Iran's Nuclear Programme: Obama's Balance Wobbles

The Latest from Iran (3 October): Debating Mousavi’s Strategy
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Big Win for Tehran at Geneva Talks
Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks

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It only took 24 hours for the Obama Administration, after the "substantial progress" of Thursday's Geneva talks on Iran's nuclear programme, to hit the choppy waters of Washington and Tehran politics.

On Friday morning, it was looking very good for the White House. Most of the US media were putting out the news of Iran's agreement to invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect the Qom enrichment facility and to ship uranium to Russia to be enriched. They were adding the Administration's gloss that this was all made to a forceful American stance which had pushed the Iranians into concessions.

By Friday afternoon, the public-relations glue had come unstuck, as a State Department briefing turned into black comedy. (Watch the clip from the 8:44 mark.) The first wobble was over the "third-party enrichment" which had supposedly been established. Journalists challenged that Iranian officials were saying only that they had agreed to consider the proposal; the Department spokesman, unprepared for this information, could only warble about an "agreement in principle".

He came off even worse in the second exchange over Iran's invitation to inspect the Qom plant, after he said there was "no hard-and-fast deadline" for the inspections. Why then, journalists clamoured, had Barack Obama pointedly mentioned on Thursday night a "two-week deadline"? Caught between his opening line of flexibility and the inconvenience of the President's firm marker, the spokesman, umm, stammered.

This would all be good voyeuristic fun if it did not pont to the two larger problems for the Administration. The first is that the Iranian Government is not going to go gently into the diplomatic night playing its assigned role. Tehran, in our view, was already going to be conciliatory at the opening discussions in the hope of getting more discussions. It was not going to jump into any hard-and-fast deal.

The spin that the US Government "forced" Iran's concessions only adds to the dfficulty. Not wanting to appear to be forced into anything, Iranian officials "clarify" that firm measures have not been agreed but must be the subject of further talks, in this case, technical discussions in Vienna on 18 October and the next Iran meeting with the 5+1 powers, possibly at the end of this month.

The second and even greater challenge for the Obama Administration from within. There has always been a group of officials in the Executive who saw negotiations as a process that had to be endured before, with the Iranians inevitably breaking the talks and/or agreements, more pressure could be put on Tehran.

So, even as the "significantly positive" outcome of Geneva was being announced, they were tossing a bucket of red herrings to the media. There might be even more "secret" sites that Tehran had not declared. Iran still had enough uranium to make The Bomb. The Israelis were watching carefully. (Juan Cole points out how all these diversions made their way into Friday's New York Times.)

The loudest of these heckles was that, whatever happened at Geneva, The Iranians Weren't Really Serious. Yesterday morning The Wall Street Journal, which might as well declare that it is a propaganda sheet masquerading as news, declared in its opening paragraph, "Analysts cautioned that the Iranians merely may be seeking to defuse pressure for sanctions while continuing their nuclear program." (The two "analysts" were an Israeli reservist general and George W. Bush's "special envoy on nonproliferation issues".)

Lo and behold, this morning The New York Times headlines, "U.S. Wonders if Iran Is Playing for Time or Is Serious on Deal". Helene Cooper splashes about "administration officials" warning "the trick now for Mr. Obama...will be to avoid getting tripped up", which is actually only one "senior" official (Who is he/she? On the side of those pushing for a lasting agreement with the Iranians? On the side of those seeing no prospect of an agreement?) putting out the dampening comment, “That’s the big ‘if,’ isn’t it? Will they do it? No one wants to do a premature victory lap.”

Let's just put this basic comment out, already fearing that it will disappear in the media wash. The Iranian Government is playing this process "long". It is likely to allow an IAEA inspection of Qom, although even this will be subject to discussions on conditions, but other issues including third-party enrichment, will go into a set of committees. Any agreement will take months, rather than weeks, of contact.

From the start, the Obama Administration --- split between different factions --- have been locked into playing the process "short". A quick result had to be obtained, otherwise sanctions would have to be sought quickly. That is why all the fatuous talk of deadlines --- December? September? October? --- has loudly accompanied and even out-shouted the complexities of engagement.

The President has been unable to extricate himself from this unproductive dilemma. So once again, we will have a two-week cycle of domestic fury, even though the Administration has no stick to wield, before the technical talks in Vienna.

Arms and the Public Diplomat: British Council and the British Aerospace Scandal

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As we write regularly on public diplomacy, we noted the latest entry by our colleague Ali Fisher on his Wandren PD site. As BAE Systems (British Aerospace) faces prosecution over bribery allegations and the prospect of the largest financial punishment in British history, Fisher notes:

The British Council has been running programmes in partnership with BAE Systems for almost 20 years. Although the allegations of corruption are unproven, they may still undermine the British Council’s commitment to increase international understanding and bridge trust gaps in order to create harmony and prosperity for all.

Partnerships with BAE have included the Post-doctoral Summer Research (PDSR) Programme in Saudi Arabia. The British Council website acknowledges that The programme is supported by BAE Systems, the major British company with overall responsibility for the Al-Yamamah programme. The Programme has been sponsored from its inception in 1991 by BAE Systems and administered by the British Council.

Read rest of article....

Olympic Video Shocker: "Ohmigod, The Foreigners Won!"

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[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EuE60mq0r1Q&feature=player_embedded#[/youtube]

The Latest from Iran (2 October): Back to the Homefront

NEW Iran Video: Football & “Ya Hossein! Mir Hossein!”
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Big Win for Tehran at Geneva Talks
Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks
The Latest from Iran (1 October): From Geneva to “Unity”?

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1525 GMT: The student group Daftar-Tahkim-Vahdat has called for the freeing of 15 of their members, saying their arrests will not help the volatile atmosphere at universities: "Failure to release the students immediately is like putting a match to a warehouse of dynamite".

1410 GMT: Report that 15 members of the student group Daftar-Tahkim-Vahdat have been arrested at Jamshidiyeh Park.

1340 GMT: Little Politics, Big (Football) Politics. As the match ended 1-1, Esteglhal and Persepolis fans were chanting, "We don't want football full with politics!" Seems that there are suspicions, after the 7th draw in a row, that matches are being fixed to avoid conflict.

We've posted a short video of crowd chanting during the match.

1310 GMT: Protest and Football. Despite the heavy security presence at the Esteglhal-Persepolis match, the crowd broke out into chants of "Ya Hossein! Mir Hossein!" and flashed victory signs.

Latest score: 1-1.

1220 GMT: From the Esteghlal-Persepolis football match: "Impossible to chant during game. Security forces everywhere. Plainclothes mixed with ordinary supporters." There are reports of 15-20 arrests.

At halftime, the score was 0-0.

1135 GMT: Nothing but Defense Here. The line at today's Friday Prayers has been political and unsubtle: Iran's weapons are for its defense against evil enemies, and Iran will "never ignore its nuclear rights".

1125 GMT: Behzad Nabavi, a senior member of the reformist Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution party detained since June, has been hospitalised with complications from hernia and undergone surgery; he is now in intensive care.

1110 GMT: On the Iranian weekend, the news is slow. Arguably, the most important event today is not Friday Prayers but Iranian's biggest football match, the derby between Esteglhal and Persepolis. Hundreds of security personnel are reported to have been mobilised in Azadi Stadium.

0930 GMT: The Shouts from the Peanut Gallery. And now President Obama's biggest test --- bigger than his manoeuvres with/against Iran --- begins. The Wall Street Journal screeches, "Springtime for Mullahs".

Unlike our own concern over the effect of the talks on the internal situation in Iran, there is no substance behind the Journal's polemic, "This supposed fresh start in Geneva only gives them new legitimacy, and new hope that they can have their bomb and enhanced global standing too."

0840 GMT: Now This is Interesting. It is reported that, after he met with Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi to discuss the post-election situation,  Ayatollah Safi-Golpaygani has had separate meetings with the Mayor of Tehran, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, and Iran's Prosecutor-General, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie.

0740 GMT: After the days of built-up drama surrounding the Geneva talks (we've posted a special analysis, President Obama's statement, and last night's TV appearance by chief Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili), attention may return to Iran's internal situation today, although so far it has been a quiet morning for Friday prayers.

There is another move on the clerical front, with Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani announcing his telephone conversation with Ayatollah Dastgheib, another prominent critic of the Government. This follows a face-to-face discussion, reported yesterday, between Grand Ayatollahs Safi-Golpaygani and Makarem-Shirazi.

It also appears that the Revolutionary Guard is in a spot of bother over its economic plans. It is reported that the consortium linked to the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps has not been able to put up the first payment for its purchase of 51% of Iran's state telecommunications company.

Iran's Nuclear Programme: Big Win for Tehran at Geneva Talks

LATEST Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama’s Balance Wobbles
Latest Iran Video: Nuclear Official Jalili on CNN (1 October)
Iran’s Nuclear Programme: Obama Remarks on Geneva Talks
The Latest from Iran (1 October): From Geneva to “Unity”?

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First Things First. We may have underestimated the significance of yesterday's discussions between Iran and the "5+1" power when we wrote (1640 GMT), "The Iranians have achieved their primary objective, which is to avoid an immediate condemnation and the threat of sanctions from a “breakdown” of today’s discussions."

The biggest signal of a breakthrough at the talks was not the declaration, from all sides, that Iran would invite the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit the second enrichment facility at Qom "in the next couple of weeks" (1715 GMT). That was always the likely Iranian concession to "the West": contrary to the exaggerations in the US and British media, Qom is not that significant a plant, serving at this point as potential back-up to the main enrichment site at Natanz. So Tehran can accept inspections, provided its sovereignty is also maintained in an agreement, with the assurance that there's nothing illegal to be seen at the second facility.

No, here was the white smoke of a larger deal: "the Western media continues to miss the announcement, enthusiastically proclaimed by Press TV, that officials from Iran and the “5+1″ powers will have technical talks on 18 October on 'third-party enrichment'" (1935 GMT). A couple of hours later, McClatchy News Service put out the news:

Iran agreed in principle at high-level talks here to ship most of its enriched uranium to Russia, where it would be refined for exclusively peaceful uses, in what Western diplomats called a significant, but interim measure, to ease concerns over its nuclear development.

Under the tentative deal reached here, Iran would ship what a U.S. official said was "most" of its approximately 3.300 pounds of low-enriched uranium to Russia where it would be further refined. French technicians would then fabricate it into fuel rods and return it to Tehran, to insert into a nuclear research reactor that is used to make isotopes for nuclear medicine.

This morning, The New York Times headlines, "Iran Agrees to Send Enriched Uranium to Russia", and The Washington Post also picks up on the development. Perhaps most importantly, President Obama slipped the news into his statement last night, "Taking the step of transferring its low-enriched uranium to a third country would be a step towards building confidence that Iran’s program is in fact peaceful."

Of course, this is far from a done deal. The head of Iran's delegation, Saeed Jalili, was cautious when he appeared on CNN last night, saying that the matter would not have to be discussed by the "experts" in the IAEA, rather than the 5+1 Powers. Press TV's website, in contrast to the network's excited declaration of the technical talks on 18 October, is now silent on the matter.

Yet make no mistake. At this point the outcome is a victory for the Ahmadinejad Government. A week ago, President Obama, flanked by the British and French leaders, was loudly declaring that the US would be punishing Iran economically if Tehran did not concede on the "secret nuclear plant". The White House scrambled last night to keep the stick on the table, with Obama putting out boilerplate warnings, Talk is not substitute for action. Pledges of cooperation must be fulfilled....Our patience is not unlimited." An official added the specific caution to The New York Times, "[This] would represent a major accomplishment for the West, reducing Iran’s ability to make a nuclear weapon quickly and buying more time for negotiations to bear fruit. If Iran has secret stockpiles of enriched uranium, however, the accomplishment would be hollow."

Now, however, that stick would have to be waved in the face of not one but two tracks of conversations. There are the technical talks, and there is the next meeting of the 5+1 powers with Iran, flagged up for the end of October. So, unless the US is prepared to pull the plug suddenly on both processes (or unless the Iranian Government is foolish enough to abandon the discussions), there is no pretext for further sanctions before the end of the year, even if Tehran draws out the talks with the IAEA over access to the second enrichment facility.

And even then, Washington's stick has been a limp one. Juan Cole enthuses this morning, "Barack Obama pwned Bush-Cheney in one day, and got more concessions from Iran in 7 1/2 hours than the former administration got in 8 years of saber-rattling," but the Obama Administration probably could have had the same result that it got yesterday had it kept its collective mouth shut last week. Instead, the President and his advisors raised the stakes with threats and then found, in the 72 hours leading up to Geneva, that they could not deliver if necessary: neither Russia nor China was on board, and the European Union as well as the IAEA signalled their preference for genuine discussions.

This alone would be excellent reward for Tehran, but President Ahmadinejad's victory --- and this will be the unnoticed side-effect of the discussions --- is even greater. For over the last week, the "Western" powers have given him the legitimacy for which he has struggled at home. Have no doubt: the President and his advisors will be proclaiming loudly that they have defended Iran's sovereignty, upheld the rights of other peoples with their insistence on discussion on wider political and economic issues, and forced the US, Britain, and France to back down. Last night Jalili was already denouncing the "media terrorism" which tried to humiliate Iran and refusing to acknowledge a question from an Israeli reporter.

In other words --- I doubt you can find many non-Iranian commentators who will note this, although The Guardian has noted somewhat clumsily, "An Islamic regime involved in rape...is more of an issue in Tehran than the nuclear one" --- the Geneva discussions were the second theatre for the Ahmadinejad Government. What it needed, even more than the disappearance of the sanctions threat and space for its nuclear programme, was the drama and spectacle of recognition to take back home.

The President and his advisors may have been playing to the Western galleries, but they recognise that the primary theatre is still at home. So now the question arises: can the regime use the nuclear talks to push aside the challenges to its authority or will other issues --- detentions, abuses, Constitutional manipulations --- now return to centre stage?