Text: The EastWest Institute (US-Russian) Report on "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential"

For more than a year, US and Russian scientists and other experts supported by The EastWest Institute have been studying US-Russian relations and Iran's weapons programmes. Their report, released this week, recommends the suspension of plans for missile defence and pursuit of a diplomatic route, both in the United Nations and directly with Iran, on the nuclear issue.

Recommendations

5.10 This report has concluded that there is at present no IRBM/ICBM [intermediate-range/inter-continental ballistic missile] threat from Iran and that such a threat, even if it were to emerge, is not imminent. Moreover, if such a threat were forthcoming, the proposed European missile defenses would not provide a dependable defense against it. It does not make sense, therefore, to proceed with deployment of the European missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

5.11 The more immediate danger comes from the military and political consequences that would follow if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them against targets in the Middle East. The urgent task, therefore, is for Russia and the United States (and other states) to work closely together to seek, by diplomatic and political means, a resolution of the crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear program. Such cooperation could be helped if the issue of European
missile defense were set aside.

5.12 If deployment of the European missile defense system were suspended, the United States and Russia could
explore in a serious fashion the possibility of cooperation in ballistic missile defense, an issue also mentioned in
the joint statement of the two presidents. A wide range of options could be explored, including the possibility
of boost-phase missile defense. (See the Technical Addendum for a detailed discussion.)

5.13 There is scope for U.S.-Russian cooperation in thefollowing areas:

a. Ensuring that the sanctions the Security Council has imposed on Iran are implemented strictly;
b. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and in particular the IAEA’s capacity to implement safeguards and enhance its verification procedures;
c. Strengthening the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime] in order to restrict further the export of sensitive missile technologies;
d. Persuading Iran, by diplomatic means, to adopt measures that will reassure its neighbors (and the international community more generally) that its nuclear program is directed solely toward peaceful purposes.
e. Exploring the responses the two countries could take if Iran should expel the IAEA inspectors; and studying other paths by which Iran might seek to “break out” as a nuclear power and devising appropriate responses.
f. Investigating seriously the possibility of cooperation in missile defense.

5.14 The issues dealt with in this report — the potential nuclear-missile challenge from Iran and the role of missile defense in meeting that challenge — have in the past served to worsen U.S.-Russian relations. The analysis given in this paper points to a diff erent possibility: that cooperation between the two countries could help to resolve these important and urgent issues and could play a role in changing the U.S.-Russian relationship for the better.

Text: The Latest CIA Report on Iran's Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programmes

Every year, the US Director of National Intelligence is required by law to submit to Congress a report on "the acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 6 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions".

This is the section of the full report, submitted earlier this month, concerning Iran:

I. Acquisition by Country

As required by Section 721 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act, the following are country summaries of acquisition activities (solicitations, negotiations, contracts, and deliveries) related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and advanced conventional weapons (ACW) that occurred from 1 January through 31 December 2008. This report focuses on key countries that we assess are seeking WMD capabilities.

Iran

Nuclear

We assess that Iran had been working to develop nuclear weapons through at least fall 2003, but that in fall 2003 Iran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, and its covert uranium conversion- and enrichment-related activities. We judge that the halt lasted at least several years, and that Tehran had not resumed these activities as of at least mid-2007. We do not know whether Iran currently intends to develop nuclear weapons, although we assess Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons by continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.

During the reporting period, Iran continued to expand its nuclear infrastructure and continued uranium enrichment and activities related to its heavy water research reactor, despite multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions since late 2006 calling for the suspension of those activities.

• In 2008, Iran continued to make progress enriching uranium at the underground cascade halls at Natanz with first-generation centrifuges, and in testing and operating second-generation centrifuges at the pilot plant there.

• In November 2008, Iran announced it had about 5,000 centrifuges operating at Natanz. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that between mid-December 2007 and November 2008, Iran fed about 8,080 kilograms of uranium
feed gas into its cascades, and produced about 555 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) gas (uranium hexafluoride) at an enrichment level appropriate for reactor fuel, a significant improvement from the 75 kilograms of LEU gas it had produced in 2007.

• Iran has also fed small amounts of uranium feed gas to its second generationcentrifuges—the IR-2, since January 2008, and the IR-3, since April 2008.

• Iran in January 2008 received the final delivery of the initial batch of uranium fuel purchased from Russia required to operate the nuclear reactor at Bushehr. Delays in the project pushed the reactor's startup time into 2009.

• Iran in 2008 continued construction of the reactor buildings at the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor, including installing a dome on the reactor containment building by mid-November.

• The IAEA in 2008 continued to investigate the "alleged studies" documentation — information indicating Iran conducted military-led, covert uranium conversion and nuclear weaponization work prior to 2003. According to the November 2008 Director General's Report to the Board of Governors, the "alleged studies" issue remains unresolved and the IAEA continues to call on Iran to provide further clarification.

Ballistic Missiles

Iran has continued to develop its ballistic missile program, which it views as its primary deterrent. Iran is fielding increased numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs) and we judge that Iran currently is focusing on producing more capable MRBMs. Iran's ballistic missile inventory is one of the largest in the Middle East.

The Shahab-3 MRBM, capable of striking Israel, was formally handed over to the Iranian military in July 2003. During a military parade in September 2007, Iran displayed a missile, referred to as the Ghadr-1, which Iranian officials claimed had a range of 1,800-km.

Iran's defense ministry in 2005 stated that it had successfully tested an engine for a 2,000km ballistic missile and implied it would have two-stages~a key technology in the development of longer-range ballistic missiles. In late November 2007, Iran's defense minister claimed Iran had developed a new 2000 km-range missile called the Ashura. Iranian officials on 12 November 2008 claimed to have launched a two stage, solid propellant missile called the Sejil with a range of 2,000 km.

As early as 2005, Iran has stated its intentions to send its own satellites into orbit. In 2005, Iran's first satellite with an imagery payload, Sina-1, was launched on a Russian rocket, and Iran signed a $132 million deal with a Russian firm to build and launch a communications satellite. As of January 2008, Tehran reportedly had allocated $250 million to build and purchase satellites. Iran announced it would launch four more satellites by 2010 to improve land and mobile telephone communications.

Iranian officials, including President Ahmadi-Nejad, claimed that Tehran in February 2008 launched a probe called the Kavoshgar ("towards orbit") and that this device is transmitting information back to Earth. Based on Iranian press footage of the launch, however, the vehicle—which looked similar to the Shahab-3 MRBM, a system that by itself probably does not have the capability to place an object into orbit—appeared to suffer an in-flight failure. Iran's President also announced Tehran would conduct two more rocket tests prior to launching a "home-produced" satellite into orbit later in 2008, and several Iranian news websites released photos of a new rocket called "Safir" that appears larger than Tehran's existing ballistic missiles. Iranian officials stated on 27 August 2008 that they had launched a smaller research rocket called the Kavosh-2.

Technologies used to build an SLV are directly applicable to the development of longer range ballistic missiles. Assistance from entities in China and North Korea, as well as assistance from Russian entities at least in the past, has helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. Iran still remains dependent on foreign suppliers for
some key missile components, however. Iran also has marketed for export at trade shows guidance components suitable for ballistic missiles.

Chemical and Biological

We assess that Iran maintains the capability to produce chemical warfare (CW) agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive applications. Tehran continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise from foreign entities that could advance its capability to produce CW agents. We judge that Iran is capable of weaponizing CW agents in a variety of delivery systems.

Iran probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive purposes, if it made the decision to do so. We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for BW.

Video Shocker: Obama is Hitler (And You're on His List)

Via Media Matters:

Our favourite delusional paranoid and/or talk-show shyster, Glenn Beck, reworks the poem about the Jews, leaping from the AIG financial services group to the auto industry, to prove that Obama/Hitler is "coming after you":

Afghanistan Hearts-and-Minds Update: We're Sorry (But We Didn't Kill That Many of You)

New York Times, 20 May: "Acknowledging the pain inflicted on the Afghan people by American airpower, [US Ambassador to Afghanistan] General [Karl] Eikenberry...called the May 4 aerial bombardment in Bala Baluk district a tragedy and pledged to sharply reduce the chances of civilian casualties in future operations."

CNN, 20 May: "U.S. airstrikes in western Afghanistan this month killed up to 65 Taliban insurgents and 30 Afghan civilians, according to interim results of a military investigation released Wednesday. The civilian deaths were 'most likely' accidental, a U.S. military source told CNN."

Reuters, 20 May: A NATO-led air raid may have killed eight civilians in Afghanistan, the alliance said on Wednesday.

Israel-Palestine: Obama's Two-Week Window

The Netanyahu Meeting: Obama Wins Battle, Loses War
Assessing Netanyahu-Obama: Israel, Iran, and Palestine
Video and Transcript : Obama-Netanyahu News Conference

The most interesting follow-up to Monday's meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Obama is in Ha'aretz. In contrast to the non-coverage in The New York Times and the puff pieces in The Washington Post (Howard Schneider: Netanyahu was fantastic; David Ignatius: Obama is fantastic), the Israeli newspaper has the important story:

The Obama Administration is scrambling, against a 4 June deadline, for something to offer the Arab world. And the prospects aren't looking good.

Aluf Benn and Barak Ravid open their article with the dramatic statement from an American official: "The United States expects Israel to make concrete concessions to the Palestinians before U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to Cairo." It soon turns out that the concessions, though welcome, aren't that dramatic:Washington wants the Israeli Cabinet to agree on Sunday to "ease its restrictions on imports and exports of goods to Gaza...to ease restrictions on movement in the West Bank".

That is unlikely to be enough. American officials also told Benn and Ravid that "senior Saudi officials have so far rejected outright the idea of gradual normalization". Riyadh is insisting that the US must press for negotiations on "a detailed plan for an Israeli-Palestinian final-status agreement". The plan would include "an Israeli withdrawal from almost all of the West Bank, a division of Jerusalem, and a complex arrangement on the [Palestinian] refugees".

Netanyahu's suggestion to Obama "that the Arab states amend the Arab peace initiative to make it more attractive to Israel" was flatly rejected by the Saudis in private talks with the US. In particular, Saudi Arabia balked at any concessions on the rights of refugees.

On other issues, the US and Israeli delegations used the old tactic of "committees" to cover up differences and thus lack of movement. Because Netanyahu refused Obama's request to halt the expansion of Jewish settlements, that will now have a Working Group. So will Iran and "normalization with Arab states".

All of which is well and good to cover the non-results of the Obama-Netanyahu talks, but next to useless for the President's grand speech in 15 days. If Barack can offer no more than "working groups", and token shipments of goods across the Gaza border, he may want to consider what "hope" and "change" will mean to his audience.