy, literacy (including amongst females in a region where rates are historically low), and low infant mortality. If you read Thursday's Wall Street Journal article on China's unraveled health care system, which used to be one of the best in the Third World, Iran does not look that bad.

What does this mean? Yes, social policy in Iran is imbued with politics, just as in any large state (look no further than the daily grind on Capitol Hill in Washington). Factions exist, with constituencies, and they jockey for power and recognition of successful policies.

It is all too forgotten now that privatization, subsidy reform, foreign investment, and welfare expansion were all part of the Khatami administration's economic plans between 1997 and 2005. And in a very Clintonesque move, Ahmadinejad has borrowed some of the best ideas of his predecessor and claimed them as his own. It seems now that the current (and very tendentious) alignment of factions in the Majles has fostered the political will to actually pass a restructuring of subsidies, while those conditions did not exist in the second Khatami term.

Daily politics in Iran has lineages deeply embedded in its past. Even the Revolutionary Guard's intervention in the economy stems from the after-effects of the 1980s war, when President Rafsanjani utilized Guard manpower and engineering expertise for the reconstruction of the country. This also had the added benefit of keeping hundreds of thousands of Iranian veterans employed, with a few of them getting quite rich in the process.

It is difficult to predict how well the government will pull off a restructuring of the subsidy system. While a much smaller implementation of gasoline rationing two years ago resulted in a few instances of gas stations being attacked, today the measure is seen as a success and discussed as a microcosm for the reforms. Plans to utilize the social security system of Iran to distribute cash and aid to the lower 50% of Iranians to offset incoming higher prices may actually expand and strengthen the social safety net. This may also inadvertently decrease the power of religious foundations such as the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, widely criticized as a non-transparent charity organization, but currently very influential in poor Iranians' lives.

Any look through the microscope at Iranian politics must not be blinkered. Instead, it should be accompanied with a longer-term perspective on Iran's economy and society, one that allows us to talk about Iran with the same kind of language and terminology we use to talk about Turkey, Mexico, China, and any large middle-income country.

The Latest from Iran (15 October): Restricting the Movement

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Iran: The Latest on Mehdi Karroubi
The Latest from Iran (14 October): Watching Karroubi, Rafsanjani, and the Supreme Leader’s Health

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2010 GMT: Our Daily Contribution to the Khamenei Death Rumour Mill. The Supreme Leader's Facebook site has the following message from Wednesday, "Today Noon; Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran attended a rite in respect of Imam Sadeq(A.S)".

If true, this would disprove Tuesday's Peiknet story, the original source of the current health rumors, that the Supreme Leader had been confined to his house by doctors.

1620 GMT: A Dutch Member of Parliament, Harry van Bommel, has urged Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen to take further action against the imminent execution of Iranians sentenced in post-election cases:

Protest at the European level is not enough. The Netherlands should also use its own channels. There is an escalation of political oppression in Iran and we should react to that by using heavier diplomatic means....To prevent the eradication of any kind of opposition in Iran, the Netherlands must act now.

Human rights is one of Verhagen's policy priorities, and he can be contacted in English or Dutch via Twitter.

1545 GMT: Mehdi Karroubi has responded --- big-time --- to Government attempts to arrest him over his allegations of abuses of detainees. We've got the details in a separate entry.

1405 GMT: Fereshteh Ghazi has posted an interview with  the lawyer of Arash Pour-Rahmani, who was sentenced to death for subversive activity last week. Her headline is a blunt description: "Close to Death but Clueless".

1400 GMT: Iranian authorities continue to prevent filmmaker Jafar Panahi, who was briefly detained on 30 July, from leaving the country.

1110 GMT: President Ahmadinejad has used the setpiece of a meeting with an Egyptian writer and scholar to declare that further US sanctions on Iran are unlikely: “In a status where countries are seeking free trade, talk of embargoes is meaningless. At any rate, they have already imposed sanctions against our country, but achieved nothing. The world is a big place and all states are not controlled by a certain bullying regime."

Of course, this could be read as defiance but another reading is that Ahmadinejad is signalling that productive engagement is alive and well.

0900 GMT: Yesterday we noticed the latest message from Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, delivered after his class at Qom's seminary, challenging the Revolutionary Guard. An EA correspondent adds details of the statement:

As Ayatollah Khomeini has said, the Army, Revolutionary Forces, and Basij militia must not interfere with the political affairs as it would be very dangerous for the country. These forces should use their power against the enemy not the people and friends.

Statements that protecting the Islamic republic is obligatory only apply if the Islamic system is loyal to its values and slogans.

The values and the slogans of the Islamic Republic are "Independence, Freedom, and the Islamic Republic". Independence means not to be obedient to a superpower. Freedom is having the freedom of speech and the belief that the opponents will not be put behind bars. Republic means a system based on people's votes and finally Islamic means that the system should be based upon the Islamic values.

0815 GMT: Amidst the rumours about the Supreme Leader's health, there will be some terrible "analysis" today, but the blogger Allahpundit takes an early lead in the competition. It's not so much that he/she declares "Irresponsible Rumor of the Day" and then treats it as true for his/her thought. It's more that the speculation is awful:

Before the summer uprising, the odds-on choice to succeed [the Supreme Leader] was Rafsanjani....One possibility is [now] the Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, Ahmadinejad’s own personal “spiritual advisor”....Another possibility is that the [Revolutionary] Guard will simply finish the process started this summer and stage a full-blown military coup, installing Ahmadinejad or Jafari as dictator and taking things from there....The third possibility is the likeliest — namely, finding a puppet from among the clerical ranks who can be sold to the west as a 'pragmatist' or 'reformist' while letting the Guard control things behind the scenes.

0625 GMT: Amidst continuing chatter --- all unconfirmed --- about the declining state of the Supreme Leader's health, including claims that the Tehran Bazaar is talking about Ayatollah Khamenei's passing, this line stands out: "Obviously, every rumor about Khamenei’s death to date has been false."

0615 GMT: Meanwhile, in the "West", there has been a notable switch from the nuclear issue to "human rights" to challenge the Obama Administration's engagement with the Ahmadinejad Government. This morning's Washington Post editorial endorses the latest speech by Iranian lawyer and Nobel Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi: "Mr. Obama has extended the hand of friendship to a man who has blood on his hands. He can at least avoid shaking the hand of friendship with him." Tehran Bureau, increasingly prominent as a site for the views of the Iranian diaspora, features Setareh Sabety's comment, "I do not want my President, who made me cry with his words of justice and freedom, who made me think that the impossible was possible, to shake the hands of the murderer of my children."

0600 GMT: More "Information"? Could be coincidence but Javan Online, the newspaper associated with the Revolutionary Guard, has followed its story on Hashemi Rafsanjani with a purported statement from Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani on the post-election protests. Mahdavi-Kani was named as co-author with Rafsanjani of the draft National Unity Plan, published by Fars News in late September, the incident that prompted Rafsanjani's denunciation on Tuesday of "false news".

Meanwhile, Javan's lead story is another purported analysis of US-supported regime change.

0500 GMT: A rather strange day on Wednesday.

We watched for signs of political movement from Mehdi Karroubi and Hashemi Rafsanjani; what we saw was the extent of the Government's attempts to break their challenge.

The headline story of the Government's threats to prosecute Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi was supplemented by accounts of the restrictions on the movements of both men. With constant surveillance and pressure by Government forces, they are confined to houses for long periods and, in the case of Mousavi, reportedly corresponding by written messages inside the home.

As for Rafsanjani, who is free to move and who holds key positions inside the establishment, he faces the Government distortion of his words and views. It also should not be forgotten that the regime maintains the threat of prosecution of his family members if the former President should move too far out of line.

A reader writes passionately, "Rafsanjani has no power any more and he lost it all trying to resolve his personal agenda." That's a fair challenge, especially given Rafsanjani's cautious and perhaps over-complex approach to politics, but I think it minimises the extent of the Government's fightback against a dangerous foe, especially after his mid-July Friday Prayers.

I also think that, as the Government is doing, one has to keep all the leaders in the picture. Individually, Karroubi, Mousavi, and Rafsanjani (as well as others like former President Khatami and senior clerics) can only have limited effect in the campaign for "reform" of the Ahmadinejad Government and Iranian system. It is only when there is both the movement of Rafsanjani inside the establishment and the challenge brought by Karroubi-Mousavi from outside --- again, a convergence we saw in mid-July --- that President Ahmadinejad and his allies are on the defensive.

Logically, then, the Government's approach is divide and rule. If Rafsanjani can be threatened and distorted into a strategy of gradual --- very gradual --- steps and Mousavi can be bottled up, then Karroubi's persistent statements are mere annoyances.

So is that it, then? Not quite. The paradox is that the umbrella political term in Iran right now is "National Unity Plan". Indeed, the Javan "information" that Rafsanjani supported Ahmadinejad's 2nd-term Government was put out in the context of a political meeting on that Plan.

We still don't know the details of the current draft Plan, from amongst the confusing reports of recent weeks, but any "National Unity Plan" which does not take some account of the opposition of past months will be seen as far from unifying.

And, yes, even that could be successful --- can Mousavi, Karroubi, Khatami, and the dissident clerics summon up the strength for another confrontation? --- were it not for another looming presence. The Green movement has been quieted and limited by time and Government restrictions, but it has not been vanquished. And 4 November, the day of the next major demonstration, is now less than three weeks away.

The Government restrictions have lengthened the political game --- we now see patterns in months, rather than weeks or days --- but it has not won it. No amount of surveillance, disinformation, or threat of prosecution can cover up that reality.