Iran's Political Confusion: Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, and the Nuclear Agreement

Latest from Iran (26 October): After the Fair

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This short, little-noticed story may be important in more than one way.

Yesterday, speaking to an association of engineers, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Reza Bahonar declared:

Presently, the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme Leader emphasize that our strategic policies are based on the absence of negotiations with the United States.That is why we will not have any direct negotiations with the United States.....The conditions for such negotiations must emerge, which have not as yet emerged.

With those three sentences, Bahonar attempted to sweep away both the current talks on Iran's nuclear programme and the concept of "engagement" with Washington. The immediate effect, if his words were heeded, would be Tehran's refusal --- after last week's Vienna discussions and the original deadline of last Friday --- to accept the proposal for "third-party enrichment".

That alone would let the conflict genie out of the diplomatic bottle, with the Obama Administration backed into a corner to set aside talks for harsher economic sanctions. That's pretty big, but it is still not as big as the internal outcome. Bahonar may be the messenger not only for a blow against engagement, but also a smack-down of President Ahmadinejad

Last week, when Bahonar came out against the nuclear discussions, we downplayed his remarks, seeing him as a bystander. When Speaker of the Parliament jumped in with his criticisms of Vienna, however, we raised an eyebrow: was this Ayatollah Khamenei's signal that he was drawing a line across engagement?

Bahonar's latest public declaration indicates, "Yes". And with that Yes comes an even bigger turn of the Iranian political wheel: is the Supreme Leader challenging not only engagement but his own President's authority?

If the signals continue, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has a decision to make. He either defies Ayatollah Khamenei for the sake of his foreign policy, but this risks a showdown with the leader of the Iranian system. On the other hand, if he accepts the Supreme Leader's veto, ensuring a renewed diplomatic isolation for Iran.

More importantly, if Ahmadinejad bows down, he risks unveiling the conditional footing of his own legitimacy. For almost five months, he has fought --- with much more success than we initially predicted --- to establish his position not only against the Green opposition but against the Supreme Leader. He gave way in the dispute over First Vice President Rahim-Mashai, only to bring his ally back into the Government as Chief of Staff, and he made an aggressive move to control of the Ministry of Intelligence. Against doubts within the establishment, Ahmadinejad got Khamenei's approval for his Inauguration and the Supreme Leader's intervention for Parliamentary endorsement of his Cabinet.

Now all that might be unsettled.

In one sense, this is business as usual. The Supreme Leader is the nominal Number One in the Islamic Republic, and that is especially pertinent on issues of Iran's foreign policy and national security.

But this business as usual comes in a most unusual situation. Those not so fond of Ahmadinejad, both outside and inside the political establishment, will see this as a cutting-back of the President's autonomy. And that trimming opens up political space for others to stake their own positions.

Your move, Mahmoud.