Transcript: FBI Agent Ali Soufan Testifies on Torture

Related Post: Bush Official Zelikow Condemns Illegal Programmes

Testifying behind a screen, former FBI agent Ali Soufan told a Senate hearing yesterday about the damage caused by the Bush Administration's "enhanced interrogations". Soufan was one of the first agents to question Al Qa'eda operative Abu Zubaydah, and by "connecting" with the detainee, he learned the identity of 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Shortly afterwards, CIA operatives took over the question, applying techniques including waterboarding. Abu Zubaydah, mentally and physically broken, offered little from that point.

Soufan's testimony can be read next to his opinion piece, published last month, in The New York Times.

Mr. Chairman, Committee members, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I know that each one of you cares deeply about our nation's security. It was always a comfort to me during the most dangerous of situations that I faced, from going undercover as an al Qaeda operative, to unraveling terrorist cells, to tracking down the killers of the 17 U.S. sailors murdered in the USS Cole bombing, that those of us on the frontline had your support and the backing of the American people. So I thank you.

The issue that I am here to discuss today – interrogation methods used to question terrorists – is not, and should not be, a partisan matter. We all share a commitment to using the best interrogation method possible that serves our national security interests and fits squarely within the framework of our nation's principles.

From my experience – and I speak as someone who has personally interrogated many terrorists and elicited important actionable intelligence– I strongly believe that it is a mistake to use what has become known as the "enhanced interrogation techniques," a position shared by many professional operatives, including the CIA officers who were present at the initial phases of the Abu Zubaydah interrogation.

These techniques, from an operational perspective, are ineffective, slow and unreliable, and as a result harmful to our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. (This is aside from the important additional considerations that they are un-American and harmful to our reputation and cause.)

My interest in speaking about this issue is not to advocate the prosecution of anyone. People were given misinformation, half-truths, and false claims of successes; and reluctant intelligence officers were given instructions and assurances from higher authorities. Examining a past we cannot change is only worthwhile when it helps guide us towards claiming a better future that is yet within our reach.

And my focus is on the future. I wish to do my part to ensure that we never again use these harmful, slow, ineffective, and unreliable techniques instead of the tried, tested, and successful ones – the ones that are also in sync with our values and moral character. Only by doing this will we defeat the terrorists as effectively and quickly as possible.

Most of my professional career has been spent investigating, studying, and interrogating terrorists. I have had the privilege of working alongside, and learning from, some of the most dedicated and talented men and women our nation has– individuals from the FBI, and other law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies.

In my capacity as a FBI Agent, I investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, including the East Africa bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and the events surrounding the attacks of 9/11. I also coordinated both domestic and international counter-terrorism operations on the Joint Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office.

I personally interrogated many terrorists we have in our custody and elsewhere, and gained confessions, identified terror operatives, their funding, details of potential plots, and information on how al Qaeda operates, along with other actionable intelligence. Because of these successes, I was the government's main witness in both of the trials we have had so far in Guantanamo Bay – the trial of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a driver and bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden, and Ali Hamza Al Bahlul, Bin Laden's propagandist. In addition I am currently helping the prosecution prepare for upcoming trials of other detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.

There are many examples of successful interrogations of terrorists that have taken place before and after 9/11. Many of them are classified, but one that is already public and mirrors the other cases, is the interrogation of al Qaeda terrorist Nasser Ahmad Nasser al-Bahri, known as Abu Jandal. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, together with my partner Special Agent Robert McFadden, a first-class intelligence operative from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), (which, from my experience, is one of the classiest agencies I encountered in the intelligence community), I interrogated Abu Jandal.
Through our interrogation, which was done completely by the book (including advising him of his rights), we obtained a treasure trove of highly significant actionable intelligence. For example, Abu Jandal gave us extensive information on Osama Bin Laden's terror network, structure, leadership, membership, security details, facilities, family, communication methods, travels, training, ammunitions, and weaponry, including a breakdown of what machine guns, rifles, rocket launchers, and anti-tank missiles they used. He also provided explicit details of the 9/11plot operatives, and identified many terrorists who we later successfully apprehended.

The information was important for the preparation of the war in Afghanistan in 2001. It also provided an important background to the 9/11 Commission report; it provided a foundation for the trials so far held in Guantanamo Bay; and it also has been invaluable in helping to capture and identify top al Qaeda operatives and thus disrupt plots.
The approach used in these successful interrogations can be called the Informed Interrogation Approach. Until the introduction of the "enhanced" technique, it was the sole approach used by our military, intelligence, and law enforcement community.

It is an approach rooted in experiences and lessons learned during World War II and from our Counter-insurgency experience in Vietnam – experiences and lessons that generated the Army Field Manual. This was then refined over the decades to include how to interrogate terrorism suspects specifically, as experience was gained from interrogations following the first World Trade Center bombing, the East Africa Embassy bombings, and the USS Cole bombing. To sum up, it is an approach derived from the cumulative experiences, wisdom, and successes of the most effective operational people our country has produced.

Before I joined the Bureau, for example, traditional investigative strategies along with intelligence derived from human sources successfully thwarted the 1993 New York City Landmark Bomb Plot (TERRSTOP), a plot by the Blind Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman, to attack the UN Headquarters, the FBI's New York office, and tunnels and bridges across New York City, -- as a follow-up to the 1993 World Trade Center bombings. That remains to this day the largest thwarted attack on our homeland. I had the privilege of working with, and learning from, those who conducted this successful operation.

The Informed Interrogation Approach is based on leveraging our knowledge of the detainee's culture and mindset, together with using information we already know about him.

The interrogator knows that there are three primary points of influence on the detainee:

First, there is the fear that the detainee feels as a result of his capture and isolation from his support base. People crave human contact, and this is especially true in some cultures more than others. The interrogator turns this knowledge into an advantage by becoming the one person the detainee can talk to and who listens to what he has to say, and uses this to encourage the detainee to open up.

In addition, acting in a non-threatening way isn't how the detainee is trained to expect a U.S. interrogator to act. This adds to the detainee's confusion and makes him more likely to cooperate.

Second, and connected, there is the need the detainee feels to sustain a position of respect and value to interrogator. As the interrogator is the one person speaking to and listening to the detainee, a relationship is built – and the detainee doesn't want to jeopardize it. The interrogator capitalizes on this and compels the detainee to give up more information.

And third, there is the impression the detainee has of the evidence against him. The interrogator has to do his or her homework and become an expert in every detail known to the intelligence community about the detainee. The interrogator then uses that knowledge to impress upon the detainee that everything about him is known and that any lie will be easily caught.

For example, in my first interrogation of the terrorist Abu Zubaydah, who had strong links to al Qaeda's leaders and who knew the details of the 9/11 plot before it happened, I asked him his name. He replied with his alias. I then asked him, "how about if I call you Hani?" That was the name his mother nicknamed him as a child. He looked at me in shock, said "ok," and we started talking.

The Army Field Manual is not about being nice or soft. It is a knowledge-based approach. It is about outwitting the detainee by using a combination of interpersonal, cognitive, and emotional strategies to get the information needed. If done correctly it's an approach that works quickly and effectively because it outwits the detainee using a method that he is not trained, or able, to resist.

This Informed Interrogation Approach is in sharp contrast with the harsh interrogation approach introduced by outside contractors and forced upon CIA officials to use.

The harsh technique method doesn't use the knowledge we have of the detainee's history, mindset, vulnerabilities, or culture, and instead tries to subjugate the detainee into submission through humiliation and cruelty. The approach applies a force continuum, each time using harsher and harsher techniques until the detainee submits.

The idea behind the technique is to force the detainee to see the interrogator as the master who controls his pain. It is an exercise in trying to gain compliance rather than eliciting cooperation. A theoretical application of this technique is a situation where the detainee is stripped naked and told: "Tell us what you know."

If the detainee doesn't immediately respond by giving information, for example he asks: "what do you want to know?" the interviewer will reply: "you know," and walk out of the interrogation room. Then the next step on the force continuum is introduced, for example sleep deprivation, and the process will continue until the detainee's will is broken and he automatically gives up all information he is presumed to know.

There are many problems with this technique.

A major problem is that it is ineffective. Al Qaeda terrorists are trained to resist torture. As shocking as these techniques are to us, the al Qaeda training prepares them for much worse – the torture they would expect to receive if caught by dictatorships for example.

This is why, as we see from the recently released Department of Justice memos on interrogation, the contractors had to keep getting authorization to use harsher and harsher methods, until they reached waterboarding and then there was nothing they could do but use that technique again and again. Abu Zubaydah had to be waterboarded 83 times and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed 183 times. In a democracy there is a glass ceiling of harsh techniques the interrogator cannot breach, and a detainee can eventually call the interrogator's bluff.

In addition the harsh techniques only serves to reinforce what the detainee has been prepared to expect if captured. This gives him a greater sense of control and predictability about his experience, and strengthens his will to resist.

A second major problem with this technique is that evidence gained from it is unreliable. There is no way to know whether the detainee is being truthful, or just speaking to either mitigate his discomfort or to deliberately provide false information. As the interrogator isn't an expert on the detainee or the subject matter, nor has he spent time going over the details of the case, the interrogator cannot easily know if the detainee is telling the truth. This unfortunately has happened and we have had problems ranging from agents chasing false leads to the disastrous case of Ibn Sheikh al-Libby who gave false information on Iraq, al Qaeda, and WMD.

A third major problem with this technique is that it is slow. It takes place over a long period of time, for example preventing the detainee from sleeping for 180 hours as the memos detail, or waterboarding 183 times in the case of KSM. When we have an alleged "ticking timebomb" scenario and need to get information quickly, we can't afford to wait that long.

A fourth problem with this technique is that ignores the end game. In our country we have due process, which requires evidence to be collected in a certain way. The CIA, because of the sensitivity of its operations, by necessity, operates secretly. These two factors mean that by putting the CIA in charge of interrogations, either secrecy is sacrificed for justice and the CIA's operations are hampered, or justice is not served. Neither is a desirable outcome.

Another disastrous consequence of the use of the harsh techniques was that it reintroduced the "Chinese Wall" between the CIA and FBI – similar to the wall that prevented us from working together to stop 9/11. In addition, the FBI and the CIA officers on the ground during the Abu Zubaydah interrogation were working together closely and effectively, until the contractors' interferences. Because we in the FBI would not be a part of the harsh techniques, the agents who knew the most about the terrorists could have no part in the investigation. An FBI colleague of mine, for example, who had tracked KSM and knew more about him than anyone in the government, was not allowed to speak to him.

Furthermore, the CIA specializes in collecting, analyzing, and interpreting intelligence. The FBI, on the other hand, has a trained investigative branch. Until that point, we were complimenting each other's expertise, until the imposition of the "enhanced methods." As a result people ended doing what they were not trained to do.

It is also important to realize that those behind this technique are outside contractors with no expertise in intelligence operations, investigations, terrorism, or al Qaeda. Nor did the contractors have any experience in the art of interview and interrogation. One of the contractors told me this at the time, and this lack of experience has also now been recently reported on by sources familiar with their backgrounds.

The case of the terrorist Abu Zubaydah is a good example of where the success of the Informed Interrogation Approach can be contrasted with the failure of the harsh technique approach. I have to restrict my remarks to what has been unclassified. (I will note that there is documented evidence supporting everything I will tell you today.)

Immediately after Abu Zubaydah was captured, a fellow FBI agent and I were flown to meet him at an undisclosed location. We were both very familiar with Abu Zubaydah and have successfully interrogated al-Qaeda terrorists. We started interrogating him, supported by CIA officials who were stationed at the location, and within the first hour of the interrogation, using the Informed Interrogation Approach, we gained important actionable intelligence.

The information was so important that, as I later learned from open sources, it went to CIA Director George Tenet who was so impressed that he initially ordered us to be congratulated. That was apparently quickly withdrawn as soon as Mr. Tenet was told that it was FBI agents, who were responsible. He then immediately ordered a CIA CTC interrogation team to leave DC and head to the location to take over from us.

During his capture Abu Zubaydah had been injured. After seeing the extent of his injuries, the CIA medical team supporting us decided they were not equipped to treat him and we had to take him to a hospital or he would die. At the hospital, we continued our questioning as much as possible, while taking into account his medical condition and the need to know all information he might have on existing threats.

We were once again very successful and elicited information regarding the role of KSM as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, and lots of other information that remains classified. (It is important to remember that before this we had no idea of KSM's role in 9/11 or his importance in the al Qaeda leadership structure.) All this happened before the CTC team arrived.

A few days after we started questioning Abu Zubaydah, the CTC interrogation team finally arrived from DC with a contractor who was instructing them on how they should conduct the interrogations, and we were removed. Immediately, on the instructions of the contractor, harsh techniques were introduced, starting with nudity. (The harsher techniques mentioned in the memos were not introduced or even discussed at this point.)

The new techniques did not produce results as Abu Zubaydah shut down and stopped talking. At that time nudity and low-level sleep deprivation (between 24 and 48 hours) was being used. After a few days of getting no information, and after repeated inquiries from DC asking why all of sudden no information was being transmitted (when before there had been a steady stream), we again were given control of the interrogation.

We then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah again started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence.

This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called "dirty bomber." To remind you of how important this information was viewed at the time, the then-Attorney General, John Ashcroft, held a press conference from Moscow to discuss the news. Other important actionable intelligence was also gained that remains classified.

After a few days, the contractor attempted to once again try his untested theory and he started to re-implementing the harsh techniques. He moved this time further along the force continuum, introducing loud noise and then temperature manipulation.

Throughout this time, my fellow FBI agent and I, along with a top CIA interrogator who was working with us, protested, but we were overruled. I should also note that another colleague, an operational psychologist for the CIA, had left the location because he objected to what was being done.

Again, however, the technique wasn't working and Abu Zubaydah wasn't revealing any information, so we were once again brought back in to interrogate him. We found it harder to reengage him this time, because of how the techniques had affected him, but eventually, we succeeded, and he re-engaged again.

Once again the contractor insisted on stepping up the notches of his experiment, and this time he requested the authorization to place Abu Zubaydah in a confinement box, as the next stage in the force continuum. While everything I saw to this point were nowhere near the severity later listed in the memos, the evolution of the contractor's theory, along with what I had seen till then, struck me as "borderline torture."

As the Department of Justice IG report released last year states, I protested to my superiors in the FBI and refused to be a part of what was happening. The Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, a man I deeply respect, agreed passing the message that "we don't do that," and I was pulled out.

As you can see from this timeline, many of the claims made in the memos about the success of the enhanced techniques are inaccurate. For example, it is untrue to claim Abu Zubaydah wasn't cooperating before August 1, 2002. The truth is that we got actionable intelligence from him in the first hour of interrogating him.

In addition, simply by putting together dates cited in the memos with claims made, falsehoods are obvious. For example, it has been claimed that waterboarding got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading to the capture of Jose Padilla. But that doesn't add up: Waterboarding wasn't approved until 1 August 2002 (verbally it was authorized around mid July 2002), and Padilla was arrested in May 2002.

The same goes for KSM's involvement in 9/11: That was discovered in April 2002, while waterboarding was not introduced until almost three months later. It speaks volumes that the quoted instances of harsh interrogation methods being a success are false.

Nor can it be said that the harsh techniques were effective, which is why we had to be called back in repeatedly. As we know from the memos, the techniques that were apparently introduced after I left did not appear to work either, which is why the memos granted authorization for harsher techniques. That continued for several months right till waterboarding was introduced, which had to be used 83 times – an indication that Abu Zubaydah had called the interrogator's bluff knowing the glass ceiling that existed.

Authoritative CIA, FBI, and military sources have also questioned the claims made by the advocates of the techniques. For example, in one of the recently released Justice Department memos, the author, Stephen Bradbury, acknowledged a (still classified) internal CIA Inspector General report that had found it "difficult to determine conclusively whether interrogations have provided information critical to interdicting specific imminent attacks."

In summary, the Informed Interrogation Approach outlined in the Army Field Manual is the most effective, reliable, and speedy approach we have for interrogating terrorists. It is legal and has worked time and again.

It was a mistake to abandon it in favor of harsh interrogation methods that are harmful, shameful, slower, unreliable, ineffective, and play directly into the enemy's handbook. It was a mistake to abandon an approach that was working and naively replace it with an untested method. It was a mistake to abandon an approach that is based on the cumulative wisdom and successful tradition of our military, intelligence, and law enforcement community, in favor of techniques advocated by contractors with no relevant experience.

The mistake was so costly precisely because the situation was, and remains, too risky to allow someone to experiment with amateurish, Hollywood style interrogation methods- that in reality- taints sources, risks outcomes, ignores the end game, and diminishes our moral high ground in a battle that is impossible to win without first capturing the hearts and minds around the world. It was one of the worst and most harmful decisions made in our efforts against al Qaeda.

For the last seven years, it was not easy objecting to these methods when they had powerful backers. I stood up then for the same reason I'm willing to take on critics now, because I took an oath swearing to protect this great nation. I could not stand by quietly while our country's safety was endangered and our moral standing damaged.

I know you are motivated by the same considerations, and I hope you help ensure that these grave mistakes are never made again.

Thank you.

Video and Transcript: Dick Cheney on Fox News (12 May)

Related Post: Torture Now - Jon Stewart Takes on the New Dick Cheney
Related Post: Video and Transcript of Dick Cheney on “Face the Nation” (10 May)

Yep, him again. Fed lines by Fox's Neil Cavuto, Cheney blew more smoke with the demand that Government memoranda providing the effectiveness of torture be released, covering up the inconvenience that Government memoranda have been released and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of "enhanced interrogation". He raged against the next symbolic moment, the possible release of hundreds of photographs of the programme (think Abu Ghraib, magnified many times), and repeated how Obama is endangering the nation and the world.



CAVUTO: We’re getting word that by May 28th, up to potentially 2,000 pictures are going to be released by the White House showing various interrogation methods, up to 2,000. What do you think of that?

CHENEY: Well, I guess what I think is important is that there be some balance to what is being released. The fact of the matter is the administration appears to be committed to putting out information that sort of favors their point of views in terms of being opposed to, for example, enhanced interrogation techniques.

But so far they’ve refused to put out memos that were done by the CIA that I’ve requested be declassified that show the positive results of the detainee program, and all of the information and the intelligence we were able to garner from these high-value detainees.

CAVUTO: And you say there are at least two such CIA memos that point to...

CHENEY: Two specifically that I requested.

CAVUTO: To the enhanced interrogation and that it did yield results.

CHENEY: Yes, well, that specifically talked about detainees, about the contributions that we got to our overall intelligence picture. Publicly General Hayden, who used to be director of the CIA, said as late as 2006 a majority of the intelligence we had gotten about al Qaeda came from detainees, high-value targets like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, like Abu Zubaydah, people that we captured during the course of our campaign against al Qaeda.

And they, of course, were obviously also the people that the debate has focused on with respect to enhanced interrogation techniques. So I...

CAVUTO: Have you spoken to anyone in the White House lately about this? And did they give you a head’s up, we’re going to release all of these interrogation...

(CROSSTALK)

CHENEY: Well, what I did was make a formal request for declassification through the National Archives, which is the way you do it, and then it goes out to the agency responsible, in this case, the CIA. And I’m still awaiting a formal answer from them.

CAVUTO: Your daughter, Liz, was on a rival news network this morning.

CHENEY: She was.

CAVUTO: And she made the comment that the White House should have called my dad, I’m paraphrasing here, Mr. Vice President, but it was clearly -- the inference was that that did not happen.

What happened? When this whole dust-up started happening on interrogation and then eliminating waterboarding, did anyone from the White House give you or President Bush a head’s up that this policy was about to be reversed?

CHENEY: Well, I didn’t discuss it with anybody in the administration, but I’m not offended by that. They campaigned all across the country, from one end of the country to the other against enhanced interrogation techniques, and made it very clear they were opposed to that. They called it torture.

I don’t believe it was torture. We had attorneys who gave us a clear guidance as to what was appropriate and what wasn’t. The reason we’ve gotten into this debate at all is because the administration saw fit to go back and release OLC opinions, opinions out of the Office of Legal Counsel and the Justice Department dealing with its classified program.

Now that’s a very rare occurrence. You don’t ordinarily release those opinions, especially when it deals with classified programs. They did it in a way that sort of blocked so far any real discussion of the results of the program, and instead focused upon the techniques themselves.

And they really began the debate then with the suggestions that perhaps people should be prosecuted for having participated in the program or the lawyers who gave us these opinions should be disbarred. I think it’s an outrage.

I think the proposition that a new administration can come in and in effect launch an attack on their predecessor because they disagreed with the legal advice that was given by the Justice Department or because they find that they don’t like the policies that were pursued by the prior administration.

It’s one thing to come in and change the policy, it’s an entirely different proposition to come in and say that you’re somehow going to go after the lawyers and the Justice Department or the agents who carried out that policy. I just -- I think that’s outrageous. And that’s why I’ve spoken out as I have to defend the policy and...

(CROSSTALK)

CAVUTO: But you have, but President Bush has not. And that, to your critics, is a sign of his statesmanship and your lack of it. What do you make of that?

CHENEY: Well, I don’t pay a lot of attention to what the critics say, obviously. From my standpoint, that a notion that I should remain silent while they go public, that I shouldn’t say anything while they threaten to disbar the lawyers who gave us the advice that was crucial in terms of this program, that I shouldn’t say anything when they go out and release information that they believe is critical of the program and critical of our policies, but refuse to put out information that shows the results of what we were able to achieve.

Bottom line is we successfully defended the nation for seven and a half years against a follow-on attack to 9/11. That was a remarkable achievement. Nobody would have thought that was possible, but it was. I believe it was possible because of the policies we had in place, which they’re now dismantling.

CAVUTO: So by that definition, are we more likely to be attacked now? Is that what you’re saying?

CHENEY: I think that we are stripping ourselves of some of the capabilities that we used in order to block, if you will, or disrupt activities by al Qaeda that would have led to additional attacks. I think that’s an important debate to have. I don’t think we should just roll over when the new administration says -- accuses of us committing torture, which we did not, or somehow violating the law, which we did not. I think you need to stand up and respond to that, and that’s what I’ve done.

CAVUTO: Have you raised this with President Bush? Have you talked with him and said, look, I’m going to go out and I’m going to be talking to Fox, I’m going to be talking, I want to let the world know how I feel?

CHENEY: You know, I’ve had a number of conversations on the telephone since January 20th.

CAVUTO: Any recently?

CHENEY: Those are -- oh, it’s been a couple of weeks. But we’re...

CAVUTO: How were those conversations? What do you talk about?

CHENEY: Well, those were private when we were in the White House and they remain so today.

CAVUTO: So you’re not going to tell me?

CHENEY: No.

CAVUTO: OK. Fine.

All right. We’re getting word out of “The Jerusalem Post,” Mr. Vice President, that Iran has deployed mobile ground-to-air and ground-to- sea missiles along the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps beyond, in the Persian Gulf.

How bad is this getting?

CHENEY: Well, I haven’t seen the reports. I think it’s important to be aware of or recognize that Straits of Hormuz obviously are a key waterway, not just from the standpoint of the United States, but that about -- these numbers are rough, but about 20 percent of the world’s oil supply passes through those straits every day. It’s something close to 18, 19 million barrels that come out of the Gulf, come out of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and so forth. That’s the major export route, if you will, and so anything that potentially threatens the free flow of that traffic, obviously, would be of concern.

CAVUTO: Well, what they’re obviously doing is saying, you attack us, then we respond in spades (ph). And then the whole world is dealing with $100, $200 a barrel oil, right?

CHENEY: Well, I don’t know what they’re doing, obviously. I can’t speak for what the Iranians are up to. They’re difficult enough to follow when you’re talking to them, and we’re not talking to them and haven’t for a long time. But I do think...

CAVUTO: Well, we are making overtures to them, right? CHENEY: Well, the...

CAVUTO: This president is trying, and that the time for that type of behavior, as well as opening up more to folks like Hugo Chavez and all, the time is now for that, because we got nowhere (ph) this administration is doing. But you did, which was effectively to isolate these guys.

What do you make of that?

CHENEY: The Iranians have a track record. We tried to resolve the issue diplomatically. We worked with our European friends and allies. We tried to persuade them that they did not need to enrich uranium to weapons grade, that the Russians, for example, were prepared to sell them fuel for their reactor and then take the spent fuel back after the fuel had been used.

A lot of ways for them to acquire nuclear power-generating capabilities without producing weapons. They clearly seem to be in the business of wanting to produce weapons. We were unable to talk them out of it previously, and there was a very serious effort diplomatically, working through the United Nations and with the EU3, the way we refer to them, the British and the Germans and the French.

The fact is that, as far as we know, they’re still in the business of trying to produce that capability, and that would be a fundamental threat not only to the folks in the immediate region, but potentially others around the world, including the United States. They’re working on missile technology, and they can marry up a weapon with the missile, and they become a formidable power.

CAVUTO: President Obama is going to be in Egypt next month (INAUDIBLE), which he will use that nation as an address to the Muslim world. He is not stopping by Israel when he is in the neighborhood, so to speak. What do you make of that?

CHENEY: I don’t know that it has any significance. But obviously, I haven’t been part of scheduling for the new administration, so I don’t know what considerations go into that. But I don’t think I can attribute motives one way or the other.

CAVUTO: So, to Israelis who are concerned that maybe this administration, again, with a vested interest for the whole region at heart, is more inclined to engage Muslim nations, maybe even some radical nations. It’s giving some Israelis pause. Should it?

CHENEY: Well, I think it’s giving not only Israelis pause, it’s also - excuse me - creating concerns on the part of nearly everybody in the region. And I would put in that category, although I haven’t talked to him recently, the Saudis, the Gulf states, the Emirates and so forth, because they have been more concerned in recent years about developments in Iran than anything else, than any other issue in the area or the region. And that’s because they believe if you - if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it’ll fundamentally change the dynamic in that part of the world.

CAVUTO: How close are they, by the way, do you think?

CHENEY: Well, you can get all kinds of estimates. They clearly have installed thousands of centrifuges. That’s their claim. But there have been inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency that can give us fairly precise information on how many centrifuges are installed and so forth. In terms of how close they are, I - you know, there are estimates, but I can’t give you a precise read or take on how much it is.

CAVUTO: Well, what would U.S. policy be, Mr. Vice President, if were to see Benjamin Netanyahu act alone, unilaterally to take out those centrifuges?

CHENEY: Well, I can’t speak for the administration, obviously, and that’s where you need to go to find out.

CAVUTO: What would you think?

CHENEY: I would find it that it would be a reflection of the fact that the Israelis believe this is an existential threat to the state of Israel. That Iran has taken a position and supported it over the years, that Israel should cease to exist, should go out of business, and Iran remains one of the prime sponsors of terror in the world, especially Hezbollah, and that all things considered, I think the Israelis look at developments in Iran, and they have stated publicly that they believe a nuclear-armed Iran is something that fundamentally threatens their existence. So, I would expect them to try to do something about it.

CAVUTO: Soon?

CHENEY: I can’t predict that. I don’t - I obviously don’t know, and can’t predict what they’ll do or when they’ll do it.

CAVUTO: Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired General David McKiernan from leading (ph) Afghanistan and said that whatever we were doing - I’m paraphrasing here, sir - wasn’t working and that we need more of a special-operations guy than we supposedly have now, and saying that the battle game and plan for Afghanistan has changed. Has it?

CHENEY: I think there’s been a significant increase, obviously, in the focus on Afghanistan, which I think is good. We had completed a review of our policy in Afghanistan shortly before we left office, and then decided that we would not put it out at that point, that that would feed into whatever the Obama administration wanted to do and might help them form a sounder policy. One of the things they’ve done and I think makes good sense is send more troops. I also believe the decision yesterday to send Stan McChrystal, lieutenant general, to take over in Afghanistan is a very good one. Stan’s an absolutely outstanding officer. I’m not saying anything critical of General McKiernan, who’s leaving. But Stan McChrystal was head of the Joint Special Operations Command. He’s been a superb officer...

CAVUTO: So, you support that choice?

CHENEY: I think the choice is excellent, and you’d be hard put to find anybody better than Stan McChrystal to take on that assignment.

CAVUTO: If you don’t mind, sir, I’d like to go back to terror (ph) for a second, and...

CHENEY: Excuse me.

CAVUTO: Sure. Nancy Pelosi has been caught up in when did she know and how much did she know, as far as the waterboarding issue, elevated interrogation techniques, and says she was aware of a 2003 meeting, but the way it’s been characterized that she was aware of all the details is wrong, and that painting (ph) her any other way is wrong. What do you make of that?

CHENEY: I don’t know the specifics of what sessions she was in. I know she was listed in a memorandum I’ve seen, a timeline that talks about when various members were briefed that the agencies produced in the last few days as public documents.

CAVUTO: When you say “briefed,” briefed on specifically waterboarding?

CHENEY: Briefed on enhanced interrogation techniques.

CAVUTO: That include waterboarding.

CHENEY: I don’t know. I wasn’t in the meetings, and I can’t speak to the content of the meetings. I know what the intention was. I know that the CIA basically took the responsibility of briefing members of Congress, a few in number, chairman and ranking member of the intelligence committees about the program.

CAVUTO: Congresswoman Jane Harman was among those who did write the letter of protest.

CHENEY: I don’t know about that, but I...

CAVUTO: Now, she passed along her concern to Nancy Pelosi , who I guess went through the legislative channels, who didn’t want to disrupt the legislative channels, to let her do the speaking, if I’m interpreting it correctly. But what...

CHENEY: You’re down in the weeds now.

CAVUTO: I guess I am.

CHENEY: I’m generally, obviously, aware of the program. I’m aware of the fact...

CAVUTO: Would you say more (ph) people knew than are saying so about these interrogation techniques?

CHENEY: I think it paralleled the surveillance program, for example, the terrorist surveillance program that we ran where I ran the briefings. And we briefed every few months the chairman and ranking member, and at one point, the “Big 9,” the speaker and majority and minority leaders in the House and Senate, on the substance of the program, on what we were doing, on how we were doing it, sought their advice and guidance on whether we should continue it.

CAVUTO: Well, do you remember any of them, Mr. Vice President, saying, whoa, whoa, whoa! This is a little too far for our tastes. We don’t want this.

CHENEY: No. On the terrorist surveillance program, after we’d given them the brief in the Situation Room in the basement - I presided over it - I went around the table and asked if they thought we should continue the program. They were unanimous. Then I asked if they thought we should...

CAVUTO: Who was unanimous?

CHENEY: The speaker, the majority and minority leader of the House and Senate, as well as the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee.

CAVUTO: On everything that had been stipulated, including these interrogations?

CHENEY: No, on the terrorist surveillance program.

CAVUTO: Gotcha.

CHENEY: I’m just giving you an example. And then I asked if they thought we should go back and get additional congressional authority, and they said absolutely not. That would reveal the existence of the program. And I think what happened with respect to enhanced interrogation techniques is, the CIA did go up. They did brief the relevant people, and I think what often happens in these circumstances is once a controversy develops, then some of the people that were briefed get forgetful.

CAVUTO: Let me just, on one last foreign policy issue before we hit on some economics. I know your time is tight. On Gitmo. The administration’s intelligence director had said that detainees who are just misplaced and are here have a right to, among other things, and could get who are just misplaced and are here, have a right, to among other things, and could get welfare, for example. How do you feel about that?

CHENEY: I think it’s a terrible idea. While we were running things at Guantanamo, there were several hundred people that processed through there, that were held there for a period of time and were ultimately sent back to their home countries.

The ones that are remaining, about 245, are the hardcore, the worst of the worst. They’re cases have been reviewed, they were given an review down at Guantanamo, and they were kept in custody because we believe they constituted a threat to the United States, so they had some continuing value.

Of those that were released, we had about a 12 percent recidivism rate, 12 percent that went back into the terrorism business. I think the recidivism on the ones that are still there would be far higher. It includes people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11.

Now, I think they’re having a very hard time finding anybody around the world who wants to take these folks. I know when we tried to place a few Uighurs, Chinese terrorists...

CAVUTO: Right, right.

CHENEY: And while we were still in office, ultimately, the only country that would take them was Albania. Everybody else rejected them.

CAVUTO: Where do you think they’re going to end up?

CHENEY: Well, I think they need to keep Guantanamo open. I think it’s a mistake to try to close it. I think if you didn’t have it, you’d have to invent it. If you bring those people to the United States, I don’t know a single congressman who is going to stand up and say, gee, send me some terrorists. I’d like to have some al Qaeda-types living in my district. That’s not going to happen.

So I think they’re going to find someplace where they can locate these folks. Guantanamo is a great facility. It’s very well run. These people are very well treated. It’s open to inspection by the International Red Cross and the press and so forth. It’s a good facility, it’s an important program, and we ought to continue it.

CAVUTO: Senator Biden was making his, today, spin to a union group, saying, we have to rebuild the middle class and the way to do that is to help labor unions grow. What do you make of that?

CHENEY: Well, I’m not anti-labor union. I carried a ticket for six years in the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in my youth. I built power line transmission line all over Wyoming, Utah, Colorado. That’s how I paid for my education. So, I’m not anti-union.

I do think the legislation that the administration is supporting and that the unions are pushing hard, the so-called Card Check Law, would do away with a secret ballot in terms of the question of organizing unions. I think it would be a huge mistake. I don’t think we want to get into the business where we make it easier for there to be the kind of intimidation that we’ve sometimes seen in these operations in the past and where people wouldn’t be able to cast a secret ballot in terms of whether or not they want to join a union.

CAVUTO: Jack Welt (ph) said they be deliteriates (ph) to our economic recovery. Do you agree?

CHENEY: Well, I always felt that what Ronald Reagan did back in 1981in the early part of his administration when he was very tough with the air traffic controllers was a good, sound, solid move. I think that, as I say, people want to join a union, fine. That’s their business. There are provisions for that that allow unions to be represented.

But I think what the unions are trying to do here is dramatically expand the base in terms of membership and they will, in turn, generate vast sums of money in terms of dues and political contributions. And I think it does have wide- ranging ramifications and that the current system where we have secret ballots for people to decide whether or not want to be represented by unions is a good way to go. We ought to preserve it.

CAVUTO: You mentioned Ronald Regan, sir, and Jeb Bush made some news recently made some news recently saying that the party, and I’ll paraphrase here, obsesses a bit too much about Ronald Regan and have got to move on and move forward. What do make of that?

CHENEY: Well, I like Jeb. I think he’s a good man. I’d like to see him continue to say involved politically.

CAVUTO: For president?

CHENEY: I’d probably support him for president.

CAVUTO: Would you really?

CHENEY: He’s a good man.

CAVUTO: Over Mitt Romney?

CHENEY: I’m not - I’m not endorsing anybody today. I’m not...

CAVUTO: Any candidate you like?

CHENEY: I’m not in the business of endorsing anybody at this point, Neil. But I’m a big fan of Jeb’s.

I think, in terms of the Regan legacy, I think it’s important to the party. I think it was a period of time when we had an administration that understood that the engine that drives the American economy is the private sector. That one of the things that was most important from the standpoint of government was to get out of the way of the private sector and let small businesses grow and develop and create jobs and create wealth. You had to reduce the tax burden to the maximum percent possible. Exactly the opposite of the kind of policies we see coming out of the administration today when we’re experiencing a vast - a proposal for a vast increase in the power of the government over the private sector.

CAVUTO: Without, you know, any regard for party, it started with your administration, right? I mean, the bailout, the financial bailouts of the banks and looking to help the auto companies being in very dire economic moments, certainly, was started by you and President Bush.

CHENEY: Well...

CAVUTO: Do you regret any of that?

CHENEY: I disagreed with bailing out the automobile companies. I would have encouraged the process to go forward for a Chapter 11.

(CROSSTALK)

CAVUTO: What about the banks?

CHENEY: ...to go.

The banks were different. And the reason the banks are different is because they are part of the financial system that is the heart and soul of our economy. And the federal government has major responsibilities for the health of our financial institutions. You’ve got the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, the FDIC, SEC, et cetera. And when the markets began to seize up, when people couldn’t get credit any more, when the collapse, for example, of the subprime mortgage market and so forth, put at risk the basic fundamental health of our economy because it threatened that core of our financial system and there isn’t anybody other than the federal government that can fix it. And therefore, we felt that we had no choice. But it’s still...

(CROSSTALK)

CAVUTO: But it’s still in shaky shape, right? After all...

CHENEY: It’s still in shaky shape, but there are...

(CROSSTALK)

CAVUTO: ... bankruptcy like you recommended for the auto companies be applied to the banks...

CHENEY: Not for the banks.

CAVUTO: Really?

CHENEY: I really think that would have been a serious problem when you have...

CAVUTO: Now, what did you see, can you say now, what did everyone see that was going to be so horrific that ...

CHENEY: Well, when we have the secretary of the Treasury or the secretary of the Treasury and the chairman of the Federal Reserve come in and say we’ve got a major crisis on our hands and within 48 hours major financial institutions are going to go down in flames. Or that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that dominated the mortgage market out there were suddenly in trouble financially because of the collapse of the subprime mortgage...

CAVUTO: But you must have seen where that was going, right? What you do for one, all expecting then - it’s an expectations game, right?

CHENEY: Right. But again, I think you’ve got to, and we did, make a distinction about the financial sector, because it is different than the other parts of the economy. The other parts of the economy can’t function without a strong financial sector, without credit, without sound monetary policy and actions by the government and the Federal Reserve to establish and maintain the value of our currency. Trying

CAVUTO: But now we’ve got the president, the government dictating salaries at these institutions rescued - which, I guess, happens if you take taxpayer dollars - and dictating their very business, right?

CHENEY: Well, the thing I find objectionable is that people are taking what was done with respect to the financial sector and without discriminating, trying to do the same thing for a broader range of sectors. And think that’s a mistake.

CAVUTO: Do you think it went too far?

CHENEY: I think so. I would have kept it focused on the financial institutions. But I do - I worry that the current situation is a set of circumstances where the administration is using the excuse of the economic difficulties in order to significantly broaden the power and authority of the government over the private sector. I think that’s a huge mistake.

CAVUTO: In “The Wall Street Journal’s” story that has it that the president’s tax hikes actually go in to those earning $235,000, not $250,000. What do you think of that?

CHENEY: I haven’t seen the story, but I worry. I don’t see any way you can do what he’s trying to do in terms of the vast expansion of governmental programs and the huge federal deficit and major tax increases without the kind of tax increases that are going to hit virtually every American.

CAVUTO: Do you think it stops at 39.6 percent?

CHENEY: I’m afraid it won’t, not if you go with a government of the size and scale that the administration apparently envisions.

CAVUTO: What do you envision that we’ll ultimately get to?

CHENEY: Well, I’d much prefer a situation in which we did not embark upon a course of the vast expansion of the authority of the federal government over the private sector. I’d be much more focused on tax cuts and reducing the economic burden on the private sector that the federal government represents as the best way to get the economy up and running again. I think you need to create jobs, you need to support small business, you need to encourage people to go out and save and invest and create the kind of entrepreneurial activity that really has given us the greatness that is the American economy, not expand the size of the federal government.

CAVUTO: Finally, Mr. Vice President, many have urged the Republican Party to moderate, to get more mainstream, to do what Democrats did at the time that Bill Clinton in the late ‘80s into ‘92, become more palatable to a wider section of the population. What do you say?

CHENEY: I think we need to run a party that is broadly based, where people of a wide variety of viewpoints are welcome. I don’t think we ought to change the basic fundamental philosophy of the Republican Party. I personally am a conservative Republican. I obviously believe in my philosophy, and I think that’s the basis upon which we have to build any resurgence of our party. I think we will, but I think we’ll do it by being true to our principles, not becoming more like the Democrats.

CAVUTO: So, you don’t think you’d isolate the Republicans going your route?

CHENEY: No.

CAVUTO: Mr. Vice President, thank you very, very much.

CHENEY: Pleasure as always, Neil.

CAVUTO: Thank you very much.

CHENEY: Good to see you.

Video and Transcript: Dick Cheney on "Face the Nation" (10 May)

Latest Post: Video and Transcript of Dick Cheney on Fox News (12 May)
Related Post: Torture Now - Jon Stewart Takes on the New Dick Cheney

He's not going to give up, is he? The most secretive Vice President in US history continues to be the most talkative ex-VP, primarily because Dick Cheney wants to "win" on the torture issue. His latest grandstanding was on CBS Television's "Face the Nation":


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BOB SCHIEFFER: Mr. Vice President, thank you for being here. You’re obviously here because we invited you here and we appreciate that, but I want to ask you something. President Bush has done what people normally do when they leave the Oval Office -- he has remained mum. He said very little. At one point, he said that he thought President Obama deserved his silence.

But you have taken a very different tack, and I must say a very unusual tack for somebody just leaving the vice president’s office. You’ve been speaking out not just frequently, but often very pointedly. At one point you said, for example, the Obama administration has made this country less safe. That’s a very serious charge. Why have you taken this approach?

CHENEY: Well, Bob, first of all, it’s good to go back on the show.

SCHIEFFER: Thank you.

CHENEY: It’s nice to know that you’re still loved and are invited out in public sometimes.

The reason I’ve been speaking, and in effect what I’ve been doing is responding to press queries such as yours, is because I think the issues that are at stake here are so important. And, in effect, what we’ve seen happen with respect to the Obama administration as they came to power is they have moved to take down a lot of those policies we put in place that kept the nation safe for nearly eight years from a follow-on terrorist attack like 9/11. Dealing with prisoner interrogation, for example, or the terrorist surveillance program.

They campaigned against these policies across the country, and then they came in now, and they have tried, very hard, to undertake actions that I just fundamentally disagree with.

SCHIEFFER: Well, do you -- I mean, should we take that literally? You say that the administration has made this country more vulnerable to attacks here in the homeland.

CHENEY: That’s my belief, based upon the fact, Bob, that we put in place those policies after 9/11. On the morning of 9/12, if you will, there was a great deal we didn’t know about Al Qaida. There was the need to embark upon a new strategy with respect to treating this as a strategic threat to the United States. There was the possibility of Al Qaida terrorists in the midst of one of our own cities with a nuclear weapon or a biological agent.

It was a time of great concern, and we put in place some very good policies, and they worked, for eight years. Now we have an administration that’s come to power that has been critical of the programs, but not only that, there’s been talk about prosecuting the lawyers in the Justice Department who gave us the opinions that we operated in accordance with, or referring them to the Bar Association for disbarment or sanctions of some kind, or possibly cooperating with foreign governments that are interested in trying to prosecute American officials, those same officials who were responsible for defending this nation for the last eight years.

That whole complex of things is what I find deeply disturbing, and I think to the extent that those policies were responsible for saving lives, that the administration is now trying to cancel those policies or end them, terminate them, then I think it’s fair to argue -- and I do argue -- that that means in the future we’re not going to have the same safeguards we’ve had for the last eight years.

SCHIEFFER: Well, but why does that make the country less safe? You’re talking about -- you say you don’t think we ought to be going back and questioning those people, looking into some of these things. All right, I take your point on that, but how is that making the country less safe? How does that make the country more vulnerable to an attack in the future?

CHENEY: Well, at the heart of what we did with the terrorist surveillance program and the enhanced interrogation techniques for Al Qaida terrorists and so forth was collect information. It was about intelligence. It was about finding out what Al Qaida was going to do, what their capabilities and plans were. It was discovering all those things we needed in order to be able to go defeat Al Qaida.

And in effect, what’s happening here, when you get rid of enhanced interrogation techniques, for example, or the terrorist surveillance program, you reduce the intelligence flow to the intelligence community upon which we based those policies that were so successful.

So I think before they do that sort of thing, it’s important to sit down and find out what did we learn? Why did it work?

One of the things that I did six weeks ago was I made a request that two memos that I personally know of, written by the CIA, that lay out the successes of those policies and point out in considerable detail all of -- all that we were able to achieve by virtue of those policies, that those memos be released, be made public. The administration has released legal opinions out of the Office of Legal Counsel. They don’t have any qualms at all about putting things out that can be used to be critical of the Bush administration policies. But when you’ve got memos out there that show precisely how much was achieved and how lives were saved as a result of these policies, they won’t release those. At least, they haven’t yet.

SCHIEFFER: Let me just ask you about that, because some people in the administration -- believe the attorney general says he does not know of such memos. Other people in the administration say, as a matter of fact, what we found out using these methods -- and I mean, let’s call things what they are -- waterboarding was one of the techniques that were used -- that they really didn’t get all that much from that. You say they did.

CHENEY: I say they did. Four former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency say they did, bipartisan basis.

Release the memos. And we can look and see for yourself what was produced.

The memos do exist. I have seen them. I had them in my files at one time. Now everything is part of the National Archives. I’m sure the agency has copies of those materials, and there’s a formal way you go through, once you’re a former official, a formal way you go through requesting declassification of something, and I started that process, as I say, six weeks ago. I haven’t heard anything from it yet. I assume...

SCHIEFFER: You have not -- they haven’t responded to you as yet?

CHENEY: That’s right. There’s been -- up until now, I’ve got a letter of notification saying they had started the process, but I haven’t seen anything by way of a result from this request for declassification. And if we’re going to have this debate, it ought to be a complete debate, and those memos ought to be out there for people to look at and journalists like yourself to evaluate in terms of what we were able to accomplish with these policies.

SCHIEFFER: Well, Mr. Vice President, let me ask you this. I mean, I’m not asking you to violate any rules of classification, but is there anything you can tell us specifically that those memos would tell us? I mean, some information we gleaned, some fact that we got that we wouldn’t have gotten otherwise?

CHENEY: That’s what’s in those memos. It talks specifically about different attack planning that was under way and how it was stopped. It talks about how the volume of intelligence reports that were produced from that.

SCHIEFFER: Does it talk about planning for attacks or attacks that were actually stopped?

CHENEY: Well, I need to be careful here, Bob, because it’s still classified. The way to answer this is give us the memos. Put them out there. Release them to the press. Let everybody take a look and see.

What it shows is that overwhelmingly, the process we had in place produced from certain key individuals, such as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaydah, two of the three who were waterboarded, and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is the man who killed 3,000 Americans on 9/11, blew up the World Trade Center, attacked the Pentagon, tried to blow up the White House or the Capitol building. An evil, evil man that’s been in our custody since March of ‘03. He did not cooperate fully in terms of interrogations until after waterboarding. Once we went through that process, he produced vast quantities of invaluable information about Al Qaida.

SCHIEFFER: What do you say to those, Mr. Vice President, who say that when we employ these kinds of tactics, which are after all the tactics that the other side uses, that when we adopt their methods, that we’re weakening security, not enhancing security, because it sort of makes a mockery of what we tell the rest of the world?

CHENEY: Well, then you’d have to say that, in effect, we’re prepared to sacrifice American lives rather than run an intelligent interrogation program that would provide us the information we need to protect America.

The fact of the matter is, these techniques that we’re talking about are used on our own people. We -- in a program that in effect trains our people with respect to capture and evasion and so forth and escape, a lot of them go through these same exact procedures. Now...

SCHIEFFER: Do you -- is what you’re saying here is that we should do anything if we could get information?

CHENEY: No. Remember what happened here, Bob. We had captured these people. We had pursued interrogation in a normal way. We decided that we needed some enhanced techniques. So we went to the Justice Department. And the controversy has arisen over the opinions written by the Justice Department.

The reason we went to the Justice Department wasn’t because we felt we were going to take some kind of free hand assault on these people or that we were in the torture business. We weren’t. And specifically, what we got from the Office of Legal Counsel were legal memos that laid out what is appropriate and what’s not appropriate, in light of our international commitments.

CHENEY: If we had been about torture, we wouldn’t have wasted our time going to the Justice Department.

SCHIEFFER: How much did President Bush know specifically about the methods that were being used? We know that you-- and you have said-- that you approved this...

CHENEY: Right.

SCHIEFFER: ... somewhere down the line. Did President Bush know everything you knew?

CHENEY: I certainly, yes, have every reason to believe he knew -- he knew a great deal about the program. He basically authorized it. I mean, this was a presidential-level decision. And the decision went to the president. He signed off on it.

SCHIEFFER: You said -- you said just a moment ago as you were talking about this, that -- you said that we have to realize what was at stake and we have to realize the circumstances. Do you have any regrets whatsoever about any of the methods that were taken? Any of the things that were used back in those days? Because there’s no question the country -- it was a different time. The country’s mood was different. We had just been -- something had happened here that had never happened before.

In retrospect, you -- years have passed. You’re now out of office. Do you think we should have done some things differently back then, or do you have any regrets about any of it?

CHENEY: No regrets. I think it was absolutely the right thing to do. I’m convinced, absolutely convinced, that we saved thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives.

In the aftermath of 9/11, we had all of these questions about who Al Qaida was, where they were operating and so forth. We didn’t know nearly as much as we know today. We were faced with a very real possibility -- we had reporting that said Al Qaida is trying to acquire nuclear capabilities. We had the A.Q. Khan network out there, a black-market operator selling nuclear weapons technology to Libya, North Korea and Iran. We had the anthrax attack within a matter of weeks after 9/11. We had the kind of situation that meant that we were absolutely convinced, the country was convinced, that there was a very high likelihood of a follow-on attack, a mass casualty attack against the United States. No one then would have bet anything that you’re going to go eight years and not have another attack. And we know, in fact, that they did try other attacks, and that we were able to stop them.

Now, if you’d look at it from the perspective of a senior government official, somebody like myself, who stood up and took the oath of office on January 20th of ‘01 and raised their right hand and said we’re going to protect and defend the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, this was exactly, exactly what was needed to do it.

I think if you look at this intelligence program that when things are quieter, 20 or 30 years from now, you’ll be able to look back on this and say this is one of the great success stories of American intelligence. I think, in fact, what the men and women in the intelligence community and the lawyers in the Justice Department and the senior officials who approved this program did exactly the right thing. I think the charge that somehow there was something wrong done here or that this was torture in violation of U.S. statutes is just absolutely false.

SCHIEFFER: You -- you are speaking out. You say you obviously feel passionately about this. How far are you willing to take this approach? Are you willing to go back to the Congress and talk to people in Congress about this? There are all kinds of people talking about various kinds of investigations. Would you go back and talk to the Congress?

CHENEY: Certainly. I’ve made it very clear that I feel very strongly that what we did here was exactly the right thing to do. And if I don’t speak out, then where do we find ourselves, Bob? Then the critics have free run, and there isn’t anybody there on the other side to tell the truth. So it’s important -- it’s important that we...

SCHIEFFER: Senator Leahy, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, was on this broadcast recently. And I said, do you intend to ask the former vice president to come up? And he said if he will testify under oath. Would you be willing to testify under oath?

CHENEY: I’d have to see what the circumstances are and what kind of precedent we were setting. But certainly I wouldn’t be out here today if I didn’t feel comfortable talking about what we’re doing publicly. I think it’s very, very important that we have a clear understanding that what happened here was an honorable approach to defending the nation, that there was nothing devious or deceitful or dishonest or illegal about what was done.

SCHIEFFER: All right. We’re going to take a little break here and come back and talk about this and some other things, in a moment.

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

SCHIEFFER: We’re back again with the former vice president, Dick Cheney .

Mr. Vice President, General Petraeus, our top military man out in that part of the world, said this morning he is confident that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are secure. But I want to ask you this, does the United States have enough information about the location of those weapons and the security of those weapons that we could take action should there be a collapse of Pakistan’s government or a civil war broke out?

CHENEY: Well, I wouldn’t want to speculate on that, Bob. I think the key thing from my perspective would be if General Petraeus, who is our commander in Centcom, covering that part of the world, knowing as he does how important that issue is, if he says they’re on top of it, I believe it.

SCHIEFFER: So how do you feel about what’s happening in Pakistan right now? Though, I mean, the Pakistani government continues to seem to have trouble sort of getting organized to fight the Taliban. Sometimes you wonder if they -- if they take the threat of the Taliban as seriously as we seem to take it in this country. Do you have faith that they can beat the Taliban in their country?

CHENEY: We had a problem, I’d say, a year or so ago, was one we worried about very much in the Bush administration, that you had in Pakistan Al Qaida, which had retreated there from Afghanistan. You had the Taliban coming back and forth across the border. And the feeling that the Pakistani government understood that the Al Qaida was a threat to the U.S. and that the Taliban were a threat to Afghanistan, but they didn’t believe they were threatened.

I think that is gone now. I think they understand full well that those radical Islamists, whatever their stripe in northwestern Pakistan, would love to see the government in Islamabad toppled. And I think they’re committed to do that. That’s a major step forward, just to have the government in Pakistan understand that they are as threatened, if not more so, than are the United States or Afghanistan.

SCHIEFFER: What about Afghanistan? President Karzai said recently that maybe we ought to stop some of the air attacks there because of civilian casualties. Jim Jones, the new national security adviser, said he did not foresee air attacks being stopped there. How is that war going, in your view? What are we doing that we should be doing and what are we doing -- or what is not happening that should be happening, in your analysis?

CHENEY: I think we have to get our heads around the concept that there’s not likely to be a point any time in the near future when you can say, oh, it’s all wrapped up, we can go home. I think that’s the wrong way to look at this conflict.

Afghanistan is a very, very difficult part of the world to operate in, from an economic standpoint, a geographical standpoint. It’s a very tough place to do business.

What happened, of course, was that it became a sanctuary for Al Qaida, and they used it to train terrorists to come to the United States and kill Americans.

We can’t allow that to happen. We can’t allow ourselves to go back to a situation where Afghanistan is out there operating -- there’s no U.S. presence, no foreign military presence -- until we’re convinced that the Afghans themselves can control all their sovereign territory. When that day happens, I think we’ll be happy to leave. But that’s how I would define success in Afghanistan, is it no longer constitutes a threat to the United States.

I think we have to be committed there for a long period of time. I was glad to see President Obama commit additional troops to Afghanistan. I think we need to do whatever we have to do there to be able to prevail.

Air strikes are an important part of it. And a lot of times, the air strikes do generate controversy, but oftentimes we found in the past that these strikes are engineered by the Taliban. For example, a suggestion in the most recent case is that they used grenades to kill a lot of civilians, not American bombs.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you about Guantanamo. President Obama said it’s going to be closed within a year. It’s proved to be a little more complicated than perhaps some in the administration thought it was going to be. Now you’ve got Congress in a real uproar about if these people are brought to prisons in this country. We’ve had resolutions introduced up there on the Hill that unless the state legislature gives the go-ahead, you can’t put them into a prison any place in that particular state. But can we ask other countries to take these people back, Mr. Vice President? If we’re not willing to take them back in this country?

CHENEY: Well, we have asked other countries to take them back, and they’ve refused. I can remember a situation before we left office where we were trying to find a home for some Uighurs, who were generally believed not to be all that big a threat. They ended up in Albania, because Albania was the only country in the world that would take them.

What’s left -- we released hundreds already of the less threatening types. About 12 percent of them, nonetheless, went back into the fight as terrorists. The group that’s left, the 245 or so, these are the worst of the worst. This is the hard core. You’d have a recidivism rate out of this group of maybe 50 or 60 percent.

They want to get out because they want to kill more Americans. And you’re just going to find it very difficult to send them any place.

Now, as I say, there has been some talk on the part of the administration about putting them in the United States. I think that’s going to be a tough sell. I don’t know a single congressional district in this country that is going to say, gee, great, they’re sending us 20 Al Qaida terrorists.

It’s a graphic demonstration of why Guantanamo is important. We had to have a place, a facility, where we could capture these people and hold them until they were no longer a danger to the United States. If you bring them to the United States, they acquire all kinds of legal rights. And as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said when we captured him, he said I’ll talk to you guys after I get to New York and see my lawyer. That’s the kind of problem you’re going to have with these terrorists.

SCHIEFFER: Let’s talk quickly about your party, the Republican Party. A lot of controversy. Arlen Specter has left. He said there’s no room for moderates in the party anymore. You said last week the party should not moderate. But what are you going to do? I mean, you can purify the party to the point that it’s too small to ever get elected to anything. How do you broaden the appeal of your party, and yet do you think there’s a place for moderates?

CHENEY: Oh, sure. I think there is room for moderates in the Republican Party. I think partly it’s a semantic problem. I don’t think the party ought to move dramatically to the left, for example, in order to try to redefine its base.

We are what we are. We’re Republicans. We have certain things we believe in. And maintaining our loyalty and commitment to those principles is vital to our success.

I think there are some good efforts out there. Jeb Bush, I know, has been working on it. Eric Cantor , Mitt Romney, trying to find ways to appeal to a broader range of people. I don’t have any problem with that. I think that’s a good thing to do. But the suggestion our Democratic friends always make is somehow, you know, if you Republicans were just more like Democrats, you’d win elections. Well, I don’t buy that. I think we win elections when we have good solid conservative principles to run upon and base our policies on those principles.

SCHIEFFER: Colin Powell, Rush Limbaugh said the other day that the party would probably be better off if Colin Powell left and just became a Democrat. Colin Powell said Republicans would be better off if they didn’t have Rush Limbaugh out speaking for them. Where do you come down?

CHENEY: Well, if I had to choose in terms of being a Republican, I’d go with Rush Limbaugh, I think. I think my take on it was Colin had already left the party. I didn’t know he was still a Republican.

SCHIEFFER: So you think that he’s not a Republican?

CHENEY: I just noted he endorsed the Democratic candidate for president this time, Barack Obama . I assumed that that is some indication of his loyalty and his interest.

SCHIEFFER: And you said you would take Rush Limbaugh over Colin Powell.

CHENEY: I would.

SCHIEFFER: All right.

CHENEY: Politically.

SCHIEFFER: Mr. Vice President, you promised some news. I think we probably made a little.

CHENEY: All right.