The Latest from Iran (18 November): Bubbling and Surfacing

NEW The Latest Iran Video: Demonstration at University in Karaj (17 November)
NEW Iran: Re-Evaluating the Green Movement After 5+ Months
NEW Latest Iran Video: “A Death in Tehran” on Neda Agha Soltan (17 November)
The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama’s Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)

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2105 GMT: Apparently Saeed Sharati was freed "on the order of Tehran's Revolutionary Court", which seems like an acquittal. If so, that would be to my knowledge the first release of a prominent reformist after a trial.

2045 GMT: Carrot and Stick. Is the Government showing confidence that it has the reformists under control with a combination of jail sentences for some and releases for others? Saeed Shariati, a high-ranking Islamic Iran Participation Front members detained for more than three months, and Ashkan Mojallali, Mahdieh Minooie, and Iman Mirabzadeh, arrested at a prayer gathering last month, were freed --- presumably on bail --- earlier today.

1820 GMT: When Analyses Attack. From this morning's post: "One explanation for the shift may be that the Government’s 5+ months of restrictions on the communications and movements of the oppositonal leadership, “supported” by detentions and trials, have worn down the scope of the leadership’s declarations and ambitions."

This afternoon's news: "Rasoul Montajeb-Nia, the vice chairman of the Etemad Melli party [of Mehdi Karroubi] in an interview said that they are waiting for the authorities to remove the ban on this party's main office for further legal operation and activities."

Meanwhile, former President Mohammad Khatami visited Fatemeh Shahidi, a journalist for the reformist (and suspended) Etemade Melli newspape,) who was recently released after months in detention.

1355 GMT: Is This the End of the Nuclear Deal? Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has made a declaration to the Islamic Students News Agency which appears to be significant:

We reviewed [the Vienna proposal] from an economic and technical aspect. We will definitely not send out our 3.5 percent enriched uranium....We will [instead] consider swapping the fuel simultaneously in Iran....Iranian experts are reviewing the issue of swap to see how much fuel can be transferred. The amount they mentioned for the swap is not acceptable ... and our experts are still studying it.

If I read this correctly, Iran is proposing that a delivery of "20 percent uranium" be brought in from outside the country and swapped for Iran's "3.5 percent uranium". That would mean no initial reduction in Iran's overall uranium stock of 1500 kilogrammes --- the Vienna proposal would have taken up to 80 percent outside Iran for enrichment in Russia.

Considered this way, the question thrown back at the "5+1" countries is whether they can accept that the existing level of uranium production and stock will remain inside Iran's border and thus in its control. That's not a death blow to the negotiations; as Mottaki noted in another interview:

Q: From what I gather, you are looking to modify the basic P5+1 proposal but U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said this is a ‘take it or leave it’ offer.

A: In diplomacy, we do not have zero or hundred. Therefore, flexibility is considered the essence of diplomacy. I believe this, and I guess the American side will understand this point as well…. Earlier, when they wanted to talk to us, they put some preconditions (like suspension of enrichment).But today they are talking and participating in talks without any preconditions.

However, the swap suggestion could be a measure too far for the US and European countries. As Mottaki noted, "We have called for another meeting of the technical people who were part of Vienna talks and we will explain our considerations. But so far such meeting has not convened."

1305 GMT: Iran's chief of police Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam has declared that the death of Ramin Pourandarjan, the 26-year-old physician at Kahrizak Prison, "was the result of suicide. The doctor had complaints of being threatened with a five-year jail term and had lost his spirit." Previously, state media said Pourandarjan had suffered a heart attack or stroke (see updates earlier this week).

"He committed suicide after he was summoned to the court."

1255 GMT: Journalist Kambiz Norouzi has been sentenced to two years in prison and 76 lashes after conviction "advertising against the establishment" and participating in post-election protests.

Ali Behzadiyan-Nejad, the nephew of Mir Hossein Mousavi's campaign manager, has been sentenced to six years in prison for “disturbing the security of the country” and “advertising against the establishment”. Behzadiyan’s lawyer said some of the evidence used against  by the prosecutor were “comments people wrote in [Behzadiyan's] personal blog”.

1225 GMT: Don't Do It. The commander of Basij militia, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, has warned that his forces will confront any further "street riots". Naqdi claimed that demonstrators had staged riots in response to calls from US-based satellite stations run by Iranian expatriates: "Those groups that chant slogans against the revolution's values ... should know that they will be confronted by Basij."

1015 GMT: The Banknote Rebellion. Soon after the post-election crisis began, protesters began inscribing Green slogans and criticism of the Government on Iranian banknotes. An EA reader points us to the follow-up story that the Central Bank of Iran has tried to take the banknotes out of circulation, but with so many about, they have given up the effort.

1000 GMT: Nuclear Manoeuvres. Trying to offset apparent pressure from Russia, the spokesman for Parliament's National Security Commission insists that the Bushehr nuclear reactor will soon be operational. Russian officials said earlier this week that the plant would be delayed past its proposed opening date of the end of 2009.

0930 GMT: A Surfacing from Raf? An interesting article, given the relative silence of former President Hashemi Rafsanjani since August. Emrooz, the newspaper linked to Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, claims inside information from a meeting of Rafsanjani with several former members of Parliament.

One of those former MPs says Rafsanjani set four conditions, first offered in his 17 July sermon, for his return to Tehran Friday Prayers: the release of political prisoners, support for those injured in post-election conflict, rebuilding of relations with Grand Ayatollahs and clerics, and an opening-up of state radio and television to different viewpoints. Another source claims, “Without naming any specific individual, Hashemi warned against the growth of a movement that seeks to ignore the regime’s achievements and implicate everyone who cares about the regime.”

0920 GMT: A later start this morning, as we worked on an analysis of the shifts in the Green movement and their significance; even as leaders show caution in their statements, the signs of a long-term but far-from-disappearing movement persist. We have also posted the Public Broadcasting Service documentary, shown in the US last night, "A Death in Tehran" on the story of Neda Agha Soltan and the post-election protests.

Regular readers will note our frequent references to and use of sources from the Facebook page supporting Mir Hossein Mousavi. Tehran Bureau has a profile of the man behind the site, Mohammad Sadeghi.

Iran: Re-Evaluating the Green Movement After 5+ Months

The Latest from Iran (17 November): An Obama-Ahmadinejad Alliance?

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0800 GMT: In recent days there has been an apparent shift in the content of the statements of opposition leaders. Despite Government restrictions, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Mohammad Khatami have continued to get out public declarations, mainly through meetings with reformist groups or appearances such as Karroubi's visit to Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani in hospital, but their content now seems to be carefully hedged. While the abuses of the Government are still identified, all three have been at great pains to put their calls for changes within the framework of the Constitution and the Iranian system, as well as warning their followers not to resort to extreme action.

In tone, this is not new. The Green movement has always maintained that it is upholding the laws and values of the Islamic Republic and that it is the Government which has dismissed or violated those foundations of 1979. There has been far less in content, however, from Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami on political objectives, and even specific issues such as the enquiry into detainee abuses, spurred by Khatami's letter of 29 July to Hashemi Rafsanjani, have not featured so prominently.



One explanation for the shift may be that the Government's 5+ months of restrictions on the communications and movements of the oppositonal leadership, “supported” by detentions and trials, have worn down the scope of the leadership's declarations and ambitions. Another is that figures like Rafsanjani have moved away from open co-operation and that initiatives such as the National Unity Plan appear to have run into the ground. A third is that the leaders have a growing fear of a movement which, angry and frustrated, may strike out violently against the Government.

Whatever the reason for a more cautious approach from the top, this should not be mistaken as the settling of the Green Wave. Dissent bubbles --- yesterday, catching up with news, it was notable that there were not only the statements of Karroubi and Khatami but also the more pointed criticisms of Grand Ayatollahs Sane'i and Montazeri and a show of support for the challenge of Grand Ayatollah Dastgheib. (I also understand, from a private source, that Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi --- considered a “conservative” in clerical approach --- has launched a scathing attack on the Government in a closed-door session which has not been made public.)

And, of course, there is the simmering at the Universities and other locations of protests, which emerges somewhere as public demonstration on a daily basis. Even if this is not picked up by the media, it should not be missed: note, as EA readers have, the dramatic challenge at the international university at Qazvin to the appearance of regime supporter Hamid Rasaee.

The thoughtful discussion on EA's comments board --- is this now a challenge which is long-term but which will not abate until there are major changes in the Iranian system? --- continues. I don't think there is a definitive answer, but I do think it exposes the fatuousness of mainstream assertions such as that in The New York Times (see yesterday's updates), "[Iran] now looks as if it’s back to business as usual." Indeed, for all the difficulties at the top of the opposition, I was struck recently by the comment of a shrewd but normally cautious Iranian activist, “This is no longer about the election. This is about the concept of velayat-e-faqih [the concept of clerical rule through the Supreme Leader].”

At the same time, that prospect of a demand for action which extends over time but expands in scope raises an equally long-term question. Up to now, I could be secure in the easy fit of a Green leadership, complemented by those like Rafsanjani who also wanted to curb Ahmadinejad's authority, with the mass if somewhat disjointed effort from below. Now I wonder what will be the new dynamic amongst a political leadership, manoeuvring not only against Government forces but against its own concerns and fear, senior clerics who will not go away quietly, and that Green Wave --- sometimes abstract, sometimes below the surface, but also visible in the shows of anger, frustration, and hope --- which ebbs but is never stilled?

The Iran Cul-de-Sac: 4 Points on Obama's Embrace of Ahmadinejad (and Rejection of the Green Movement)

The Bomb, The Bomb: Distorting the Latest Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme
Iran Document: The International Atomic Energy Agency Report on Nuclear Facilities
The Latest from Iran (16 November): Catching Up

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1. IT'S THE NUKES, STUPID

If anyone in the Iranian Government still believes in the
Washington-directed "velvet revolution", rather than using it as a stick to beat the opposition, he/she can breathe easy. The driving force for the Obama Administration's approach to Iran is the quest for an agreement on uranium enrichment.

That ambition is led by the President, and his determination has brought general consensus in an Administration that was arguing over the value of talks earlier in 2009. Broadly speaking, the White House, the National Security Council, and the State Department are all on the same page now.

Any reference to the internal situation in Iran, as in the Obama recent statement calling for recognition of the rights of protesters, is a gloss. The President and his advisors may have a legal and humanitarian interest in what happens to demonstrators, as well to US citizens detained and sentenced to years in prison in Iran, but it is not their top policy priority.

Indeed, Washington's position is now fixed firmly enough to withstand not only the demands of reformists but figures like Hashemi Rafsanjani to go slow on deal with President Ahmadinejad. I suspect we will find that Obama has personally gone farther --- much farther --- than any President since 1979 to get an accommodation with Tehran.

2. GETTING THE GREEN MOVEMENT WRONG

The quest for a nuclear deal has been accompanied by a disturbing if tangential story of how "intelligence" and "analysis" has undermined the Iranian opposition.

Ever since the June election, some US officials, primarily in the intelligence community, have been putting out the line that the Green Movement is insignificant and/or not to be trusted on issues such as nuclear weapons, Israel, and
"anti-Americanism". (The public face of this line is the commentaries of Flynt Leverett, formerly of the National Security Council, and Hillary Mann Leverett, formerly of the State Department.)

This assessment was reinforced by the appearance in October of former Khatami Government official and "Karroubi advisor" Ataollah Mojaherani at the conference of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His strident caution to the audience that a "Green Government" was unlikely to give ground on Iran's nuclear programme or on the position towards Israel apparently sent shock waves through the audience, angering other reformists present in the audience who feared Mohajerani had just damaged their cause.

They were right. It is the Mojaherani incident that is behind the clamour of well-placed Washington columnists like Jackson Diehl and David Ignatius to beware the Greens. More importantly, the speech fuelled the "analysis" within the CIA that the politics of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami were not to be trusted, a belief that accompanied (and possibly fed by) sources such as those in Borzou Daragahi's pre-13 Aban article assaulting the Green Movement.

What is intriguing is how a Washington distraction became the foundation for some in the CIA to bury or fear the Greens. It is true that Mohajerani was a prominent member of the Karroubi campaign and wore the badge of a glittering if past political career: youngest deputy of the first post-Revolution Parliament, Vice-President in the Rafsanjani Government, Minister of Culture under Mohammad Khatami.

Still, at the time, we gave almost no space to the Mojaherani speech because it was so disconnected from events and political strategy in Iran. Before and after the Washington episode, I have not seen Mojaherani's name rise up in the movements of the Green Wave. In short, he was one of a number of former officials who have or had connections with a complex network of "reformists".

For many in Washington, however, Mojaherani was thought to be no less than the ambassador for the Green Movement, presenting its manifesto. And when the approach of his speech did not match up to the "revolution" --- in presentation and policy, if not Islamic system --- that they wanted, those officials and commentators reacted like a lover spurned.

(There is a wider point here. The Iranian Government has had success in disrupting communications within Iran
but it is also important that it has limited any dialogue between the reformist opposition and the "outside", in this case the
US Government. With no direct line
established as the Green Movement evolved, American officials have
relied upon a variety of people, usually located outside Iran presenting a wide range of often contradictory advice and speculation rather than solid information.

While the situation may have been inevitable, given the detentions of many reformists and de facto house arrest of leaders like Mir Hossein Mousavi, it strikes me that the Obama Administration has not worked around these restrictions to read the lines --- and between the lines --- of statements not only of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami but of other activists like Alireza Beheshti and senior clerics from and beyond Qom.)

3. THE MYTH OF THE PLAN B: SANCTIONS

As a case study in internal politics,
the beauty of the Obama nuclear-first, engagement-first approach has been how it has brought consensus amongst differing groups within the Administration. If the talks brought nuclear agreement, that would be a significant result for the unclenched fist (the line often attributed to some State Department officials and envoys like Richard Holbrooke). If they were finally collapsed by Iranian stalling and intransigence, the platform for aggressive sanctions would be laid (the line often
attributed to Dennis Ross, now at the National Security Council).

The only problem comes if, having grasped the hand of the Iranian Government in talks, the Obama Administration then has to slap Ahmadinejad's face in the absence of an agreement.

Washington's current calculation, supported by its diplomatic strategy, turns the Russian key. Moscow's envoys are working on the Iranian Government to accept the uranium enrichment plan, while Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issues unsubtle hints that he will not stand back if Tehran balks.

That is not the same as a Russian commitment to sanctions. Let's assume, however, that Moscow accepts a US-led multilateral effort inside or outside the United Nations. And let's assume that President Obama, who no doubt has mentioned this in Beijing this week, gets a Chinese promise to stand aside.

What next? If there is no nuclear agreement, it will quite likely be because the Supreme Leader has objected, despite Obama's sustained direct efforts. So how does a stricter round of sanctions change Ayatollah Khamenei's position?

It doesn't. So the Obama Administration is presumably counting on a diplomatic and economic containment, indeed isolation, of Iran.

That, however, does nothing to address the issue of President Ahmadinejad, who remains in office. It does nothing to deal with the increasing role of the Revolutionary Guards in matters beyond the nuclear and even military realm. (Indeed, as some analysts have contended, further sanctions may assist the Guard's economic ventures, although this effect may be mitigated if the restrictions can specifically target Guard "investments".)

Sanctions certainly do nothing with respect to the reformists and the Green movement. Even if Washington recants and tries to bring them back into political consideration, it is unclear --- given the perceived snub by Obama's officials in recent weeks --- if the opposition will offer even a cautious welcome.

4. BACK TO THE CUL-DE-SAC

In the Bush years, the cul-de-sac for American policy was the threat that could not be carried out. Whether the vision was a "turn left from Baghdad" intervention, briefly considered in 2003, the military strikes advocated by Vice President Cheney in 2007, or a sledgehammer set of economic sanctions, the Administration could not deliver the blow. The "best" it could manage was the muddled if funded programme of "soft power" in the 2nd term, which was never defined as either a live-and-let-live civic engagement or the cover for "velvet revolution".

The hope of the Obama approach has been to get out of that dead end, opening up space for other initiatives such as Middle Eastern agreements, through engagement. And, considered narrowly in the context of discussions on nuclear programmes and regional politics, that was solid, realist common sense.

But "narrowly" became very narrow after the elections of 12 June. If Obama wanted to dance, he had to dance with an Iranian President who now lacked legitimacy (despite the efforts of engagement advocates like the Leveretts to explain how Ahmadinejad had really won the election and a clear mandate).

That legitimacy, within weeks of the election, was not just a question of a "reformist" challenge. Ahmadinejad has also been in a tenuous position vis-a-vis political rivals like Hashemi Rafsanjani, the conservatives/principlists in the Iranian Parliament, Ayatollahs (and thus bodies such as the Assembly of Experts), and at times the Supreme Leader. That is why the Iranian President, far from breaking off talks to pursue The Bomb, is hugging the nuclear discussions so close --- with no prospect of salvation through an economic miracle, this is his prescription for political longevity.

Now Obama's engagement gamble, re-shaped in this post-June cauldron, may still succeed if the Supreme Leader gives his backing to an agreement on uranium enrichment. (Which is why, just to repeat, this President is going farther than any predecessor in 30 years) A wider US agenda, which may adapt engagement for exchanges on Iran's political and legal issues as well as geopolitical interests, could then be drafted.

But, if the nuclear deal does not go through, Obama and Ahmadinejad now dance in a downward spiral. The Iranian President will struggle to serve out his disputed second term. And the US President will be back in the cul-de-sac: pressed by some advisors and a lot of Congressmen to pursue sanctions which offer no remedy for --- and no exit from --- the political dilemma of his failed engagement.

The Latest from Iran (14 November): Political Fatigue?

NEW Iran: The Political Attack on the National Iranian American Council
Iran Text: Khatami on Legitimate Protest and Illegitimate Government (13 November)
Iran: Is This an “Unravelling” Protest Beyond Mousavi and Karroubi?
Iran: Why is Washington Belittling the Green Movement?
The Latest from Iran (13 November): Accusations

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1330 GMT: Iranian sources report that a fifth post-election death sentence for threatening national security has been handed down in the case of Reza Khademi.

1325 GMT: A summary of Mir Hossein Mousavi's comments in his meeting with Mehdi Karroubi on Friday: "This great movement defends basic values. This movement says, 'Do not tell lies. Falsehood is condemned. Fraud is condemned.'

"Those who beat people must not think that by intimidating people they can make people stay home. Islam has taught people seek their rights without fear."

1145 GMT: Reviving? Mir Hossein Mousavi has met Mehdi Karroubi "to comfort [cleric]. about the physical assult on him by the security forces and plainclothes militia at the November 4th [13 Aban] rallies and to condemn and talk about the violent acts of the security and Basij militia forces against people, especially women on that day".

1140 GMT:Cracking Down on the Students. Abdollah Momeni, the spokesman of the reformist student organisation Darhat-Tahkim-Vahdat, has been sentenced to eight years in prison!

1130 GMT: When Arts and Politics Mix. President Ahmadinejad, acting as the head of the Revolutionary Cultural Council, has changed the existing constitution of the Academy of Arts, possibly to prepare for the dismissal of Mir Hossein Mousavi as the President of the Academy. Under the amendment, the President of the Academy would be appointed directly by the Iranian President, without any requirement for consultation with the members of the Academy.

During President Khatami’s administration, it was established that the President of the Academy would be elected by the permanent members of the Academy’s General Assembly, and the president as the head of the Revolutionary Cultural Court would approve the nominee.

0955 GMT: The Department to Combat US Conspiracies.

The Chair of the Human Rights Committee of Parliament's Human Rights Commmittee has suggested raising the amount devoted to exposing US human rights violations and combatting its conspiracies to $50 million. Earlier this year, the Ministry of Information formed a special agency with a $20 million budget to foreign-backed "velvet revolution".

0945 GMT: Oh, Yeah, We're Tough. A bit of posturing from the Iranian military, declaring that Iran is will mass-produce a new generation of air-to-air, heat-seeking missiles tracking targets via infrared emission.

Air Force commander Brigadier General Hassan Shah-Safi said that the missile haved been successfully test-fired in different situations. It has a range of up to 100 kilometers.

0750 GMT: At the risk of walking into a political firestorm, I have posted a separate entry on the current attacks on the National Iranian American Council.

0630 GMT: Days after the execution of Ehsan Fattahian, another Kurdish political dissident, Shirkooh Maarefi, is facing death for "activities against national security and armed combat".

0550 GMT: A very quiet morning for news from Iran. Indeed, looking back over the updates, a relatively development-free 48 hours. President Ahmadinejad's Wednesday night interview, for all its  important signals on the nuclear issue as well as his grab for power against the Tehran local government, has drifted away with little discussion. On the other side, the Khatami statement to academics on legitimate protest and illegitimate power has also received scant attention --- the reaction I have seen and heard points to scepticism over whether the former President has said anything of significance, particularly given his public absence on 13 Aban. The Mousavi statement on Monday to Jamaran has not resonated, and Mehdi Karroubi has been silent this week.

Of course, none of this means that everyone can pack up and go home --- no more to see in this post-election crisis. It does highlight, however, the debate over the path of the Green movement as it moves towards the next marker of 16 Azar (7 December) for mass demonstrations. Throughout this conflict, I have thought of the necessary linkage of a widespread movement "from below", with its energy and demands to be recognised and respected, with the political moves of political and clerical figures. However, Hashemi Rafsanjani is now pursuing a divergent agenda. Mousavi appears at a loss how to act beyond periodic statements, especially as he cannot link them to a symbolic public appearance. While Karroubi continues to inspire interest and hope in many, the last few days illustrate the fragility of relying on him. And, lacking that political lighting rod for their criticisms, the dissenting clerics of Qom have been muted since 13 Aban.

So, given the effect of the Government's constrictions and the toll of political complications on the efforts of "leaders", can the linkage be set aside for a different movement? In other words, can the Green Wave not only be propelled but directed from below? 13 Aban was a success in the sense that it proved resistance was ongoing, despite the lack of leadership from the top. The question may be whether that resistance, planning its next big move in just over three weeks, can translate symbolic defiance into pressure upon the regime between as well as during those high-profile moments.

The Latest from Iran (13 November): Accusations

NEW Iran Text: Khatami on Legitimate Protest and Illegitimate Government (13 November)
Iran: Is This an “Unravelling” Protest Beyond Mousavi and Karroubi?
Iran: Why is Washington Belittling the Green Movement?
The Latest from Iran (12 November): Ahmadinejad Moves for Nuclear Deal

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1805 GMT: Another Move for the Nuke Deal. Looks like the Ahmadinejad-military axis has put down another marker with the statement of the head of Iran’s armed forces, Major-General Hassan Firouzabadi, supporting the uranium enrichment agreement: “We will not suffer a loss from the exchange of fuel. Rather, in obtaining fuel enriched to 20 percent as needed by the reactors, nearly one million of our people would take advantage of its medical possibilities annually....The quantity of 3.5 percent enriched uranium [to be shipped out] is not so large as to cause damage to Iran’s supply."

1605 GMT: What's Happening at the Revolutionary Guard? Radio Fardi summarises the changes in higher commander at the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, including the head of the Tehran command. I'll have to leave it to others to assess whether these are "normal" changes in the organisation or whether there is a political story behind them.

1515 GMT: Confidence or Concern? Reuters has now picked up the statement of Mojtaba Zolnour, a representative of the Supreme Leader in the Revolutionary Guard, that the Assembly of Experts cannot remove him from office.

Zolnour told a gathering of Khamenei's representatives in Iranian universities, "The members of the assembly...do not appoint the Supreme Leader, rather they discover him and it is not that they would be able to remove him any time they wish so."

Now is Zolnour saying this because he is feeling good that the Supreme Leader is secure in his seat of power or is his warning prompted by fears that members of the Assembly, who raised the possibility of removal in August/September, may not be pacified?



1500 GMT: Football Story of Day. Or maybe, thanks to the Green movement, a non-story because there was a non-crowd. Persian2English writes about a disappointing turnout for the Iran v. Iceland match in Azadi stadium on Tuesday, citing state media: “In spite of efforts...to have spectators show up in the stadium, only 100 attended to watch the match between the two countries' national teams." (Goal.com say "only a few hundred" turned up to watch a "low-key friendly".)

1400 GMT: We've posted a long statement, adapted from the website linked to Mir Hossein Mousavi, made by former President Mohammad Khatami to academics. Khatami appears to be going to great lengths to set out "legitimate" protest (as opposed to "radical" activity) criticising the failure of the Government to serve the Iranian people and uphold the Constitution.

1315 GMT: Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi has announced that Shapour Kazemi, the brother of Mir Hossein Mousavi's wife Zahra Rahnavard, will be tried in Revolutionary Court.

1200 GMT: Your Tehran Friday Prayer Report.

Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, the former head of the Guardian Council, used his speech to put 13 Aban in the "right" context. The presence of students has demonstrated the Revolution's resolve against the "enemy flag" of the United States. Washington also gave Jannati the opportunity to attack the Iranian opposition --- despite the fact that he did not see them on 13 Aban --- "$55 million" authorised by the US for subversive activities.

1100 GMT: Persian2English reports on the Revolutionary Court's sentencing of Hassan Salamat, a master’s student at Tehran University, to four years in prison. Salamat was arrested in post-election protests on charges of "propagating aganist the regime and conspiracy to disrupt national security". He spent two months in Evin Prison before being released on $200,000 bail.

1010 GMT: An intriguing interview with Tehran Chief Prosecutor Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi on the Islamic Republic News Agency website. It's intriguing in part because Doulatabadi is clearly on the defensive about allegations of abuses by the regime. He admits that the Constitution in principle puts forth open trials but gives a convoluted explanation as to why this is not possible. He also expresses the hope that some trials can be completed in the next month.

Even more interesting, however, is the politics in the interview. Pointing to the regime's ongoing manoeuvres against former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Doulatabadi says Rafsanjani's son Mehdi Hashemi --- accused in the first Tehran trial of corruption and intrigue in the Preisdential election --- should return from Britain to Iran if he believes the charges are false.

0825 GMT: Just catching up with news this morning.

Both The New York Times and Press TV share an interest in the seizure by US Federal prosecutors of properties, including the land where four mosques sit, of the Alavi Foundation. The prosecutors claim that the Foundation, whose 36-story office tower is also being taken, is illegally providing money and other services to Iran.

The Los Angeles Times goes instead for The Bomb, with a survey considering the reactions of Arab states and people to Iran's nuclear programme.

As for us, we're starting the day with two features outlining our concern over "Western" images of the Green Wave, which may point to a US Government policy shifting against the Iranian opposition: "Why is Washington Belittling the Green Movement?" and "Is This an 'Unravelling' Protest Beyond Mousavi and Karroubi?"