EA Soundcheck: 7 Points on Afghanistan's Presidential Election

Iran: Scott Lucas on “Sea of Green Radio”
Iran: Scott Lucas Audio Interview with Fintan Dunne

Enduring America is pleased to announce the launch of a new project, EA Soundcheck, in cooperation with FintanDunne.com. To provide the best in audio analysis to complement EA's blogs, we'll be working with Fintan to get behind the headlines on major international issues.

Today Scott Lucas and Fintan Dunne set out a guide for Afghanistan's Presidential election on Thursday and for its likely significance:

Listen to broadcast....

1. What's it all about?

41 candidates have put their names forward. The first round of balloting is this Thursday. Unofficial results will be put out within days, but official results will not be announced until 17 September. If no candidate receives more than 50 percent, a second round would be held, possibly on 1 October.

2. Who are the frontrunners?

Make that frontrunner in the singular. Current President Hamid Karzai is almost certain to retain office. There was a flutter two weeks with a poll which showed Karzai with "only" 36 percent (although 20 percent had not made a decision) and closest challenger Dr Abdollah Abdollah with 20 percent. Karzai, however, is up to more than 40 percent in latest polls and is cutting deals and spending money to win the bloc votes of villages and clans.

3. So it's a corrupt process?

It's a machine politics process (for those who grew up in the US, think Chicago not too far in the past). The campaign is based as much on deals between political factions and buying loyalties as it is on one person, one vote.

4. Who else to watch for?

Abdollah Abdollah, the former Foreign Minister, has made an impact and gotten a lot of media play with his fluent campaigning style. His support will struggle to move beyond the north and his Tajik base, however, making it unlikely he can push Karzai close in a second round.

Ramazan Bashardost, the former Planning Minister and an ethnic Hazara, has been the surprise of the campaign with a stunning performance in televised debates. His stance against corruption has won plaudits. It will not mean a surprise victory but it could open up the political discourse in Afghanistan.

And then there is Ashraf Ghani, former Finance Minister. Polls show him in single digits but he does bring the American factor.

5. The American factor?

Up to early 2009, it appeared that the US Government was pushing for Ghani to become President. He was getting heavy publicity in the American press, and there were stories of US financial support. However, his extended stay in America began to work against him in the run-up to the campaign, and he could not establish a broad base of support.

So the story is that US officials would like Ghani to become "chief executive" in a Karzai Government. This would keep an eye and possibly a check on the President, both over alleged corruption and plans that might not be in line with those of the US.

6. What does the US Want to Do with Hamid?

Washington has to accept that Karzai, for better or worse, is likely to mobilise the most support on Election Day. The question will become the battle between Karzai's quest for autonomy, e.g., on issues such as negotiations with the "Taliban", and the American desire to control the pace of political and economic development.

7. Is This Really Democracy?

It's not a "fair" process, as set out in the textbooks. The return from exile of General Rashid Dostum, the "warlord" with blood-stained hands who has significant influence in the north of Afghanistan, in exchange for a Uzbek voting bloc (estimated to be up to 10 percent) for Karzai is a marker of political reality.

However, if this process opens up some space, any space, for political empowerment, then it's better than no process at all. The bigger question will be whether the groups within Afghanistan can find some way forward after the election to a modicum of stability. And that question will be bound up not with abstract "democracy" but with the manoeuvring vis-a-vis the Americans.

Pakistan: After Mehsud's Death, Are the Taliban Defeated?

The apparent assassination of the Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud (pictured) in an American missile attack has raised questions over the future of the insurgency. This article from Arif Rafiq of The Pakistan Policy Blog is a compehensive look not only at the situation in Pakistan but across the border in Afghanistan:

Almost two weeks after the killing of Baitullah Mehsud, Pakistan continues to have an upper hand over the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). But Rawalpindi-Islamabad’s gains over the TTP are unconsolidated. The Pakistani Taliban network can rejuvenate itself. Pakistan needs to sustain its vigilance against the militants, while at the same time not drag itself into a full-fledged conflict in South Waziristan it is not ready for.

Pakistan has managed to:

* secure its major urban areas outside the Pashtun belt, and, to a large extent, Peshawar, from militant attacks. There has been no equivalent of the Manawan police academy or ISI office attacks in Lahore or the Pearl Continental attack in Peshawar.
* cleanse the Malakand division of militants (though not completely — see below) to the extent that much of the internally displaced population is returning home and willing to facilitate policing efforts to prevent a Taliban return.
* increase approval of the Pakistan Army in the Malakand division, despite the fact that it hasn’t followed a COINdinista Network Approved Strategy (CNAS).
* continue to penetrate terrorist cells and apprehend key facilitators, funders, and trained suicide bombers.
* push the militant leadership into the North-South Waziristan corridor.
* fracture the TTP leadership, or at least create the perception that it is in “disarray.”
* put the Mehsud network — and anti-state takfiri terrorists, in general — on the defensive, both physically and ideologically.
* maintain pressure on TTP remnants in Bajaur, Khyber, Mohmand, and Orakzai. Note that there hasn’t been an attack on a NATO convoy in Pakistan recently.
* transfer the Pashtun “hot potato” on to the United States.

This success is due to:

* the use of air power against militants in the Malakand division and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that, while causing significant civilian casualties, neither turned the local population against the central government nor strained the manpower of the Pakistani security services.
* a commitment to keep a large military presence in Swat for the next few years.
* a sustained counterpropaganda campaign utilizing the private media and religious scholars, particularly Barelvis.
* a clever psy-ops campaign against the TTP.
* a whole-hearted embrace of its fallen soldiers, with public funerals made accessible to the media.
* excellent investigative and police work done by the federal interior ministry down to the provincial police forces.
* the decision by the Obama administration to focus drone attacks against the Baitullah Mehsud network.

The TTP has failed to:

* prove that Baitullah Mehsud is alive. Hakimullah Mehsud, who appears to be living, promised a Baitullah video by last Monday, but it never appeared.
* demonstrate leadership continuity by appointing a successor to Baitullah.
* counter Pakistan Army claims that there was a clash between Hakimullah and Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud by having the two agree on a Baitullah successor or, somehow, publicly prove they are on the same page.
* show that it remains a force to be reckoned with by pulling off a major attack in Islamabad, Peshawar, or urban Punjab.
* legitimize (or re-legitimize) its insurgency and campaign of terror in the eyes of the Pakistani public by linking it to Pakistan’s support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.

Despite the Pakistan military’s gains against the TTP, the terrorist outfit’s senior leadership — aside from Baitullah — remains alive. Commanders such as Faqir Muhammad and Hakimullah Mehsud are around. But their continued existence does not preclude a disassembly of the TTP. Afterall, it is an umbrella organization. Disassembly would require the commanders to no longer share the same threat: the Pakistan military-intelligence establishment. And that would require an undesirable return to a messy policy of Rawalpindi sorting out the bad guys from the less bad guys (i.e. “good” vs. “bad” Taliban).

For the Pakistan Army, South Waziristan remains the belly of the beast. Its unforgiving land is the home of the Mehsud network as well as a host of Pakistani and foreign jihadi groups.

But, for many reasons, the Pakistan Army cannot afford a ground incursion into South Waziristan....

Read rest of article....

Video: Obama Speech on Afghanistan to Veterans of Foreign Wars (17 August)

Yesterday President Obama spoke to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Phoenix, Arizona. The headline was "Obama Defends War in Afghanistan", as the President explained that the US intervention was a "war of necessity" (as opposed to the Bush Administration's "war of choice" in Iraq), two days before the Afghan Presidential vote. Obama, however, also spoke more widely about other theatres of US operations and about the relationship between military and non-military power.

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[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5GVYKpaSrT8[/youtube]

PART 2 OF 3

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_aao8m5RYvo&feature=related[/youtube]

PART 3 OF 3

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o3o3pKPxkEk[/youtube]

The Afghanistan Election: Scott Lucas on Al Jazeera English (12 August)

I have been unable to write as much on Afghanistan recently as I would like to, especially with the Presidential election scheduled for 20 August. So it was a pleasure yesterday to exchange views on Al Jazeera English's Inside Story with the Independent Member of Parliament, Daoud Sultanzoy. Despite some technical problems, we were able to consider the election, wider political issues inside Afghanistan, the possibility of disruption of the vote, and the plans of other key players such as the US Government.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mxvoIVw8afg[/youtube]

Transcripts III: National Security Advisor Jones on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Korea (9 August)

Video and Transcript I: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, Iran (9 August)
Transcript II: National Security Advisor Jones on North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran

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The transcript of the interview with General James Jones, President Obama's National Security Advisor, on CBS News' Face the Nation with Bob Schieffer:

BOB SCHIEFFER: And good morning again, General Jones is in the studio with us this morning.

Thank you very much for coming, General. You went to Afghanistan back in June, you took reporter Bob Woodward along on the trip and afterwards he reported that you told the commanders there they would have to make due with what they had. Yet every day brings a new report that General McChrystal, the top American commander on the ground there, is preparing a new assessment and it appears that he is going to ask for more troops.

We hear that from various people, Anthony Cordesman from CSIS is just back from there. He says we have set impossible goals. We set impossible time frames. He says you are going to have to have more resources.

Are you getting ready to consider putting more troops into Afghanistan?

JONES: We -- first of all, it is a pleasure to be with you, thank you very much for having me. The fact is -- and I’ll get to my remarks on what the intention was, but the fact is that in March, we announced a very comprehensive strategy that everybody participated in.

That strategy has essentially three legs, more security, followed by economic development, followed by better governance from the -- at the local levels in Afghanistan. And buttressed by more rapid development of the Afghan army and the Afghan police. So we want to put an Afghan capacity together as quickly as possible. We have over 40 nations on the ground, we have all of the international organizations you could want, from the U.N. to NATO, to E.U., the World Bank, the IMF, and nongovernmental organizations.

And Afghanistan will be solved by a better coordination of these elements. The troop strength is an important piece of it, and my message to General McChrystal and to the commanders when I went there was to say, think about the total strategy that we have all agreed to, General McChrystal is conducting an assessment at the request of secretary of defense.

They -- the Defense Department will evaluate what General McChrystal has to say, and in due time it will come up for a decision by the president.

But I did not say -- I want to be clear on this, I did not say that troop strength is off the table for discussion. What I did say is that we have yet to be able to measure the implementation of the new strategy, so if you have recommendations, make it in the context of the new strategy.

This -- we have learned one thing in six years, we -- this is not just about troop strength.

SCHIEFFER: Well, but that sounds like you are getting us ready for sending more troops to Afghanistan.

JONES: Well, let me put another thing on the table here. When the president made his decision, there were additional troops that were on the charts that the secretary of defense said at the time, Mr. President, you do not have to make this decision now, this is something we can consider later after we measure the implementation of our strategy.

So we will have discussions as the weeks and months go by. The big thing for us now is to make sure that the strategy is being implemented, we have got new commanders, we have got new diplomats, we have got Richard Holbrooke, who is providing the theater engagement.

It is not just about Afghanistan, it’s about Pakistan and what is going on there.

SCHIEFFER: But, General, we have been there how long? Six years, and it is like -- it sounds like you are talking about we just got there.

JONES: No, no, no. We -- I have been involved in this for six years also.

SCHIEFFER: Well, how bad is it there? Every report we have is that it is worse than it has ever been. That it has become sort of a sinkhole and now you are trying to develop yardsticks to find out how well we are doing.

When are we going to know how we are doing, even? JONES: We will -- that is a very good question, and it is a fair question. I -- this is my opinion. My opinion was that we did not have a well-articulated strategy until March of this year.

We had a strategy for security. We had a little bit of a strategy for economic development, which was other people’s problems. And we had a strategy that may be addressed a little bit of governance and the rule of law. This strategy merges all of those three things.

We also are -- we are definitely going to, in conjunction with our allies, develop the Afghan army at a faster rate and the Afghan police so we can have Afghans in charge of their own destiny in a shorter period of time.

So, yes, we have been there six years. But if you go back to the overall history of it, and you look at the three pillars that need to be developed, security has always been done reasonably well, although we have had some backsliding since 2007, but the other two have been allowed to not develop as quickly.

So in conjunction with our allies, and I want to make sure that I make this point as well, that this is not just a U.S. problem. This is an international problem, and we cannot -- I think we have the strategy and we will shortly see, and I mean within a year, whether this strategy is working and then we will adjust from there.

SCHIEFFER: We’ll know in a year if the new strategy...

JONES: Within the year...

SCHIEFFER: ... is working?

JONES: And we have the metrics to evaluate this strategy. The Congress has mandated them. We were going to do them anyway. The president has said, “I want regular reports as to how we’re doing.”

SCHIEFFER: But so far it isn’t working? Would that be fair to say?

JONES: Well, it’s -- it’s only been three months old.

SCHIEFFER: Well, I mean, the previous strategy?

JONES: We don’t even have -- the troop strength that has been agreed has not even arrived there, so -- so my benchmark is this administration, in March, committed to a new strategy. We involved Afghanistan. We involved Pakistan. We involved NATO, the allies. We had the NATO summit, where the allies had a -- a new...

SCHIEFFER: So let me see if I can just sum this up.

JONES: ... a new attitude.

SCHIEFFER: You’re going to develop a new strategy...

JONES: We’ve had it.

SCHIEFFER: ... and you have a new strategy going, and you may have to send more troops to Afghanistan?

You’re not, at least, going to rule that out at this point?

JONES: I won’t rule -- we won’t rule anything out that stands to reason, but it is fair to say that, once we agree on a new strategy, we want to make sure that it is -- has a chance to be evaluated.

SCHIEFFER: OK.

JONES: And if things come up where we need to adjust one way or the other, and it involves troops or it involves more incentives...

(CROSSTALK) JONES: ... for economic development or better assistance to help the Afghan government function, we’ll do that.

SCHIEFFER: Now, what was it, last weekend, that Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, flew out to meet with General McChrystal?

JONES: Correct.

SCHIEFFER: That suggests there may be some sort of -- we may be in some sort of crisis mode. This was a secret trip that wasn’t announced until after they completed it.

Would you think -- would you say that things in Afghanistan at this point are at a crisis level?

JONES: Well, we’re -- coming up to a very important election. We have, I think, a -- no, I don’t think -- I don’t think we’re at a crisis level, in terms of -- or that there’s going to be any movement on the ground by the Taliban that’s going to overthrow the government. We’re going to have, I think, a good election. The signs are that it’s going to be -- the instruments of security are being well- thought-out.

I think, with the success that we’ve had on the Pakistan side of the border, which we can talk about if you like, and the growing troop strength by the U.S. and some of our allies on the Afghan side, I think -- I think the security aspect of things is -- going to get better.

There’s going to be a little bit more fighting. Unfortunately, we’re taking more casualties, but if we’re able to marry up the other two legs of this three-legged stool that I mentioned, put things that will change the economic forecast for the Afghan people on the ground, put Afghan troops, Afghan police in the villages languages and towns, I think that’s the -- that’s the future.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you about this situation in Pakistan. Mehsud, the top Taliban man -- I heard you say earlier today that we’re 90 percent sure that we got him. Now, how important is that?

JONES: Well, I think it is very important. First of all, it’s important because this is Pakistan’s public enemy number one, if I could. He has -- he controls a very violent aspect of the insurgent problems in -- on the Pakistani side of the border. And this would be -- this is a big deal, and...

SCHIEFFER: Let’s talk, a little bit, about the developments in North Korea. Former President Clinton went there. He got these people. We now know that it was the North Koreans that said, if you’ll send him, we’ll -- we’ll let these two young Americans go.

We also know that, because I’ve heard you already report this, that the president, former president, did have conversations with them on a variety of subjects.

What happens now? Do we -- do we expect some development here now?

JONES: Well, we hope so. President Clinton did have the opportunity to talk to the North Korean leader and suggest that the happy scene that was carried out in California with the unification of families could have happened with the detainee from South Korea in Seoul or in Tokyo with the Japanese abductees and he represented our desire to have them released as well.

I think that obviously with his, as the former president, with his father, the Korean leader’s father, was -- had eight years of experience with dealing with North Korea, and he was able to, in his own way -- the I hope persuasive that there is a better way, there is a better path, that it is clear that a couple of things are clear.

One is that we sent no official or unofficial message from our government, so there was no -- there is nothing secretive here, that North Korea knows that the path to talking is through the six party process, and that within that six party process --

SCHIEFFER: They seem to want to have some sort of one-on-one dialogue with the United States. Would we be willing to do that?

JONES: Sure within the context of the six party talks.

SCHIEFFER: What does that mean?

JONES: Meaning if they come back to the talks, we will talk to them bilaterally within those talks. We have coordinated all of this by the way with the other allies, the Chinese, the Russians, the South Koreans, the Japanese. So the path is clear, and President Clinton is a very convincing gentleman and I hope he was able to convince them.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you this, General. Why do you think the North Korean leader wanted to do this? Was he trying to impress his own people? Was he trying to impress his military that look, I can get a former president of the United States to come over here. That shows you I am still a strong and vibrant leader? Or was he trying to impress the rest of the world? What was that all about?

JONES: You know, I would be guessing. You know, internally, he can manipulate this anyway he wants but as far as the rest of the world, I think that we are clear on what it was and what it wasn’t.

SCHIEFFER: And what it was?

JONES: What it was is a private humanitarian mission to rescue and obtain the release of two girls so they could be with their families and that is President Obama’s -- that was his goal in this.

SCHIEFFER: Finally, Gitmo. Every indication is you will not be able to make the president’s deadline of closing that down by the end of the year.

JONES: This is a complex issue and we are working on this every single day. I still believe that we can achieve our goals, but it is a complex issue.

SCHIEFFER: But you are not sure if you are going to make it?

JONES: No, I think we will. I think there are some things on the table that we can’t necessarily talk about right now, but hopefully there are some signs here that we will find the right way to do this.

SCHIEFFER: All right General Jones, thanks for being with us and I hope you come back.

JONES: It is a pleasure, thank you very much.