Israel Analysis: Dark Clouds Over Netanyahu Before Washington Visit (Yenidunya)

On Tuesday, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak told Labor Party colleagues that there was close and intimate security cooperation between Israel and the US, with both parties waiting for the next steps in the diplomatic arena to ensure a long-term “special security relationship” and defend Israel’s military superiority in the region. Barak added that only a “decisive Israeli effort” to break the diplomatic stalemate over Palestine “can free Israel from the international siege.”

Later in the day, in a conference at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, Barak talked about withdrawal and disengagement from Gaza, predicting: “Israel will have to take additional unilateral steps.”

Israel-Russia: Handshakes over Iran, Tensions over Hamas
Palestine Latest: Israel to Use “United Jerusalem” Card against Obama’s Gaza Demand?

In advance of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's meeting with President Barack Obama, this was a warning to the Government.

There has been speculation that Labor could leave the coalition if Netanyahu failed to control the coalition or to expand it by bringing in the "centrist" Kadima. Barak underlined the significance of the freeze on Israeli settlements in the West Bank,  set to expire at the end of September, and US mid-term Congressional elections in November, saying that the next few months will be “certainly important”.

Despite Barak's warning, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman showed no change in his party's agenda: "There is absolutely no chance of reaching a Palestinian state until the year 2012. One can dream and imagine, but we are far from reaching an agreement."

It is not just Lieberman but also Israeli conservatives hindering Netanyahu's bargaining position. Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat approved the plan calling for the razing of 22 Palestinian homes to make room for a tourist center in the Silwan neighborhood of East Jerusalem.

According to documents obtained by Haaretz, the department which inspects building plans before  submission to the planning committee found no less than 250 defects in the Silwan plan. Just a week before the plan was approved, Jerusalem city engineer Shlomo Eshkol submitted a list of 30 criticisms of the plan and demanded significant changes.

The Jerusalem municipality's legal adviser, Yossi Havilio, also found that the plan did not meet legal standards. To get around the difficulty, Barkat privately hired a lawyer to oversee the plan on behalf of the municipality.

All of these internal complications arise as US special envoy George Mitchell, before the fifth round of talks due to start on Thursday, has expressed to Netanyahu his wish to see more movement by Israel on core issues.

A senior U.S. administration official told Haaretz : "We want things to move faster." Then he added, "To date there has been insufficient progress."

Afghanistan: A Winnable War? (Kagan & Kagan)

I should point out that the question mark in the title is mine. For Frederick and Kimberly Kagan, writing in The Weekly Standard, there is no doubt that the US can triumph in Afghanistan.

That makes the ratio of assertion v. information in their article even more striking. Apart from two paragraphs on the "Marjah offensive", there is nothing of substance on Afghan politics and society. And even the passage on Marjah sweeps away the significance of "the incapacity of the Afghan government to deliver either justice or basic services to its people". (Indeed, it's notable that when the Kagans try to prop up the notion of likely American success, they talk about the internal dimension in Iraq rather than Afghanistan.)

Beyond Afghanistan: The US and the Poison of the “Long War” (Bacevich)

Success in Afghanistan is possible. The policy that President Obama announced in December and firmly reiterated last week is sound. So is the strategy that General Stanley McChrystal devised last summer and has been implementing this year.

There have been setbacks and disappointments during this campaign, and adjustments will likely be necessary. These are inescapable in war. Success is not by any means inevitable. Enemies adapt and spoilers spoil. But both panic and despair are premature. The coalition has made significant military progress against the Taliban, and will make more progress as the last surge forces arrive in August. Although military progress is insufficient by itself to resolve the conflict, it is a vital precondition. As The New York Times editors recently noted, “Until the insurgents are genuinely bloodied, they will keep insisting on a full restoration of their repressive power.” General David Petraeus knows how to bloody insurgents—and he also knows how to support and encourage political development and conflict resolution. He takes over the mission with the renewed support of the White House.

Neither the recent setbacks nor the manner of McChrystal’s departure should be allowed to obscure the enormous progress he has made in setting conditions for successful campaigns over the next two years. The internal, structural changes he made have revolutionized the ability of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to conduct counterinsurgency operations. He oversaw the establishment of a three-star NATO training command that has accelerated both the expansion and the qualitative improvement of the Afghan National Security Forces in less than a year. He introduced a program of partnering ISAF units and headquarters with Afghan forces that had worked wonders in Iraq—and he improved on it. He oversaw the introduction of a three-star operational headquarters to develop and coordinate countrywide campaign plans. He has managed the massive planning and logistical burden of receiving the influx of surge forces and putting them immediately to use in a country with little infrastructure.

While undertaking these enormous tasks of internal reorganization, he has also taken the fight to the enemy. The controversies about his restrictions on the operations of Special Forces and rules of engagement that limit the use of destructive force in inhabited areas have obscured the fact that both Special Forces and conventional forces have been fighting harder than ever before and disrupting and seriously damaging enemy networks and strongholds. Targeted operations against Taliban networks have increased significantly during McChrystal’s tenure, and the Taliban’s ability to operate comfortably in Afghanistan has been greatly reduced. ISAF forces have killed, captured, or driven off numerous Taliban shadow governors and military commanders. They have pushed into areas the Taliban had controlled and eliminated safe-havens.

The story of Marjah is particularly illustrative. Before this year, Marjah was a Taliban sanctuary, command-and-control node, and staging area. Taliban fighters based there had been able to support operations against ISAF and coalition forces throughout Helmand Province. Lasting progress in Helmand was simply not possible without clearing Marjah. McChrystal cleared it. The Taliban naturally are trying to regain control of it. ISAF and the ANSF are trying to prevent them.

The attempt to import “governance” rapidly into the area is faltering, which is not surprising considering the haste with which the operation was conducted (driven at least partly by the perceived pressure of the president’s July 2011 timeline). The attempt was also ill-conceived. Governance plans for Marjah emphasized extending the influence of the central government to an area that supported insurgents precisely because it saw the central government as threatening and predatory. Although ISAF persuaded President Hamid Karzai to remove the most notorious malign actor in the area from power, Karzai allowed him to remain in the background, stoking fears among the people that he would inevitably return. The incapacity of the Afghan government to deliver either justice or basic services to its people naturally led to disappointment as well, partly because ISAF’s own rhetoric had raised expectations to unrealistic levels.

The biggest problem with the Marjah operation, however, is that it was justified and explained on the wrong basis. Marjah is not a vitally important area in principle, even in Helmand. It is important because of its role as a Taliban base camp. It was so thoroughly controlled by the insurgents that the prospects for the rapid reestablishment of governance were always dim. It was fundamentally a military objective rather than a political one, and McChrystal made a mistake by offering Marjah as a test case of ISAF’s ability to improve Afghan governance. What matters about Marjah is that the enemy can no longer use it as a sanctuary and headquarters. ISAF’s military success there has allowed the coalition to launch subsequent operations in the Upper Helmand River Valley, particularly the more strategically important contested area around Sangin. The Marjah operation has so far succeeded in what it should have been intended to do. The aspects that are faltering should not have been priorities in that location.

Kandahar differs from Marjah in almost all respects. Kandahar City is not now a Taliban stronghold, although the Taliban are present in some force in its western districts and can stage attacks throughout the city. The Taliban had controlled the vital neighboring district of Arghandab until newly arrived American forces began contesting it in September 2009. The insurgents remain very strong in Zhari, Panjwayi, and Maiwand Districts to the west and south of Kandahar City, but they do not control any of those areas as completely as they controlled Marjah.

Read rest of article....

Palestine Latest: Israel to Use "United Jerusalem" Card against Obama's Gaza Demand?

Following the approval of the demolition of 22"illegal" Arab homes in the Silwan neighbourhood of East Jerusalem, the Jerusalem District Planning and Building Committee is set to approve a master plan, the first since 1959, calling for the expansion of Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. The proposal is largely based on construction on privately-owned Arab property. The committee will give those who object to the plan 60 days to submit their reservations.

According to the non-government organisation Ir Amim, while the plan calls for 13,500 new residential units in East Jerusalem for Palestinians, updated demographic studies indicate that this amount barely represents half the minimum needs for the Arab population by 2030. Ir Amim also claims the plan allows for Palestinian construction in the north and south of the capital  but barely provides for an expansion of Arab construction projects in the centre of the city.

Israel-Palestine Latest: The East Jerusalem Demolition/Settlements Argument

On Sunday, about 150 protesters clashed with the settlers' security guards in Silwan. Six Border Police officers were wounded by stones, and dozens of women and children suffered from tear gas inhalation after the Israeli forces began firing.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is planning to meet with U.S. President Barack Obama at the White House on 6 July, after a fifth round of indirect talks between the US envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, Israel, and the Palestinians Authority.

Israel's Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited Washington last week and met Vice President Joe Biden, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. On Sunday, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen met with Israeli Defense Forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi. Pentagon and Defense Ministry officials also held talks in Israel within the framework of the two countries' strategic dialogue.

Israel's ambassador to Washington, Michael Oren,was also in Israel to give a briefing at the Foreign Ministry. According to Israeli diplomats, Oren said relations between the two countries are not in a crisis because a crisis is something that passes; however, using a geological analogy, Oren said, "Relations are in the state of a tectonic rift in which continents are drifting apart." (Oren has now denied he made the remark.)

Yediot Ahronot's Shimon Shiffer claims that Obama will demand that Netanyahu lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip entirely and give permission for Palestinians to leave the Strip freely through Israeli border crossings. If true, then the Israeli Prime Minister may use the East Jerusalem expansion as a bargaining card, trading it for some conditions on the lifting of the blockade.

Petraeus, Afghanistan, and the Lessons of Iraq (Cole)

The last 72 hours, following the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal as commander of US forces in Afghanistan, have been filled by the US media with the glorification of McChrystal's successor, General David Petraeus. The New York Times set down the truth:

General Petraeus, 57, brings an extraordinary set of skills to his new job: a Boy Scout’s charm, penetrating intelligence and a ferocious will to succeed. At ease with the press and the public, and an adept negotiator, General Petraeus will probably distinguish himself from his predecessor with the political skills that carried him through the most difficult months of the counteroffensive in Iraq known as the surge.

Juan Cole offers a different perspective on Petraeus and, more importantly, on Iraq and Afghanistan:

Afghanistan Analysis: McChrystal, Counter-Insurgency, and Blaming the Ambassador (Mull)

President Obama’s appointment of Gen. David Petraeus to succeed Gen. Stanley McChrystal as commander of US forces in Afghanistan signaled a continued commitment by the White House to a large-scale counter-insurgency campaign involving taking large swathes of territory, clearing it of insurgents, holding it in the medium term, and building up local government and social services.

It is frequently asserted that Gen. Petraeus “succeeded” in Iraq via a troop escalation or “surge” of 30,000 extra US troops that he dedicated to counter-insurgency purposes in al-Anbar and Baghdad Provinces.

But it would be a huge mistake to see Iraq either as a success story or as stable. It is the scene of an ongoing civil war between Sunnis and Shiites that is killing roughly 300 civilians a month. It can’t form a government months after the March 7 elections, even though the outcomes are known, having a permanently hung parliament, wherein the four major parties find it difficult to agree on a prime minister. The political vacuum has proved an opening for Sunni Arab insurgents, who have mounted effective bombing campaigns and more recently are targeting the banks. And now the caretaker government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is being shaken by a wave of violent mass protests even in Shiite cities that voted for him, against his government’s failure to provide key services, especially electricity in the midst of a sweltering summer heat wave.

On [19 June], a big protest rally denouncing the lack of electricity turned violent, and police shot dead two protesters. In some parts of Iraq temperatures reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit, and few places have electricity more than 6 or 7 hours a day. The minister of electricity has been forced to resign. On Thursday, the headline in al-Zaman, the Times of Baghdad, read “Electricity Uprisings Break out in Hilla and Diyala under the Banner of Ousting al-Maliki.” If the caretaker government falls in the face of this popular pressure before parliament can agree on a new prime minister, there would be a dreadful security vacuum and a constitutional crisis.

Going back 3 1/2 years, Gen. Petraeus did what he could to end the Sunni-Shiite Civil War of 2006-2007, which helped produce the nearly 4 million Iraqi displaced (most of whom are still homeless) and likely killed tens of thousands. He put blast walls up to separate Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods; he put in checkpoints to keep out car and truck bombs; he made some markets pedestrian-only to stop them being blown up; he established Sunni Arab pro-American militias, the “Sons of Iraq,” to fight the fundamentalist vigilantes, both Sunni and Shiite; and he systematically tracked down and had killed the leadership of the insurgent cells.

I mean to take nothing away from the significant and important efforts of the US military in 2007 when I say that they did not all by themselves end the Sunni-Shiite civil war. [But]in some ways, they inadvertently hastened a Shiite victory. Gen. Casey had been convinced to begin his plan of disarming the Iraqis in Baghdad with the Sunni Arabs by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The US military stuck to this bargain. But it turns out that if you disarmed the Sunni Arabs, then the Shiite militias came at night to chase them away. As I argued a couple of summers ago, working in part from the intrepid journalism of Karen DeYoung at the Washington Post, the main reason for decrease in the virulence of the Civil War (it is not over) was that the Shiites succeeded in ethnically cleansing the Sunnis from Baghdad. Based on US military and NGO statistics, on patterns of ambient light from West Baghdad visible by satellite, on the on-the-ground investigations of journalists like AP’s Hamza Hendawi, and on subsequent voting patterns, I don’t think Baghdad is now more than 10-15% Sunni, whereas it was probably about half and half Sunni and Shiite at the time of Bush’s invasion in 2003.

Obviously, when formerly mixed neighborhoods gradually no longer had Sunnis living in them, the ethnic violence declined (militant Shiites would have had to drive for an hour to find a Sunni to ethnically cleanse). My own field research among Iraqi refugees in Jordan in August of 2008 revealed to me the mechanisms by which the Sunnis were chased out. Many had been explicitly threatened by name, receiving death threats in their mail boxes. In addition, one fourth of Iraqi families who formally registered as refugees in Jordan had had a child kidnapped. Many had seen family members or close friends killed before their eyes. Some continued to receive threats in East Amman apartments, as the militias tracked them down to their new, squalid residences.

It was in part this Shiite wave of militia power and the usurping of Sunni property (most displaced families in Iraq have lost possession of their homes) that convinced many Sunni clans to go over to the Americans and to fight the Sunni fundamentalists in their midst, since it was the latter whose constant bombings and attacks on Shiite neighborhoods that had provoked the Civil War. Sunni Arabs in Iraq were initially absolutely convinced that they were a majority and that the Sunni Arab world would help them get back their country from the Americans, the Shiites and the Kurds. By early 2007 it had become clear that the Shiites were overwhelming them and that, indeed, their only plausible savior was the Americans, who might be persuaded to act as a moderating influence on the Shiites.

The Shiite victory in the Civil War was thus absolutely crucial as an Iraqi social-history background for what success Petraeus’s policies had.

No such major social-historical change has occurred in Afghanistan or is likely to. The Taliban and other insurgents primarily spring from the Pashtun ethnic group that predominates in the east and southwest of the country. Pashtuns probably make up about 42 percent of Afghanistan’s some 34 million people. Pashtun clans provided the top political leadership to Afghanistan from the 18th century, through the Durrani monarchy, and they look down on the northern Tajik and Hazarah ethnic groups (who speak dialects of Persian). Although probably only 20-30 percent of Afghan Pashtuns view the Taliban favorably, more may admire the Taliban as a group that stands up for Afghanistan’s independence from the Western nations now occupying it.

The Pashtuns do not believe that they have been conquered by anyone, and the vast majority of them wants US and NATO troops out of their country. They would fall down laughing at the idea of being afraid of the Tajiks and Hazarahs. So they will not be as easy to turn as the terrified and traumatized Sunnis of Iraq were in 2007.

What governmental and military framework the government of Nuri al-Maliki has been able to provide depends deeply on Iraq’s human capital. It was an industrializing society with an educated work force, a majority urban sector, and a respectable literacy rate, and its army could be rebuilt in part because literate soldiers are easier to train (not to mention that a stock of experienced soldiers and officers familiar with conventional military tactics could be drawn on). Iraq is an oil state with an income of $60 billion a year from petroleum alone. Afghanistan’s entire nominal GDP is $12 bn. a year. Afghanistan is 28% literate and its army is 10% literate. It is largely rural, poorly educated, and decades of civil war have destroyed or chased abroad its small managerial classes. Afghanistan is far more dependent on kinship ties (clans and tribes) in politics than Iraq (only 1/3 of Iraqis in polling say that tribal identity is important to them). Clan politics is notoriously insular and difficult for foreigners to enter into.

Moreover, Gen. Petreaus’s policies in 2007 in Iraq had many drawbacks. As noted, starting with the disarming of one ethno-religious group, the Sunni Arabs, left them vulnerable to ethnic cleansing by the still-armed Shiite militias. The creation of 100,000 Sons of Iraq fighters among the Sunni Arabs was viewed as a security problem by the Shiite government of al-Maliki, which brought only 17,000 of them into the police or other security forces. Many of the others were gradually dropped from the payroll by the Iraqi government, and, deprived of support by the withdrawing American troops, began being targeted by vengeful fundamentalists as traitors. The blast walls erected around neighborhoods cut them off economically from the city and produced 80% unemployment within, and so that tactic was not sustainable. There were also joint Sunni-Shiite demonstrations against Gen. Petraeus on the grounds that he was imposing and artificial sectarian separation on Iraqis. (I know.) The heavy US dependence on Blackwater and other private security contractors went badly awry when they kept going cowboy and committed a massacre at Nissour Square in 2007. (The same firm, now renamed, is being brought into Afghanistan.)

Above all, Gen Petreaus was unable to attain in Iraq that pot of gold at the bottom of the counter-insurgency rainbow, increased government capacity and political reconciliation. Even his ultimate crackdown on the Mahdi Army and attempt to marginalize the Sadrists who follow Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr largely failed. The Sadrists did well in the March elections and may well end up being king-makers in the negotiations over a new prime minister and the speed of the American withdrawal. Nor has the Arab-Kurdish conflict been resolved (and that one is a tinderbox).

The Shiite prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, deeply dislikes the ex-Baathists (whom he sees as supported by neighboring Syria), and which he codes as predominantly Sunni Arabs. He has not reached out to them in any significant way, and some 80% of the Sunni Arabs are estimated to have voted for Maliki’s rival, Iyad Allawi (an ex-Baathist himself). Although the list they voted for, the Iraqiya, gained the largest single number of seats, it is not being recognized as the biggest bloc in parliament and will almost certainly not be allowed to form a government. Instead, the two big Shiite blocs made a post-election alliance and are insisting that they will form the government, and the courts have backed them.

The message to Sunnis? Even if you put down your arms and participate in the electoral process, you will likely be marginalized by the Shiite majority.

And now al-Maliki faces the Great Electricity Uprising of 2010. Iraq cannot be a model for victory in Afghanistan, and it isn’t even clear that there has been any meaningful ‘victory’ in Iraq. The best that could be said is that in summer of 2006, 2500 civilians were showing up dead every month, and now it is a tenth of that (still a lot).

The counter-insurgency push in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan could go either way. It could tamp down the Taliban and other insurgents and produce a population grateful for increased security, even at the cost of increased foreign control. Or it could involve Fallujah-like leveling of towns and large numbers of killed and displaced clansmen, pushing Pashtuns now favorable to Karzai into insurgency. I would give the former a 10% chance of happening.

The Latest from Iran (26 June): Absolute Security?

1745 GMT: More on the Khomeini Challenge. Earlier we noted growing concern within the Iranian establishment over the influence of "radicals" (1235 GMT).

Radio Zamaneh has more on that concern through the remarks of Seyed Hassan Khomeini, grandson of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, as he spoke to families of victims of a 1981 bombing.

Khomeini said “extremism” must be abandoned and “extremists” must be "churned away" from the Islamic Republic.

Noting the growing economic problems in Iran, which has "disheartened" its people, Khomeini said Iranians want their officials to get over “personal vendettas” and “childish grudges” and instead try to resolve the country’s problems.

NEW Iran Document & Analysis: US Gov’t Statement on Sanctions, Nukes, & Human Rights
NEW Iran: Summary of the New US Sanctions
NEW Iran Interview: Ahmad Batebi “The Green Movement and Mousavi”
The Real Race for Iran: Human Rights v. Tehran’s Defenders (Shahryar)
The Latest from Iran (25 June): The Important Issues

1640 GMT: Another Execution? Six weeks after five Iranians were hung, concerns have escalated over Zainab Jalalian and Hossein Khezri, who are reportedly at risk of imminent execution.

The death sentence for Jalalian, convicted of mohareb ("war against God") because of her membership in the separatist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), was upheld and sent to the enforcement section today. Zainab's plea to say goodbye to her family was met with, "shut up" by the sentencing judge, and she was condemned to death by hanging. As Zainab was not permitted legal representation,

Amnesty International has issued an Urgent Action Alert for Zainab Jalalian and Hossein Khezri, who are believed to be at risk of imminent execution. We have assembled a sample letter you can send to Iranian authorities regarding these two cases.

1230 GMT: Taking on the "Radicals"? After a week of clear escalation in conflict --- not between the "Greens" and the regime but within the establshment --- the Iranian political scene is filled with warnings of "radical" behaviour threatening the Islamic Republic.

Khabar Online features an analysis declaring that conservatives and principlists "will pay for" the actions of the radicals. radicals' move, historical review pointing at this radical current since the IR establishment

Mohammad Reza Bahonar, the Vice Speaker of Parliament, http://www.aftabnews.ir/vdcjivevmuqeyhz.fsfu.html of the "threats of fundamentalism" while suggesting a faction of reformists may "reappear in a new form".

High-profile MP Ahmad Tavakoli has criticised attacks on political figures, saying that even those who have done wrong to the Iranian system should be treated with justice.

And Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson, Seyed Hassan Khomeini, has declared that people want radicals to be banned and asked Iranians to listen to the warningsor marja (senior clerics) about moral decline, poverty, and inflation.

1220 GMT: Asking about Political Rights. Member of Parliament Kazem Delkhosh has raised a query: why do other parties need a permit for rallies when (Basij protesting in front of the Majlis gets receive meals, cookies, Sundis [juice drinks] and buses?

1215 GMT: All is Well (Nuclear Edition). The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, has emphasised that, despite recent conflicts and the UN sanctions resolution, Tehran will continue to work with monitors from the International Atomic Energy Agency.

1210 GMT: More "Absolute Security". Basij commander Mohammad Reza Naghdi has announced new commando deployments will soon take place.

1200 GMT: Video Turmoil. A couple of clips from this week apparently pointing to tensions in Iranian politics. The clash between prominent member of Parliament Ali Motahari and pro-Ahmadinejad legislators, culminating in Motahari's "shut up and sit down", has emerged.

Then there is this claimed video of a crowd in Rasht facing up to "morality police", breaking the back window of their vehicle. Persian2English asks further information, including the report, "A few minutes later, Special Guard forces entered the scene with batons and shot tear gas into the crowd."

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QxoHdkLTzDo&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

1140 GMT: Critiquing Iran and the World. A group of Tehran University professors have issued a statement assessing Iran's foreign policy approach as an attempt to project power by creating divisions amongst others.

1130 GMT: We have posted two features out of Washington --- the sanctions provisions passed by the US Congress and soon to be signed by President Obama, and the statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton linking those sanctions to Iran's nuclear programme and human rights.

0650 GMT: All is Well (Gasoline Special). Iran's Deputy Oil Minister Ali-Reza Zeighami has declared that sanctions passed by the US Congress on Iran's energy sector will not put any pressure on the country: "Despite sanctions, Iran will be self-sufficient in gasoline production within two years and after that we can begin exporting gasoline."

Zeighami claimed that the completion of five projects at refineries will triple Iran's output.

0645 GMT: Culture Corner. It appears that Iran is not absolutely secure against the excesses of "Western" culture, however. Thomas Erdbrink, writing in The Washington Post, highlights the success of Rupert Murdoch's Farsi1 satellite television channel, with situation comedies and Latin American, Korean, and US soap operas dubbed into Persian.

We leave it to Iranian authorities to explain why --- unlike many other foreign channels which have been jammed --- Farsi1 has made it into Iranian homes.

0630 GMT: We emerge from the Iranian weekend with comments from human rights activist Ahmad Batebi on the dynamics of the Green Movement and the role of Mir Hossein Mousavi.

Meanwhile, Iran's authorities continue to talk up the notion of "absolute security". Iran's police chief Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam, after his recent reflection on the post-election crisis (including admission of security mistakes and an implicit indication of electoral manipulation), is now giving assurances about the present.

Ahmadi-Moghaddam said Iran's aim is complete protection of borders by 2015, with more investment in the construction of roads and checkpoints. He also announced a plan to increase border patrol units with "state-of-the-art" equipment.