Wednesday
Sep092009
Iran: Ahmadinejad's "All-In" Move?
Wednesday, September 9, 2009 at 6:58
The Latest from Iran (9 September): The Stakes Are Raised
Iran Urgent Analysis: Is This the Defining Showdown?
The Latest from Iran (8 September): Picking A Fight?
NEW Iran: Ahmadinejad Chooses Confrontation Over Compromise and Governing
UPDATED Iran: Mousavi HQ Raided by Security Forces
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Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
An admission: for the first time in three months, I feel very uncertain about an analysis. Up to this point, with the immense help of colleagues and readers, I could read and analyse the move of various participants in the post-election conflict, watching them act and react against each other. Even in mid-August, when we tried to figure out the manoeuvres of Hashemi Rafsanjani, I think we came to a secure conclusion about his complex, cautious steps.
Yesterday afternoon changed all this. We were in the midst of reading yet another turn of the kaleidoscope: an apparent alignment between the Supreme Leader and other elements in the Iranian Establishment to find a compromise that would contain the reformists by offering a limited "compromise", thus securing the system. This would have entailed a loudly-proclaimed but strictly-defined enquiry into detentions and abuses, public but relatively gentle criticism of the President's handling of the crisis, and perhaps the "Ramadan present" of a release of high-profile prisoners.
It seemed this was the latest but one of the most important chess moves in the conflict. Then at 3 p.m. Tehran time yesterday, 24 hours after security forces raided an office run by the staff of Mir Hossein Mousavi, someone --- most likely, the President, working with the Revolutionary Guard --- ordered the seizure of the main office of Mehdi Karroubi and the Etemade Melli political party and website, arresting the editor-in-chief of etemademelli.ir and perhaps shutting the site down. And a few hours after that, Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor, Alireza Beheshti, was arrested.
I think the difficulty in evaluating these steps is that Ahmadinejad is not playing chess. Dismissing our once-favourite cliche for a new analogy, with the attack on the Mousavi and Karroubi camps, the President and the Revolutionary Guards are palying cards, and they just put all their chips in the middle.
It's called an "all-in" bet. It's far more brutal than the intricate moves on the chessboard, and it forces your opponent not only to think but to make a make-or-break decision. In the face of this assault, does the Green movement fold its cards, conceding that for now Ahmadinejad has the authority, however illegitimate that might be? Or does it "call", preparing for a showdown that could mean more arrests and the effectively dismantling of an organised opposition for the near-future?
This, however, is the easy part of the analysis. The much tricker reading is that Ahmadinejad's move (again, considering "Ahmadinejad" as the President, his close allies, and Revolutionary Guard leaders) may not have been solely against the opposition.
With the dramatic measures taken in the last 48 hours, supported by his confrontational rhetoric, the President is moving not only against the "Green Path of Hope" but against other members of the Establishment and even the Supreme Leader.
I'll add the caution that my view is not universally held here at EA, where heated debate will continue today. And Josh Shahryar, who is working on a must-read analysis that should appear by Friday, has a slightly different perspective.
The immediate question: did the Supreme Leader know of the steps for raids and arrests, even as he was publicly advising Ahmadinejad yesterday morning to listen to "benevolent criticism"?
The interpretation that Ayatollah Khamenei is in line with the President/IRGC crackdown argues that the plans to move against Mousavi and Karroubi were in place before the Supreme Leader announced he would be leading Friday prayers in Tehran. Thus, by the time he took the podium, a message to the reformists that "enough is enough" would be backed up by a velvet fist. Behave yourselves, and Alireza Behesti will be released in a few days, your offices can be re-opened, and you can maintain your websites and newspapers (while adhering to our guidelines for proper reporting and analysis).
(An important note: this of course is also an important message to Hashemi Rafsanjani: "Do not make a move, my friend." If you lead prayers on Qods Day, 18 September, do not offer any opening for continued opposition to this Government.)
The price of the deal? Control of the enquiry into the post-election abuses would pass into the hands of the Government, with Mehdi Karroubi giving up any significant role and intervention. A few scapegoats could take the fall for the deaths at Kahrizak prison, thus appeasing conservative/principlist politicians who were angered by the abuse of Mohsen Ruholamini, and possibly for the raid on Tehran University at the start of the crisis.
Seeing it on paper after hearing it from colleagues, it makes sense. But I'm still not sure.
While the Supreme Leader has taken a tough line with the direct challenge of the opposition throughout this crisis, he has also compromises within the Establishment to strengthen it politicially. So his 19 June Friday Prayer address, while defying the Green movement on calls to review the election, also sought to bring Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani together. Other steps have tried to check the President, notably the insistence on the removal of the First Vice President, Esfandiari Rahim-Mashai, and on the appointment of Sadegh Larijani to head Iran's judiciary. While Ayatollah Khamenei did swing behind full approval of Ahmadinejad's Cabinet, my reading was still that he was doing this for the sake of the system, rather than the President.
It was for this reason that (with hindsight, erroneously) I had been writing that Ahmadinejad was relatively weak in this crisis. I had not counted in his street-fighting resilience and aggression, which meant that (to return to the card table) he would raise the stakes rather than fold. At the same time, it has been for this reason that I had seen the Supreme Leader making move after move to balance and bring together elements of the Establishment who were in tension and even fighting one another.
The Ahmadinejad-IRGC risks that balance by substituting the blunt showdown of political poker for the nuances of the chessboard. So, for me, it is a bet that forces the hand of the Supreme Leader as well as the Green opposition and Rafsanjani. His response comes in 48 hours when he addresses the Friday faithful in Tehran.
Yet, even if I'm wrong on the short-term --- Khamenei is in line with the Ahmadinejad-IRGC strike at the reformists --- there is an even more important dimension beyond. The cold conclusion is that the President and his allies have seized the initiative, and that sets a precedent.
The foundation of the Islamic Republic from its inception by Ayatollah Khomeini has been the concept of velayat-e-faqih, ultimate clerical authority. This has not been an authority that has rested on the Supreme Leader maintaining a detachment from politics (a mistaken assumption of some who have read Khamenei's moves in this crisis as a break from the past) but being able to define the political, at times overruling his President and the Executive.
When he intervened after 12 June (and, indeed, before that) over the Presidential election, the Supreme Leader was trying to maintain control over that process. Whatever the fate of this week's "all-in" bet by Ahmadinejad and the IRGC, the Supreme Leader has not been able to accomplish that. Velayat-e-faqih has been eroded.
So if we could conclude one chapter of this crisis by taking the Green movement off the table (and I don't think that even this can be set down --- watch for Qods Day), there are other players in this game. And the biggest to date of those players, a Mr Ali Khamenei, now may have his make-or-decision decision.
Call or fold?
Iran Urgent Analysis: Is This the Defining Showdown?
The Latest from Iran (8 September): Picking A Fight?
NEW Iran: Ahmadinejad Chooses Confrontation Over Compromise and Governing
UPDATED Iran: Mousavi HQ Raided by Security Forces
Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis
An admission: for the first time in three months, I feel very uncertain about an analysis. Up to this point, with the immense help of colleagues and readers, I could read and analyse the move of various participants in the post-election conflict, watching them act and react against each other. Even in mid-August, when we tried to figure out the manoeuvres of Hashemi Rafsanjani, I think we came to a secure conclusion about his complex, cautious steps.Yesterday afternoon changed all this. We were in the midst of reading yet another turn of the kaleidoscope: an apparent alignment between the Supreme Leader and other elements in the Iranian Establishment to find a compromise that would contain the reformists by offering a limited "compromise", thus securing the system. This would have entailed a loudly-proclaimed but strictly-defined enquiry into detentions and abuses, public but relatively gentle criticism of the President's handling of the crisis, and perhaps the "Ramadan present" of a release of high-profile prisoners.
It seemed this was the latest but one of the most important chess moves in the conflict. Then at 3 p.m. Tehran time yesterday, 24 hours after security forces raided an office run by the staff of Mir Hossein Mousavi, someone --- most likely, the President, working with the Revolutionary Guard --- ordered the seizure of the main office of Mehdi Karroubi and the Etemade Melli political party and website, arresting the editor-in-chief of etemademelli.ir and perhaps shutting the site down. And a few hours after that, Mir Hossein Mousavi's chief advisor, Alireza Beheshti, was arrested.
I think the difficulty in evaluating these steps is that Ahmadinejad is not playing chess. Dismissing our once-favourite cliche for a new analogy, with the attack on the Mousavi and Karroubi camps, the President and the Revolutionary Guards are palying cards, and they just put all their chips in the middle.
It's called an "all-in" bet. It's far more brutal than the intricate moves on the chessboard, and it forces your opponent not only to think but to make a make-or-break decision. In the face of this assault, does the Green movement fold its cards, conceding that for now Ahmadinejad has the authority, however illegitimate that might be? Or does it "call", preparing for a showdown that could mean more arrests and the effectively dismantling of an organised opposition for the near-future?
This, however, is the easy part of the analysis. The much tricker reading is that Ahmadinejad's move (again, considering "Ahmadinejad" as the President, his close allies, and Revolutionary Guard leaders) may not have been solely against the opposition.
With the dramatic measures taken in the last 48 hours, supported by his confrontational rhetoric, the President is moving not only against the "Green Path of Hope" but against other members of the Establishment and even the Supreme Leader.
I'll add the caution that my view is not universally held here at EA, where heated debate will continue today. And Josh Shahryar, who is working on a must-read analysis that should appear by Friday, has a slightly different perspective.
The immediate question: did the Supreme Leader know of the steps for raids and arrests, even as he was publicly advising Ahmadinejad yesterday morning to listen to "benevolent criticism"?
The interpretation that Ayatollah Khamenei is in line with the President/IRGC crackdown argues that the plans to move against Mousavi and Karroubi were in place before the Supreme Leader announced he would be leading Friday prayers in Tehran. Thus, by the time he took the podium, a message to the reformists that "enough is enough" would be backed up by a velvet fist. Behave yourselves, and Alireza Behesti will be released in a few days, your offices can be re-opened, and you can maintain your websites and newspapers (while adhering to our guidelines for proper reporting and analysis).
(An important note: this of course is also an important message to Hashemi Rafsanjani: "Do not make a move, my friend." If you lead prayers on Qods Day, 18 September, do not offer any opening for continued opposition to this Government.)
The price of the deal? Control of the enquiry into the post-election abuses would pass into the hands of the Government, with Mehdi Karroubi giving up any significant role and intervention. A few scapegoats could take the fall for the deaths at Kahrizak prison, thus appeasing conservative/principlist politicians who were angered by the abuse of Mohsen Ruholamini, and possibly for the raid on Tehran University at the start of the crisis.
Seeing it on paper after hearing it from colleagues, it makes sense. But I'm still not sure.
While the Supreme Leader has taken a tough line with the direct challenge of the opposition throughout this crisis, he has also compromises within the Establishment to strengthen it politicially. So his 19 June Friday Prayer address, while defying the Green movement on calls to review the election, also sought to bring Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani together. Other steps have tried to check the President, notably the insistence on the removal of the First Vice President, Esfandiari Rahim-Mashai, and on the appointment of Sadegh Larijani to head Iran's judiciary. While Ayatollah Khamenei did swing behind full approval of Ahmadinejad's Cabinet, my reading was still that he was doing this for the sake of the system, rather than the President.
It was for this reason that (with hindsight, erroneously) I had been writing that Ahmadinejad was relatively weak in this crisis. I had not counted in his street-fighting resilience and aggression, which meant that (to return to the card table) he would raise the stakes rather than fold. At the same time, it has been for this reason that I had seen the Supreme Leader making move after move to balance and bring together elements of the Establishment who were in tension and even fighting one another.
The Ahmadinejad-IRGC risks that balance by substituting the blunt showdown of political poker for the nuances of the chessboard. So, for me, it is a bet that forces the hand of the Supreme Leader as well as the Green opposition and Rafsanjani. His response comes in 48 hours when he addresses the Friday faithful in Tehran.
Yet, even if I'm wrong on the short-term --- Khamenei is in line with the Ahmadinejad-IRGC strike at the reformists --- there is an even more important dimension beyond. The cold conclusion is that the President and his allies have seized the initiative, and that sets a precedent.
The foundation of the Islamic Republic from its inception by Ayatollah Khomeini has been the concept of velayat-e-faqih, ultimate clerical authority. This has not been an authority that has rested on the Supreme Leader maintaining a detachment from politics (a mistaken assumption of some who have read Khamenei's moves in this crisis as a break from the past) but being able to define the political, at times overruling his President and the Executive.
When he intervened after 12 June (and, indeed, before that) over the Presidential election, the Supreme Leader was trying to maintain control over that process. Whatever the fate of this week's "all-in" bet by Ahmadinejad and the IRGC, the Supreme Leader has not been able to accomplish that. Velayat-e-faqih has been eroded.
So if we could conclude one chapter of this crisis by taking the Green movement off the table (and I don't think that even this can be set down --- watch for Qods Day), there are other players in this game. And the biggest to date of those players, a Mr Ali Khamenei, now may have his make-or-decision decision.
Call or fold?
Reader Comments (16)
It smells like SL is a completely secondary element now and will be used if/where he serves a purpose. Javani has blatantly said that IRGC is running the show in spite of Khomeini's original dictates. Ahmadinejad said today that Iran's mission is to "raise the Mahdist flag around the world" and that since the election, Iran has become "the most powerful regime (system) in the world." (http://www.fararu.com/vdcbwfbf.rhb8zpiuur.html )
A lot of people take these words as pure rhetoric; I don't. I believe he has a dream and will risk a lot to achieve it (that may even get him into trouble with IRGC Corporation in the end).
Ahmadinejad/IRGC will arrest the opposition leaders and their close associates. They'll purge the universities, newspapers and other institutions. (Along the way, they may even try a limited "reign of terror" if they think it useful.) And they'll get belligerent outside of Iran's borders--all on a newly branded ideological platform.
Mesbah Yazdi will be the theological guru; Mashaei, the government; and Mojtaba/Jafari/Javani, the military.
Rafsanjani, the Larijanis and many others will probably all go away eventually.
I beleive that Khamenie, Ahmaddinejad and IRGC are all working closely together in every aspect of this coup. I also beleive that the brain behind this was Mesbah Yazdi, The one thing they did not count on was the continued support of the people, behind the reformist, this is truly a thorn for them. Also all the players in this game have yet to place thier bets. very soon you will see the pot rise, The Grand Ayotollas are comming together now, I am sure that in the coming days they will be speaking in one voice for humanty against this regime. Also we seem to leave out the regular army and I am sure thier will be a large number of the IRGC and Basij who will change sides on this, simply becouse they will soon relize they themselves will be blamed for most of the unfortunate destruction in other words, They will be the sacrficial lambs of this regime. So they will soon turn, only to save themselves. Qods Day will be written in the history books (Sept.18, 2009) I feel this day may soon become Independece Day for the Iraian Nation. Call me a dreamer!
Yes, Sheila, why does no one speak of the Army? And agreed, Mahasti, Khamenie is an old man, isolated and physically depleted, who no longer wears the 'mystery' cloak of Velayat-e-faqih. By his own hand, he has become a version of some kind of wind up toy.
Am unsure of the complete composition of Ahmadi & Co., but regardless, these people have no choice. They have everything to lose -- the perfume of power, billions of dollars, and perhaps their lives if the rules change. Can't see them going quietly away for any reason at all. They care for their own perpetuation, not for the people of Iran, that's obvious.
And how will the determined but unarmed opposition stand up against the batons, gas, guns and knives? The kidnappings? Should we expect them to remain at home and do nothing? How can they? The regime follows them home. Or will they appear en masse for an end scene and its punishing aftermath?
The situation seems far beyond 'peaceful protest,' which requires the opposing side to honor the 'rules.' In this case, the regime has demonstrated that it is ferociously lawless.
Perhaps the prelude of arrests and abductions reported yesterday is but a 'warmup' to what the regime will do before Qods Day arrives. Their only option is to try to erase it from the calendar.
That's why I'd like to know - where is the Army? They are the unmentioned thousands. These are sadly tragic days for the good people of Iran. Pray for them, please.
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Enduring America, S. Taned シルビア, Victoria, Iran and others. Enduring America said: #IranElection Urgent Analysis (Part 2 of 3): Did #Ahmadinejad & IRGC also move anti #Khamenei yesterday? http://bit.ly/7MXbT #iran [...]
Looking at the latest movements I am beginning to believe more and more that indeed the S.L must be terminally ill and does not have long left in him. This would mean that unlike the Green's and Hashemi, the Guards do not have the luxuary to waste even a second. If the Supreme leader was to pass away it could mean a HUGE risk for the Guards, the Expediancy council being led by Hashemi and him having a majority vote there and also the fact that the guards have openly attacked the old establishment it is almost a given that the selection of the new leader would pose a serious threat to their plans.
This make alot of sense to me why in times where one would not expect them to (the Guards) keep provoking, instead of laying low they keep throwing more and more oil on the fire which one would expect them to be wanting to die. These actions make alot of sense as their futur and existence is relying on them winning the battle BEFORE the S.L dies. This also would explain the somewhat relaxed, passive role the oppposition has taken. They might just be wanting to create the right atmosphere for the real battle to come.
The Guards on the other hand know they must act now, they need to provoke, they need to gain ground NOW, as there maybe no tommorow.
For me this is still very much a chess game, and the Greens and Hashemi have put their pieces in a defensive mode just trying not to lose any ground and making the Guards make all the moves, look for opening and infact FORCE openings.
My very first post on EA started with a Napoleon quote, Our Victory is in the mistakes of our opponents and that still seems to be the case for the green's and Hashemi. Just cosolidating power and waiting for mistakes and the right moment to open their attacks.
With each mistake and each fierce attack the Guards make, with each leak of Info, each story of the horrific acts happening in prison etc. they are gaining more support for the day the new S.L is to be named.
This is just a possible scenario, same as many we have ventured into the last weeks but looking at the actions of each player in the last few weeks this very much makes sence.
But then again if everything that made sence had happened in Iran during the last decades, we'd have a complete diffrent Iran today.
To me the game seems to be maintenance of the "establishment" by the SL. If he actively chastises AN, then he could be in effect criticizing himself and thus the establishment itself given his support of AN's "victory" in the election. The SL's actions teeter between the varying elements, reformists, AN/IRG, principalists, at an attempt to keep all from falling over the fence. The recent actions, e.g. office raids, may prove to be enough for the SL to take more decisive action, what this would be who knows, but likely still aimed to protect the establishment.
I think you are right on the SL's reluctance to undermine the president. I think it is fair to view the regime and country's stability as coinciding (not necessarily attributably) with the consolidated power of the office of the presidency and end of prime ministership in 1989.
Must also be remembered that the trouble Iran went through 1979-81 with presidents and prime ministers resigning, impeached, assassinated. Khamenei himself steadied the ship when he became President- it's an office he knows and values.
I agree with Afshin that the IRGC's moves are an attempt to consolidate power before SL goes. However, the end game is not clear to me. My gut says that the IRGC can maintain their position for months and perhaps years; however, it will come at the price of an inefficient police state that is bereft of its best minds and its most talented people. The efforts to provide a strong face, will come at the cost of a greatly weakened state.
Ahmadinejad and the IRGC have a monopoly on force inside the country. They can dictate their desired outcome over the short term. I interpret their moves as an attempt to decapitate the reform movement. This is something that they have desired to do for years -- it was something that they planned to do regardless of whether they won the June election legitimately or not. The value of the election for the public is that it laid bare for all to see the reality of the situation. Perhaps it simply has accelerated the process.
The one major error that Ahmadinejad and the IRGC seem to have made is their inability to grasp the apparent depth and breadth of public hostility. In all likelihood they are too insulated, living in a kind of fantasy world. Maybe they are now aware of the breadth and depth of discontent, but they lack the ability to apply any kind of appropriate remedy, because, fundamentally they are the problem. They continue to just treat the surface causes.
The deeper and deeper the IRGC et al reach into the society to silence critics, the more wide-spread the discontent is likely to become. The more the IRGC resorts to heavy-handed and illegitimate means; the more it will be forced to maintain its grip on power through force and illegitimate means.
The SL appears to be either complicit or too inept to exert control at this point as well. Ahmadinejad and others may keep up appearances and humor the old man by showing him deference in public (with a few lapses -- see the VP selection); however, the truth seems to be that the SL is no longer in control of events. Even so, I do not see the SL reversing himself at this stage. Maybe he has had his doubts about Ahmadinejad, but I don't see him moving into open conflict with Ahmadinejad or the IRGC. I hope that I am wrong, but I don't see him having the requisite humility to admit error. His position would make such a move untenable. He might fear that a reversal will highlight his fallibility -- something that he will be even more disinclined to do in a weakened state.
The issues that the SL will continue to highlight are ones that may be of concern to some conservative factions, but I do not seem him providing a remedy to grievances of other parties in the conflict. So long as those grievances fester it is hard to envision any kind of a resolution.
There is no apparent "fold" as far as I can see for any of the factions at this point. It is hard to see reform happening within the system, and it is hard to see a reversal of the current course of events. This is true even if the Larijanis are co-opted -- as appears to be the case -- and Rafsanjani is co-opted. This may turn out to be true too even if the reformists are removed officially from the scene. The sources of conflict at this stage appear to be too wide-spread and deep at this point.
I'm afraid I should agree with mahasti's comment .
It seems , that from long ago , a group of ruthless thugs in IRGC and some corrupted sick minded clerics like Mesbah Yazdi and a more obscure third mafia group ( who pushed Ahmadinejad) have been planning and putting in place the nightmare scenario that we are living and as "observer" said : SL is nothing but a wind up toy . By deliberately letting the leak of some horrendous information about their atrocities ; they have showed that they have no principals , no limits in their savagery and no one can be spared and thus have shocked and terrified the people who could be their only real adversary . having quietened the protests , they have cleared the path to get to the big heads of the reformists and they would have no scruples in executing them if it served their cause. The problem is that the opposition is playing chess while this government and it's allies are playing a war game .
Unfortunately such government having the weakness of NOT being patriotic and popular and having the vice of being corrupted and incompetent, is more profitable to other countries like Russia and even the US ; and so they may choose certain policies as to consolidate A.N's government .
Accepting the reality and knowing the demon, makes one fight it better and broadens the chance of winning sooner.
Since mind can succeed over matter , the question would be : How can we "wisely" fight this demon ?
To Afshin's point about the SL's impending death, the most likely scenario is that IRGC will arrest Rafsanjani et al if that happens early, establish martial law, and with Mesbah's backing declare Mojtaba as SL's successor, justifying the move on the Shi'a historical model of the Prophet Mohammad-Imam Ali family relationship. It will also do away with, or reshape any institutions--including the Expediency Council--as it needs to and reinvent the regime/Constitution to place the Guards center stage both policitally and militarily.
All the players for such a scenario are in place.
If this scenario plays out, it's anybody's guess whether the regular army will pose a challenge to the IRGC and how bloody the process will be.
MD, I think if the IRGC/Ahmadi/Meshab camp goes all the way, we're looking at something more like the Spanish Civil War than just a political tug of war between a "wise" and peaceful camp and IRGC. There will be armed resistance, sabotage of oil supplies/shipments, massacre of clerics and lay people on both sides--the whole works.
The big question is the role of international powers over the next year. That could impact the IRGC's position economically and militarily and simultaneously influence the opposition's game plan in as yet unpredictable ways.
Mahasti,
Although the opposition does not have the appropriate infrastructure for armed resistance , but your theory is quite plausible .
By "wise" strategy , I meant the ways & means by which the power could be weakened
( e.g.. economically , fracture from within , etc.).
As for the international power , they will certainly fish from muddled water if not compelled by their public opinion to do other wise , That is why in the absence of proper coverage by the professional media the role of social media in this case is very important .
The end game is coming soon and I am pretty sure it starts with a few Cruise Missles up that country's ass.
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The discovery of a weapons cache in western Afghanistan has raised concerns that Iran is interfering in the war-torn country, much like it did in Iraq, by supplying weapons used to attack and kill U.S. and coalition troops, U.S. officials tell FOX News.
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When this is proven, and it will be, we are gonna take that stinking, perverted, ass-backwards country OUT.
How this illigitimate regime has lasted this long is beyond me. A country full of idiots I suppose.
So go ahead mullahs, rape your little boys and girls while you still have time because your time is short.
@ ken mac
Another fine example of new-con thinking. Lets just bomb 'em that will solve the problems...
There is not a problem in the world one can not solve with a few boms and lots of ammo......
Question - How do we solve the getto problems in American cities like LA?
Answer - These are uneducated, poor criminal people. Lets bomb them, if there are no uneducated, poor folks there is no getto
Question - How should we fight Hizbollah in urban situations where they are among civilians?
Answer - Bomb them there all arabs anyway
Question - How do we solve the huge unemployement issues the US is having ?
Answer - lets organise a day were all unemplyed people attend and then we bomb them. No more unemployment
Question - How can we arrange peace in Israel/Palestine when both parties wont give up east Jerusalem?
Answer - Just Bomb East Jerusalem, then they have nothing left to fight for
See these guys are right, I mean take the Iran situation where the idiot population is being so mistreated by the Mulla's. Lets just bomb them, We'll free the Iranian People by killing them. Cause if people are dead, they can't possibly be oppressed anymore, right? How can u oppress or hurt a dead guy, thats what i mean there u go problem solved.
so dont forget answer to any National or International problem is:
Lets just bomb them...
Let's look at the allegations...
-Weapons used by the Taliban originated in Iran.
Well if so they can join the weapons that originated in the US and its allies, Pakistan.
-Iranian intelligence is funneling money to Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Well if so, it can join the money provided to Karzai over the years by the US and its allies, Pakistan
-They have succeeded in having a government in Kabul that is rather friendly to them.
Well, if so, it is because the US removed the previous extremely unfriendly government.
I think it is hillarious that the US stations hundreds of thousands of troops thousands of miles away from its borders, surrounding Iran. But then acts incredulous at the very notion that Iranian intelligence might have any presence in the countries it borders on.
Quite apart from the flimsy evidence it provides for Iranian-Taliban cooperation (which goes against all ideological and historical logic). In fact, I doubt the Taliban (the original Pashtun group) have any presence in Herat at all. It is just as likely that these arms were provided by Iran to fight the Taliban. In terms of Iranian intelligence links with the military leaders in that region- it goes back to the Soviet war and then the Afghan civil war. It's unsurprising.
The far more important Iranian presence in Herat is economic- hence it is one of the better, if not best, places to live in Afghanistan.
@ ChriseE
You have it right that the economic, educational and sanitary presence is the one that most matters. Iran has been slow to penetrate Afghanistan, but the IRGC model works like this:
1) Send in some economic activity and military militia building capability to help organize some semblance of security and activity
2) Follow with schools and mosques and force the local militia to start protecting these new assets
3) Follow with hospitals and force the local population to protect the schools and hospitals
Now you command and control the area you have penetrated utilizing local population, no level of force can remove you, unless they are willing to destroy the local population completely. This model was used in Iraq and in Lebanon. The only surprise is how slow Iran has been to use it in Afghanistan, and how shallow the penetration has been (Herat and Frah and a few other provinces only) Otherwise, its a cheap effective and highly brutal method. Americans themselves know this too well.