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Entries by Scott Lucas (139)

Tuesday
Oct062009

Latest Iran Video: 4 Clips from Tehran Azad University Protests (6 October)

The Latest from Iran (6 October): Loud Noises, Quiet Manoeuvres

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Note: Videos are "photographic negatives" to prevent identification of protesters --- More clips available via Mehdi Saharkhiz

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGeHIWVlPDg&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onbGQuXC9YM&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ul-MaLygA0&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umEcPxUO348&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]
Tuesday
Oct062009

Israel-Palestine: The US Mistake on the Goldstone Report

LATEST Palestine: Pressure on Abbas to Resign in Goldstone Report Furour
Israel-Palestine: More Clashes in Jerusalem
Israel-Palestine Inside Line: Hamas & Syria Criticise Abbas; Israel VP Cancels Britain Trip Over “War Crimes” Fears

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GAZA4As EA's Ali Yenidunya updates on the latest fall-out from the deferred UN vote on the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War, Marc Lynch, in his blog for Foreign Policy, raises questions about the Obama Administration's decision to block the report:

I'm still trying to figure out the thinking behind the Obama administration's rapid moves to block the Goldstone report on the Gaza war.  Without even getting into the moral issues involved or the accuracy of the report, the most likely tactical considerations behind the administration's decision seem short-sighted.  Its move likely responded to the intense public and private Israeli campaign against the report, and probably aimed at winning back some positive relations with the Israelis and maintaining momentum on the peace process.

But if the administration's hope was that killing the report would make the issue quietly go away while winning some political capital with the Israelis, it is likely to be disappointed.  Quite the contrary:  the report is becoming a major political issue in the Arab world, badly damaging the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, while Obama seems to be getting little credit from Israeli public opinion or the Israeli government.

Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are already paying a heavy price for succumbing to reported American pressure to drop the report.  It isn't just Hamas criticism, though there's plenty of that.  This has rapidly become a leading issue in the Palestinian and Arab media, and is shaping up into a profound setback for the already weak PA leadership.  Virtually every sector of Palestinian opinion -- from Hamas to Fatah, from Gaza to the West Bank -- has united in harsh criticism of the move.  Even Mohammed Dahlan -- Dahlan! -- is positioning himself in opposition, showing where he thinks the political points are to be scored.  The Economics Minister in Fayyad's government Bassem al-Khoury reportedly submitted his resignation in protest.   Given his key role in pushing the so-called "economic peace" that Israeli and American officials are so keen upon, perhaps that will get more attention than the massive, broad-based criticism across the rest of Palestinian society.

There seems to be little question that Abbas's decision to go along with American pressure will have a significant impact on the popularity and legitimacy of the PA.  He is already backpedaling in the face of the intense public backlash, announcing the formation of a committee to look into the "circumstances surrounding the issue" (gee, wonder what he'll find when he investigates his own decision?), but it's probably too late.  Whatever gains made by Fatah after its Bethlehem conference and by Fayyad with the announcement of his agenda for a Palestinian state are likely to be washed away in this deluge.  The credibility of the Hamas narrative about the PA's collaboration with Israel and unrepresentative nature will be strongly enhanced. And it will not help Salam Fayyad establish authority that he has been fingered by some sources as the person directly responsible for the decision.

Why was the PA leadership put in this untenable situation?  The Obama team has consistently identified building Palestinian Authority legitimacy and capacity as a key part of its strategy.  Did nobody consider the impact that such an important symbolic issue as the perceived suppression of the Goldstone report would have on this supposedly crucial dimension of the strategy?

At the wider Arab level, the American stance on the Goldstone report has galvanized doubts about the credibility of Obama's outreach to the Muslim world and claims to genuine change.  The skeptics who demanded deeds to match words are having a field day.  As much as the inability to prevail in the battle over the settlements hurt Obama's credibility with the Arab world, at least he got some credit for trying, for prioritizing the issue and paying some costs to keep at it.  But the Goldstone report decision looks to most of the Arab public as a straightforward capitulation to Israel and abdication of any claims to the moral high ground. It will further undermine the Cairo promises, which look ever more distant.

Meanwhile, I have searched in vain for signs that the Israeli public or hawkish commentariat have given the Obama administration any credit for its efforts.  Israeli commentators seem to have simply taken the American protection for granted, or grudgingly acknowledged it in passing, without revising their views of Obama. The scornful, dismissive tone of the hawks towards Obama continues, while doves largely ignore it or disagree.  If there's been a concerted effort to leverage the decision to improve his standing with the Israeli leadership or public, I haven't seen it.

I can understand the decision to sacrifice the Goldstone inquiry into the Gaza war to tactical or strategic considerations, whether or not I agree with the call.  It wouldn't be the first time.  But I would hope that such a decision would have seriously anticipated the implications for the legitimacy and efficacy of the Palestinian Authority, for Obama's credibility among Arab and Muslim audiences, or for how to leverage it into real gains with the Israeli public.
Tuesday
Oct062009

Israel-Palestine Inside Line: Hamas & Syria Criticise Abbas; Israel VP Cancels Britain Trip Over "War Crimes" Fears 

Israel-Palestine: More Clashes in Jerusalem

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Hamas, Syria Line Up Against Palestinian Authority Over Goldstone: The furour over the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War continues after Palestinian representatives supported Israel in deferral of a UN vote on the conclusions. Palestianian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas backtracked on Sunday, announcing that a committee would investigate the circumstances surrounding the deferral. Hamas, however, maintained its pressure on the PA, accusing Abbas of betraying Palestinians: “The decision of deferral was merely justifying the war and encouraging the occupation.”

Damascus has also jumped into the dispute, postponing a scheduled visit by Abbas.

Israel's VP Cancels Britain Trip Because of Fear of Arrest: Concerned that he would be detained on war crimes charges, Israeli Vice Premier Moshe Ya'alon has declined an invitation to a charity event in London next month. According to the Jerusalem Post, the Foreign Ministry advised Ya'alon not to travel, because of possible charges from his involvement in the 2002 assassination of a Hamas leader that killed 14 other people. The Ministry played down the arrest warning, saying that Ya'alon called off his trip "to avoid playing into the hands of anti-Israel propaganda."
Tuesday
Oct062009

Israel-Palestine: More Clashes in Jerusalem

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JERUSALEM CLASHESRecent clashes between Israeli policemen and Palestinian demonstrators flared again this weekend in East Jerusalem. On Sunday, the Islamic Movement urged protesters to come to the Temple Mount to "defend Al-Aqsa [Mosque]". After this announcement, Israeli police closed the Temple Mount compound on Sunday morning and reopened it, but only to those of certain ages, later in the day.

The following day, Arabs from northern Israel and East Jerusalem began throwing stones and bottles at police and others threw stones and Molotov cocktails at a Border Police roadblock near the Shuafat refugee camp. Israeli police arrested the deputy head of the Islamic Movement, Sheikh Kamel Khatib, and Hatem Abdel Qader, the Fatah representative overseeing Jerusalem, on suspicion of incitement to violence.

On Monday evening, the Palestinian Authority called on Palestinians "to confront Israel and its plans" and accused the government of Israel of "trying to thwart the creation of a Palestinian state". Prime Minister Salam Fayyad said, “We call on the Palestinian public to confront Israel and its plans, which are intended to prevent the Palestinian people from fulfilling their aspirations of establishing a Palestinian state in the occupied territories.” The Palestinian Authority also urged the world "to force Israel to halt is efforts to Judaize the city".
Israeli police will remain on high alert on Tuesday for the annual Jerusalem March. Organizers said they expected 70,000 people from across the world to participate.
Tuesday
Oct062009

Iran: Talks and Legitimacy - Takeyh and Marandi on CNN

The Latest from Iran (6 October): Loud Noises, Quiet Manoeuvres

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TAKEYHMARANDIOn Sunday, CNN's Christiane Amanpour followed up her interview with chief Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili with a discussion with Dr Seyed Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran and Dr Ray Takeyh, formerly of the US State Department and now with the Council on Foreign Relations.



There is little here in the way of new analysis on the nuclear talks: Marandi is now CNN's "go-to" academic for a view supporting the Iranian Government, and Takeyh will be generally supportive of an Obama strategy of engagement.

The key paragraph instead is on Iran's internal situation. Note how Marandi links Iran's sovereignty to the question of Ahmadinejad's legitimacy, citing two very suspect opinion polls to put his central point. Accept the President and life will be a lot easier:
Iran is quite stable, and unlike what one often hears in the western media, I don't think that the country is in any serious problem.

I think that it's important for the American government to recognize that and to deal with the reality on the ground in Iran. If you'll recall, Terror Free Tomorrow, they had a poll before the elections that showed that Mr. Ahmadinejad was well ahead. And then the more recent University of Maryland poll also showed that he won the elections, or he was far more popular than Mr. Mousavi.

This doesn't go down well in the United States, I know. But I think that the United States, in order to be able to move towards rapprochement, and to be able to deal with Iran, they have to finally come to understand that Iran is not going to go away and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not going to collapse. If they do come to that recognition and they do come to respect the country, then I think that rapprochement would become much more easy, and I think that the Iranians are quite willing to move in that direction.


AMANPOUR: The Iranian government has invited hundreds of journalists, as well as six ambassadors from the so-called Non-Aligned Movement. There are no western countries represented here. Nonetheless, the Iranian government is saying that this is a transparency visit designed to show the world what it claims to be its peaceful nuclear program.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: That was early 2007, at another of Iran's nuclear facilities near the city of Esfahan. So, nearly three years later, will the Geneva talks between Iran and the U.S. lead to a new era of dialogue?

We turn to Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University, and to Ray Takeyh, a former adviser to the Obama administration on Iran.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, if I could go to you first, what is the mood in Iran around these talks? What are people hoping for?

MOHAMMAD MARANDI, PROFESSOR, TEHRAN UNIVERSITY: Well, I think people are mostly hoping that the United States and its allies will change their attitude towards the country. The tone, of course, did change a bit after Obama came to power, but there hasn't been any substantial change in the eyes of the Iranian people with regards to policy towards the country. And this is an appropriate time for the United States to make that change if they're really serious about dialogue, meaningful dialogue with Iran.

AMANPOUR: OK. Stand by for one second.

And Mr. Takeyh, what does the United States expect to get out of this meeting?

RAY TAKEYH, FMR. ADVISER TO OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ON IRAN: More focus on Iran's nuclear program, particularly the second site that has been -- the clandestine site that was revealed this week, having access to it and having it safeguarded by international inspectors; having Iran essentially accept confidence-building measures in this overall nuclear program; getting some of Iran's accumulated low-enriched uranium out of the country for reprocessing; and establishing a mechanism whereby the dialogue between the two countries can be more systematic, as opposed to episodic that it's been in the past.

AMANPOUR: So, therefore, it should be good news after today, because there has at least, according to all sides, been a development on the inspectors, the IAEA inspectors going, they say.

TAKEYH: Right. That's going to be worked out. And to be fair, the inspectors were going to go in there. After Iran itself declared this facility to the IAEA, it did so with a purpose of actually inviting them to inspect the facilities. So, that might have been the easier part. Getting the overall Iranian nuclear program into some degree of regulation and restraint, that might be tougher.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, in Tehran, do you think and do you believe the government wants broader relations or a different relationship with the United States beyond just these specific talks?

MARANDI: Yes. I think that if the Iranians feel that the Americans are truly serious, then there is indeed a possibility for rapprochement.

Both countries have serious issues in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as in Pakistan, that need to be resolved. And in some ways, they do have similar interests.

The problem is that the Iranians, in the past, on a number of occasions, did step forward for rapprochement, and the Americans gave a very negative response. For example, in the past, during the Clinton years, the Iranians allowed Conoco to come and develop oilfields in Iran, and then sanctions were imposed on Iran. And then, when Iran helped in Afghanistan, it was called a part of the access of evil.

So, this time around, I think the Iranians are going to wait to see what the Americans will be doing. They will probably not take the first step forward themselves.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Takeyh, in terms of what Mr. Marandi just raced, the issue of sanctions, what can the United States or should the United States do, or the international community, in terms of how to go forward? Incentives, would there be? And if they impose sanctions, if they chose to, do you think that would make any bit of difference?

TAKEYH: Well, I think for the next couple of months, everyone is going to wait to see how these negotiations evolve, and if you're going to make some sort of a progress, I think, by January. At that time, I think there are going to be serious discussions about a multilateral sanctions regime that may encompass China and Russia, particularly because at that time, you'd be making an assessment about how these talks work, whether Iran is genuine about coming to terms with the international community, with using these talks to stall and delay. That's when the sanctions issue is going to be revisited.

AMANPOUR: But Iran has said clearly that it hasn't worked in the past, it doesn't bow to those kinds of threats.

Another thing that the president of Iran has said -- he was quoted before these talks -- is that it was a way for them to gauge whether they would be treated with respect at these talks, whether there would be a different atmosphere in terms of interpersonal atmosphere across the table as a way forward.

Do you think that the atmospherics were also important today?

TAKEYH: Atmospherics is always important when you're talking about Iran, because as a country, (INAUDIBLE) international respectability, even though its conduct doesn't always merit it. But these particular sessions seem to have been conducted in a civil, respectful tone by both parties.

There was a sidebar discussion between an American representative and an Iranian representative. I don't know what transpired there, but, essentially, there seemed to have been a better atmosphere than perhaps in the previous talks, and certainly in reference to the rhetoric coming out of both capitals during the past week.

AMANPOUR: Mr. Marandi, given the political dilemma in Iran today and the continued protests, the continued issues there, what is actually going on in terms of various different factions in Iran today?

MARANDI: Well, one interesting thing is that, with regards to the nuclear program, MPs from all the different factions and political parties in parliament, both the different reformists, as well as the different principalists or conservative factions, they all signed a joint statement supporting Iran's position in the negotiations, which is quite significant. But I think it's also important to note that Iran is quite stable, and unlike what one often hears in the western media, I don't think that the country is in any serious problem.

I think that it's important for the American government to recognize that and to deal with the reality on the ground in Iran. If you'll recall, Terror Free Tomorrow, they had a poll before the elections that showed that Mr. Ahmadinejad was well ahead. And then the more recent University of Maryland poll also showed that he won the elections, or he was far more popular than Mr. Mousavi.

This doesn't go down well in the United States, I know. But I think that the United States, in order to be able to move towards rapprochement, and to be able to deal with Iran, they have to finally come to understand that Iran is not going to go away and the Islamic Republic of Iran is not going to collapse. If they do come to that recognition and they do come to respect the country, then I think that rapprochement would become much more easy, and I think that the Iranians are quite willing to move in that direction.

AMANPOUR: Well, let me put that to Mr. Takeyh.

You were in the State Department, you were on the sort of Iran file. You're no longer there.

What is the possibility of rapprochement beyond just this issue?

TAKEYH: Well, it reflects Iran's conduct on a broad ranges of issues -- its entanglements in terrorism, and obviously the nuclear file being probably the most important issue. But it's contingent on Iran's behavior...

(CROSSTALK)

AMANPOUR: When President Obama came in, he came in with a different language towards Iran.

TAKEYH: That's right.

AMANPOUR: Does that still hold? Does he still want to have reset relations?

TAKEYH: I think so. I think that throughout the discussions that have taken place during the past week regarding some of Iran's conduct, the president and others have always insisted that the diplomatic path is still open and Iran has a possibility of walking through the door if it chooses to. But the door is not going to stay open forever.

AMANPOUR: Does the United States agree with several proposals such as that Iran does not ever react well under threat, that Iran wants to be treated as the power of the region, which it is, by all accounts, a major power in the region?

TAKEYH: I think there's a recognition that Iran is a major power in the region and can exercise its influence. But it's important for that influence to be exercised in a constructive manner.