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Entries in Ali Shirzadian (1)

Tuesday
Oct132009

UPDATED Iran: The Washington-Tehran Deal on Enriched Uranium?

The Latest from Iran (11 October): “Media Operations”

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IRAN NUKESUPDATE 13 October 1900 GMT: For the love of Ed Murrow, is there a journalist out there who is not being led by the nose on the US-Russia Sanctions on Iran story?

Both The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times prefer to take the bait of Oh No, Russia Will Not Support US Sanctions, quoting Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “Threats, sanctions, and threats of pressure in the current situation, we are convinced, would be counterproductive.” This apparently "throw[s] cold water on the Obama administration’s hopes that Russia had bxeen persuaded to cooperate with its effort to intensify the global pressure on Tehran".

Reuters prefers to be the mouthpiece for Oh Yes, Russia Will Support US Sanctions, relying on a US State Department spokesman who assures everyone that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev is "quite clear that, while pleased with the Geneva results, he expects Iran to implement them and if they don't there should be sanctions."

None of these journalists takes the time to ponder that they are being taken for a public ride. The proposal on the table for Secretary of State Clinton and her hosts is not sanctions but the Russian enrichment of 80 percent of Iran's uranium. All else at this point is a diversion.


UPDATE 1510 GMT: From Deception, Enlightenment. Want to see the clues to the possible US-Iran-Russia deal on enrichment? All you have to do is find the right angle on the mainstream media's simple reporting.

For example, Paul Harris in The Observer of London recites the finger-wagging party line of "American officials", "Clinton woos Russia over Iran sanctions", when she is in Moscow on Tuesday. Actually, in light of this story, expect the Secretary of State to be discussing --- privately, not publicly --- the details of third-party enrichment.

The Los Angeles Times has an even bigger tip-off. Modifying earlier media reports of a defiant position by the spokesman for Iran's nuclear energy organisation, it quotes from a later interview with Ali Shirzadian:
We’re looking at three options. We hand over 3.5% enriched and receive in return 20% enriched, or we buy 20% enriched on the market, or we will be allowed to enrich ourselves. I stress that no matter what option we take it will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency....Any of these options will work for both sides.


There have been been few "scoops" for the mainstream media during the post-election crisis in Iran, but Glenn Kessler of The Washington Post can claim one this morning:

"Iran four months ago discreetly contacted the United Nations-affiliated agency for nuclear energy to outline a worrisome situation: A research reactor in Tehran that produces medical isotopes that detect and treat the diseases of about 10,000 patients a week will run out of fuel by the end of 2010. Iran also had a request: Can you help us find a country that will sell us new fuel?"

The outcome? "An unusual deal, brokered largely by the United States, that aims to buy time for a diplomatic solution to the impasse over Iran's nuclear ambitions. If it works, Iran will end up with fuel necessary to treat desperately ill patients -- and greatly reduce its stock of low-enriched uranium."

This is the deal at the heart of the headline discussion of "third-party enrichment", probably by Russia, of Iran's uranium. Kessler explains that the source for the medical programme, 50 pounds enriched to almost 20 percent by Argentina, is running low. The Iranians have been asking for use of their stock of 3300 pounds, currently at about 3-4 percent enrichment, but that, of course, is tangled up in the debate over whether Tehran is looking for a pretext to produce weapons-grade uranium.

Under the Obama Administration's plan, "Iran...would have to give up about 80 percent of its stockpile to get back the same amount of uranium supplied by Argentina in 1993". Kessler, obviously using Administration sources, says that "White House official Gary Samore broached the idea to Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Russia's atomic energy agency, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov. A senior U.S. official said, 'Both of them immediately said this is a great idea.'"

France is also involved, shaping the enriched fuel into uranium-aluminum
metal plates. And the International Atomic Energy Agency has helped broker the plan in talks with Tehran, including Mohammad El-Baradei's recent visit.

In the slow-moving world of international diplomacy, these are dramatic developments. However, there are two important points that Kessler --- in part because he feels obligated to sprinkle his article with superficial nay-saying ("critics question why the United States would be assisting a nuclear pariah"; "it will be too easy for Iran to extract the more highly enriched uranium for weapons") --- does not address.

First, this is the clearest possible sign that Washington --- come the hell or high water of its domestic opponents --- will be pursuing engagement. This is high-profile public relations: "senior Administration officials" have gone out of their way to place this story with the Post, knowing that it will get maximum attention over Sunday breakfasts through the capital. Every one of the boilerplate criticisms in Kessler's article is knocked back with an assurance such as "Iran has no known technical expertise at extracting uranium from a metal alloy".

Talk of deadlines and sanctions are now just window-dressing to distract the sceptics. While the Iranian regime will undoubtedly draw out negotiations, ensuring that the deal is not seen as a sign of its weakness, it sees value in the proposal: as Kessler notes, "[US officials] were relieved when, on the eve of the Geneva talks, he was quoted as saying that Iran would ship its low-enriched uranium to a third country for processing."

But here's the second point that does not even dawn on Kessler. "Four months ago", when Iran contacted the IAEA, was also "four months ago" when Iran was holding its Presidential election. Kessler does not identify when the US was informed of Tehran's approach, but one can assume it was soon afterwards.

So the Obama Administration took the decision that any position on Iran's internal turmoil was secondary to striking a nuclear deal. If the cost of that bargain was a granting of "legitimacy" to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it was a price worth paying.