Iran Analysis: The Hardliners Take on Ahmadinejad

The dominant front-line story on EA from Iran these days is the tension within the establishment: the growing conservative/principlist movement against the Government, the fight over Islamic Azad University, the disputes over the budget and the (still far from implemented) subsidy cuts, the criticisms over corruption, intimidation of senior clerics, and even pressure on the Supreme Leader.

This, however, may be the most dramatic illustration of the divisions.

Recently, the President's Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai claimed publicly that he had been told by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "You are being attacked because of me. They cannot attack me so they have a go at you."

Ahmadinejad then said to his principal aide, "In one year’s time [you] will become a kafar (infidel)" in these criticisms." Rahim-Mashai added his view: "Ahmadinejad’s turn will also come, and this prediction will come true in one and a half year’s time."

And who is behind this plot? Rahim-Mashai pointed at the prominent "hard-line" newspaper Keyhan: "In the opinion of [Keyhan editor Hossein] Shariatmadari I am not even Muslim. In his view I am a spy and a monafegh (heretic) and a part of a velvet coup."

And there's more. Last Thursday, Mehdi Mohammadi, Keyhan's political editor, told supporters of the"hard-line" movement Ansar Hezbollah:

In Iran, a new movement is appearing which wants to say that it’s more revolutionary than the Supreme Leader. This new movement wants to pit the supporters of Hezbollah in the society against the Supreme Leader, and to make this movement problematic for him. This new movement doesn’t want to see the country in peace and tranquility. It even wants to vacate the surroundings of the Supreme Leader from others and only keep itself in his proximity. And when this happens, it will want to say that we are the only ones who stayed, therefore all authority should be surrendered to me because I won 25 million votes.

That "I won 25 million votes" makes clear that Mohammadi is targeting the President. And here's a twist: Ansar Hezbollah is considered close to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who has often been identified as Ahmadinejad's religious mentor.

Then there is the curious affair of Mohammad Nasser Saghaie Biriya, Ahmadinejad's religious affairs advisor, who tried to resign last week. The supposed source was Ahmadinejad's criticism last month of the excesses of "morality police", for example, over the enforcement of hijab.

So what is going on here? There are two immediate possibilities: 1. the "hardliners" see the President going soft in his social policies, even as he tries to parade Iran's leading position abroad (note, for example, the smile-raising moment of Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami warning Ahmadinejad of the folly of his statement that men might be allowed to wear ties and not commit religious error); 2. the "hardliners" are making their own grab for power.

Yet while part of the tension lies in these all-too-obvious dynamics, the wider cause is still the one that has besieged the President since June 2009: his legitimacy is not assured.

If Ahmadinejad had truly established a grip on the economy, if he had demonstrated capability in political as well as economic management, if he had backed up his "25 million" chant with the clear support of Iran's people, then the hard-line concerns would not have turned into open opposition.

He didn't. And perhaps more importantly, he's not even a secure firewall, anyone. By that, I mean that one of Ahmadinejad's role has always been to serve as protection for the Supreme Leader and the Iranian system. Governments always get criticised and, in Iran's case, such criticism has the benefit of taking possible heat away from other institutions and Ayatollah Khamenei.

(If I was being provocative, I would suggest that this is not unique to the Islamic Republic. Many monarchs and indeed the Shah of Iran have tried to use Prime Ministers as firewalls against opposition. History shows when they have succeeded and when they have failed.)

The disputed election, however, damaged Ahmadinejad as a firewall. Indeed, when the Supreme Leader tried to shore up the President with his Friday Prayer sermon a week after the vote, telling everyone to shut up and sit down, the declaration had the opposite effect.

By the summer, it was not just a question of whether the President could survive but whether Ayatollah Khamenei was stable in his authority. In August, the tension broke into the open with the vehement opposition to the selection of Rahim-Mashai --- yes, the same person who is claiming that he is now the hard-liners' primary target --- as 1st Vice President and with battles for control of key Ministries. It took a letter from the Supreme Leader to Ahmadinejad and the uneasy "compromise" of Rahim-Mashai resigning the Vice Presidency but then becoming Chief of Staff to ease the prospect of an internal coup.

The claim that this crisis passed because the "Green" opposition to Ahmadinejad's election has disappeared or been muted always missed the wider point. Even if Government repression could take people off the streets and break up their communications, many within the Iranian establishment were not satisfied that the President had established authority. Indeed, many see him as counter-productive, sapping any strength that the Iranian system can claim.

That, of course, is not the sole reason for Keyhan's assault. There are personal factors and egos in play here. It does mean, however, that some in the establishment who might knock back Keyhan and other "hard-liners" will now try to use this conflict for their own manoeuvres.

If Ahmadinejad is no longer a suitable firewall for the Supreme Leader and thus the current Iranian system, then he must go, sooner or later.

But then the irony: the person who will step in to make this "later" rather than "sooner" is Ayatollah Khamenei. The President may be damaged goods but there is no assurance that a replacement will provide better cover for the Supreme Leader. To the contrary, the drama of toppling Ahmadinejad may expose weakness rather than establish strength.

So, in addition to putting out --- in confusing fashion, itself testimony to the tensions within --- his "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa last week, the Supreme Leader also appears to have worked with Mesbah Yazdi to persuade the President's religious advisor, Biriya, to withdraw his resignation. Keyhan's campaign against Rahim-Masahi, for now, has now picked up the endorsement of officials. A lid has been maintained on the Kahrizak prison abuse scandal, protecting other Ahmadinejad aides like Saeed Mortazavi.

The President is still in place. But whether Rahim-Mashai proves to be a prophet with his 18-month prediction --- "Ahmadinejad's time will come" --- reamins to be seen.

The Latest from Iran (27 July): Regime Wavering?

2020 GMT: Googling Iran. In a well-meaning but rather scattered New York Times article on Iranians living in the US, this episode stands out:

On a recent muggy afternoon in Washington Aliakbar Mousavi, a former member of Parliament, sat at a white table in a small Google conference room, imploring a top executive to provide more Persian-language Internet tools.

Speaking in halting English acquired during a year in the United States, Mr. Mousavi told Robert O. Boorstin, the company’s director of public policy, that activists inside Iran desperately needed Google earth, Google advertising and other services that can help thwart repression.

Mr. Boorstin was sympathetic if noncommittal, promising to consult with various engineers.

NEW Latest Iran Video: Ahmadinejad on Afghanistan, Sanctions, & the US (26 July)
NEW Iran Document: Mousavi on Governing and Mis-Governing, Now and in the 1980s (26 July)
NEW Iran Analysis: Interpreting Khamenei’s “Re-Appearing” Fatwa (Verde)
The Latest from Iran (26 July): Behind the International Screen

2015 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. An appellate court has upheld the four-year sentence of activist Amir Khosrow Dalirsani, jailed for assembly and conspiracy to act against national security. Dalirsani was detained after the Ashura protests in December.

2000 GMT: Arrested for Using Facebook. RAHANA reports Hanieh Farshi-Shatrian, a 28-year-old woman, has been arrested in Tabriz for "activism" on Facebook. Farshi-Shatrian has no history of political activity.

1825 GMT: We have posted the short video of the interview of President Ahmadinejad by CBS News, covering Afghanistan and sanctions but omitting any consideration of Iran's internal situation.

1815 GMT: The Missing Lawyer. Golnaz Esfandiari summarises the case of human rights lawyer Mohammad Mostafaei, who is still missing and whose wife and brother-in-law are still detained.

1705 GMT: Claim of Day. Rah-e-Sabz asserts that a group of the Supreme Leader's advisors, including his son Mojtaba Khamenei, Basij commander Hossein Taeb, and Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, held a special meeting after the June 2009 election and laid off 250 pro-Green officers of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

1700 GMT: Labour Front. Iran Labor Report has a special feature on "rampant wage thefts", where workers at large firms like Naghshe Iran Carpet Weaving in Qazvin, Khuzestan Pipe Factory, and Iran Telecommunication Industries have not been paid for months.

1650 GMT: The Battle Within. Looks like rifts within the establishment are getting worse....

Aftab News now has a second item critiquing divisions within the "hard-line camp" (for the first item, see 0845 GMT), saying that rifts are due to a lack of ability, law-breaking, and distortion of ideology.

But this may be small change compared to a fight brewing between Keyhan and the President's inner circle. We should have a special analysis on Wednesday.

1640 GMT: Mahmoud's Wisdom of the Day. Peyke Iran, from Islamic Students News Agency, summarises President Ahmadinejad's latest speech: "The biggest gift to is the Imam....If you are poor, get married and God will feed you."

1638 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Kurdish high school teacher Mohsen Jaladiani has been sentenced to six years in prison.

1633 GMT: Economy Watch (Revolutionary Guards Edition). Member of Parliament Mehrdad Lahouti has asserted that Khatam ol-Anbia, the engineering firm linked to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, may be entering the project to construct a freeway from Tehran to the Caspian Sea.

1630 GMT: Larijani Replies to Mousavi? Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, in an apparent response to Mir Hossein Mousavi's latest statement --- especially Mousavi's comments on the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 --- has warned against the "classification of people", saying that accusations against them are "not right".

1330 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Earlier today we mentioned Hamed Saber, the photo-blogger and computer scientist detained for more than a month.

More than 70 Iranian university graduates and academics have launched a campaign calling for Saber's release.

1230 GMT: Ahmadinejad's War Strategy. The President has made another international move with an interview with Press TV.

On the surface, Ahmadinejad has restated his "war conspiracy", saying again that he expects the US to act soon: "They have decided to attack at least two countries in the region in the next three months....(We have) very precise information that the Americans have hatched a plot, according to which they to wage a psychological war against Iran."

Dig deeper, though, and you may find a more complex Ahmadinejad move. Notice that "Europe" and Britain do not take their usual roles alongside the US as Iran's opponents.

Could that be because Tehran --- and Ahmadinejad in particular --- are hoping to re-open talks on the uranium enrichment issue?

0907 GMT: Academic Corner. The commander of the Revolutionary Guard, General Mohammad Ali Jafari, has been appointed to the board of Yazd University by Minister of Science and Higher Education Kamran Daneshjoo.

0905 GMT: The Rice Scandal. MP Hassan Tamini, the speaker of Parliament's Health Commission, says that he has "no doubt" that 11 types of imported rice are polluted with lead, arsenic, and carcinogens.

0855 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran posts an interview with the mother of human rights activist Shiva Nazar Ahari, who has been arrested twice and detained for ten months since the June 2009 election.

Student Iman Sadighi, who was detained for 130 days, reports on conditions in Mati Kala prison in Babol.

A statement from activists in Rah-e-Sabz claims sentences in courts are based on factional affiliations and demands the release of journalist Abdolreza Tajik and photo-blogger Hamed Saber.

0850 GMT: More Tension. MP Ali Motahari, now a persistent high-profile critic of the Government, has turned to the hijab issue to challenge the President, insisting that people will turn away if hijab is not defended. Motahari has also --- in line with others --- taken a swipe at Ahmadinejad as voicing the words of his Chief of Staff, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai.

0845 GMT: Economy Watch. Aftab News asserts that, instead of admitting its mistakes, the government is blaming the private sector for unemployment. The newspaper says critics are right in assuming that the Ahmadinejad administration continues to control companies by using subsidiary firms with non-government names.

0840 GMT: Threatening the Bloggers. The Committee to Protect Bloggers reports that Fariborz Shamshiri, who blogs at Rotten Gods and has worked with Amnesty International and Freedom House, has received death threats on his life. Shamshiri says, “This is not the first time I am receiving this kind of threats but this is getting out of hand.”

0835 GMT: Parliament Update. MP Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh has claimed that the elimination of reformists has led to a split within the hardline movement, with the struggle for power visible in the Majlis and Government. These problems are compounded by "radicals" who have forgotten that they are the people's representatives and are ready to sacrifice the Majlis for the Government.

MP Abolqasem Raoufian warns: "If we continue like this, reformists may win next elections. If the reformists are eliminated from next elections --- which is wrong --- hardliners will split into three camps."

0830 GMT: And What is Larijani Doing? Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani has joined in the post-fatwa debate to put in a few punches at the President. He has said that if a government wants to comply with that of the 12th ("hidden") Imam, it should establish social justice and give no alms because they are not necessary in such a just society. The government should also follow laws and fight against enemies such as the US and Zionists.

Larijani's parting shot? "Don't increase enemies with improper words", as Iran is "far away" from the just and effective government of the 12th Imam.

0825 GMT: Rallying around Khamenei? Hojatoleslam Mohammad Saeidi, the Friday Prayer leader in Qom, has asserted that there have always been senior clerics who prefered to oppose the Supreme Leader rather than "infidels" such as Zionists and the British.

Ayatollah Mohammad Qorvi has announced that the Khamenei fatwa is the "minimum approval" of velayat-e-faqih (clerical supremacy).

0800 GMT: We begin the morning with two features. Mr Verde analyses the problems for the Supreme Leader's "I am the Rule of the Prophet" fatwa, which has suddenly reappeared on his website. And we post the English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's latest statement, which links criticism of the current Government with a review of the political and military tensions during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.

Meanwhile....

Rumour of the Day

Rah-e-Sabz tries to add to the pressure on the regime by alleging that Ministry of Intelligence operatives were responsible for the murders of Neda Agha Soltan, killed in June 2009, and Dr Masoud Alimohammadi, who died in an explosion in January.

The news site claims from sources that almost three weeks ago, a car bomb exploded in Shahrak-e Rahahan, apparently to destroy the body of a victim killed elsehwere.  Two Ministry of Intelligence operatives were allegedly arrested and are being held, with a third person, in the ministry cellblock in Evin Prison.

In a possibly related incident about the same time, a car bomb failed to kill a wealthy businessman.

According to Rah-e-Sabz, the two arrested men work for Hamidreza Daneshmandi, the Director of Internal Security at the ministry. Further investigation supposedly revealed that this team was responsible for the deaths of Neda Agha Soltan and Dr Alimohammadi and may also be responsible for the explosion in the Khomeini Shrine a few days after the June 2009 elections.

Rah-e-Sabz says the investigation has led to tensions between the police and judiciary on one side and the Ministry of Intelligence on the other.

Latest Iran Video: Ahmadinejad on Afghanistan, Sanctions, & the US (26 July)

Brief notes on this interview of President Ahmadinejad by CBS News:

1. As Marc Lynch has noted at Foreign Policy, there is a real danger of a superficial portrayal of the Wikleaks "War Diary" showing a link between Tehran and the Taliban or even between Tehran and Al Qa'eda.

There is a massive difference between documents recording that "US officials say there are links...." and documents establishing evidence of links. As far as I know --- and this is a general remark on some of those claiming what the documents "show" --- those putting forth the Iran-Taliban-Al Qa'eda connections have not actually read any of the documents, only summaries put out for the press.

2. Beyond Afghanistan, CBS played nicely into Ahmadinejad's hands with softball questions on the nuclear programme, sanctions, and relations with Washington.

3. Most importantly, where was there any reference to Iran's internal situation? Is a major US network really that blinkered?

UPDATED Egypt: Mubarak's Not-So-Secret Cancer?

UPDATE 27 July: President Mubarak, in a thank-you letter to the spiritual leader of the Israeli religious party Shas, has said he is in great shape and "fully recovered". Rabbi Ovadia Yosef had sent a "Get Well" card two weeks ago.



UPDATE 24 July: Ten days after officials said he would be his attendance at the African Union summit in Uganda would demonstrate his good health, President Mubarak has cancelled the trip. Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif will now represent Cairo.

On Wednesday, presidential spokesman Suleiman Awwad had again dismissed reports that Mubarak was ill, saying staff were "out of breath" trying to keep up with his schedule.

UPDATE 19 July: The Mubarak cancer story has now made the pages of The Washington Times: "The 82-year-old Egyptian leader is thought by most Western intelligence agencies to be dying from terminal cancer affecting his stomach and pancreas."

UPDATE 13 July: As-Safir reports that Mubarak is going to Germany this week for another round of medical treatment. The Egyptian President had been scheduled to meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas in advance of Saturday's arrival by US envoy George Mitchell.

UPDATE 1600 GMT: A twist in the tale....

The Jerusalem Post, where we first saw the story this morning, has now removed any reference to cancer and posted the headline, "Mubarak Has Fallen Ill". The original Al-Quds al-Arabi story does appear to refer to medical tests in relation to a tumour.

EA has had reliable reports that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is suffering from cancer, raising questions over the country's political future. Egyptian authorities have been keen to keep the news from emerging, but the wall started to crumble when Mubarak had treatment in Germany --- the ostensible reason was gall-bladder surgery --- in March.

Now the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi has brought out the story. Mubarak has been in Paris, nominally to meet French President Sarkozy and Lebanese Prime Minister Sa'ad Hariri, but the newspaper says he has also undergone a round of medical tests.

Iran Document: Mousavi on Governing and Mis-Governing, Now and in the 1980s (26 July)

An English translation of Mir Hossein Mousavi's statement on Monday, posted on the Facebook site supporting him:

During the last years of his regime, the second Pahlavi (the Shah, overthrown in 1979) also announced that the Rastakhiz Party (Renaissance Party) is the only party in the country and we all saw what his fate was. [Editor's Note: This is a reference to President Ahmadinejad's recent declaration that Iran only needs one political party, the Velayat Party.]

Some have seriously mixed the celebration of this day [the birthday of Imam Mehdi, the 12th "hidden" Imam] and the philosophy of “waiting”[for his reappearance] with political agendas and superstitious. Now there are some internet websites that based on their forecast for the resurrection give made-up commentaries on country’s internal and international policies.

In these commentaries, the presence of the United States is considered as a confrontation with Imam Mehdi. Worse than that, dangerous and adventurous policies are recommended to help the resurrection [of the Imam Mehdi]....Some of the foreign policies that have caused the current critical situation have root in this kind of mentality, and the problem does not even end with the foreign policies. With a mind like this, an unordinary sensitivity toward the word progress is formed and this is one of the reasons behind eliminating the planning system and shutting down important councils.

With this belief that in six months to a year Imam Mehdi will emerge, they shut down Kangan Port and Southern Pars [oil and gas] projects. Any planning for water or electricity and in general the economy of the country is halted and instead of creating jobs and trying to invest, the charity-type economy and distributing money among people is substituted. The philosophy of “waiting”, which has always made the believers and followers of Imam Mehdi put in more effort, has been turned upside down.

The rule of justice and elimination of injustice and oppression from the society is the focus of narratives about the resurrection. The root of immoralities in the society are the rule of injustice and the government’s divergence from justice. Don’t think that you can keep a great number of the nation’s children, including intellectuals, academia, teachers, workers, journalists, women and youths, in prison in the name of Islamic government but that this injustice and oppression will have no effect on the people’s beliefs.

Establishing justice and avoiding injustice is the important criterion for measuring how close is a societyto that to the kind ready for Imam Mehdi. The more a regime distances itself from justice and commits injustice, oppression and mistreatment of the people the more it distances itself from the kind of society acceptable to Imam Mehdi.

Ignoring the nation’s right to rule its own fate, disregarding the national covenant and demolishing nation’s rights, shutting down voices and newspapers and turning the national media into an exclusive one, wasting public resources with major economic corruptions, and breaking the backs of the workers, farmers, and employees under high costs are all signs of injustice and oppression and  society distancing from the Imam Mehdi’s values.

In a society acceptable to Imam Mehdi, they don’t overlook the major thieves to cut off the hands of a petty thief. We ask again and we will not get tired of asking, "What happened to the files of major financial corruptions?" They were opened in the Parliament, which is in line with the administration, but then the Parliament was shockingly and suddenly silenced.

In this effort not only the foreigners and allies of Saddam [Hussein] are active but the administration’s agents as well.

The appendices that were published [in Government newspapers around the 12 June anniversary of the 2009 Presidential election] are good excuses for the Green Movement to, alongside all its activities, face the history of the last 30 years realistically and study it with its independent investigation.

These days, with the excuse of the anniversary of UN Resolution 598 (the resolution that ended the 1980-1988 war between Iran and Iraq) --- in no previous year had they remembered it --- clear and planned distortions about the history of the Holy Defence (against Iraq’s invasion) and the role of the administration at the time (the cabinet of Prime Minister Mousavi) are fabricated.

These days some are claiming that they wanted to conquer Baghdad but the administration at the time prevented them. I have not yet spoken of the first decade after the revolution and had never intended to speak about it. Apparently, if these distortions continue, to defend the brave soldiers and leaders who had great roles [in protecting the country], I have to tell my untold stories and also what was the reason behind my resignation in 1989.

That former Minister, who himself knows how he was forced on me and knows better than anyone else how all of the government’s facilities were flooding to the war fronts, now says that, if the government’s facilities were at the disposal of the war fronts, we would have conquered Baghdad.

I say that if you [this former Minister]....had the control of the government, you would have done the same thing to the country that you did with the money set aside for the poor and orphans in the Foundation for the Underprivileged during your time as its head.

I cannot believe that [the former Minister has] forgotten that $4 billion out of the $6 billion of the oil revenues were spent at the war fronts and on the war, and the remaining $2 billion were in fact to protect the country....You force me to say that despite the bright outcome of the Holy Defence --- at the cost of the sacrifice of the blood of many and the devotion of the soldiers ready to die --- was that not even a square centimetre of the land of this country was forfeited to the enemy....

Conquering Iraq by handing the government to a few military commanders was not possible. But to achieve the enemy’s certain defeat, it was necessary that from the beginning the relationship between the administration and the control of the war and military planning was not cut. How this relationship was cut is another story that maybe I will explain at another time.

After, as this former minister says,...the control of “the command headquarters for all forces” was given to the administration, there were great improvements in the war fronts in that small time frame....At that time, I accepted the responsibility of heading “the command headquarters for all forces” with the condition that I bring some of the brilliant managers and directors to that centre.

One of the most prominent and most influential of them was Mr. Behzad Nabavi, the senior member of the Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution Organization, who we know has all kind of troubles these days [Nabavi has been detained since last summer]. The decision that the headquarters, alongside the military commanders and these brilliant managers, was a fundamental change in the arrangement of the fronts and it was decided that in the least possible tim,e using all of the country’s facilities, the troops present in Kurdestan were transferred to Khuzestan. With the efforts of the governor of Khuzestan,...Mohsen Mirdamadi (the currently imprisoned chairman of the Islamic Iran Participation Front), and other managers in the province, measures were taken to deal with the imminent attack of the enemy.

The prediction of the headquarters was correct. Soon one of the strongest attacks of Saddam occurred and there was one the most epic battles in the history of the Holy Defence, which involved the martyrdom of several children of our country. The enemy received such a slap in the face that after thatit  could not manage another attack and that all it could do was to support Monafeghin (the "terrorist" Mojahedin-e-Khalq --- MKO), which led to that great betrayal against Iran with the support of Saddam’s forces, but our people crushed them with their resistance.”

These remarks are to say that if you truly respect the blood of martyrs and the efforts of the support teams and the thorough resistance of all of the nation and the administration during this decisive war..., don’t give in to the demands of those who distort the history and play politics with it.

In the past two decades, I did not think that my own direct information from the war was sufficient, and I tried to also study the documents, manuscripts and printed analyses. I was always careful not only to look at the official documents which had been prepared under the direction of the commanders but also to use the articles and analyses of all experts including those of the Army. One of the best analyses was by the intelligent and patriotic officer, Sergeant Moeeni Vaziri, which I benefited from greatly.

This war has a lot of untold stories, and I have not seen that Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani, as the acting commander-in-chief, ever speak of his troubles harmonizing the army and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps. The troubles in my view had nothing to do with the body of the IRGC or the army, and I witnessed how eroding these troubles were.

In my opinion, three years into the war, there were fundamental mistakes in determining war strategies. Sending troops to Kurdestan was one of them, and more significant than that was hoping for a great classic operation similar to the enemy’s operations. This greatly diminished our relative advantage as well as the country’s facilities, and for almost five years all of the country’s facilities --- even to the points of taking snow ploughs off the roads, using all of the government’s trucks and even confiscating trucks that belonged to the private sector, as well as employing all financial-industrial capacities of the country --- were used but the result was what we all witnessed.

The idea that this former minister raised was the remainder of those wishful hopes for the classic war plans....This kind of view of the war from the very beginning was opposed among the fighters...In the communications that the commanders, such as the martyr Haaj Davood Karimi, had with me, they preferred operations similar to those during the first era of the Holy Defence. These plans were more in line with the country’s economic and social abilities. In future, if it is needed and I am forced to, I will explain these discussions in more depth.