UPDATED: "Taliban": Well, They All Look the Same....

This week Josh Mull ("UJ"), both in his guest blog and in his comments, has offered valuable insight into the complexity of local groups and insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I've now discovered an analysis by Steve Hynd ("Cernig"), which I think is an excellent introduction to the political, economic, and social dimensions beyond the label "Taliban". It's reprinted below this report from Al Jazeera:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fWT1kqoeszI[/youtube] 

Taliban: What's in a Name?

Two years into the Iraq war, moderately well read Westerners already knew that the insurgency there wasn't monolithic. Honest reporting repeatedly made clear that Al Qaeda, Sunni militant groups of various varieties and Sadrists didn't see eye to eye and often worked at cross purposes even while all were hostile to America and its allies.

Yet after seven years in Afghanistan, the same cannot be said about Western knowledge of militants in the region. There's a big, amorphous mass called "The Taliban" which is in cahoots with Al Qaeda - and that's about as fine grained as it usually gets.


That was sufficient back in 2001. The American-led coalition invaded to engage Osama bin Laden's group and the Taliban's organized fighters and on the battlefield itself Afghans quickly sorted into those who were either Al Qeada or Taliban, or those who were against them.

But it doesn't cover the current complex situation at all well,which means the West's voters are at a disadvantage when it comes to understanding - and approving or disapproving - their leaders' plans. As Brandon Friedman, a former officer who served in Afghanistan, put it in a recent email:

Instead of fighting organized theocratic government forces and their foreign terrorist guests, we're now arrayed against a Tatooine-esque combination actual foreign terrorists, actual Taliban fighters from two different countries, narco-warlords jockeying for regional power and influence, regular warlords jockeying for regional power and influence, angry Afghan citizens who've grown weary of civilian casualties, angry Afghan civilians who've grown weary of foreign forces and their broken promises, regular Afghan citizens who side with the Taliban out of sheer necessity for survival, angry opium farmers, Pakistani agents, and, finally, the invisible blight of government corruption.

Reducing that complexity to a simple "Us and Them" formula hinders much of the debate about Afghanistan.

So it was pleasant to see, among coverage of recent US missile strikes, a report by Mark Mazzetti, David Sanger and Eric Schmidt of the New York Times which tried to explain the various flavors of Taliban, their motives and their aims. The piece highlighted the difference between the Taliban group that Pakistan is most interested in opposing, Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the network run by Jalaluddin Haqqani, which is believed responsible for the campaign against Western forces in Afghanistan.

The latter group thinks the former has no business attacking Pakistani security forces or the Pakistani government, pointing to a reciprocal tension between Pakistan and the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. While the Pakistani government is happy to do peace deals with Haqqani's network and less so with Mehsud's, the coalition is more likely to eventually do so with the latter. Meanwhile, Pakistani counter-terror efforts are always going to focus on Mehsud's groups - which isn't all that useful to the West.

We could do with more of this kind of reporting about the region. In particular, we could do with more differentiation on press reports of the four or five main current strains of Taliban of interest to Western efforts in the region. That's the plea recently made by Frederick Kagan, in a short article for the National Review Online reproduced at the American Enterprise Institute:

There is no such thing as "the Taliban" today. Many different groups with different leaders and aims call themselves "Taliban," and many more are called "Taliban" by their enemies. In addition to Mullah Omar's Taliban based in Pakistan and indigenous Taliban forces in Afghanistan, there is an indigenous Pakistani Taliban controlled by Baitullah Mehsud (this group is thought to have been responsible for assassinating Benazir Bhutto). Both are linked with al-Qaeda, and both are dangerous and determined. In other areas, however, "Taliban" groups are primarily disaffected tribesmen who find it more convenient to get help from the Taliban than from other sources.

In general terms, any group that calls itself "Taliban" is identifying itself as against the government in Kabul, the U.S., and U.S. allies. Our job is to understand which groups are truly dangerous, which are irreconcilable with our goals for Afghanistan--and which can be fractured or persuaded to rejoin the Afghan polity. We can't fight them all, and we can't negotiate with them all. Dropping the term "Taliban" and referring to specific groups instead would be a good way to start understanding who is really causing problems.

Mullah Omar's Taliban - the original Afghanistan-ruling Taliban - is nowadays more under the day-to-day direction of Mullah Bradar (or Brehadar), Omar's trusted chief of military operations but it still leans heavily towards the position of Jalaluddin Haqqani's Taliban, which has largely supplanted it as the pre-eminent force in Afghanistan. Both are based in Pakistan but mostly interested in attacking allied forces in Afghanistan and the Afghan government. As one prominent member of Omar's group told Asia Times reporter Syed Saleem Shahzad last September:

It is necessary to understand that there is a sea of difference between the people who call themselves the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban [led by Mehsud] and the Taliban. We have nothing to do with them. In fact, we oppose the policies they adhere to against the Pakistani security forces.

We individually speak to all groups, whether they are Pakistanis, Kashmiris, Arabs, Uzbeks or whosoever, telling them not to create violence in Pakistan, especially in the name of the Taliban.

Journalists in the West could do worse than refer to veteran reporter Anand Gopal's incisive look at the various competing groups of militants in the region, which also include the resurgent Hizb-i-Islami of charismatic fundamentalist Hekmatyar, who like Haqqani used to be one of those favored by both CIA and ISI intelligence agencies. Gopal writes of a "rainbow coalition" arrayed against U.S. troops, which is "competing commanders with differing ideologies and strategies, who nonetheless agree on one essential goal: kicking out the foreigners."

As Brandon Freidman writes, it's tempting to default to the soundbite term "Taliban" when talking about all these groups and to thus treat them as if they were one monolithic structure. But a more nuanced debate is not only healthy in any democracy, it might pave the way for Western public acceptance of what every military commander has said must eventually happen if there is ever to be real peace - an accord with more moderate groups to reconcile them to mainstream Afghan and Pakistani politics.

Analysis: Josh Mull on "Mr Obama's War" in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - US Special Forces Training Pakistani Units, US Military Pressing Pakistani Allies
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan

I was trying to write a full analysis, based on our revelations of US political and mililtary activity in Pakistan over the last week, when Josh Mull, a.k.a. "UJ", posted this comment on yesterday's entry "Mr Obama’s War: Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan".

The comment rightly corrects me on several points but, more importantly, I think it offers the answers I was seeking: "What we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan."

Excellent analysis but…come on now…Obama is “happy” to expand the war in Pakistan? How could you possibly know something like that? Maybe he was outraged or furious to expand the war.

I agree with you that “the media” does often misuse the term “Taliban” but US Military literature as well as relevant trade/industry publications are quite specific about the differences between Big T Taliban, that is the Afghan Mullah Omar-led insurgency and al-Qa’eda militants, and little t taliban, or the Pakistani (Sirajuddin Haqqani, Baitullah Mehsud, etc.) insurgency and tribal militants. As long as we’re picking at the mainstream press, they also like to lump in everyone from Jundallah (Iranian People's Resistance Movement) to the Baloch National Democratic Party as “Taliban,” so really, what are we hoping for from them?

You said: “Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.”

The synergy of these two strategies becomes a bit more clear with the inclusion of more data.

For instance, describing one strategy as “Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others” is a bit misleading. For one thing, the specific machinations of “Islamabad” have to be made apparent. The Pakistani Military is in charge, and it uses the popularly elected civilian government as a credible tool for diplomatic negotiations with insurgent/militant factions throughout Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and India. This alone tells us that the strategy is much broader in scope than simply Afghanistan, or even the Global War on Terror, but it also helps clarify the second part of the statement, “reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others.”

Since we’re clear that the entire Pakistani National Security strategy is based on relations with “some” militants and hostility to “others,” let’s focus exclusively on Pakistan’s small t taliban. Since 2002, the Pakistani government has been striking deals with the militants. Each time, the violence increases, and the US and Pakistani military are forced to crack down. What’s absent from your analysis is that each time the US and Pakistani military crack down, including the recent drone strikes against Mehsud ordered by President Obama, they come with much more international credibility and political legitimacy.

Domestically, the Pakistani military was seen as brutal and thuggish bullies for invading the tribal areas unilaterally. Once they cooperated with the insurgents, and the Pakistani civilian population was rewarded with bloody kidnappings and suicide bombings, public demand for a violent crack down was solidified. The international community is also given a stark moral choice: live with the human rights black hole of Sharia Law or provide more support to the effort to quash the insurgency. Even President Obama was able to openly campaign on promises of increased violence against Pakistani insurgents on the foundation of failed Pakistani government truces and increased Afghan attacks, and he was rewarded with a 9+ million vote mandate from the American electorate.

Thus we have an answer to your final question, whether or not these strategies are “in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.” The answer is yes, these strategies are directly opposed to any effort to “defuse tensions with insurgents,” and for that matter, it has never been the stated goal of anyone relevant to the conflict to defuse tensions with the militants. Instead, what we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?: An Alternative Analysis

Responding to Scott Lucas' analysis yesterday of the "revelations" of an Israeli covert programme to disrupt Iran's nuclear programme, including economic sabotage and assassinations, Josh Mull offers a far different point of view. The story in The Daily Telegraph is not Western/Israeli psychological warfare against Tehran; instead, it indicates that Israeli pressure has lost and an American engagement with Iran has triumphed.

Earlier this week in The Daily Telegraph, it was revealed by former US intelligence operatives that Israel and the United States have allegedly been waging a covert campaign of kidnappings, assassinations, and sabotage against Iran's nuclear program. In his post "Is Israel Winning a Covert War Against Iran?", Professor Lucas proposes that this revelation is "a bit of 'psychological warfare' to keep Tehran off-balance over what might and might not be attempted to undermine its nuclear programme" as well as a "stick" in non-proliferation discussions.

However, the leak could also be interpreted as exactly the opposite of Prof. Lucas's assessment. Not only is this revelation more concrete than mere "psychological" warfare. It is a Loss, not a Win, for Israel and a Carrot, not a Stick, for Iran.

There are already reports that the United States and Israel have targeted Iranian nuclear operatives in the past. In December 2006, the Iranian Deputy Defense Minister, Ali Reza Asgari, disappeared while travelling in Istanbul, Turkey. The Turkish newspaper Hurriyet speculated at the time that Asgari had hidden his family in Damascus, Syria before defecting to the West. However, according to the Iranian Labor News Agency, Asgari's family was actually back in Iran. They denied Asgari would seek asylum with the west, and Iran publicly accused the US and Israel of kidnapping Asgari, a process known as "extraordinary rendition." Four months later, US non-proliferation expert Robert Levinson disappeared under equally mysterious circumstances in Iran, a possible retaliation for Asgari.

There is also evidence possibly verifying the existence of the shell companies which, the Telegraph article suggests, are used to "dupe" and sabotage Iranian companies involved in the nuclear program. The US Treasury Department regularly designates, or "burns" to use apt intelligence lingo, corporations and financial entities it knows to be connected to illicit Iranian activities. For instance, in December 2008, in a possible closing act of the exiting Bush Administration, the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) burned one of its largest shell companies, Assa Corporation.

World Check reported at the time "the corporate name chosen, Assa Corp. and Co., is deceptively similar to that of a well-known European corporation and of several US companies. This is a tactic frequently employed by financial criminals to confuse and mislead." World Check also pointed out "the address of the New York corporation appears to be that of the law firm that organised the company, which could indicate that it is a shell company with no actual address. The company has no telephone listing in New York, has no Internet footprint, and does not have a principal place of business."

Note there are never any subsequent indictments or investigations into these "designated" entities, just a simple burning, or public destruction, of the intelligence asset. While parallel information from Iran regarding their financial investigations is unavailable, it could be presumed that companies are burned by OFAC after being discovered by Iranian counter-intelligence officials.

The leak can be seen as a major loss, not a win, for Israel. As the CIA officer told the Telegraph, "Disruption is designed to slow progress on the programme, done in such a way that they don't realise what's happening." Obviously, Iran is now fully aware of the operation. Israeli intelligence services will be, or more likely have already been, forced to abort all facets of the operation and Iranian nuclear officials will likely be even more closely scrutinized, controlled, and monitored by state security services.

One of the most grim aspects of Israel's loss is, of course, the gruesome destruction of its intelligence assets remaining in Iran. Fars, an Iranian news agency, reported in November 2008 that three people suspected of spying for Israel, specifically a connection to Defense Minister Asgari's kidnapping, were executed by the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps. CNN also reports on another man, Ali Ashtari, who "was convicted by [the IRGC) in June of spying for Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad." Furthermore "according to Ashtari's 'confession,' published by Fars, he was a salesman who obtained high-end but security-compromised pieces of electronic equipment...and sold them to military and defense centers in Iran." The covert war, clearly already suffering losses, will now possibly be completely dismantled.

With that in mind, it's possible to see this as not only a "stick" for Israel, but also as a "carrot" for Iran. The consequences for Israel have been noted, but the direct benefits to Iran require more subtlty to discern. As Prof. Lucas points out in his analysis, the sources Radio Farda and STRATFOR, used in the Telegraph leak as well as other similar leaks, have been linked to the US Government and its intelligence agencies in the past. However, rather than interpreting their connection to US intelligence as a disqualification, it should more accurately interpreted as adding legitimacy to the claims. Quite plainly, it could mean the US Government explicitly authorized the release of this information.

The benefit to Iran would be tangible evidence that the administration of President Barack Obama was ending the policy of regime change in Iran. Furthermore, he is willing to use US psychological operations assets previously devoted to targeting Iran to instead target Israel. It will be difficult for Iranian hardliners to argue that the US is a either a puppet or puppeteer of Zionist interests when Obama is burning Israeli intelligence assets on the front page of the Daily Telegraph.

If there is in fact an American and Israeli covert war of disruption being waged against Iran's nuclear program, it is now in my judgement, completely over, with the results being a humiliating loss for Israel, a lowering of hostilities with Iran, and a vastly strengthened American diplomatic position vis-a-vis the Iranian nuclear negotiations.