Iran Review has just posted an article by Dr. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh of the Tehran International Studies and Research Institute, on President Obama's foreign policy and the Middle East. I found the analysis intriguing both in its expression of Iran's interest in the region and in its "window of hope" for the new Administration. At the same time, there is an uncertainty about the substance of US policy and a warning that the window can be closed: "The US president must remember that candle of hope is not eternal and can be put out easily and due to a single incident."
Middle East: The Difficult Test of Hope in Obama
There may be no escaping of the fact that in the extremely realistic world of international relations the presence of a window of hope may be a source of optimism and pessimism at the same time. In fact, to the same extent that positive forces may be encouraged over the possibility of change and pin their hope in future horizons, uncertainty and suspicion plus bitter realism may work to eliminate the same window of hope. Here in addition to honesty and truthfulness whose requisites is the window of hope, hard work and faith in the path chosen as well as firmness in treading this path is vital for the strength of positive forces and thwarting its negative impacts.
“Change” and “hope” were two main points in the statements Barack Obama made before and after US presidential election. His words for many people of the world breathed life into the last rays of hope which were gradually fading away under the eight-year rule of the Neo-Cons.
In the Middle East region, the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan apparently shifted the battlefield from the American soil and the heart of New York but for the people of the region they had no outcome but death and destruction, floods of refugees and escalation of ethnic and religious disputes. Contrary to the propaganda, neither Iraq became safer compared to the time of Saddam Hussein nor Afghanistan became more stable than what it was under the Taliban.
As far as the Israeli-Palestinian differences were concerned not only they were not settled but were further aggravated. In fact, the two recent Israeli wars in Lebanon and Gaza were added to the list of unending tragedies in the region. Arms purchases severely increased and the climate of the region became strictly security oriented. Iran’s nuclear issue quickly turned into a security matter from a technical and scientific case. Four UN resolutions plus numerous other sanctions imposed by Europe and US increased the pressures on Tehran.
With the coming to power of Obama the crisis-riddled Middle East region had just one expectation from the American president: “Materialization and application of rationality in the US foreign policy in the region.” The kind of rationality to understand why the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has remained unresolved for 60 years; why the region has become a hub for training extremist religious forces; why Iran despite all the sanctions and pressures considers access to nuclear technology its unquestionable right; why the liberated Iraq cannot leave one single day behind without witnessing confrontations and bombings; why America’s biggest enemy, i.e., Al-Qaeda hails from Saudi Arabia, a formal US ally; why Israel is facing more complicated and tougher security problems every day; why suicide operations against US and NATO forces would never end; and why the idea of a stable and tranquil Middle East is becoming a dream never come true.
At present, one cannot perceive a specific sign from Obama’s foreign policy. The new US foreign policy team has tried to get to know the issues and cope with them cautiously and refrain from taking hasty decisions. Probably this is the same window of hope glimmering in the heart of inhabitants of the Middle East region. Can one hope that a sound and intelligent policy based on recognition and taking into account all the open and hidden potentials in the complicated issues of the region would show to the Middle Easterners that rationality is back in the US foreign policy? Can the taboo of Washington’s unsparing and unconditional support for Israel be broken in the mind of the regional people? Can something be done for the people of the region to believe that the US military presence in the region does not serve its personal interests or is not for control and supervision over the oil production and supply routes? Can the belief in America’s double standards in dealing with political, security and human rights issues of the region be erased from the people’s mind? Can the emotional and irrational approach towards Iran’s nuclear issue lead to clearing the region of nuclear arms? Can one be hopeful that IAEA inspectors would conduct at least one snap inspection of Israel’s nuclear installations? Can Hamas and Hizbollah be seen from a new and different look?
I am confident that the regional people’s candle of hope is still burning and many of them are precisely and carefully scrutinizing all the behaviors and reactions of President Obama to get a scent of change and rationality out of them. However, the US president must remember that candle of hope is not eternal and can be put out easily and due to a single incident.
Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi, freed on appeal after an 8-year sentence for espionage, is now far from Iran. Her drama will now disappear from public view.
The significance of the outcome, however, will be lasting.
There were some interesting revelations in the last stages of the case. In particular, Saberi's lawyer revealed that his client had translated a confidential Iranian document on the US position in Iraq. This, plus Saberi's visit to Israel, had aroused Iranian suspicions that the journalist was not operating without a licence but providing information to a foreign agency. Here was Saberi's representative, not Tehran, was offering evidence for the escalation of the charges from buying wine to carrying out espionage.
This did not rule out the political dimension of the case, in particular, the rush to try and sentence Saberi. However, it could explain why the US Government was careful not to press Tehran too hard. Indeed, it appeared that the attorney's statement was part of a deal with Tehran in which Saberi would be released but Iran's actions would be (at least partially) vindicated.
For the Iranian political system, after Saberi was sentenced, acted very pragmatically. President Ahmadinejad was quick to "request" the hearing of an appeal, which meant the court would hear an appeal. And, since defendants who are allowed to appeal are almost always successful in Iran, the message was clear: Saberi's sentence would be reduced, most likely to the point where she would be able to leave the country.
None of this should be read as benevolence. The calculation was clear: the Obama Administration has advanced towards engagement with Tehran, and Iran --- tentatively at first, but now steadily behind the scenes --- has responded. The Saberi case should not derail that process. That assessment was reinforced, I suspect, as it became clear that Saberi was naive rather than sinister in her activities.
Thus a court case becomes politically significant, especially becomes of its timing. Saberi was released a week before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits Washington to insist that the US break off the engagement with Iran. The freeing of Roxana removes a card (albeit probably a 7 rather than an ace) from Netanyahu's hand.Of course, the rhetoric will continue about the maniacal leadership in Tehran, but the substance here is realpolitik rather than evil or ideology.
Sometimes, the celebration is not only of a humanitarian outcome but of the less-than-humanitarian manoeuvres that lie behind it --- and of the political and quite positive consequences that may follow.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit on Monday to Washington is shaping up as a critical early moment --- even amidst the torture controversy, Afghanistan-Pakistan, and a minor thing called the global economy --- in the Obama Presidency.
The Israelis are sticking to the line that something has to be done about the Tehran menace before they will address other regional issues, in particular negotiations with Palestine. That "something" is unlikely to be military action; instead, Netanyahu will ask Washington to step up economic sanctions. At the very least, the demand will be that the US break off its "engagement" with the Iranian Government. (An editorial by Efraim Halevy, the former head of Israel's intelligence service Mossad, in Thursday's Financial Times of London is a must-read: "The 'sequence' must be clear: Iran first.)
Leading Obama officials, notably Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have already countered that the issue of Israeli-Palestinian talks must be the priority. Iran's nuclear programme should not be the excuse (the Americans have stopped short of the word "blackmail") to stall on a two-state solution, which Netanyahu and his Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, still oppose.
How serious is the debate? Consider this story, which just emerged: two weeks ago CIA Director Leon Panetta visited Israel to warn Netanyahu against an airstrike on Iran. Consider, however, that Israeli officials framed this as a warning against a "surprise attack", leaving open the possibility that Tel Aviv could attack if the US was notified in advance.
The Obama administration and its European allies are setting a target of early October to determine whether engagement with Iran is making progress or should lead to sanctions.
They also are developing specific benchmarks to gauge Iranian behavior. Those include whether Tehran is willing to let United Nations monitors make snap inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities that are now off-limits, and whether it will agree to a "freeze for freeze" -- halting uranium enrichment in return for holding off on new economic sanctions -- as a precursor to formal negotiations.
What adds a bit of spice to the claim, implying that Iran has less than five months to meet US conditions, is The Journal citation of "senior Administration officials" as sources. The indication is that there is still a battle among Obama's advisors over whether to treat "engagement" as an ongoing negotiation or whether to combine it with guaranteed sanctions if Tehran does not make the required moves within a quick (in diplomatic terms) period of time.
That possibility, while intriguing, is still secondary to what happens on Monday. What President Obama needs now is not an Iranian concession but an Israeli one. If Netanyahu holds fast and does not open up the possibility of "genuine" talks with the Palestinian Authority, including discussions of political status as well as economic development and security, then Obama's message --- launched on Inauguration Day --- of a new day in the Middle East is looking shaky.
Of course, the two leaders may fudge the outcome, claiming success in an ongoing discussion without making any specific commitments on the next step in the Israeli-Palestinian process. And Washington is guarding against disappointment: that is why it left eight days between the visit of Netanyahu and that of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on 26 May and another two days before Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas comes to the White House to see what's happening.
That, however, would not be enough. Obama has tied himself to an address to the "Islamic world" on 4 June from Cairo. His rhetorical approaches so far --- the Inaugural Address, the interview on Al Arabiya television in January, the speech from Turkey last month --- have been warmly received. This time, however, he has to bring something of substance to the table. Otherwise, it will be a speech too far.
Forget that "first 100 days" media fluff. Monday will be a true example of when the initial stages of a Presidency transform into defining moments.
Two weeks ago, Turkey and Syria held, for the first time in history, joint military drills. The exercises were a clear sign of the increasingly close ties between the two states as they co-operate on wider agendas. At the same time, they raise the question: what happens to other relationship, notably the long-standing ties between Ankara and Tel Aviv?
When Turkey felt isolated by its neighbors in 1995, the first door it knocked on was Israel's. The Turks had one eye on recent manoeuvres by Greece: the Greco-Syrian military training agreement in 1995 followed a similar arrangement between Israel and Greece in December 1994. On the economic front, the volume of trade between Israel and Greece reached $350 million, double that of 1989. Meanwhile, Syria was causing problems with the border dispute over Hatay, arguments over water, and Hafez al Assad's support to the PKK, the Kurdish "terrorist" organization.
Turkey's nightmare was wider cooperation between Syria and Israel, meaning that Tel Aviv would be tied to long-standing rivals both in Damascus and in Athens. So Ankara countered with a full alignment with Israel. Military, economic and technological agreements were reached in 1996, and a trilateral operation in the Eastern Mediterranean by Israel, Turkey and the US was conducted in January 1998.
More than a decade later, it is Tel Aviv which is concerned about "isolation" as other countries establish alliances. Defense Minister Ehud Barak called the Turkish-Syrian exercise "a worrisome situation" and the Israeli press featured the issue after the head of the Turkish military, Ilker Basbug said Turkey was not interested in Israel's reaction. The Jerusalem Post tried to limit the exercise's significance, with the claim of Professor Efraim Inbar that he had spoken to Turkish army officers: "The Turkish military does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state." The newspaper also highlighted tensions between the army and Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party.
The Israeli criticisms are evidence that the fallout from the rhetorical war between Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israel's leaders has not dissipated. The revenge for Erdogan's attack on Israel at the Davos summit is the wearing down of his Justice and Development Party. Thus the hostility to the Turkish-Syrian exercises is in part a message to Turkey's military: keep your Prime Minister under control.
As for the regional politics, the Israeli response is another signal that any peace will have to start with Israeli-Syrian talks rather than alignments beyond Tel Aviv. Yet the Israeli-Syrian discussions have been sidelined with the Netanyahu Government's focus on Iran, set against the US insistence on a two-state solution with Palestine.
So the Israeli media fills the political vacuum while trying to keep both Turkey and Syria off-balance. The question arises: is this also the aim of Prime Minister Netanyahu and his Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, or are they also trying to figure out how to reconcile Israel's relationship with its immediate crises with its wider but now suspect "alliances" in the region?
Yep, him again. Fed lines by Fox's Neil Cavuto, Cheney blew more smoke with the demand that Government memoranda providing the effectiveness of torture be released, covering up the inconvenience that Government memoranda have been released and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of "enhanced interrogation". He raged against the next symbolic moment, the possible release of hundreds of photographs of the programme (think Abu Ghraib, magnified many times), and repeated how Obama is endangering the nation and the world.
CAVUTO: We’re getting word that by May 28th, up to potentially 2,000 pictures are going to be released by the White House showing various interrogation methods, up to 2,000. What do you think of that?
CHENEY: Well, I guess what I think is important is that there be some balance to what is being released. The fact of the matter is the administration appears to be committed to putting out information that sort of favors their point of views in terms of being opposed to, for example, enhanced interrogation techniques.
But so far they’ve refused to put out memos that were done by the CIA that I’ve requested be declassified that show the positive results of the detainee program, and all of the information and the intelligence we were able to garner from these high-value detainees.
CAVUTO: And you say there are at least two such CIA memos that point to...
CHENEY: Two specifically that I requested.
CAVUTO: To the enhanced interrogation and that it did yield results.
CHENEY: Yes, well, that specifically talked about detainees, about the contributions that we got to our overall intelligence picture. Publicly General Hayden, who used to be director of the CIA, said as late as 2006 a majority of the intelligence we had gotten about al Qaeda came from detainees, high-value targets like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, like Abu Zubaydah, people that we captured during the course of our campaign against al Qaeda.
And they, of course, were obviously also the people that the debate has focused on with respect to enhanced interrogation techniques. So I...
CAVUTO: Have you spoken to anyone in the White House lately about this? And did they give you a head’s up, we’re going to release all of these interrogation...
(CROSSTALK)
CHENEY: Well, what I did was make a formal request for declassification through the National Archives, which is the way you do it, and then it goes out to the agency responsible, in this case, the CIA. And I’m still awaiting a formal answer from them.
CAVUTO: Your daughter, Liz, was on a rival news network this morning.
CHENEY: She was.
CAVUTO: And she made the comment that the White House should have called my dad, I’m paraphrasing here, Mr. Vice President, but it was clearly -- the inference was that that did not happen.
What happened? When this whole dust-up started happening on interrogation and then eliminating waterboarding, did anyone from the White House give you or President Bush a head’s up that this policy was about to be reversed?
CHENEY: Well, I didn’t discuss it with anybody in the administration, but I’m not offended by that. They campaigned all across the country, from one end of the country to the other against enhanced interrogation techniques, and made it very clear they were opposed to that. They called it torture.
I don’t believe it was torture. We had attorneys who gave us a clear guidance as to what was appropriate and what wasn’t. The reason we’ve gotten into this debate at all is because the administration saw fit to go back and release OLC opinions, opinions out of the Office of Legal Counsel and the Justice Department dealing with its classified program.
Now that’s a very rare occurrence. You don’t ordinarily release those opinions, especially when it deals with classified programs. They did it in a way that sort of blocked so far any real discussion of the results of the program, and instead focused upon the techniques themselves.
And they really began the debate then with the suggestions that perhaps people should be prosecuted for having participated in the program or the lawyers who gave us these opinions should be disbarred. I think it’s an outrage.
I think the proposition that a new administration can come in and in effect launch an attack on their predecessor because they disagreed with the legal advice that was given by the Justice Department or because they find that they don’t like the policies that were pursued by the prior administration.
It’s one thing to come in and change the policy, it’s an entirely different proposition to come in and say that you’re somehow going to go after the lawyers and the Justice Department or the agents who carried out that policy. I just -- I think that’s outrageous. And that’s why I’ve spoken out as I have to defend the policy and...
(CROSSTALK)
CAVUTO: But you have, but President Bush has not. And that, to your critics, is a sign of his statesmanship and your lack of it. What do you make of that?
CHENEY: Well, I don’t pay a lot of attention to what the critics say, obviously. From my standpoint, that a notion that I should remain silent while they go public, that I shouldn’t say anything while they threaten to disbar the lawyers who gave us the advice that was crucial in terms of this program, that I shouldn’t say anything when they go out and release information that they believe is critical of the program and critical of our policies, but refuse to put out information that shows the results of what we were able to achieve.
Bottom line is we successfully defended the nation for seven and a half years against a follow-on attack to 9/11. That was a remarkable achievement. Nobody would have thought that was possible, but it was. I believe it was possible because of the policies we had in place, which they’re now dismantling.
CAVUTO: So by that definition, are we more likely to be attacked now? Is that what you’re saying?
CHENEY: I think that we are stripping ourselves of some of the capabilities that we used in order to block, if you will, or disrupt activities by al Qaeda that would have led to additional attacks. I think that’s an important debate to have. I don’t think we should just roll over when the new administration says -- accuses of us committing torture, which we did not, or somehow violating the law, which we did not. I think you need to stand up and respond to that, and that’s what I’ve done.
CAVUTO: Have you raised this with President Bush? Have you talked with him and said, look, I’m going to go out and I’m going to be talking to Fox, I’m going to be talking, I want to let the world know how I feel?
CHENEY: You know, I’ve had a number of conversations on the telephone since January 20th.
CAVUTO: Any recently?
CHENEY: Those are -- oh, it’s been a couple of weeks. But we’re...
CAVUTO: How were those conversations? What do you talk about?
CHENEY: Well, those were private when we were in the White House and they remain so today.
CAVUTO: So you’re not going to tell me?
CHENEY: No.
CAVUTO: OK. Fine.
All right. We’re getting word out of “The Jerusalem Post,” Mr. Vice President, that Iran has deployed mobile ground-to-air and ground-to- sea missiles along the Strait of Hormuz, and perhaps beyond, in the Persian Gulf.
How bad is this getting?
CHENEY: Well, I haven’t seen the reports. I think it’s important to be aware of or recognize that Straits of Hormuz obviously are a key waterway, not just from the standpoint of the United States, but that about -- these numbers are rough, but about 20 percent of the world’s oil supply passes through those straits every day. It’s something close to 18, 19 million barrels that come out of the Gulf, come out of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, and so forth. That’s the major export route, if you will, and so anything that potentially threatens the free flow of that traffic, obviously, would be of concern.
CAVUTO: Well, what they’re obviously doing is saying, you attack us, then we respond in spades (ph). And then the whole world is dealing with $100, $200 a barrel oil, right?
CHENEY: Well, I don’t know what they’re doing, obviously. I can’t speak for what the Iranians are up to. They’re difficult enough to follow when you’re talking to them, and we’re not talking to them and haven’t for a long time. But I do think...
CAVUTO: Well, we are making overtures to them, right? CHENEY: Well, the...
CAVUTO: This president is trying, and that the time for that type of behavior, as well as opening up more to folks like Hugo Chavez and all, the time is now for that, because we got nowhere (ph) this administration is doing. But you did, which was effectively to isolate these guys.
What do you make of that?
CHENEY: The Iranians have a track record. We tried to resolve the issue diplomatically. We worked with our European friends and allies. We tried to persuade them that they did not need to enrich uranium to weapons grade, that the Russians, for example, were prepared to sell them fuel for their reactor and then take the spent fuel back after the fuel had been used.
A lot of ways for them to acquire nuclear power-generating capabilities without producing weapons. They clearly seem to be in the business of wanting to produce weapons. We were unable to talk them out of it previously, and there was a very serious effort diplomatically, working through the United Nations and with the EU3, the way we refer to them, the British and the Germans and the French.
The fact is that, as far as we know, they’re still in the business of trying to produce that capability, and that would be a fundamental threat not only to the folks in the immediate region, but potentially others around the world, including the United States. They’re working on missile technology, and they can marry up a weapon with the missile, and they become a formidable power.
CAVUTO: President Obama is going to be in Egypt next month (INAUDIBLE), which he will use that nation as an address to the Muslim world. He is not stopping by Israel when he is in the neighborhood, so to speak. What do you make of that?
CHENEY: I don’t know that it has any significance. But obviously, I haven’t been part of scheduling for the new administration, so I don’t know what considerations go into that. But I don’t think I can attribute motives one way or the other.
CAVUTO: So, to Israelis who are concerned that maybe this administration, again, with a vested interest for the whole region at heart, is more inclined to engage Muslim nations, maybe even some radical nations. It’s giving some Israelis pause. Should it?
CHENEY: Well, I think it’s giving not only Israelis pause, it’s also - excuse me - creating concerns on the part of nearly everybody in the region. And I would put in that category, although I haven’t talked to him recently, the Saudis, the Gulf states, the Emirates and so forth, because they have been more concerned in recent years about developments in Iran than anything else, than any other issue in the area or the region. And that’s because they believe if you - if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it’ll fundamentally change the dynamic in that part of the world.
CAVUTO: How close are they, by the way, do you think?
CHENEY: Well, you can get all kinds of estimates. They clearly have installed thousands of centrifuges. That’s their claim. But there have been inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency that can give us fairly precise information on how many centrifuges are installed and so forth. In terms of how close they are, I - you know, there are estimates, but I can’t give you a precise read or take on how much it is.
CAVUTO: Well, what would U.S. policy be, Mr. Vice President, if were to see Benjamin Netanyahu act alone, unilaterally to take out those centrifuges?
CHENEY: Well, I can’t speak for the administration, obviously, and that’s where you need to go to find out.
CAVUTO: What would you think?
CHENEY: I would find it that it would be a reflection of the fact that the Israelis believe this is an existential threat to the state of Israel. That Iran has taken a position and supported it over the years, that Israel should cease to exist, should go out of business, and Iran remains one of the prime sponsors of terror in the world, especially Hezbollah, and that all things considered, I think the Israelis look at developments in Iran, and they have stated publicly that they believe a nuclear-armed Iran is something that fundamentally threatens their existence. So, I would expect them to try to do something about it.
CAVUTO: Soon?
CHENEY: I can’t predict that. I don’t - I obviously don’t know, and can’t predict what they’ll do or when they’ll do it.
CAVUTO: Defense Secretary Robert Gates fired General David McKiernan from leading (ph) Afghanistan and said that whatever we were doing - I’m paraphrasing here, sir - wasn’t working and that we need more of a special-operations guy than we supposedly have now, and saying that the battle game and plan for Afghanistan has changed. Has it?
CHENEY: I think there’s been a significant increase, obviously, in the focus on Afghanistan, which I think is good. We had completed a review of our policy in Afghanistan shortly before we left office, and then decided that we would not put it out at that point, that that would feed into whatever the Obama administration wanted to do and might help them form a sounder policy. One of the things they’ve done and I think makes good sense is send more troops. I also believe the decision yesterday to send Stan McChrystal, lieutenant general, to take over in Afghanistan is a very good one. Stan’s an absolutely outstanding officer. I’m not saying anything critical of General McKiernan, who’s leaving. But Stan McChrystal was head of the Joint Special Operations Command. He’s been a superb officer...
CAVUTO: So, you support that choice?
CHENEY: I think the choice is excellent, and you’d be hard put to find anybody better than Stan McChrystal to take on that assignment.
CAVUTO: If you don’t mind, sir, I’d like to go back to terror (ph) for a second, and...
CHENEY: Excuse me.
CAVUTO: Sure. Nancy Pelosi has been caught up in when did she know and how much did she know, as far as the waterboarding issue, elevated interrogation techniques, and says she was aware of a 2003 meeting, but the way it’s been characterized that she was aware of all the details is wrong, and that painting (ph) her any other way is wrong. What do you make of that?
CHENEY: I don’t know the specifics of what sessions she was in. I know she was listed in a memorandum I’ve seen, a timeline that talks about when various members were briefed that the agencies produced in the last few days as public documents.
CAVUTO: When you say “briefed,” briefed on specifically waterboarding?
CHENEY: Briefed on enhanced interrogation techniques.
CAVUTO: That include waterboarding.
CHENEY: I don’t know. I wasn’t in the meetings, and I can’t speak to the content of the meetings. I know what the intention was. I know that the CIA basically took the responsibility of briefing members of Congress, a few in number, chairman and ranking member of the intelligence committees about the program.
CAVUTO: Congresswoman Jane Harman was among those who did write the letter of protest.
CHENEY: I don’t know about that, but I...
CAVUTO: Now, she passed along her concern to Nancy Pelosi , who I guess went through the legislative channels, who didn’t want to disrupt the legislative channels, to let her do the speaking, if I’m interpreting it correctly. But what...
CHENEY: You’re down in the weeds now.
CAVUTO: I guess I am.
CHENEY: I’m generally, obviously, aware of the program. I’m aware of the fact...
CAVUTO: Would you say more (ph) people knew than are saying so about these interrogation techniques?
CHENEY: I think it paralleled the surveillance program, for example, the terrorist surveillance program that we ran where I ran the briefings. And we briefed every few months the chairman and ranking member, and at one point, the “Big 9,” the speaker and majority and minority leaders in the House and Senate, on the substance of the program, on what we were doing, on how we were doing it, sought their advice and guidance on whether we should continue it.
CAVUTO: Well, do you remember any of them, Mr. Vice President, saying, whoa, whoa, whoa! This is a little too far for our tastes. We don’t want this.
CHENEY: No. On the terrorist surveillance program, after we’d given them the brief in the Situation Room in the basement - I presided over it - I went around the table and asked if they thought we should continue the program. They were unanimous. Then I asked if they thought we should...
CAVUTO: Who was unanimous?
CHENEY: The speaker, the majority and minority leader of the House and Senate, as well as the chairman and ranking member of the Intelligence Committee.
CAVUTO: On everything that had been stipulated, including these interrogations?
CHENEY: No, on the terrorist surveillance program.
CAVUTO: Gotcha.
CHENEY: I’m just giving you an example. And then I asked if they thought we should go back and get additional congressional authority, and they said absolutely not. That would reveal the existence of the program. And I think what happened with respect to enhanced interrogation techniques is, the CIA did go up. They did brief the relevant people, and I think what often happens in these circumstances is once a controversy develops, then some of the people that were briefed get forgetful.
CAVUTO: Let me just, on one last foreign policy issue before we hit on some economics. I know your time is tight. On Gitmo. The administration’s intelligence director had said that detainees who are just misplaced and are here have a right to, among other things, and could get who are just misplaced and are here, have a right, to among other things, and could get welfare, for example. How do you feel about that?
CHENEY: I think it’s a terrible idea. While we were running things at Guantanamo, there were several hundred people that processed through there, that were held there for a period of time and were ultimately sent back to their home countries.
The ones that are remaining, about 245, are the hardcore, the worst of the worst. They’re cases have been reviewed, they were given an review down at Guantanamo, and they were kept in custody because we believe they constituted a threat to the United States, so they had some continuing value.
Of those that were released, we had about a 12 percent recidivism rate, 12 percent that went back into the terrorism business. I think the recidivism on the ones that are still there would be far higher. It includes people like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of 9/11.
Now, I think they’re having a very hard time finding anybody around the world who wants to take these folks. I know when we tried to place a few Uighurs, Chinese terrorists...
CAVUTO: Right, right.
CHENEY: And while we were still in office, ultimately, the only country that would take them was Albania. Everybody else rejected them.
CAVUTO: Where do you think they’re going to end up?
CHENEY: Well, I think they need to keep Guantanamo open. I think it’s a mistake to try to close it. I think if you didn’t have it, you’d have to invent it. If you bring those people to the United States, I don’t know a single congressman who is going to stand up and say, gee, send me some terrorists. I’d like to have some al Qaeda-types living in my district. That’s not going to happen.
So I think they’re going to find someplace where they can locate these folks. Guantanamo is a great facility. It’s very well run. These people are very well treated. It’s open to inspection by the International Red Cross and the press and so forth. It’s a good facility, it’s an important program, and we ought to continue it.
CAVUTO: Senator Biden was making his, today, spin to a union group, saying, we have to rebuild the middle class and the way to do that is to help labor unions grow. What do you make of that?
CHENEY: Well, I’m not anti-labor union. I carried a ticket for six years in the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in my youth. I built power line transmission line all over Wyoming, Utah, Colorado. That’s how I paid for my education. So, I’m not anti-union.
I do think the legislation that the administration is supporting and that the unions are pushing hard, the so-called Card Check Law, would do away with a secret ballot in terms of the question of organizing unions. I think it would be a huge mistake. I don’t think we want to get into the business where we make it easier for there to be the kind of intimidation that we’ve sometimes seen in these operations in the past and where people wouldn’t be able to cast a secret ballot in terms of whether or not they want to join a union.
CAVUTO: Jack Welt (ph) said they be deliteriates (ph) to our economic recovery. Do you agree?
CHENEY: Well, I always felt that what Ronald Reagan did back in 1981in the early part of his administration when he was very tough with the air traffic controllers was a good, sound, solid move. I think that, as I say, people want to join a union, fine. That’s their business. There are provisions for that that allow unions to be represented.
But I think what the unions are trying to do here is dramatically expand the base in terms of membership and they will, in turn, generate vast sums of money in terms of dues and political contributions. And I think it does have wide- ranging ramifications and that the current system where we have secret ballots for people to decide whether or not want to be represented by unions is a good way to go. We ought to preserve it.
CAVUTO: You mentioned Ronald Regan, sir, and Jeb Bush made some news recently made some news recently saying that the party, and I’ll paraphrase here, obsesses a bit too much about Ronald Regan and have got to move on and move forward. What do make of that?
CHENEY: Well, I like Jeb. I think he’s a good man. I’d like to see him continue to say involved politically.
CAVUTO: For president?
CHENEY: I’d probably support him for president.
CAVUTO: Would you really?
CHENEY: He’s a good man.
CAVUTO: Over Mitt Romney?
CHENEY: I’m not - I’m not endorsing anybody today. I’m not...
CAVUTO: Any candidate you like?
CHENEY: I’m not in the business of endorsing anybody at this point, Neil. But I’m a big fan of Jeb’s.
I think, in terms of the Regan legacy, I think it’s important to the party. I think it was a period of time when we had an administration that understood that the engine that drives the American economy is the private sector. That one of the things that was most important from the standpoint of government was to get out of the way of the private sector and let small businesses grow and develop and create jobs and create wealth. You had to reduce the tax burden to the maximum percent possible. Exactly the opposite of the kind of policies we see coming out of the administration today when we’re experiencing a vast - a proposal for a vast increase in the power of the government over the private sector.
CAVUTO: Without, you know, any regard for party, it started with your administration, right? I mean, the bailout, the financial bailouts of the banks and looking to help the auto companies being in very dire economic moments, certainly, was started by you and President Bush.
CHENEY: Well...
CAVUTO: Do you regret any of that?
CHENEY: I disagreed with bailing out the automobile companies. I would have encouraged the process to go forward for a Chapter 11.
(CROSSTALK)
CAVUTO: What about the banks?
CHENEY: ...to go.
The banks were different. And the reason the banks are different is because they are part of the financial system that is the heart and soul of our economy. And the federal government has major responsibilities for the health of our financial institutions. You’ve got the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, the FDIC, SEC, et cetera. And when the markets began to seize up, when people couldn’t get credit any more, when the collapse, for example, of the subprime mortgage market and so forth, put at risk the basic fundamental health of our economy because it threatened that core of our financial system and there isn’t anybody other than the federal government that can fix it. And therefore, we felt that we had no choice. But it’s still...
(CROSSTALK)
CAVUTO: But it’s still in shaky shape, right? After all...
CHENEY: It’s still in shaky shape, but there are...
(CROSSTALK)
CAVUTO: ... bankruptcy like you recommended for the auto companies be applied to the banks...
CHENEY: Not for the banks.
CAVUTO: Really?
CHENEY: I really think that would have been a serious problem when you have...
CAVUTO: Now, what did you see, can you say now, what did everyone see that was going to be so horrific that ...
CHENEY: Well, when we have the secretary of the Treasury or the secretary of the Treasury and the chairman of the Federal Reserve come in and say we’ve got a major crisis on our hands and within 48 hours major financial institutions are going to go down in flames. Or that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that dominated the mortgage market out there were suddenly in trouble financially because of the collapse of the subprime mortgage...
CAVUTO: But you must have seen where that was going, right? What you do for one, all expecting then - it’s an expectations game, right?
CHENEY: Right. But again, I think you’ve got to, and we did, make a distinction about the financial sector, because it is different than the other parts of the economy. The other parts of the economy can’t function without a strong financial sector, without credit, without sound monetary policy and actions by the government and the Federal Reserve to establish and maintain the value of our currency. Trying
CAVUTO: But now we’ve got the president, the government dictating salaries at these institutions rescued - which, I guess, happens if you take taxpayer dollars - and dictating their very business, right?
CHENEY: Well, the thing I find objectionable is that people are taking what was done with respect to the financial sector and without discriminating, trying to do the same thing for a broader range of sectors. And think that’s a mistake.
CAVUTO: Do you think it went too far?
CHENEY: I think so. I would have kept it focused on the financial institutions. But I do - I worry that the current situation is a set of circumstances where the administration is using the excuse of the economic difficulties in order to significantly broaden the power and authority of the government over the private sector. I think that’s a huge mistake.
CAVUTO: In “The Wall Street Journal’s” story that has it that the president’s tax hikes actually go in to those earning $235,000, not $250,000. What do you think of that?
CHENEY: I haven’t seen the story, but I worry. I don’t see any way you can do what he’s trying to do in terms of the vast expansion of governmental programs and the huge federal deficit and major tax increases without the kind of tax increases that are going to hit virtually every American.
CAVUTO: Do you think it stops at 39.6 percent?
CHENEY: I’m afraid it won’t, not if you go with a government of the size and scale that the administration apparently envisions.
CAVUTO: What do you envision that we’ll ultimately get to?
CHENEY: Well, I’d much prefer a situation in which we did not embark upon a course of the vast expansion of the authority of the federal government over the private sector. I’d be much more focused on tax cuts and reducing the economic burden on the private sector that the federal government represents as the best way to get the economy up and running again. I think you need to create jobs, you need to support small business, you need to encourage people to go out and save and invest and create the kind of entrepreneurial activity that really has given us the greatness that is the American economy, not expand the size of the federal government.
CAVUTO: Finally, Mr. Vice President, many have urged the Republican Party to moderate, to get more mainstream, to do what Democrats did at the time that Bill Clinton in the late ‘80s into ‘92, become more palatable to a wider section of the population. What do you say?
CHENEY: I think we need to run a party that is broadly based, where people of a wide variety of viewpoints are welcome. I don’t think we ought to change the basic fundamental philosophy of the Republican Party. I personally am a conservative Republican. I obviously believe in my philosophy, and I think that’s the basis upon which we have to build any resurgence of our party. I think we will, but I think we’ll do it by being true to our principles, not becoming more like the Democrats.
CAVUTO: So, you don’t think you’d isolate the Republicans going your route?
CHENEY: No.
CAVUTO: Mr. Vice President, thank you very, very much.
Monday, May 18, 2009 at 13:40 
Iran Review has just posted an article by Dr. Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh of the Tehran International Studies and Research Institute, on President Obama's foreign policy and the Middle East. I found the analysis intriguing both in its expression of Iran's interest in the region and in its "window of hope" for the new Administration. At the same time, there is an uncertainty about the substance of US policy and a warning that the window can be closed: "The US president must remember that candle of hope is not eternal and can be put out easily and due to a single incident."
Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi, freed on appeal after an 8-year sentence for espionage, is now far from Iran. Her drama will now disappear from public view.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit on Monday to Washington is shaping up as a critical early moment --- even amidst the torture controversy, Afghanistan-Pakistan, and a minor thing called the global economy --- in the Obama Presidency.
Two weeks ago, Turkey and Syria held, for the first time in history, joint military drills. The exercises were a clear sign of the increasingly close ties between the two states as they co-operate on wider agendas. At the same time, they raise the question: what happens to other relationship, notably the long-standing ties between Ankara and Tel Aviv?