Thursday
Nov052009
Iran's New 13 Aban: "A Major Blow to Khamenei's Authority"
Thursday, November 5, 2009 at 15:25
Iran’s New 13 Aban: “The Green Wave Has Bounced Back”
The Latest from Iran (5 November): Riding the Wave?
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This is the response from EA's Chris Emery this morning's analysis of 13 Aban by Mr Smith. After Emery's evaluation, Mr Smith offers a brief reply:
The one aspect I missed in your analysis, particularly in regard to the political manoeuvrings of the Larijani brothers and the much-vaunted National Unity Plan, is any mention of the Supreme Leader. Today was undoubtedly another major blow to his personal authority. Yet he is far from an irrelevancy. Any strategy to remove Ahmadinejad will undoubtedly have to include a carefully calibrated approach to Khamenei.
Which comes back to what I have been saying for months: Ahmadinejad's conservative and reformist opponents are going to have to decide on whether they settle for the paralysis of the President's Government or take a leap of faith and pursue his removal. I stated a long time ago that I thought the former was probably inevitable, but I still don't think they have a strategy for the latter. My simplistic reading sees the Larijanis' decision on this question as central. Personally, I doubt they will move until the anti-Ahmadinejad coalition is able to flex economic muscle: the Green Movement is notably lacking the support of industry or business. Strikes are the crucial source of leverage.
The undoubted achievement of the Green Movement is now the denial of the regime's mobilisation of pro-regime collective memory. Imagine if the American authorities overnight had to view the 4th of July with a sense of dread. As such, Khamenei's position as custodian of the revolution is now ridiculous.
For me, the next critical date is Ashua (about 28 December). If the opposition is able to mobilise Shia collective identity, as Imam Khomeini did, then the regime's problems are huge. This is also where the senior clerics can really play a part --- perhaps Rafsanjani's behind-the-scenes moves are anticipating this?
Mr Smith replies:
You are absolutely right --- I had actually included a word or two on the SL but then deleted it mistakenly while editing another topic within the piece. Yesterday's events were really the end of the Supreme Leader's prestige, if he had any left. He is now fairly and squarely in centre of the Green Movement's blame game, something the reformist leaders have to take into account now.
I am still of the opinion that they have to act and send the open letter to Khamenei soon. I think there could be opportunities for a "grand coalition" of sorts against Ahmadinejad if and when the Larijanis finally decide to jump ship and revoke their current tight association with the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad institutional camp.
The Latest from Iran (5 November): Riding the Wave?
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
This is the response from EA's Chris Emery this morning's analysis of 13 Aban by Mr Smith. After Emery's evaluation, Mr Smith offers a brief reply:
The one aspect I missed in your analysis, particularly in regard to the political manoeuvrings of the Larijani brothers and the much-vaunted National Unity Plan, is any mention of the Supreme Leader. Today was undoubtedly another major blow to his personal authority. Yet he is far from an irrelevancy. Any strategy to remove Ahmadinejad will undoubtedly have to include a carefully calibrated approach to Khamenei.Which comes back to what I have been saying for months: Ahmadinejad's conservative and reformist opponents are going to have to decide on whether they settle for the paralysis of the President's Government or take a leap of faith and pursue his removal. I stated a long time ago that I thought the former was probably inevitable, but I still don't think they have a strategy for the latter. My simplistic reading sees the Larijanis' decision on this question as central. Personally, I doubt they will move until the anti-Ahmadinejad coalition is able to flex economic muscle: the Green Movement is notably lacking the support of industry or business. Strikes are the crucial source of leverage.
The undoubted achievement of the Green Movement is now the denial of the regime's mobilisation of pro-regime collective memory. Imagine if the American authorities overnight had to view the 4th of July with a sense of dread. As such, Khamenei's position as custodian of the revolution is now ridiculous.
For me, the next critical date is Ashua (about 28 December). If the opposition is able to mobilise Shia collective identity, as Imam Khomeini did, then the regime's problems are huge. This is also where the senior clerics can really play a part --- perhaps Rafsanjani's behind-the-scenes moves are anticipating this?
Mr Smith replies:
You are absolutely right --- I had actually included a word or two on the SL but then deleted it mistakenly while editing another topic within the piece. Yesterday's events were really the end of the Supreme Leader's prestige, if he had any left. He is now fairly and squarely in centre of the Green Movement's blame game, something the reformist leaders have to take into account now.
I am still of the opinion that they have to act and send the open letter to Khamenei soon. I think there could be opportunities for a "grand coalition" of sorts against Ahmadinejad if and when the Larijanis finally decide to jump ship and revoke their current tight association with the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad institutional camp.
