Tuesday
Jan122010
Iran: How Far Do The Green Movements Go?


As protesters draw breath during a relatively long pause between major demonstrations, the question may not be how the regime reacts to these statements --- my reading, set out yesterday, is that the Iranian Government's immediate concern is challenges within the establishment than with the pressure beyond it --- but how the Green movement(s) respond.
While Karroubi and Khatami were clear in their criticisms of the regime, both also emphasised that their approach rested on non-violence on all sides and that their resolutions were within the system, adhering to the Constitution. What, however, does adherence to the Constitution entail? Would this just be a question of apologies, compensation, and the punishment of some officials? Or would the demands reach to the removal of President Ahmadinejad for his responsibility in the failures and abuses? Do they include a change in the position of the Supreme Leader?
(Our initial evaluation that Karroubi had specifically mentioned Khamenei in his five-point plan has not been followed by other summaries. We are double-checking.)
An analysis from an activist sets out the issue forcefully:
The green movement, at least when it comes to its slogans, has defined some short-term objectives. Slogans which, at an earlier point, consisted of calling Ahmadinejad a liar or questioning his 63% share of the vote have now become more direct and confrontational, addressing the dictator himself and wanting an end to the dictatorship.
Why is it that, when the demand of the main body of the movement has evolved to such an extent, the leaders, namely Mousavi and Karroubi, refuse to announce it openly? Why is there no mention of this demand in the statement issued by Bazargan, Soroush, Kadivar, Ganji, and Mohajerani (the five Iranian expatriate intellectuals who issued their 10 Demands two days after Mousavi's New Year statement)?
The demand for the removal of Khamenei is, in reality, a demand for fundamental change; it is tantamount to the negation of his policies for the last 20 years, but at the same time, it does not equal the overthrow of the regime. This demand does not even mean the negation of the supreme leadership as a principle. Even the most conservatives groups within the green movement can remain loyal to Khomeini’s ideals (that is, loyalty to the supreme leader), while simultaneously agreeing that Khamenei is not competent for the position.