UPDATED Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad

URGENT UPDATE 1240 GMT: The Next Move in the Plot? Abdolhossein Ruholamini has given another interview about the crimes in Kahrizak Prison, including the abuse and death of his son Mohsen.

Ruholamini repeated the information, mentioned in our main article about his speech to a student organisation, that he has more than 3500 pages of evidence against the people in charge of Kahrizak. And he reiterated that there is independent evidence of the attempted murder of Kahrizak doctor Ramin Pourandarjan, who died last autumn. Ruholamini again singled out Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi as the main suspect, saying the former Tehran prosecutor should accept the charges and resign instead of issuing political statements.

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Ruholamini added the new claim that forces "behind the scenes" have been trying to get the families of victims to agree to silence, but he declared that he and some other families would "stand till the end".

These claims, however, are only the set-up for Ruholamini's political hammer blow: in a meeting with the Supreme Leader, "Ayatollah Khamenei supported my cause".

And guess where the interview has been reprinted? Well, it is in two publications linked to the central plotters against President Ahmadinejad: Tabnak, linked to Mohsen Rezaei, and in Farda, which supports Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf.

UPDATE 1000 GMT: There has been no high-profile media coverage, to our knowledge, of our news of the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting. The closest intersection has been a blog post by Babak Dad, who is now writing outside Iran, and his interview on Voice of America Persian yesterday. Dad's blog considered in detail the more general story of the manoevures by Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf against the Ahmadinejad Government, while his interview  but so far he has not connected this to the specific claim of a plot to curb or remove the President from power.

UPDATE 23 JANUARY, 0700 GMT: 24 hours later, how does the plot story hold up?

Well, there was no explicit confirmation --- given the sensitivity of any attempt to depose the President, that would be unlikely --- there were no development pointing away from the possibility. Indeed, the one piece of circumstantial evidence, Ali Larijani's statement before Friday Prayers in a city southwest of Tehran, gave implied support. The Speaker of Parliament made a veiled invitation to opposition leaders to join a move, and he continued the attack on the Government's management of the economy.

(Someone is also starting some pretty wicked rumours. Notable amongst these on Friday was the "Iran banks will fail on Wednesday" story.)

EA readers maintained a healthy scepticism about the day throughout the day. Some points can be answered quickly --- because of the way we received the information and checked it, I am certain it is not regime disinformation or a pretext to move against irritants like Larijani. Other questions are far trickier, such as the role of the Supreme Leader in these manoeuvres and the process by which the plotters could pull the trigger and oust Ahmadinejad.

An EA correspondent picked up on some of these issues in "A Response to the Plot Against Ahmadinejad", and this morning we have a sharp, valuable discussion between Chris Emery and another EA Iran specialist on not only the complications of deposing the President but the uncertainties of what would follow.

UPDATE 0810 GMT: In last night's debate on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a member of Parliament and fervent Ahmadinejad supporter, alleged that "some people in charge want to overthrow" the Government with the help of the Parliament.

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For months we have reported on the challenge to President Ahmadinejad, not just from the Green movement but from conservative and principlist members of the Iranian establishment. Since Ashura (27 December), we have noted a rising intensity in criticism, for example, from member of Parliament Ali Motahhari and his brother-in-law, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, as well as the Parliamentary report on detainee abuses charging Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi with responsibility.

The question still remained. Were these criticisms being made by high-profile individuals or were they part of an organised effort to limit Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly even remove him from office?

Here is what we can now report from reliable sources:

1. THE MEETING MAKES A PLAN

Sometime after the demonstrations of Ashura (27 December), three well-placed Iranian politicians met to discuss current events. The protests, with their scenes of violence and, in some cases, the retreat of Iranian security forces before the opposition, had been unsettling, raising fears not only that the challenge would persist but that the authority of the Government might collapse.

The three men were 1) Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament; 2) Mohsen Rezaei, former head of the Revolutionary Guard, former Presidential candidate, and Secretary of the Expediency Council; and 3) Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mayor of Tehran.

The meeting reached agreement on a general two-step strategy. First, the crisis with the opposition would be "solved", either through a resolution with its leaders or by finally suppressing it out of existence. Then, there would be a political campaign to get rid of the unsettling influence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Each of the three men brought not ideas but key groups to the table. Larijani, of course, commanded a good deal of backing in Parliament and was close to the Supreme Leader. Rezaei not only had the background in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps but also, in the Expediency Council, worked with Hashemi Rafsanjani. Qalibaf, although mostly quiet during the post-election crisis, had the base of support from his solid reputation overseeing Tehran.

(It is likely, according to sources, that Rafsanjani knows of the plan, especially given the connection with Rezaei. It is unclear whether the Supreme Leader knows its details.)

The plan, however, soon ran into trouble with its first objective. The group was unable to get the support of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Despite the sustained wave of post-Ashura arrests, striking at the top levels of the Green movement, the prospect of large demonstrations on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, remains. And it is that prospect that was reportedly worrying the Supreme Leader when he spoke last week to ask the "elites" to choose sides and stop being "ambiguous".

So the possibility arose that the second step --- the removal of Ahmadinejad --- would take priority over the first. Newspapers connected to the three men stepped up their articles criticising the Government over the post-election crisis, over the Kahrizak Prison scandal, and over the economy. Larijani went public in statements alleging mismanagement by the Ahmadinejad administration and referring to the dangers of "extremism" within, as well as outside, the Government.

Meanwhile, a key distinction was being made at every opportunity. While the Government could and should be criticised, Ayatollah Khameini should not be challenged. Larijani in particular set out the line: velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical authority, is beyond dispute.

The immediate goals are the downfall of two men in Ahmadinejad's camp: former Tehran Prosecutor General Mortazavi, who is vulnerable because of the detainee scandal, and former First Vice-President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, whose management skills as well as his character are being attacked across a range of issues.

It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him. Victory over Rahim-Mashai, however, would be a major blow to the President. After all, this was the fight of the summer, where Ahmadinejad had to give way over his relative and friend as First Vice-President --- notably because of pressure from the Supreme Leader --- but then brought him back as his closest aide.

To lose Esfandiar once is misfortune; to lose him twice political calamity. Ahmadinejad's authority would be open to further attack, and the post-election crisis could be brought upon him personally. Which brings us to....

2. THE FATHER EXPRESSES HIS ANGER.

"It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him."

Abdolhossein Ruholamini is a prominent Tehran University professor who was the chief advisor to Mohsen Rezaei. He is also the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died from abuse this summer in Kahrizak Prison. That death was instrumental in prompting both the closure of Kahrizak, by personal order of the Supreme Leader, and the Parliamentary enquiry into events there.

Abdolhossein Ruholamini, however, is still campaigning. Last week he met with the student movement, Islamic Community from European Countries to Iran. In a forceful speech, he declared his anger with Ahmadinejad and the Government. He made clear that he and others had decided to "claim and appeal" over the authorities at Kahrizak, Saeed Mortazavi, the police, and the judiciary: (I paraphrase) "We have much evidence against Mortazavi, against police, against some judges. (Ruholamini said that, in one case, a single judge had condemned 700 people to jail in one day.) We even have phone conversations over the killing of the doctor [Ramin Pourandarjan] in Kahrizak.”

Ruholamini made clear that his claim and appeal is also against President Ahmadinejad. And he has also said that he met the Supreme Leader over the matter and Khamenei said (paraphrasing), "Go ahead. The way is clear for you."

3. THE OUTCOME?

EA sources report the sentiment of those in and around the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting and the statements of Ruholamini: “We have decided to replace Ahmadinejad”. At the same time, the group is insisting that the removal has to done within the framework of law. It is notable, for example, how Mohsen Rezaei --- in an extended interview with Press TV last week --- insisted repeatedly that the difference between him and other Presidential candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) in the post-election conflict was that Rezaei had always made his complaints within Iran's system, rather than on the streets.

The most likely path for that campaign is Parliamentary removal of Ahmadinejad --- similar to the US process of impeachment and conviction of a President --- for negligence in carrying out his duties and leading the country in a good direction. This was the process used to oust the first President of the Islamic Republic, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, in 1981.

That case, however, raises a question and possible complication. In 1981 Ayatollah Khomeini was behind the removal of Bani-Sadr. In this case, it is still not clear if the current Supreme Leader, and those close to him such as his son Mojtaba, are fully aware of or in line with the campaign against Ahmadinejad.

Which in turn brings us back to the earlier disputes of summer 2009, when the Supreme Leader --- after protracted battles with Ahmadinejad including not only Rahim-Mashai but also control of key ministries --- proceeded with the President's inauguration. This time, given the mounting fears over 22 Bahman, which way does he turn? Does he intervene or stand aside, letting others play out this political showdown?

Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)

Chris Emery and another top EA correspondent respond to yesterday's "The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad" and readers' question by considering the process for the President's removal and the political questions that would follow:

EMERY: First of all, we should not overlook that there would have to be another election within 50 days in the case of impeachment. The massive question then would be whether (Mir Hossein) Mousavi would be barred from standing. If he was, then the exercise in restoring legitimacy is worthless. If he wasn't, then the regime would be taking a monumental step. Can't see it happening for those reasons alone.

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But if it did....


My understanding is that constitutionally the Majlis Speaker would take a central role in any impeachment. They would also be responsible, along with the Deputy President and head of the Judiciary to arrange for the new President to be elected within 50 days. This may be complicated if (Speaker of Parliament) Ali Larijani is standing.

That would partly explain Rafsanjani's influence in 1981 as head of the Majlis. It might not give him quite as an important role now. On the other hand, in the above scenario, there would be two Larijanis and a weak Deputy (President) at the center of the process.

I also believe that in the case of dismissal of the President, the Deputy would take over until a new election. That would put (Mohammad Reza) Rahimi in temporary power.

However, in the case of "other matters which prevent him to perform his duties", the Leader "shall appoint another person in his place". Even if Rahimi doesn't have the "approval" of the Supreme Leader, Khamenei can appoint another for the interim. So the SL could have his pick for 50, probably quite important, days. But I assume they would not get rid of Rahimi and declare an election quickly.

(Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer) Qalibaf or Larijani or possibly (Secretary of Expediency Council Mohsen) Rezaei most likely to be acceptable to (Revolutionary) Guards and Supreme Leader. The Greens would take Qalibaf, but I suspect the international community would be happy with Larijani.

I said on Enduring America a while back that getting rid of Ahmadinejad and a modest amount of judicial reform or scapegoating would be the best way of splitting the opposition and isolating the fringe who want to dismantle the Islamic Republic. This initiative makes perfect sense but for the problem of an election.

Let me know where I am going wrong.

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, your reading is substantially correct, however the lack of precedent under the present Constitution, i.e. the one in place since 1989, means that it is likely that none of the gritty details contained in it will be respected. My gut feeling is that we won't see new elections in 50 days time, if and when Ahmadinejad is dethroned, but rather a temporary Presidential council taking over, with the usual suspects --- Larijani, Qalibaf, Rezaei, perhaps some Mousavi-leaning people --- part of it.

However, the big, unattended question in my view is --- what happens to Ahmadinejad himself if he is ousted? He certainly won't take the [deposed President in 1981, Abdolhassan] Bani Sadr route and challenge the regime before fleeing abroad, and he won't be chucked into regime retirement homes like the Supreme Leader's office and/or the Expediency Council either. How quite anyone intends to handle an impeached Ahmadinejad is quite a mystery for me, given that the man arguably has more popularity now than what Bani Sadr enjoyed at the moment of his ousting.

EMERY: I agree there is a lack of precedent, but the provisions and mechanisms for impeachment were not altered in 1989.

Would they really make up an entirely extra-Constitutional body? Perhaps they could amend the Constitution, but that was a lengthy undertaking last time and took a public referendum.

Perhaps I'm thinking too orthodox, and they could do this on the fly, but I remain skeptical that this will really happen. Not least because of the problem of what to do with Ahmadinejad. Can't quite see him donning a chador, escaping to France, and joining forces with MEK (Mujahedin e-Khalq, opposed to the Iran regime since 1979)! Of course the sensible thing to do would be to have Ahmadinejadmeet an accident and blame MEK-US-Israel-Mousavi....

CORRESPONDENT: Chris, the impeachment scenario today is very different from 30 years ago. At the time, executive power was in the hands of the Prime Minister, and Bani Sadr was technically impeached because he was relieved of his technically ceremonial office.

This time round the whole executive branch of state enters a state of paralysis, collapse, and uncertainty which cannot be rapidly hushed up like 1981, when prime minister Mohammad Ali Rajai's government, at the time totally estranged from President Bani Sadr, kept on working --- ironically one of the very first decisions after the ouster of Bani Sadr was appointing one Mir-Hossein Mousavi to the vacant Foreign Minister position. Besides, at the time there was Khomeini who could rally everyone around himself. Khamenei will not be able to redeem himself via a simple ouster of Ahmadinejad.

As for extra-constitutional bodies, there is ample precedent. The Assembly of Experts was founded in 1983 or 1984 and included in the Constitution in 1989 --- ditto the Expediency Council, which Khomeini created in January-February 1988 and which was finally incorporated in the Constitution in June 1989. All it needs is essentially a decree by Khamenei.

EMERY: So impeachment would for political reasons have to be accompanied, not by the Consitutional provisions, but by the establishment of a temporary Presidential Council which may or may not receive consitutional legitimacy some years down the line. I still think this would be an extraordinary step. It would presumably have to be rubber-stamped by Parliament.

Also, how temporary would this council be? presumably till the next election cycle?

CORRESPONDENT: I think anything, including Ahmadinejad's resignation would be exceptional and extraordinary right now, and would not solve the political crisis in the long term for sure. I am not even sure his impeachment would ensure a working government, I have reasons to believe that it would unleash anarchy.

Besides, Khamenei has erred on the side of caution throughout the past 20 years. To stick a neck out and implicitly acknowledge that he screwed it up big time on [the Presidential election of] 12-13 June would be a step too far. So I think Khamenei would agree to such a plan only if it were backed up by cast-iron guarantees from everyone involved that he and his cronies (Revolutionary Guards especially) would be left unscathed.

As to how Mousavi and (Mehdi) Karroubi would react to all this, considering that they risk alienating their popular base en masse if they appear to buckle under the terms of a pro-Khamenei agreement --- as a Qalibaf-Larijani-Rezaei one would certainly be portrayed as by the reformist media.... That remains also very much to be seen.

The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News

0030 GMT: Just a quick note to say that we've extended our break. We'll be back first thing Saturday morning with full updates, including the latest on "the plot against Ahmadinejad".

1845 GMT: We're going to catch our breath tonight after the excitement of today. We'll be back later for a wrap-up; in the meantime, keep sending in information and your analyses.

1820 GMT: Larijani's Opening? We'll need to get more on this statement by Ali Larijani, during Friday Prayers in Saveh, southwest of Tehran, but there is a hint in Mehr News that the Speaker of Parliament has extended a hand to different factions when it paraphrases, "Every effort should be made to foster unity in society, and everyone should refrain from divisive actions meant to drive individuals off the political stage."

The Persian-language report, significantly, devotes most of its attention not to the "unity" statement but to Larijani's critique of the Government's economic proposals.

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1735 GMT: Press TV Censors Ahmad Khatami? Surely not, but the website curiously omits any mention of Khatami's warning to Iranian protesters and the call for all to choose the side of the Supreme Leader (see 1250 and 1645 GMT). Instead, the entire report is "Cleric Says Iran Nuclear Case Important 'Test'".

1730 GMT: Journalist Leili Farhadpour has been arrested.

1645 GMT: More on That Friday Prayer (see 1250 GMT). Persian2English translates passages of Ahmad Khatami's statement, which is his usual warning to deviant demonstrators:

To our brothers who call themselves protesters, we ask, how much longer are you going to continue with your protests? Are you still going to use your destructive statements which neglect the law? Are you going to water the roots of those who try to turn any cooperative situation into a conflict? They say it was not them who created the chaos; the question is who initiated this atmosphere? How long are you going to continue your protests and annoy the people?

This passage, however, does give pause for consideration: "The group who considers themselves critics should announce where they stand. Either they are on this side [with the Supreme Leader and velayat-e-faqih] or they are on the other side. There is no third way."

That seems to echo Ayatollah Khamenei's statement earlier this week on "make your decision", but to whom was Khatami pointing the statement? Those deviant demonstrators, or the "critics within" the establishment?

1530 GMT: The German magazine Der Spiegel reports that Abed Tavancheh has been sentenced to one year in an Iranian prison for giving an interview about student protests.

1525 GMT: Hassan Rohani, an ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani, has continued to clash with President Ahmadinejad over the "failed" 4th Development Plan. After the Government ridiculed his data, Rohani has responded in detail in Peyke Iran.

1515 GMT: Earlier today (0845 GMT), we noted the manifesto of 31 Iranian expatriate intellectuals and artists: "The way out of this darkness, and of poverty and oppression caused by it, is that people make clear their relationship with tyranny through free elections, monitored by competent international institutions." This will bring "a system separating government from religion institutions, on behalf of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, separating legislative and executive powers, and [ensuring] judicial independence".

The statement has now been picked up by BBC Persian and by Radio Farda.

1309 GMT: The Purge at Allameh Tabatabei University. We've had reports this week of academic staff being terminated or relieved of duties. Putting them together:

Political philosopher Seyed Morteza Mardiha and women’s rights activist Saba Vasefi have been banned from teaching. According to Tabnak, eight faculty in the Economics Department have been expelled, and all but one stripped of the right to teach. The salaries of two faculty members of the Department of Agriculture have been cut.

The Development Program at Allameh Tabatabei has been completely terminated.

1250 GMT: Your Tehran Friday Prayers Summary. It's Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami setting out all that's significant in religion and politics today. Behold:

When you hold an election, that's the people's opportunity to put forth their views. Then someone wins and you stop for four years. Ahmadinejad won. So, protesters, be quiet.

And the US military is occupying Haiti, which proves they are very bad.

1240 GMT: Where's Mahmoud? President Ahmadinejad has opened a factory at Khorasan Steel and dealt with the current political crisis by calling on all Iranians to have a spiritual focus and obey Allah.

1235 GMT: Human Rights Activists News Agency reports that the files of 18 more Ashura protesters have been sent to the Revolutionary Court.

1015 GMT: We have posted comments from an EA correspondent on our featured analysis, "The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad".

0845 GMT: The Opposition Manifesto. More than 30 expatriate Iranian intellectuals and artists have issued a statement in support of Mir Hossein Mousavi.

0835 GMT: Slamming the  Opposition. Last night's debate on Iranian state media was a non-debate, as MPs Ruhollah Hosseinian and Alaeddin Boroujerdi were generally in agreement. An EA correspondent describes it as a “Love-Making discussion in which both side were praising and appreciating each other".

There was some drama, however. In addition to his claim of "a plot within" to topple the Government, Hosseinian talked of the "Axis of Revolt" of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. He offered this advice: the Supreme Leader was too patient with the opposition --- "if we had the authority; we would have sorted it out straightaway".

0820 GMT: An Iranian activist has posted a list, with English translation, of the arrest and current state (if known) of 229 people arrested on 16 Azar (7 December) or in the Tasua-Ashura demonstrations (26-27 December).

0655 GMT: We are putting the last touches to what we believe is a significant story: a high-level plan to move against President Ahmadinejad and possibly remove him from office. As soon as that is completed, we will update on latest news. (We have now posted the story.)

Iran: A Response to "The Plot Against Ahmadinejad"

A valued and well-informed EA correspondent comments on our article on the plan to limit President Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly remove him from power:

The reference to the 1981 scenario is a correct one. It should be reminded that Ayatollah Khomeini's support for the impeachment and removal of [President] Bani Sadr came very late in the day, after the leaders of the Islamic Republican Party succeeded in alienating Khomeini completely from his former lieutenant. Essentially, it didn't happen till pretty much a week or so before the actual impeachment. Guess who was instrumental in the latter happening? One Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was at the time Majlis Speaker. Rafsanjani was also the man behind the ejection of [Grand Ayatollah] Montazeri from the successorship to Khomeini. In short, he's the man with the required CV for the job of removing Ahmadinejad.

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Whether the latter will happen or not, also depends on the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps leadership. One of the big remaining enigmas of the post-election events in Iran is the exact relationship patterns in the IRGC-Ahmadinejad-Supreme Leader triangle. Different scenarios emerge. If the IRGC leadership is, as stated on paper, loyal to the persona of Khamenei and reflexively behind AN because of the former's hitherto unswerving support for the latter, then we could see change happening if and when Khamenei reassures his IRGC flock that they will not be affected by any change in the Presidency. Another way out for Khamenei is to bring back the old IRGC leadership into the fold. [Yahiya] Rahim Safavi has been making interesting noises of late, essentially aligning himself to [Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer] Qalibaf in calling for a "third way" out to get past the "power-hungry" group (Government supporters) and the "destabilising" (opposition) one.

Whatever the outcome of this power tussle, we won't be seeing a Mousavi or Karroubi led administration. The only two people I can see fitting the bill in case of the removal of Ahmadinejad are either [Ali] Larijani or Qalibaf. I think I would gladly accept Qalibaf if I were the Green wave leadership, as they will at least be able to get a semblance of proper political activity (newspapers, party meetings, etc.) going under him.

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2040 GMT: Pars Daily News claims that Seyed Hassan Ahmadian, head of Mir Hossein Mousavi's People Committee, has disappeared.

1840 GMT: "Foreign Enemies" Cause Regime Change...and Earthquakes. Investigative Journalism of the Day from Kayhan --- the earthquake in Haiti was caused by the redoubtable US "Harp" weapon, which is more powerful than an atomic bomb.

1830 GMT: More on Larijani's Challenge. In his recent speech, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani used the economy to challenge President Ahmadinejad, criticising the rising government budget and the failure of the 4th Development Plan. Only one-quarter of the Development Plan has reportedly been implemented.

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1805 GMT: Film Boycott. The famous director Abbas Kiarostami has refused to join the jury of Tehran's Fajr International Film Festival, which is scheduled to start on 25 January. Kiarostami joins other prominent figures, such as actor Ezzattollah Entezami and director Asghar Farhadi, who have turned down offers to be on the panel.

An EA reader updates: Theo Angelopoulos, the famous Greek filmmaker, has decided to withdraw from the festival.

1800 GMT: Academic Purges (cont.). Two of the Allameh Tabatabei University professors who have been banned from teaching are prominent political philosopher Seyed Morteza Mardiha and women's rights activist Saba Vasefi.

1755 GMT: The reformist Mohajedin of Islamic Revolution have issued a protest against the arrests of political activists, journalists, and students and the attacks on valuable members of the Islamic Republic for pseudo-offences, demanding their immediate release.

1630 GMT: The Tehran Prosecutor-General, Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi, has declared that anyone who associates with the Committee for Human Right Reporters is a "criminal".

Seven of the nine members of the central committee of CHRR are now detained.

1535 GMT: But the Best Will Come on Friday. Here, however, is a hint of the most explosive information we have gotten today. It will take us a bit of time to get it in proper context but....

The Plot to Remove Ahmadinejad: It involves at least three high-ranking officials in the Iran Government, one of whom is close to the Supreme Leader, one of whom is connected to the Revolutionary Guard and to Hashemi Rafsanjani, and one of whom is an influential politician but has remained almost silent in the post-election crisis. A fourth key person, who was involved in one of the Presidential campaigns and has a special grievance over the Kahrizak Prison scandal, is complementing the move with public statements.

The initial plan was to "take care" of the opposition in the current crisis and then move against the President, but it appears that this has been overtaken by events: Ahmadinejad may have to go even as the Green movement and Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami cause complications for the plotters.

1530 GMT: Another Target for the Supreme Leader. A bit of additional (and so far unknown) information behind Ayatollah Khameini's warning to the "elites" to "take sides" this week:

Last week, Ayatollah Javadi-Amoli, the former Friday Prayers leader in Qom, sent a letter to Khameini last week criticising the Government. Javadi-Amoli reportedly, after a public class in Qom, said that "nobody can solve a problem with money", a reference to the President's handout to Iran's poorest people, and that such actions were unfair because anyone "can get love" by buying it.

Khamenei's warning was, therefore, not only to Hashemi Rafsanjani and to the "conservative/principlist opposition within" but to Javadi-Amoli for going far publicly, especially as it is becoming apparent that the Supreme Leader fears a major protest on 22 Bahman (11 February).

1520 GMT: Why the Newspapers are Being Threatened (see 0955 GMT). Look to the Deputy Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Mo-Amin Ramin. An EA source says Ramin, a former Foreign Ministry official and a friend of Ahmadinejad (he reportedly is influential in the President's thoughts on the Holocaust), is behind the warnings to no less than 15 newspapers to stop publishing critical information about the Government.

The editor of Jomhouri Eslami, Masih Mohajeri, wrote to the Minister of Culture --- after Ramin threatened closure of the newspaper for publishing the 1 January statement of Mir Hossein Mousavi --- to ask him to "Ershad Ramin" (Ershad in Persian and Arabic means "Guidance"). The Parliament asked Ramin to appear before a committee and explain his actions.

Neither initiative seems to have had any effect.

1510 GMT: An Afternoon of Inside Information. Have spent a few hours checking with some very knowledgeable people about the manoeuvres inside and outside the regime. Consider this "clerical alliance", for example:

On Tuesday, Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the late Imam, went to the house of Ayatollah Sane'i in Qom. After a "very good meeting", Khomeini criticised the "hard-line" Society of Teachers and Researchers of Qom, headed by the pro-Ahmadinejad Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi.

With the visible support for Sane'i, who has been effectively ostracised (and arguably, after the death of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, feared) by the Government, and the denunciation of the Society, Khomeini's allegiances have been re-confirmed. Indeed, the visit was quickly condemned by Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a fervent backer of the President.

1034 GMT: Defend the Supreme Leader! If you're lost like me in the confusion around the intrigues for and against the Iranian Government, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and Press TV hold out this simple lifeline:

"Velayat-e-Faqih is the foundation of democracy and religion in the country," Larijani told a gathering of clerics in central Markazi Province.

Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, is the current religious jurisprudent. Under Iran's Constitution, the the Assembly of Experts chooses and supervises the Leader.

(For US readers: think of it through the words of Paul Crowe (played by Burt Reynolds) in the 1974 classic The Longest Yard: "The most important thing to remember [in American football] is....Protect your Quarterback --- Me!")

1030 GMT: Ayande News stirs the pot a little more, published an analysis of why different "hard-liners" may be trying to bring down the regime.

1025 GMT: Massoud Nur Mohammadi has joined his brother Saeed, a member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front, in detention.

1005 GMT: On the Mortazavi Battlefront. The headline fight over the future of former Tehran Prosecutor General and Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi continues. The President has expressed determination to defend Mortazavi against accusations of responsibility for detainee abuses.

0955 GMT: Hitting the Newspapers. As the conflict within the Iranian establishment intensifies, the warnings escalate. No less than 15 publications --- Tehran Emrooz, Bahar, Tose'e, Rouzan, Jahan-e Eqtesad, Ettelaat, Etemaad, Asrar, Jahan-e San'at, Mardomsalari, Arman-e Ravabet-e Omumi, Jomhouri, Poul, Farhikhtegan, and Afarinesh --- have been threatened with suspension for "inappropriate" material.

Those articles include the biting reply of member of Parliament Ali Motahhari, who is in the forefront of criticism of the Government, to Ahmadinejad Chief of Staff Rahim-Mashai, the critique of Hassan Rohani, an ally of Hashemi Rafsanjani, of the severe security situation (amniati) and the lack of freedom of speech on 29 Dey, and the most recent statement of Mohammad Khatami.

0905 GMT: Prisoners Revolt. Human Rights and Democracy Activists in Iran reports that solitary confinement prisoners at the Gohardasht facility, the site of alleged physical abuse and torture, gained control of their ward for a period of time on Monday. This is the third recent occasion when inmates have rebelled and temporarily taken over sections of the prison.

0855 GMT: Today's Unhelpful Help from the US. Writing in The Wall Street Journal, which has embraced support of the opposition as the way to regime change in Iran, James Glassman and Michael Doran are not even subtle and/or smart enough to hide their real priorities:

Al Qaeda bombers on U.S. airliners need prompt attention, but it is Iran, a supporter of terrorism now developing the capacity to fire nuclear-tipped missiles, that may pose the greatest threat to global stability and American security.

That threat can be diminished three ways: by military action, by compromise by Iran's regime, or by a new, less bellicose government taking power in Tehran. The first two appear unlikely, but the third, at least since protests broke out last June after the presidential election, seems more and more realistic. Yet so far the United States and its allies have shrunk from seriously encouraging that third way.

Having gone this far, I'm not sure why they didn't just put together the words "Green Movement" and "pawn". And take a wild guess what the Iranian regime will do with this opinion piece if it bumps into it.

Most importantly, compare this screed with the thoughts of reformist Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, which we've posted in a separate entry, on the best US approach towards the Iranian opposition.

(A far-from-unimportant opinionated side note: Glassman and Doran were both key officials in the George W. Bush Administration's disastrous and often unintentionally humourous efforts at "public diplomacy".)

0835 GMT: And here's more knife-twisting from Khabar Online: "Iran Rial Stands as the 3rd Weakest World Currency". In a not-so-subtle criticism of the Government's management of the economy, the website notes, "The latest figures on the value of various currencies against the US dollar show that Iranian rial is only stronger than dobra of Sao Tome and Vietnamese dong."

0830 GMT: Larijani v. Ahmadinejad Showdown. Following our report yesterday, the English version of Khabar Online, the website close to Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, uses "members of Parliament" to put the demand bluntly: "[President's Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-] Mashai To Be Ousted or Resigned".

0820 GMT: Taking Apart Khamenei's Speech. I doubt it will worry the Supreme Leader, given the source, but the Green movement's Rah-e-Sabz has published a sharp critique in a general challenge of Khamenei's supremacy and policies.

The website asks how Khamenei can demand the support of "nokhbegan" (intellectuals), if he has to dictate to them what they have to think. It also condemning his "plot theory", based on "cultural attack", which he has put forward from the very beginning of his Leadership. Rah-e-Sabz raises the issue of "nokhbe-koshi" (killing intellectuals).

0710 GMT: Academic Purges (cont.). After our news yesterday that at least six Allameh Tabatabei University professors have been relieved of their duties, an Iranian activist is reporting further terminations of contracts.

0644 GMT: As we catch up with the news this morning, we will also continue the attempt to bring out the meaning in the recent speeches of the Supreme Leader, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and other prominent Iranian players in the post-election conflict. Who is threatening who? Who is allying with whom?

Meanwhile, we post a scholarly example of analysing "in code": Tehran-based Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh's survey of 2009 considers the tensions within the country as well as the nuclear question and Iran's foreign relations. And we have a not-so-coded interview with Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, a former reformist member of Parliament who had to leave Iran for the US in 2005: "The United States should carefully and delicately support the opposition movement based on United Nations conventions [on human rights]."