Iran Document & Analysis: US Gov't Statement on Sanctions, Nukes, & Human Rights

I am not sure, in all the fuss around this week's US Congress vote for stricter sanctions on Tehran, that this statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton received much attention.

The first two paragraphs are the expected language on containing Iran's nuclear programme, but the third paragraph shifts the discussion to Tehran's approach to the rights of its citizens. We noted two weeks ago, on the anniversary of Iran's Presidential elections that the Obama and Clinton declarations were the most forthright to date on rights, with the Secretary of State calling for the release of all political prisoners (and naming some of them). Yesterday's declaration continues that trend.

But what does it mean in practice, as opposed to rhetoric?

The Latest from Iran (26 June): Absolute Security?

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY CLINTON

Passage of Iran Sanctions Legislation

I join President Obama in welcoming Congressional passage of legislation to strengthen sanctions against Iran. We support the broad aims of HR 2194, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 — constraining Iran’s nuclear program, changing the calculus of Iran’s leaders, and demonstrating that Iran’s policies decrease its standing, and further isolate it in the international community. We are committed to fully implementing this legislation in a manner that advances our multilateral dual-track strategy of engagement and pressure.

These new measures, along with action by the European Union and Australia, build on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 and underscore the resolve of the international community to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to hold it accountable for its international obligations. The United States will work with our partners to maximize the impact of these efforts and to continue pursuing a diplomatic resolution to the international community’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

In addition to increasing pressure on Iran’s illicit nuclear activities, this legislation also addressed the Iranian government’s continued violation of the fundamental rights of its citizens. A year after the Iranian people took to the streets to protest an election, the leadership continues to violate its most fundamental duties of government, denying its people the right to speak freely, to assemble without fear, and to the equal administration of justice. We support the Congress’ efforts to call attention to these violations, and the United States will continue to hold Iran accountable for its obligations to respect the rights of its own people.

Afghanistan Analysis: McChrystal, Counter-Insurgency, and Blaming the Ambassador (Mull)

EA correspondent Josh Mull is the Afghanistan Blogging Fellow for The Seminal and Brave New Foundation. He also writes for Rethink Afghanistan:

Supporter's of General Stanley McChrystal's counterinsurgency policy are heart-broken over his firing.  Very few COINdinistas took the position that McChrystal should be permitted to undermine civilian control of policy, as he did so plainly in the Rolling Stone piece; however, they put out the line, "He's our only hope", with warnings about ruining the war effort.

They also want revenge.

The target of this vengeance is quite clear: Karl Eikenberry, US Ambassador to Afghanistan. Take a look at these snippets from across the blogosphere:

Josh Shahryar:

When McChrystal finally got troops, he had to figure out a way around Eikenberry’s meddling into what was supposed to be his operation.

Bouhammer:

So now I am waiting for that POS [piece of s***] Eikenberry to be fired along with that ineffective Holbrooke. The relationship between the military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan is a two-way street. If the Ambassador and Special Envoy don’t get along with [Afghan President] Karzai and cannot influence him or even get a meeting with him, then they need to be FIRED asap and some people need to be put into place that can be effective at their job and get along with the military leadership.

Anonymous at Danger Room:

In fact, one e-mails: “It would be a travesty if we fired McChrystal and kept Eikenberry.”

Not only is McChrystal the “only one with any sort of relationship with [Afghan president Hamid] Karzai,” says this civilian advisor to the McChrystal-led International Security Assistance Force. Eikenberry “has no plan, didn’t get COIN [counterinsurgency] when he was the commander and still doesn’t.” Plus, the advisor adds: “The Embassy hates Eik. That’s not necessarily an indictment (I’m no fan of the Embassy). But it contributes to the dysfunction and it means that half the Embassy is focused on keeping Eik in line.”

Streetwise Professor:

Eikenberry was a backstabber from day one.

See the narrative building? McChrystal was doing a good job (they've leaked red meat to give pro-McChrystal progressives some lefty cover), it was that "POS Eikenberry" and his "meddling" that are really at fault. He's a backstabber and dysfunctional. McChrystal's violation of the relationship between civilian government and the military is no longer at issue; it's practically ignored.

McChrystal and Eikenberry have been feuding for some time now, so it's no surprise he draws the most wrath from the general's dismissal. But if we actually look closer at the tension between Eikenberry and McChrystal, we see that the Eikenberry-haters are way off base. Their attacks are at best childish displays of sour grapes; at worst, they are a fundamental misunderstanding of their own strategy.

Ambassador Eikenberry is not at fault here. In fact, Eikenberry was right all along.

What is this feud between McChrystal and Eikenberry about? It's usually described very ambiguously, a disagreement over "implementation" of the strategy or something like that. But, in fact, it is a few specific actions which amount to the battle between general and ambassador over conduct of the war.

From the Washington Post:

At times their differences over strategy have been public, particularly after two of Eikenberry's cables to Washington last year were leaked to the news media. The cables warned that McChrystal's request for new troops might be counterproductive as Karzai was "not an adequate strategic partner." McChrystal's staff members were particularly upset that they weren't made aware of Eikenberry's position before he sent the cables to Washington, they said in interviews.

Eikenberry has resisted some of McChrystal's wartime experiments. The ambassador refused to release funds to expand a military effort to turn villagers into armed guards. He opposed one Army brigade's plan to form an anti-Taliban alliance with a Pashtun tribe and funnel it development money. He criticized the military's proposal to buy generators and diesel fuel for the energy-starved city of Kandahar and supported a longer-term hydroelectric dam project.

In each of these cases, including the disagreement over the energy situation in Kandahar, it's clear that Eikenberry has had a better understanding of COIN strategy, the blending of civilian nation building with military combat. Eikenberry consistently prioritized governance, rule of law, and other long-term objectives over McChrystal's short-term concerns about winning battles and killing the enemy.

Stabilizing Afghanistan, not winning battles, is what counterinsurgency is supposedly all about. And yet Eikenberry is made out to be the bad guy.

Counterinsurgency requires the dual (dueling?) roles of military leader and diplomatic leader. As COINdinistas like to say, there has to be "unity of effort." Both sides have to work together. But now what we hear from them is that the McChrystal should have had free rein to do whatever he wanted while anything Eikenberry did was "meddling", some sort of illegitimate interference with the all-important war effort. Do the sellers of COIN even understand their own strategy? It's not clear that they do.

Why would Eikenberry dare question our military leaders? Why would he see Karzai as "not an adequate strategic partner?" Possibly because Karzai is corrupt and sits atop an illegitimate government that functions only as an organized criminal enterprise?

Why would Eikenberry oppose arming and bribing local militias? Could it be because support from the military legitimizes these groups, even though they're outlaws that pillage Afghans just the same, if not worse, than the Taliban does, in addition to undermining the central government in Kabul?

Boy, that Eikenberry sure is a jerk for pointing all this stuff out.

When we add up all the leaked cables, the wartime experiments, the history of their involvement in the war, etc, we see the full picture of Eikenberry's trespasses against McChrystal.

The High Crimes and Treason of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry:

• Failing to decisively win the war in Afghanistan when all attention and resources were focused on Iraq


• Leaking important information about the war to the press


• Resisting "short-sighted" military domination of reconstruction/nation building efforts


• Opposing the escalation of 30,000 more US troops


• Criticizing the corruption and illegitimacy of Hamid Karzai


• Opposing a US strategic security guarantee with Karzai's illegitimate administration


• Opposing Karzai's CIA-narco-lord brother having a role in the government


• Opposing formation of militias which undermine the government


• Opposing bribes of development money which corrupt and distort rule of law, nation building, etc


• Opposing short-term energy solutions which are too expensive and cripple an already broken central government

Is it clear why everyone hates Eikenberry so much? No? I don't understand it either.

Don't take any of this the wrong way. Eikenberry is not a saint, a war hero, or even particularly effective in his conflicts with McChrystal. The point here is that Eikenberry was right. He was right to be transparent about strategic deliberations. He was right to oppose the military's faulty tactics. He was right to oppose the escalation of more troops. He was right about all of these arguments with McChrystal, and with the Obama administration itself.

Obviously there is plenty of room left to criticize Eikenberry and the State Department as a whole. Their continued association with criminal organisations like Blackwater all but negates any positive outcomes they might reach, and certainly erases any honor or integrity the institution might have. Corruption is a thriving malignancy throughout our development operations, from the contractors at the bottom to the sleazy crooks at the top.

Then, of course, there's the State Dept's participation in the first place in COIN, which is a deviant, militarist perversion of traditionally civilian-controlled policies like foreign aid, development, and nation building.

General McChrystal's downfall was his own making. Eikenberry should not be thrown in with that, least of all as part of some pathetic blame game by McChrystal supporters. What's at stake here is the war in Afghanistan, and that is clearly hopeless and unwinnable. Firing McChrystal didn't change the fact that the US has absolutely nothing to gain and everything to lose by continuing its war in Afghanistan, and neither will the revenge-firing of Ambassador Eikenberry. To get to the root of any of these problems, to really see solutions for countering terrorism and developing a stable Afghanistan, America's longest war has to end.

Afghanistan: The Politics Behind McChrystal's Removal --- and Why It's Bad for the War (Shahryar)

UPDATE 1245 GMT: Full credit to Josh Shahryar for nailing this in his analysis. CNN says, from a "senior Pentagon official", that "Defense Secretary Robert Gates backed keeping Gen. Stanley McChrystal on the job because he was vital to the war effort in Afghanistan, but he was overruled". --- WSL

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal is in charge no more. After two days of intense talks about his departure, he tendered his resignation as the man in charge of NATO troops in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama –-- angered by remarks about the White House and the US ambassador in Kabul made by the general and his aides to Rolling Stone magazine--- graciously accepted the resignation. He immediately Gen. David Petraeus, the architect of the US troop surge policy in Iraq in 2008 that likely salvaged the war there, in his stead.
Has a crisis been averted? Probably not.

Afghanistan/McChrystal Analysis: Hyperventilating Over the Tip, Missing the (Petraeus) Iceberg
Afghanistan/McChrystal Watch: Petraeus Takes Over
Afghanistan Revealed: US Hands Over Millions of $$…To “Warlords” (DeYoung)

Even though President Obama saved face and probably made small gains with the hawkish portion of the US electorate --- just in time for the November mid-term elections, I might add --– the decision will have dire consequences for Obama’s war plan in Afghanistan. The reason is quite simple; nothing was actually done in the past days to understand the reasons why Gen. McChrystal made his remarks or to address the issues.

The situation with McChrystal and the White House is a by-product of two distinct but interrelated issues. The first is Gen. McChrystal’s relationship with President Obama, the Commander-in-Chief. The second is his relationship with the US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Ret. Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who was largely ignored in this fiasco by US media.

The first action that led to Wednesday's decision was the State Department's despatch of Eikenberry to Kabul in April of last year, two months before McChrystal’s appointment. Before his appointment, Eikenberry had served two terms in Afghanistan, commanding US and international troops. His last posting was as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command for 18 months before he stepped down in 2007.

McChrystal’s complaints about Eikenberry had some merit. During his tours in Afghanistan, Eikenberry’s role in the war was not appreciated, but in that time the Taliban got stronger and the insurgency spread further. And as a former commander of the same troops McChrystal was leading, it does not look like Eikenberry helped the new US commander very much. The clash was inevitable: McChrystal had an agenda, and Eikenberry’s presence in Kabul meant the general had to deal with someone with his own ideas and plans about Afghanistan.

McChrystal worked closely with the Afghan people. He took the war --- for the first time since the ouster of the Taliban –-- straight to the insurgency’s comfort zone. He carefully controlled the bombing of areas with high concentration of civilians. But most of all, he forged links with the Afghan government, which has had a sour relationship with President Obama since last year’s elections in Kabul. All of these strategies helped propel him in popularity within Afghanistan, as local actors looked set to help him accomplish his goals. It was not to be.

There’s an old saying in Urdu, “You cannot hang two swords in one scabbard.” Friction arose because Eikenberry was not as popular as McChrystal. Eikenberry was also a strong critic of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, with whom McChrystal was attempting to forge close ties to help fight the insurgency.

The second catalyst that brought McChrystal’s ouster was the President himself. Obama took an awful lot of time in deciding what to do in Afghanistan when he took office; the entire year of 2009 was wasted on crafting his war policy. By the time it was made public, winter had arrived and offensives against insurgents were impossible in snow-covered Afghan mountains.

Perhaps Obama wanted to study his options carefully. Maybe he had to focus on other issues. Whatever the reason, for a man of action like Gen. McChrystal, political considerations were not the main issue. He needed more troops to follow the US war plan. He only started getting them this spring. No general –-- especially not McChrystal, who’s known to resent civilian meddling in military matters –-- could escape frustration when faced with such a situation.

When McChrystal finally got troops, he had to figure out a way around Eikenberry’s meddling into what was supposed to be his operation. McChrystal may have been the most popular US general that has been put in charge of troops in Afghanistan. He may have led the offensive deep into Taliban heartland, forged close ties with the Afghan government and the people, and reduced civilian casualties dramatically. But he proved himself to be incompetent when it came to giving interviews to the media.

As word of McChrystal's imminent departure emerged and gathered strength, Afghan policians reacted by heaping praise upon him and pleading how important it was for the commander to stay in the country. Gen. McChrystal might have been forgiven for his Rolling Stone mistake had he not committed it just months before the November --- Defense Secretary Robert Gates seemed to have been open to the possibility of keeping him. President Obama’s political advisers, however, sided with a decision that would improve Obama’s image as a strong Commander-in-Chief and win him more votes. has welcomed his appointment. But the task of forming close ties with the Afghan government people to win a war –-- all in a year before US troops start departing Afghanistan in July 2011 --- looks impossible.

Would Obama look good if he kept someone who disrespected him so publically? Probably not. The President had to make a choice between a successful implementation of his war plan in Afghanistan and votes for the Democrats in November. He chose the latter.

However, the decision is likely going to backfirein Afghanistan once Gen. Petraeus steps into Afghanistan. He is the architect of the troop surge in the country, and the Afghan Government

Gen. McChrystal is not done. He’s around. He’ll be giving out more interviews and throwing some more mud on Obama and his political advisers, as well as Ambassador Eikenberry. So if Obama thinks he’s dodged the bullet by making a tough decision, he’s very wrong. The show’s only began, folks.

Afghanistan/McChrystal Watch: Petraeus Takes Over

1805 GMT: The official line, now reinforced by a McChrystal e-mail to press outlets, is that he resigned and was not fired.

1800 GMT: Two thoughts. 1) From the frying pan to the fire: David Petraeus is just as hostile as Stanley McChrystal to Obama's declared intention to withdraw troops by July 2011. 2) Who takes over Central Command and become Petraeus' military boss?

1751 GMT: Obama says, "It was a difficult decision I made today. Indeed it saddens me to lose the service of a soldier whom I have come to respect and admire." But this decision was necessary "for the strength of our military and our nation".

And with that Obama exits, taking no questions.

NEW Afghanistan/McChrystal Analysis: Hyperventilating Over the Tip, Missing the (Petraeus) Iceberg
NEW Afghanistan Revealed: US Hands Over Millions of $$…To “Warlords” (DeYoung)
Afghanistan Special: McChrystal and the Trashing of the President (US Military v. Obama, Chapter 472)
Afghanistan Document: The McChrystal Profile (Hastings — Rolling Stone)

1750 GMT: Obama is flanked during the statement by Vice President Biden --- one of the targets of the McChrystal teams in the Rolling Stone interview ("Vice President Bite Me") --- and General Petraeus.

Obama is now on the section of the statement on how super-fantastic Petraeus is.

1749 GMT: Obama now reinforcing his play for support by stressing decision was necessary because of responsibility to troops and demand to defeat Al Qa'eda: "Our nation is at war. We face a very tough fight in Afghanistan....We are going to break the Taliban's momentum. We are going to rebuild Afghanistan."

1743 GMT: Obama begins his statement. Have accepted McChrystal resignation with "regret" but "with certainty" that is right thing to do for US troops and war effort.

Obama stresses that decision not because of any difference on policy with McChrystal or "any sense of personal insult". He expresses "great admiration" for McChrystal and his service in Iraq and Afghanistan as "one of America's finest soldiers".

But "war is bigger than one man or woman", and "this is right decision to make". McChrystal's conduct in Rolling Stone interview "did not meet the standard that should be set by a commanding general. It undermines the civilian control of the military, the core of our democratic system, and it erodes the trust that is necessary for our team to work together to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan."

1725 GMT: CNN and Associated Press are reporting from sources that General David Petraeus, currently the head of Central Command, will take over the Afghanistan command from General McChrystal. This follows earlier leaks to CNN and NBC that Obama would "fire" McChrystal, who met the President for 30 minutes this morning but left the White House and did not attend a strategy meeting on Afghanistan.

That is pretty stunning, not because McChrystal is out but because Petraeus is effectively demoting himself from moving from Central Command --- where he is currently McChrystal's boss --- to the Afghanistan role.

Obama is making a statement within the next few minutes.

1430 GMT: The meeting between President Obama and General McChrystal, which lasted about 30 minutes, has concluded. The Afghanistan strategy meeting at the White House is at 1535 GMT --- will the general return for the discussion?

1325 GMT: Getting to the Important Point. A prominent activist ponders, "If McChrystal f**** up public outreach to Americans this often, how is he going to win hearts and minds of Afghans?"

1320 GMT: The Hot Tip? A "senior a

dministration official" has told CNN that the White House has asked the Pentagon to make a list of possible replacements for McChrystal.

1305 GMT: Beyond the Drama. A couple of commentaries to note, alongside our analysis this morning, that usefully note the policy issues beyond the McChrystal "crisis". Matthew Yglesias, drawing from his colleague Max Bergmann, writes:

The military can easily continue to pursue a McChrystal-style strategy on both the Afghan and US media fronts under different leadership. The more important question facing the White House is how they feel about that. A determined president will always prevail over the opinions of generals, but the political costs of attempting to do so can be quite high since military officials have a lot of prestige in American society.

(My caveat is the question as to whether Obama has ever --- when the crunch came --- been "determined [enough to]...prevail over the opinions of generals.")

And Juan Cole puts the challenge --- that will remain long after the Rolling Stone gathers moss --- to the President:

Obama needs to define an attainable goal in Afghanistan and then execute it swiftly. As it is, when he is pressed about what in the world we are doing there, he retreats into Bushisms: “So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That’s the goal that must be achieved.”

Well that isn’t a good enough reason to be in Afghanistan. There is no al-Qaeda to speak of in Afghanistan. And although insurgents and Taliban probably control about 20 percent of the country, they have not let al-Qaeda set up shop in their territory.

1255 GMT: On Day 2 of the Great McChrystal Balls-Up (with the reminder that we've posted the important story --- the US military v. Obama --- beyond the media noise), here's the latest....

General Stanley McChrystal, after his recall to Washington over his profile in Rolling Stone magazine, is now in the Pentagon for discussions before his meeting at the White House with President Obama. On the way into the building, he denied rumours --- spread by Joe Klein of Time magazine and picked up by other outlets from CBS News to Britain's Daily Telegraph --- that he had offered his resignation.

McChrystal told reporters, ""Come on, you know better than that.  No!"

Afghanistan/McChrystal Analysis: Hyperventilating Over the Tip, Missing the (Petraeus) Iceberg

Little to report overnight in the saga of General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander in Afghanistan, and his interview --- replete with jibes and insults at the Obama Administration by McChrystal and his aides --- with Rolling Stone magazine.

NEW Afghanistan Revealed: US Hands Over Millions of $$$…To “Warlords” (DeYoung)
Afghanistan Special: McChrystal and the Trashing of the President (US Military v. Obama, Chapter 472)
Afghanistan Document: The McChrystal Profile (Hastings — Rolling Stone)

In advance of his meeting with McChrystal today, President Obama said, ""I think it's clear that the article in which he and his team appeared showed a poor - showed poor judgment. But I also want to make sure that I talk to him directly before I make any final decisions." Obama then re-stated his key talking point, beyond any Rolling Stone obstacle:

I want everybody to keep in mind what our central focus is - and that is success in making sure that al-Qaida and its affiliates cannot attack the United States and its allies. And we've got young men and women there who are making enormous sacrifices, families back home who are making enormous sacrifices,

And so whatever decision that I make with respect to Gen. McChrystal - or any other aspect of Afghan policy - is determined entirely on how I can make sure that we have a strategy that justifies the enormous courage and sacrifice that those men and women are making over there and that ultimately makes this country safer.

Obama's statement capped an extraordinary day for Washington watchers. From before dawn, when some media outlets posted soundbites from the Rolling Stone profile, to bedtime, all other news fell before the chatter about McChrystal. (The biggest winner from yesterday's furour? It could be British Petroleum, who suddenly found that they were not the lead story in the US.)

It was a classic frenzy in which token moves began banner headlines. McChrystal had called Administration officials to apologise. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said he was concerned. The editor of Rolling Stone and the author of the piece, Michael Hastings, became media superstars for a day. Joe Klein of Time, using the time-worn device of an "unnamed source", seized centre stage by saying he most definitely knew McChrystal would resign.

That in turn left us with the white noise of "Will he/won't he? Should he/shouldn't he?" Hours of airtime and pages of print could be filled by simply re-wording the regretful conclusion: he's not the military Messiah, he's just a naughty boy.

When "perspective" was sought, it often verged on the historically ridiculous. Some journalists sought an analogy with President Truman's recall of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951, which might have been appropriate if McChrystal had threatened World War III by bombing China, bringing US forces to the verge of defeat, and calling for use of nuclear weapons.

OK, so what's the big deal? The media gets its drama. The Obama Administration buys time with statements to figure out how it is going to finesse the treatment of McChrystal, since 1) his firing/resignation or 2) his retention will bring another news cycle of criticism. And, apart from one press aide to the General, no one pays an immediate price.

Well, to be blunt: the story is not McChrystal and his boys laughing at Vice President Biden, declaring that the President is a fumbling ingenue, or sneering at their supporters like "old man" John McCain. Perhaps the most wayward statement from an "analyst" was the lament, "You think he's being fired for a pattern....He's being fired for an ARTICLE."

Wrong. Shrewder observers, drowned out in yesterday's clamour, know that the sticks-and-stones behind McChrystal's name-calling is the ongoing military battle to maintain policy supremacy over the civilians from the State Department to the US Embassy in Afghanistan to President Obama.

Twice Obama tried to set limits on a military-first approach to defeating the Taliban/extremists/Al Qa'eda/insurgents in Afghanistan. The day he entered office, having declared that he would seek a resolution to a US intervention which seemed to be going nowhere, the military presented him with three options, all of which called for an increase in US forces. Obama tried to curb the rush to escalation but gave way in March 2009 with a "limited" increase of 30,000 troops and support units.

Then the President, through National Security Advisor Jim Jones (the "clown stuck in 1985", according to a McChrystal aide), tried to draw the line: ask for any more soldiers and I will stare you out with "WTF?"

The outcome? The commanders called Obama's bluff: they said the intervention would be lost without another escalation, and they got the President's acceptance in December.

There was one headline caveat, however: Obama indicated --- to what degree of firmness depends on who is interpreting --- that the US forces would come out by July 2011.

McChrystal does not like that deadline. Nor does his boss.

That boss --- the head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus  --- was the dog who did not bark yesterday. Less than a week after testifying to Congressmen, leaving the clear impression that US forces would have to remain beyond July next year, Petraeus issued no statement, saw no reporters, provided no leaks.

If there is an important media angle here, it is this difference between McChrystal and Petraeus: the latter is far too clever in the ways of Washington to let a Rolling Stone reporter tail after him, putting verbal indiscretions on the record.

It is that difference in tactics --- not tactics against the Taliban, but tactics in the talking shops of Washington --- that means McChrystal is the point man in this US campaign, and he is expendable. After all, he got his current position after another American commander, General David McKiernan, was thrown under the bus last year.

Petraeus is in a different position. Having risen through the command ranks in Iraq, seizing the glory because of the mythical "surge", he is now at the apex of field authority. Afghanistan is his to win or lose.

His to win or lose, beyond and possibly despite the President. For --- take a look through EA's archives --- the spinning from January 2009 against Obama's limits has come from Petraeus and his allies, either at distance from Central Asia or in the corridors of Washington.

When the tip of this "crisis" is gone, that iceberg will remain.