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Entries in Saudi Arabia (6)

Sunday
Feb212010

Transcript: General Petraeus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, & Other US Conflicts (21 February)

The head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus, appeared on NBC Television's Meet the Press, first to walk viewers through the US interventions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq and then to take a tour around other issues from Iran to Guantanamo Bay to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on gays and lesbians in the military.



In contrast to previous appearances, when Petraeus was fighting his own President to get his version of US foreign and military policy, this was a stay-the-course interview behind agreed approaches. The message on Afghanistan was long-haul effort to win. On Pakistan, it was supporting Pakistani forces to vanquish the Taliban. He spoke in generalities about maintaining pressure on Iran, and beyond his main agenda, on the tricky issues like Guantanamo Bay and "enhanced interrogation" (torture), he evaded any definitive statements.

MR. DAVID GREGORY: General David Petraeus joins us live from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida.

General, welcome to MEET THE PRESS.

GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS: Thanks, David. Good to be with you.


MR. GREGORY: Let's talk about Afghanistan. This NATO-U.S. offensive in southern Afghanistan is entering its second week with reports of resistance from the Taliban that our forces are facing. How formidable are the Taliban forces that we're confronting now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, they're formidable. They're a bit disjointed at this point in time. The way the operation was conducted leaped over some of them. But there's tough fighting going on, without question.

If I could, David, in fact, I'd like to put this into context, because this is just the initial operation of what will be a 12- to 18-month campaign, as General McChrystal and his team have mapped it out. We've spent the last year getting the inputs right in Afghanistan, getting the structures and organizations necessary for a comprehensive civil-military campaign, putting the best leaders we can find in charge of those, helping with the development of the concepts, the counterinsurgency guidance General McChrystal has issued and so forth. And then now, with President Obama's policy announcement in December at West Point, the resourcing of that effort with the additional 30,000 forces that have now begun flowing, about 5,400 on the ground already, the additional civilians, the additional money, the additional authorization of Afghan security forces. So the inputs, we think, now are about right, and now we're starting to see the first of the output. And the Marja operation is the initial salvo, the initial operation in that overall campaign.

MR. GREGORY: The fight is going to be tough. As you have said, there are questions about how long the U.S. will be there in the fight, whether the Afghan army is capable enough to take over that fight. What should Americans expect as there's more engagement, as there's more fighting, in terms of U.S. losses?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, the same as in the surge in Iraq. When we go on the offensive, when we take away sanctuaries and safe havens from the Taliban and the other extremist elements that we and our Afghan and coalition partners are fighting in that country, they're going to fight back. And we're seeing that in Marja. We will see that in other areas. But we are going after them across the spectrum. We have more of our special, special operations forces going in on the ground, and you've seen the results, you've heard some of the initial results of that with more Afghan shadow governors, the Taliban shadow governors being captured, more of the high value targets being taken down. Then, through the spectrum of providing additional security for the people, supporting additional training of Afghan security forces, as I mentioned, 100,000 more of those over the course of the next year and a half or so. And then also, out on the local defense and even the reintegration of reconcilables effort that will be pursued and is being pursued with the Afghan government.

MR. GREGORY: But U.S. losses, significant?

GEN. PETRAEUS: They'll be tough. They were tough in Iraq. Look, I am--I have repeatedly said that these types of efforts are hard, and they're hard all the time. I don't use words like "optimist" or "pessimist," I use realist. And the reality is that it's hard. But we're there for a very, very important reason, and we can't forget that, David. We're in Afghanistan to ensure that it cannot once again be a sanctuary for the kind of attacks that were carried out on 9/11, which were planned initially in Kandahar, first training done in eastern Afghanistan before the attackers moved to Hamburg and then onto U.S. flight schools.

MR. GREGORY: As the offensive is taking place in southern Afghanistan, a major development in Pakistan, in neighboring Pakistan, as U.S. and Pakistani authorities captured a major Taliban figure, Abdul Baradar. What are you learning from him now that he's in custody?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, David, if I could, what we've learned, actually, in working with our Pakistani partners, who have done some very impressive work over the course of the last 10 months in particular, is that it's sometimes not best to talk a great deal about intelligence operations. And that's what I'll do here this morning.

What I will say is, again, I'd like to put this into context as well. Some 10 months or so ago, the Pakistani people, their political leaders, including major opposition figures and even the clerics, all recognized the threat posed to the very writ of governance of Pakistan. They saw this as the most pressing existential threat to their country, and they supported the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps as it went into Swat and the Malakand division of the northwest frontier province and then expanded its operations into the federally administered tribal areas. They've made some significant gains. They know they can't just clear and leave. They have to clear, hold, build and, over time, transition to local security forces. That's indeed what they're endeavoring to do. They are carrying out this fight. This is their fight against extremists internal to their country, threatening Pakistan, not them fighting our war on terror.

MR. GREGORY: Can I ask it a slightly different way, if you don't want to talk about what specifically is being learned? Presuming that both U.S. forces and Pakistani officials are doing the interrogation, do you wish you had the interrogation methods that were available to you during the Bush administration to get intelligence from a figure like this?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I have always been on the record, in fact, since 2003, with the concept of living our values. And I think that whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and bitten us in the backside. We decided early on in the 101st Airborne Division we're just going to--look, we just said we'd decide to obey the Geneva Convention, to, to move forward with that. That has, I think, stood elements in good stead. We have worked very hard over the years, indeed, to ensure that elements like the International Committee of the Red Cross and others who see the conduct of our detainee operations and so forth approve of them. Because in the cases where that is not true, we end up paying a price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradables. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick in the Central Command area of responsibility. Beyond that, frankly, we have found that the use of the interrogation methods in the Army Field Manual that was given, the force of law by Congress, that that works. And...

MR. GREGORY: Well...

GEN. PETRAEUS: And that is our experience...

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in, in the years that we have implemented it.

MR. GREGORY: In terms of recruitment threats, do you consider the prison at Guantanamo Bay in the same way? Do you consider it to be related, or do you think, in other words, should it be closed, or do you believe it was short-sighted to set a deadline certain for its closure?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I've been on the record on that for well over a year as well, saying that it should be closed. But it should be done in a responsible manner. So I'm not seized with the issue that it won't be done by a certain date. In fact, I think it is--it's very prudent to ensure that, as we move forward with that, wherever the remaining detainees are relocated and so forth, whatever jurisdiction is used in legal cases and so forth, is really thought through and done in a very pragmatic and sensible manner.

MR. GREGORY: One more question about--on the subject of terrorism. You often say when it comes to politics, you like to go around the minefield rather than go through it. But this is a question, really, related to your experience and your expertise. In the past couple of weeks, there's been a big debate about what kind of threat al-Qaeda poses directly to the United States. Vice President Biden considers another 9/11 type attack unlikely. Former Vice President Cheney, who you served under as well, said that he disagrees with that, that 9/11 is indeed possible again, this time using a nuclear or biological weapon. Again, appealing to your expertise, where do you come down on that question? What is the specific threat that al-Qaeda poses now?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, let me just express how we assess al-Qaeda in the Central Command area of responsibility, which happens to be where the bulk of al-Qaeda is located; although, certainly, the network extends beyond our area. And our assessment is that over the course of the last year or so, al-Qaeda has been diminished in that area, that Saudi Arabia and the other Arabian Peninsula countries have continued to make gains with the exception, obvious exception of Yemen--we can talk more about that if you want--that the, the progress has continued against al-Qaeda in Iraq, although, again, there are certainly remaining threats there. And we see those periodically shown in the form of horrific, barbaric attacks. There's been progress against al-Qaeda's senior leadership in the federally-administered tribal areas as well. So, as a general assessment, again, diminished. But, having said that, al-Qaeda is a flexible, adaptable--it may be barbaric, it may believe in extremist ideology, as it does, but this is a thinking, adaptive enemy, and we must maintain pressure on it everywhere.

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: It is a network, and it takes a network to keep the pressure on a network. And that is, indeed, what we're endeavoring to do.

MR. GREGORY: But, general, my question is do you think they want to pull off another 9/11 or smaller bore attacks?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well I think al-Qaeda is assessing to pull off any kind of attack. I mean, you saw the Abdulmutallab attempt on--the, the would-be Detroit bomber. Again, this is an enemy that is looking for any opportunity to attack our partners and, indeed, our homeland, and we have to keep that in mind. There's no question about its desire to continue to attack our country and our allies.

MR. GREGORY: Let me ask you about Iran. International inspectors think that, in fact, that country is moving toward production of an actual nuclear warhead. How close is that regime to going nuclear?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well it's--it is certainly a ways off, and we'll probably hear more on that from the International Atomic Energy Agency when it meets here in the, in the next week or so. It has clearly--its new director has expressed his concern about the activities. There's no question that some of those activities have advanced during that time. There's also a new National Intelligence Estimate being developed by our intelligence community in the United States. We have over the course of the last year, of course, pursued the engagement track. I think that no one at the end of this time can say that the United States and the rest of the world has--have not given Iran every opportunity to resolve the issues diplomatically. That puts us on a solid foundation now to go on what is termed the "pressure track." And that's the course in which we're embarked now. The U.N. Security Council countries, of course, expressing their concern. Russia now even piling on with that. We'll have to see where that goes and whether that can, indeed, send the kind of signal to Iran about the very serious concerns that the countries in the region and, indeed, the entire world have about Iran's activities in the nuclear program and in its continued arming, funding, training, equipping and directing of proxy extremist elements that still carry out attacks...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...in Iraq, albeit on a much limited basis, but still do that there, and also pose security challenges in southern Lebanon, Gaza, and elsewhere.

MR. GREGORY: But over the span of now two administrations so much has not worked in terms of the pressure option on Iran. Can a single country, be it the United States or Israel, deter Iran from going nuclear without a military strike?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, again, I think we have to embark on the pressure track next, but certainly they're, needless to say--you know, I was asked a couple of Sundays ago on another show, "Well, tell me, General, about your plans to take down Iran's nuclear program." And the way I answered was to, to note that it is the job of combatant commanders to consider the what-ifs, to be prepared for contingency plans. I'm not saying this in a provocative way. I'm merely saying that we have responsibilities, the American people and our commander-in-chief and so forth expect us to think those through and to be prepared for the what-ifs. And we try not to be irresponsible in that regard.

MR. GREGORY: In our remaining moments, I want to cover a couple of other areas. Iraq: Of all the countries within Central Command that you oversee, 20, would you consider Iraq to be the most democratic?

GEN. PETRAEUS: It's interesting. I've actually posed that question to think-tankers and others, and I think it actually may be. Now, we hope that that is sustained through the elections and beyond 7 March. Right now it--I don't think there's any question right now that the Iraqi government, however imperfect--and this is "Iraqracy" at work, not necessarily Western democracy. But this is a government that is representative of all of the people, it is responsive to the people, it, its leaders know they are facing the electorate on 7 March. There's a fierce campaign, there's high political drama that's gone on. Some of it is of concern in, in a substantial way to elements to the Iraqi population and leadership. But we hope that this will move through, that the elections will be, as were the provincial elections in January 2009, deemed free and fair by the United Nations, which is very much supportive of this effort, needless to say; and that, indeed, the process of selecting the next prime minister, the next government and the other leadership will be a smooth one. Although, frankly, we expect that it is going to take some time. And, again, we do expect that there's going to be considerable drama and emotion that accompanies it, and it will be a period of months, at the very least, before that second election, if you will, the election of 7 March, which selects the parliament, the council of representatives; and they then will do the wheeling and dealing and the maneuvering to select the next prime minister and the key ministers and president.

MR. GREGORY: General, with the, the military engaged in two wars, with a country fighting terrorism in other forms as well, is this an appropriate time for the military to revisit the "don't ask, don't tell" policy?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, there's a process at work here now, David, and I, and I think that it is a very sound and good process. The secretary and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs announced, when they were testifying, the creation of a review be headed by General Carter Hamm, U.S. Army four-star, and DOD General Counsel Jay Johnson. I don't think this has gotten enough prominence frankly. It is very important to this overall process. It will provide a rigorous analysis of the views of the force on the possible change. It will suggest the policies that could be used to implement a change if it, if it does come to that, so that it could be as uneventful as it was, say, in the U.K. or the Israeli militaries or, indeed, in our own CIA and FBI. And then it will assess the effects, the possible effects on readiness, recruiting and retention.

MR. GREGORY: What do you say?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Very important for that process to move forward. We'll hear from the chiefs, the Joint Chiefs on this I think, probably their personal assessments and personal views in the course of the next week or so...

MR. GREGORY: But...

GEN. PETRAEUS: ...when they're on Capitol Hill. And then the geographic combatant commanders, the other combatant commanders and I, will have our turn on Capitol Hill in a few weeks.

MR. GREGORY: But what, but what, what do you say, General? Should gays and lesbians be able to serve openly in the military?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, I'll provide that, again, on Capitol Hill if, if asked at that time. I, I know you'd like to make some news here this morning. I support what our secretary and, and chairman have embarked on here. I will--I'm fully participating in that process. And I think it's very important, again, that these issues be handled and discussed and addressed by this review that will be so important in informing decisions as we move forward.

MR. GREGORY: Do you think soldiers on the ground in the field care one way or the other if their comrades in arms are gay or lesbian?

GEN. PETRAEUS: I'm not sure that they do. We'll see. Again, that's why this review panel. You know, all we have are, are personal soundings to go on, and I've certainly done some of that myself. I mean, you've heard General Powell, who was the chairman when the policy was implemented, had a big hand in that, who said that, yes indeed, the earth has revolved around the sun a number of times since that period 15 months ago. And you've heard a variety of anecdotal input. We have experienced, certainly, in the CIA and the FBI, I know. I served in fact in combat with individuals who were gay and who were lesbian in combat situations and, frankly, you know, over time you said, "Hey, how's, how's this guy's shooting?" Or "How is her analysis," or what have you. So--but we'll see. Again, that's the importance of this review that will be conducted by General Hamm and also by the DOD general counsel. I think it is hugely important that we have the answers from the questions that they'll be asking in a very methodical way, something we've not done before because of the emotion and the sensitivity of this issue.

MR. GREGORY: All right, we'll leave it there. General Petraeus, thank you very much this morning.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Great to be with you, David. Thanks again.
Sunday
Feb212010

Iraq: How Serious is the Sunni Election Boycott?

We've been trying to get our heads around the significance of Saturday's announcement that one of Iraq's largest Sunni political parties is going to boycott the forthcoming national elections. The New York Times plays down the story. Juan Cole also thinks that the effect on the election will not be devastating, but he considers the longer-term maneouvres and probable benefits to the leading Shi'a factions:

The Los Angeles Times reports that the National Dialogue Front, a secular party led by Salih Mutlak, is calling for a boycott of the March 7 parliamentary elections in Iraq. The NDF has 11 seats in parliament, but Mutlak and another prominent party member were among over 500 candidates (out of over 6000) for parliament disqualified as too close to the prohibited Baath Party. Many of those excluded from running had openly criticized the provision in the Iraqi constitution that bans members of the Baath Party from public life. The purge of Mutlak has been widely condemned in Iraq as unfair, since he left the party in the late 1970s.


Mutlak announced that the boycott decision was taken after remarks by American leaders in Iraq that the banning of candidates had been instigated by Iran. Mutlak said that the upcoming polls in Iraq had been hijacked by Iran and were being conducted according to the Iranian rules, wherein the regime predetermines who wins and some candidates are excluded from running.

Some observers worry that there will be a mass Sunni boycott of the elections, as happened with disastrous effects in January of 2005. I don't think that catastrophe can now be repeated, because at that time the elections were held on a nation-wide basis. The current elections instead have Iraqi provinces as the electoral unit. Thus, the largely Sunni provinces of al-Anbar, Salahuddin and Ninevah will return a lot of Sunni members of parliament even with a boycott (the resulting members of parliament just would not represent that many people).

Liz Sly of the LAT says that there are two main Shiite blocs for the first time in this election (the first two parliamentary elections saw the Shiite religious parties unite into a single coalition). But she says that the two " have an informal agreement" to come together as a mega-coalition after the elections, which will enable them to form the government. (In the Iraqi constitution, the largest single party or coalition in parliament gets first shot at choosing the prime minister.)

I have argued that the Shiite-dominated Accountability and Justice Committee may have banned Mutlak precisely in hopes that his National Dialogue Front would boycott, thus depriving the Iraqiya list of enough seats to make a bid to form the government.

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that the National Dialogue Front gave as further reasons for its boycott that it was also concerned about the lack of security for elections, by the government's arbitrary arrest of its candidates and party workers, and by the lack of a truly independent high electoral commission.

In contrast, the National Iraqi List, headed by former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi-- which the National Dialogue Front had joined in a coalition effort-- announced that it would begin campaigning in earnest after last week's one-week hiatus. Allawi kicked off the campaign with a visit to the capital of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, for consultations with King Abdullah. Saudi Arabia has backed Iraqi Sunnis behind the scenes, and is worried about Iranian influence in Iraq.

Meanwhile, the main Shiite bloc, the National Iraqi Alliance (which includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, formed in 1982 in Iran), accused the United States of interfering in Iraqi domestic politics and of plotting to bring the Baath Party back into prominence as the "neo-Baath."
Wednesday
Feb172010

Israel-Russia: Situation Now A-OK on Iran?

On Monday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to discuss Hamas, the kidnapped Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, sanctions on Iran, and Russian's pending delivery of  S-300 missiles to Tehran.

At the end of the day, both leaders got what they sought. Medvedev did not put himself under any commitment to punish Iran severely but maintained a "threatening" position vis-a-vis Tehran. He  told Netanyahu that Russia will hold off on  delivering the S-300s to Iran. A spokewoman added: "The position of Russia regarding sanctions remains unchanged. [But] if Iran remains uncooperative, no one can exclude the use of sanctions."

Netanyahu was satisfied to return home with the "success" of the deferred delivery of the S-300s, and he ticked another  box in his "efforts to exhaust every possible chance to achieve peace" before "the necessity of applying a pre-emptive strike" against Iran in the future.



Netanyahu also sent another message in Moscow at a dinner meeting with Greek counterpart George Papandreo : "Turkey will go nuclear if Iran becomes so". Netanyahu added he was concerned Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia would soon begin their own attempts to develop a nuclear weapon.

On Hamas-Russia relations, Netanyahu implicitly asked Moscow to limit its relations with the Gazan organisation. A senior source in Netanyahu's entourage said the Israeli leader told  Medvedev, "We are not pleased with your relations with Hamas. But since they exist, we can relay messages on humanitarian issues. Tell Hamas they won't get a better offer from us on the deal [for Shalit, the Israeli soldier held by Hamas]."

So, after some fuss, nothing changed in the position vis-a-vis Tehran. Moscow might use the deferment of the sale of S-300 missiles to urge Netanyahu to stop plans by an Israeli firm to close a major arms deal with Georgia, a proposal leaked by Russian intelligence on Friday. In the long run, if not in the medium-term, Moscow can use its third party role, both with Hamas and with Tehran, to increase its credibility and bargaining power in the region. However, the question is how long can tension between the West and Tehran continue without a breaking point for Russia's search for a more cooperative Tehran?
Sunday
Feb142010

Middle East Inside Line: Netanyahu To Moscow, "Organ Harvesting" Furour, Clinton in Gulf, and More

British MP Disciplined over Israel "Organ Harvest" Story: Baroness Jenny Tonge, a Liberal Democrat lawmaker in Britain, has been fired from her position by leader Nick Clegg after she called for an enquiry into claims that Israel Defense Forces soldiers harvested organs in Haiti following last month's earthquake.

Clinton Talking Iran Sanctions in Gulf: Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Saudi Arabia and the Qatar this week. U.S. officials hinted Saturday that one way Saudi Arabia could help diplomatically over the Iran issu ewould be to offer guarantees that it would meet China's oil requirements.

NEW Middle East Analysis: The Iran-Russia-Israel Triangle
Palestine Video: The Avatar Protest (12 February)


Senator Kerry Warns Arabs: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry said at a U.S.-Islamic World Forum in Doha, Qatar, on Saturday that "peace may never come if it is now realized now":


Building trust must be a step-by-step process, and the region must recognize Israel's desire for acceptance and its fundamental need for security. And perhaps most importantly, the leading voices in the Arab world have a vital role to play with their people in creating the atmosphere for lasting peace with Israel.

In southern Israel, I also saw the toll that Hamas rockets had inflicted in a barrage that no country would endure interminably.

At this crucial juncture, Israel should refrain from taking steps, which have the potential to prejudge negotiations and create tensions

5th Anniversary of Hariri's Death: Tens of thousands of people from across the country gathered in Beirut's main square Sunday to mark the fifth anniversary of the killing of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri.

"We will show that we want to continue in the path of Rafik Hariri," declared his son, Prime Minister Saad Hariri.

The ‘Fatah-Gate’ sex scandal: Rafik Husseini, the director of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s bureau, is under immense pressure to resign after he was caught on tape naked in the bedroom of an Arab woman from Jerusalem.
Monday
Feb082010

Arabian-Persian Gulfs: An Introduction to Iran and the Gulf States

Sean Foley writes for Enduring America:

The news in recent weeks about the deployment of US soldiers and advanced weapons to Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reminds us of the central position of the Arab oil-producing monarchies in the Persian Gulf to international efforts to contain the Iranian nuclear program. Few states in the Middle East have closer links to the two chief actors in the dispute, Iran and the United States, or few would be more negatively affected if Washington attacked Tehran.

Yemen: A Beginner’s Guide to (The Perils Of) Intervention


The six Arab oil-producing monarchies in the Persian Gulf region --- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE --- are known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (or GCC) and have the largest oil and gas deposits in the world. GCC nationals and governments own significant portions of US and European corporations, while Europeans and Americans have invested heavily in the Council's states. The US Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain, and the US military maintains a large presence in Qatar and Jebel Ali (UAE), the only port deep enough to berth an aircraft carrier in the Gulf. Finally, GCC states have bought billions of dollars worth of US and European advanced weapons and technology, including French nuclear reactors.


GCC ties with America and Europe in part reflect the history of tensions between the government of Shi'a and Persian-speaking Iran and the much smaller Arab and Sunni states of the GCC. Relations have been especially hampered by the 1979 Iranian revolution, the support of many GCC states for Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war, and the outbreak of sectarian violence in Iraq. Iran has also threatened to seize GCC territory and to radicalize Shia populations living in the GCC. GCC governments worry that Iran could use nuclear weapons to dominate the Middle East, seal off the chief avenue for transporting oil and gas outside the Gulf (the Straits of Hormuz), or destroy desalinization plants in the GCC. These plants have accounted for as much as 50 percent of the water and electricity in some GCC states and are vulnerable to attack because they are large, utilize complicated machinery, and are built near coasts.

Nonetheless, senior GCC and Iranian officials frequently exchange official visits. Qatar has provided diplomatic support for Iran and its nuclear program at the United Nations and in the GCC. Oman cooperates with Iran in managing the Straits of Hormuz, while Qatar and Iran have jointly developed the North Gas Field, the largest field in the world. Dubai has a sizeable Iranian population and has run a highly profitable re-export trade with southern Iranian ports for decades. Iran has also become a strong market for GCC goods, especially those from the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Ultimately, the GCC states will be a key barometer of stability in the Middle East. If the GCC states publicly and consistently side with Washington against Iran, then war may be inevitable. But if the GCC states continue to quietly cooperate with Washington while publicly talking to Tehran, a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear dispute may be attainable.