Iran: The Campaign to Free Atefeh Nabavi

An EA reader brings us news of a campaign on behalf of Atefeh Nabavi (Persian-language site here), the first woman to receive a prison sentence for post-election protest. Nabavi was sentenced on Tuesday to a mandatory four years in jail for participating in the mass demonstration on 15 June, three days after the disputed Presidential vote.

The campaign, "I Am Atefeh", has been been launched by social activists. It urges people to write about their participation in protests, confessing that they committed the same "crime" as Nabavi: “We want to say that we too think like Atefeh. We are all Atefeh. You have to imprison us all.” As one demonstrator has written, "I along with millions of other citizens, who were present on that afternoon, all belong in prison with Atefeh. Either she is not guilty or we are all criminals."

The Latest from Iran (27 November): Where Now?

2020 GMT: We've posted news of a campaign, "I Am Atefeh", to express support for Atefeh Nabavi, the first woman jailed for post-election protest.

2015 GMT: Ayatollah JavAdi-Amoli announced, during today's Friday Prayers in Qom, that this was his last sermon. Since June, Javadi-Amoli had expressed his displeasure over post-election events.

NEW Iran: The Campaign to Free Atefeh Nabavi
NEW Iran: A Nobel Gesture from Obama Towards the Green Movement?
NEW Iran’s Nukes: IAEA Non-Resolution on Enrichment Means Talks Still Alive
Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? A Discussion on (Non)-Violence
Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? The EA Discussion
Latest Iran Video: BBC’s Neda Documentary “An Iranian Martyr”
NEW Iran MediaWatch: Has “Green Reform” Disappeared in Washington?
NEW Iran: 3 Problems (for the Greens, for the US, for Ahmadinejad
The Latest from Iran (26 November): Corridors of Conflict

1815 GMT: One More Time --- The Talks Go On (But Time for Tehran to Deal). Here's the White House statement on today's IAEA resolution:

Today's overwhelming vote at the IAEA's Board of Governors demonstrates the resolve and unity of the international community with regard to Iran's nuclear program. It underscores broad consensus in calling upon Iran to live up to its international obligations and offer transparency in its nuclear program. It also underscores a commitment to strengthen the rules of the international system, and to support the ability of the IAEA and UN Security Council to enforce the rules of the road, and to hold Iran accountable to those rules. Indeed, the fact that 25 countries from all parts of the world cast their votes in favor shows the urgent need for Iran to address the growing international deficit of confidence in its intentions.

The United States has strongly supported the Director General’s positive proposal to provide Iran fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor - a proposal intended to help meet the medical and humanitarian needs of the Iranian people while building confidence in Iran’s intentions. The United States has recognized Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy and remains willing to engage Iran to work toward a diplomatic solution to the concerns about its nuclear program, if - and only if - Iran chooses such a course. To date, Iran has refused a follow-on meeting to the October 1 meeting with the P5+1 countries if its nuclear program is included on the agenda. Our patience and that of the international community is limited, and time is running out. If Iran refuses to meet its obligations, then it will be responsible for its own growing isolation and the consequences.

Here's what it means:

1. The second enrichment plant at Fordoo near Qom --- of no relevance except as pretext;
2. The El Baradei statement of a "dead end" on verification --- tangential
3. The Iranian response to the Vienna "third-party enrichment" deal --- the be-all and end-all of this meeting.

In other words, this IAEA meeting has been a two-day setpiece to put Tehran's feet to the fire on the October proposal. If Iran now refuses that plan, and if the "West" decides that the Tehran counter-offer of a "swap" is out of bounds, then and only then will there a move beyond engagement. Even then, it is far from clear if that push for sanctions will have any backing from Russia and China.

1455 GMT: Forgive us for being Nukes, Nukes, Nukes, but little else is breaking at the moment. More posturing, this time from Iran's ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh, but note that this follows script of keeping channel open for discussions --- "jeopardise" is a mild democratic warning not to go farther:

.Adoption of this resolution is not only unhelpful in improving the current situation, but it will jeopardise the conducive environment vitally needed for success in the process of Geneva and Vienna negotiations expected to lead to a common understanding.

1355 GMT: At some point someone is going to figure out that IAEA members have not forced a showdown with Iran and, indeed, that they have not even moved away from talks and towards further sanctions. Here's the latest coded signal, courtesy of British Foreign Secretary David Miliband:

The resolution passed today by the IAEA Board of Governors sends the strongest possible signal to Iran that its actions and intentions remain a matter of grave international concern. As the resolution makes clear, Iran needs to comply with its obligations both to the IAEA and to the UNSC. Unless it does this, it remains impossible for the international community to have any confidence in Iranian intentions.

Britain and the other members of the E3+3 have made it very clear that our hand is stretched out to Iran. We are waiting for Iran to respond meaningfully. But if it is clear that Iran has chosen not to do so, we will have no alternative but to consider further pressure on Iran, in line with the dual track policy we have been pursuing.

And this position is not altered by Prime Minister Gordon Brown's rhetorical blast: "[Iran] should accept the offers that have been made that they can have civil nuclear power with our support, but they've got to renounce nuclear weapons. I believe the next stage will have to be sanctions if Iran does not respond to what is a very clear vote from the world community."

1210 GMT: We've just posted an urgent assessment on the International Atomic Energy Agency's resolution, passed today, on Iran's nuclear programme. The real significance --- and this is being missed by the media, who are just following the original Reuters report (see Al Jazeera English, for example) --- is that it is a very mild rebuke of Iran. That in turn means talks with Tehran on uranium enrichment are still alive.

1120 GMT: Iran's Nobel Prize Response. We saw this one coming yesterday when we reported on the Iranian Government's seizure of the Nobel Peace Prize medal and diploma of lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehman-Parast said today, "Much the same as European countries, tax evasion is a crime in Iran and individuals would face legal penalties should they commit such an act."

Mehman-Parast added that if Norwegian officials really cared about human rights, they would not have abstained in the United Nations vote on the Goldstone Report on the Gaza War.

1023 GMT: Filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbaf has won the Freedom to Create Prize, donating the $125,000 prize to non-governmental organisations helping victims of Iran's post-election conflict and dedicating the award to Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. A video of the presentation has been posted on YouTube.

0955 GMT: Nuke Update. Nothing yet coming out of the International Atomic Energy Agency meeting in Vienna. The media, as in this CNN report, is just recycling yesterday's leaked soundbite of Mohammad El Baradei's statement that IAEA analysis of Iran's nuclear status is at a "dead end".

0945 GMT: Dutch television has obtained an interview with Mehdi Karroubi. The exchange is in Farsi with Dutch subtitles.

0830 GMT: Morning Media Moment. Emily Landau of The Jerusalem Post gets in a pre-emptive strike of fanciful "analysis" with her claim, "Dangerous Misreading Iran". That "misreading" is any thought that Iran's position in the nuclear talks is affected by internal development and, in particular, the post-12 June tensions:

The confusion emanating from Iran is simply the most recent manifestation of a well-known pattern that has been repeated in different forms for close to seven years. The "yes, no, maybe" answers from Iran are the tactic that serves its overall strategy in the nuclear realm.

Which would be a fair hypothesis if Landau produced a paragraph, a sentence, even a few words setting out this "well-known pattern". She doesn't.

The serious point here is a leading Israeli academic, "the director of the Arms Control and Regional Security Project, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University", could show not one scrap of perception about the internal dynamics behind Iran's nuclear programme and foreign policy. Instead, "analysis" rests on the unshakeable position: There Cannot (and Should Not) Be a Deal with Iran.

At least the headline's good: I just suspect it's better applied to the author than to her straw-person targets.

0755 GMT: The international media are likely to be dominated today by speculations and leaks about the second day of discussions at the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's nuclear programme.

So, before getting drawn into that issue, we've taken the time --- with the help of readers and fellow bloggers --- to post two discussions about the next steps for the Green Wave(s). The use of the plural is deliberate, as you'll soon see in the debate on the evolving nature of the movement(s); the other, equally important discussion is on non-violence as protest moves towards 16 Azar (7 December) . So is our desire in posting them, not for a conclusive answer but for reflection on how and where protest and resistance develop in this marathon conflict.

Iran: A Nobel Gesture from Obama Towards the Green Movement?

The Newest Deal offers a bit of intriguing speculation: with the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony coming up on 10 December, will its recipient, one Barack Hussein Obama, take the occasion to note the political and human rights situation in Iran?

As President Obama's nuclear negotiations with the Islamic Republic have dragged on, there have increasingly been calls -- from the left, right, and the Iranian diaspora community -- for Obama to couple his engagement on the nuclear front with a more direct condemnation of human rights abuses occurring inside of Iran. PBS and the BBC's recent documentaries centered around the death of Neda Agha-Soltan, as well as the media blitz that has accompanied Newsweek's Maziar Bahari's release from detention in Iran, have only added to such calls.

Iran MediaWatch: Has “Green Reform” Disappeared in Washington?
The Latest from Iran (27 November): Where Now?

This month's suspicious death of an Iranian doctor who truthfully reported the results of an autopsy he performed on Mohsen Rouholamini, the son of a prominent conservative adviser to Mohsen Rezaei, has also been receiving significant coverage. (Ramin Pourandarjani, the doctor involved, had written in his report and testified to an investigatory committee that Rouholamini was tortured to death while incarcerated by Revolutionary Guard agents.) Suffice it to say, events such as these have certainly not helped the Obama administration frame the Iran issue in exclusively nuclear terms.

And so on December 10th, the stars may be aligned for President Obama will ratchet up his criticism of the Islamic Republic. Obama will be in Oslo on that date to accept his Nobel Peace Prize. By that point, the administration's self-imposed December deadline for the end of nuclear talks will have passed -- albeit due to political infighting within Iran rather than a lack of want to actually strike a deal -- and hence giving Obama yet another pretext to increase the pressure coming from Washington. The "peace" themed nature of the award, furthermore, is unlikely to be lost on many.

Making the occasion all the more fitting (not to mention symbolic) is the fact that the regime has now confiscated Shirin Ebadi's Nobel Peace Prize from her safe deposit box. (Ironically, Ms. Ebadi was recognized in 2003 for her work as a human rights attorney in Iran.) This is the first time in the prize's 108-year history that an award has been confiscated, by a state government or otherwise.

UPDATED Iran's Nukes: IAEA Non-Resolution on Enrichment Means Talks Still Alive

UPDATE 1830 GMT: We've got the latest on the public framing of the resolution on our updates page. In brief: 1) the Western media are spectacularly missing the political game of this move by the "5+1" powers (US, UK, France, Germany, China, Russia) behind the IAEA; 2) the aim of that game is to get Iran to put away its counter-offer and accept a "third-party enrichment" deal.

Reuters has just posted the news of the resolution adopted by members of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran's nuclear programme:

The U.N. nuclear watchdog's governing body voted overwhelmingly on Friday to censure Iran for developing a uranium enrichment site in secret, and demanded it freeze the project immediately.

The resolution, passed by a 25-3 margin with six abstentions, was the first by the 35-nation governing board in almost four years. With rare Russian and Chinese backing, it sent a message of international exasperation with Iran's nuclear secrecy and defiance.

Iran Nuclear Special: What Tehran’s Latest Offer Means (and Why the West Should Consider It)
The Latest from Iran (27 November): Where Now?

Cut through the hyperbole --- "overwhelmingly", "exasperation", "secrecy and defiance" --- and you'll find there is not much here.

The resolution on the second enrichment plant, at Fordoo near Qom, is a slap on the wrist for past "crimes". The facility ceased to be secret when Iran declared it to the IAEA on 21 September. There are no operating centrifuges in the plant, which was inspected by the IAEA earlier this month. As part of the discussions over uranium enrichment, Iran has said that it will accept IAEA supervision of the site.

At most, therefore, the resolution is a demand on Iran that, if further development of Fordoo occurs, it should be declared and the plant should be open to inspection.

But the real story is what is not in the resolution. There is no reference to the discussions on "third-party enrichment", no take-it-or-leave-it demand on Tehran, no mention of sanctions.

In other words, for all the media heat playing up Mohammad El Baradei's statement on Thursday as the sign of the breakdown of engagement with Iran (and possibly for all the stories in the next 24 hours distracted by rhetoric and thus missing the substance of the non-resolution)....

Nothing has broken down at all.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? A Discussion on (Non)-Violence

This analysis by Agh Bahman, via the blog of Pedestrian, complements our discussion this morning of the challenges and possibilities for the Green movement(s) as they move into the next phase of protest and politics, six months after the disputed Presidential election:

There’s only two weeks left to [the protests of] 16 Azar [7th of December] and some are expecting it to be like 13 Aban [4 November], if not like Quds Day [18 September]. At the same time, after 13 Aban, some conclude that the violence of security forces is really to provoke people towards violence too. And this will pave the way for more violence on the part of security.

Iran: Where Now for the Green Wave(s)? The EA Discussion

The harsher tone and actions of some demonstrators has worried some and certain political figures and activists have expressed their worries about the green movement becoming violent. (note I am not referring to some really funny or cool slogans, but the general demands of the movement).



I too am slightly worried about this. That is, I am worried about the movement getting more violent or its demands going beyond the “total implementation of the constitution” and the “full release of political prisoners”. I think this will reduce the universality of the movement. Not to mention that we must measure the strength of every movement in its demands. If the green movement can reach a full implementation of the constitution, it has done more than anyone can imagine (if you have some time, go and read the constitution, and note this also that [Mir Hossein] Mousavi and especially [Mehdi] Karoubi have stressed that they want to go back to the draft of the constitution written in 1979).

I’m going to bring in some analysis and statements released in the past few days about the need to abstain from violence on 16 Azar. Note that one of these was released by Tahkim Vahdat [Iranian student organisation], one of the most radical factions within Iran. Maybe they are truly worried that they are speaking out about this. You can read the full statements via the links I’ve put, here I only repost those parts which have to do with this discussion.

Statement by Tahkim Vahdat

Political activists are going through one of the most difficult times since the revolution. They no longer have minimum freedoms to hold even a small gathering. In this atmosphere we ask citizens to participate in upcoming demonstrations in the most peaceful manner and to shout slogans which keep the green movement within the frameworks of a peaceful movement and to keep from any radicalization, because the highest aim of this movement is to save Iran from the hands of those radicals which are willing to sacrifice all for the benefit of their own faction.

The Green Movement lives on because of its emphasis on peaceful protest, abiding the law, an emphasis on the constitution, and ethical behavior. Attributes which all go against the current dominant authority which sets up a tragedy like Kahrizak and blames one doctor for all the atrocities and through doing so only brings back the horrors of the student dormitories and a stolen plastic shaver [the only person charged with the assault on the student dormitories in 1999 was convicted of stealing a plastic shaver].

Statement by the Iran Freedom Movement

The state will have to pay a heavy price for using this much violence. It will want to continue this path. Thus, it will need to justify it. The authorities want to radicalize this movement. Experience has shown us that once citizens utilize violence, this only gives the state an excuse to use more of it.

Paramilitary forces infiltrate the ranks of protesters and try to provoke them to react violently. This is while militants always have the upper hand in violent combat because of the resources they have available to them. At the same time, the radicalization of this movement will only reduce its universality, and reduce the number of people willing to stand with it. Thus, a movement which allowed for all people, whether young or old, man or woman, family or individuals to participate in its gatherings might evolve into something that few will be willing to participate in.

The Freedom Movement of Iran believes that this movement will only triumph if it abides by peaceful, paths of reform. “Non-violence” is not only a temporary tactic. But rather, from the birth of this movement, it has been the main strategy.

Unfortunately, some opposition forces outside the country which do not have realistic views of the realities inside, willingly or unwillingly are provoking students to violence for 16 Azar. They are urging students to use the militia’s tactics on 13 Aban to “get revenge” on 16 Azar.

Iranian Labor News Agency's interview with Ezatollah Sahabi, head of the Freedom Movement

A movement which is not hierarchical has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that the movement can not be uprooted and can not be silenced because it has no particular leaders and is spread out strongly across society. At the same time, it can easily sway or go in different directions exactly because it has no particular leaders. But we must keep from radical, violent reactions.

On the Strategy of Flowers for Bullets, by Emad Bahavar [recently released from prison]

The state has yet to even acknowledge the existence of the green movement. When the head of the political wing of the Islamic Coalition Part was asked “how the country should exit this current crisis/situation” he replied: “there is no situation. The fact that chaos has reached a minimum shows that we are no longer in any situation.” Their analysis is based on an old calculation: historically, 20% of Tehran has been in disagreement with them, but has been sitting silently at home and has posed no particular to the state. The events following the elections has given this minority “hope” to create chaos and change the political system. This group will eventually go home when they discover that nothing has really changed.

There is no doubt that this analysis is wrong. Do they choose to ignore this reality or simply do not see it? … We can assess that the state has entered this equation based on a wrong analysis. This movement truly exists. This movement is not only on the surface but is rooted within society. Its demands are serious and not meeting them or even minding them will create serious obstacles and crises be it in the social, political or economic realms for the system. The persistence of these demands will only slowly eat away at the legitimacy of the system itself. But even while activists, professors and intellectuals warn of this, the state pays no heed. One reason for this lack of attention will always be that the state will claim these analyses are provided by “Western Humanities” and have nothing to do with our “Eastern, Islamic” culture. They claim that the very roots of legitimacy of the state are defined differently in the Islamic context.

The system will try its best to reduce this movement to a demonstration of a few thousand students alone. If the demonstrations get violent, the state will use “its legal permission to use legitimate violence”. Not to mention that if the movement itself grows violent, fewer individuals will be willing to join its ranks. This will only reduce the movement to a violent, chaotic effort that will soon be killed off completely by security forces. Some opposition forces outside the country, willingly or unwillingly are trying to make this happen. It is obvious that anti-establishment opposition forces outside the country did not start this movement, but they can certainly try to see it end.

On the part of the state, it has thus been decided that violence is preferred to any sort of negotiation or compromise. They are determined to shut down any “chaos” using force and security measures. To do this more broadly, they need a radicalized, violent demonstration. They are thus counting on a mass violent reaction for 13 Aban. 16 Azar is the best opportunity to use the anger of the students. The authorities will at the same time force the leaders of the movement to loudly break ranks with those who are willing to go too far and thus create one of the greatest cracks in the movement so far.