Mr Obama's War: Pakistani Insurgents Extend Cease-Fire

Update (4 p.m. GMT): Four coalition soldiers and an Afghan civilian have been killed by a roadside bomb in southern Afghanistan.

The political process in Pakistan took another step --- forward? backward? sideways? --- on Monday when insurgents in the Swat Valley extended their 10-day cease-fire in response to a Pakistani Army announcement that it was halting operations. A spokesman also announced:

We are releasing all prisoners unconditionally. Today we released four paramilitary soldiers and we will release all security personnel in our custody as a goodwill gesture.

The Pakistani Taliban in neighbouring Bajaur Province announced their own unilateral cessation of hostilities on Monday.

Treading Softly on Iran: Dennis Ross Sneaks into the Administration

Al Jazeera English reports the US State Department announcement that "Dennis Ross, a foreign policy veteran, has been appointed special adviser to Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, on the Gulf region", which includes Iran, the "broader Middle East", and southwest Asia. The appointment ends a saga running for weeks: it was widely expected that Ross would be appointed as an envoy, probably on the specific case of Iran, at the same time as Richard Holbrooke (Afghanistan/Pakistan) and George Mitchell (Middle East).

Yesterday, however, there wasn't much of a fuss. President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were not on hand, as they were for Holbrooke and Clinton; instead, State Department Robert Gibbs made a perfunctory statement. So this morning, there is no headline coverage, and it is a Middle Eastern network, rather than an American media outlet, that has to bring us the news.

The reason? A no-brainer, really. If the Obama Administration wanted meaningful engagement with Iran, Ross couldn't be appointed as the point man, given his involvement with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), which has advocated co-ordination with Israel on diplomatic, economic, and then possibly military steps to deal with Tehran. So as the President's Inaugural challenge to shake the unclenched fist was met by some signals from Iran, Ross was put into storage.

He has been brought out now, but with a remit so broad that it threatens to be vague. Now he is not focused on Iran but overlapping with both Holbrooke and Mitchell. There may be some State Department master-plan setting out how Ross, a forceful personality, will work with those two envoys, equally forceful personality, and how he and his staff will in turn work with permanent State Department desks overseeing the Middle Eastern, Persian Gulf, and Southwest Asian regions.

Somehow I doubt it. Which isn't necessarily a bad thing, provided he stands in the corner as the processes which are already unfolding --- diplomatic manoeuvres and possibly discussions with Iran, a possible US acceptance of an Israel-Palestine process that includes all parties, and a review which (smaller hope here) might come to some sensible conclusions to limit the American march to trouble in Afghanistan/Pakistan --- continue unhindered.

Mr Obama's War: Latest from the Pakistan Insurgency

The Asia Times reports, in the aftermath of the local cease-fire between the Pakistani Governments and groups in the Northwest Frontier Provice:

A mujahideen shura (Shura Ittehad al-Mujahideen) council was formed this weekend due to the personal efforts of Sirajuddin Haqqani. His network is the most resourceful and strongest component of the Taliban-led Afghan resistance, and has long-standing links to Pakistan. Other members of the council include pro-Pakistan militants such as Moulvi Nazeer and Hafiz Gul Bahadur and, importantly, Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who has fought against Pakistani troops in the tribal areas.

The shura decided that the leaders would combine forces for a joint struggle against coalition forces in Afghanistan and end hostilities against Pakistan.

Analysis: Josh Mull on "Mr Obama's War" in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - US Special Forces Training Pakistani Units, US Military Pressing Pakistani Allies
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes
Related Post: Mr Obama’s War - Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan

I was trying to write a full analysis, based on our revelations of US political and mililtary activity in Pakistan over the last week, when Josh Mull, a.k.a. "UJ", posted this comment on yesterday's entry "Mr Obama’s War: Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan".

The comment rightly corrects me on several points but, more importantly, I think it offers the answers I was seeking: "What we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan."

Excellent analysis but…come on now…Obama is “happy” to expand the war in Pakistan? How could you possibly know something like that? Maybe he was outraged or furious to expand the war.

I agree with you that “the media” does often misuse the term “Taliban” but US Military literature as well as relevant trade/industry publications are quite specific about the differences between Big T Taliban, that is the Afghan Mullah Omar-led insurgency and al-Qa’eda militants, and little t taliban, or the Pakistani (Sirajuddin Haqqani, Baitullah Mehsud, etc.) insurgency and tribal militants. As long as we’re picking at the mainstream press, they also like to lump in everyone from Jundallah (Iranian People's Resistance Movement) to the Baloch National Democratic Party as “Taliban,” so really, what are we hoping for from them?

You said: “Thus it is unclear whether the US strategy co-exists with Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others, or whether it is in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.”

The synergy of these two strategies becomes a bit more clear with the inclusion of more data.

For instance, describing one strategy as “Islamabad’s effort, reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others” is a bit misleading. For one thing, the specific machinations of “Islamabad” have to be made apparent. The Pakistani Military is in charge, and it uses the popularly elected civilian government as a credible tool for diplomatic negotiations with insurgent/militant factions throughout Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kashmir, and India. This alone tells us that the strategy is much broader in scope than simply Afghanistan, or even the Global War on Terror, but it also helps clarify the second part of the statement, “reaching accommodations with some local groups while striking at others.”

Since we’re clear that the entire Pakistani National Security strategy is based on relations with “some” militants and hostility to “others,” let’s focus exclusively on Pakistan’s small t taliban. Since 2002, the Pakistani government has been striking deals with the militants. Each time, the violence increases, and the US and Pakistani military are forced to crack down. What’s absent from your analysis is that each time the US and Pakistani military crack down, including the recent drone strikes against Mehsud ordered by President Obama, they come with much more international credibility and political legitimacy.

Domestically, the Pakistani military was seen as brutal and thuggish bullies for invading the tribal areas unilaterally. Once they cooperated with the insurgents, and the Pakistani civilian population was rewarded with bloody kidnappings and suicide bombings, public demand for a violent crack down was solidified. The international community is also given a stark moral choice: live with the human rights black hole of Sharia Law or provide more support to the effort to quash the insurgency. Even President Obama was able to openly campaign on promises of increased violence against Pakistani insurgents on the foundation of failed Pakistani government truces and increased Afghan attacks, and he was rewarded with a 9+ million vote mandate from the American electorate.

Thus we have an answer to your final question, whether or not these strategies are “in direct conflict with an effort to defuse tensions with insurgents.” The answer is yes, these strategies are directly opposed to any effort to “defuse tensions with insurgents,” and for that matter, it has never been the stated goal of anyone relevant to the conflict to defuse tensions with the militants. Instead, what we are witnessing is a long-term, wide-ranging strategy of creating international legitimacy and political credibility for an escalation of violence by the US, Pakistan, and NATO against religious and tribal insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Mr Obama's War: US Special Forces Training Pakistani Units, US Military Pressing Pakistani Allies

Related Post: Josh Mull on "Mr Obama's War" in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Related Post: Ceasefire in NW Pakistan; More on US Drone Strikes
Related Post: Mr Obama's War - Expanding the Enemies in Pakistan

The New York Times reports this morning, from US military sources, "More than 70 United States military advisers and technical specialists are secretly working in Pakistan to help its armed forces battle Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country’s lawless tribal areas."

The secret task force, overseen by US Central Command and Special Operations Command, was created last summer. The US military that the task force training and information from the CIA has helped a new Pakistani commando unit to kill or capture up to 60 militants, including at least five high-ranking commanders, since last July.

This, however, is only the headline story. Underneath is an effort by the US military to put pressure on Pakistan. The sources claim that the task force "was launched with the support of the Pakistani Government and military". However, the Pakistanis still are holding back from an all-out offensive against the insurgents:

The main commanders of the Pakistani Taliban, including its leader, Baitullah Mehsud, and its leader in the Swat region, Maulana Fazlullah, remain at large. And senior American military officials remain frustrated that they have been unable to persuade the chief of the Pakistani Army, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to embrace serious counterinsurgency training for the army itself....
The American officials acknowledge that at the very moment when Washington most needs Pakistan’s help, the greater tensions between Pakistan and India since the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last November have made the Pakistani Army less willing to shift its attention to the Qaeda and Taliban threat.

It is no coincidence that Kayani is in Washington this week for the White House review on Afghanistan and Pakistan. He will be having direct meetings with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and the US Joint Chief of Staff.

Bottom line? Expect more US-backed attacks on the military front against the bad guys and expect more psychological warfare against any Pakistani officials who appear reluctant to get on with the campaign, either by holding back on the battlefield or by offering political concessions to the local "Taliban" groups.