Palestine Video & Analysis: Saeb Erekat's Speech at Birmingham (Yenidunya/Baghdady)

Ali Yenidunya and Christina Baghdady write:

On 23 March, the chief negotiator for the Palestinian Authority, Dr. Saeb Erakat spoke about the current political stalemate at the University of Birmingham. This prompted a lively and open debate, with Erakat encouraging those who attended to challenge him. The topics covered were broad, including: the Palestinian Israeli conflict, including the most recent exchange of maps between the former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas; the relationship and influence of external powers on the region; and the problem with Hamas.

Middle East Inside Line: Is Washington Scaring the Israeli Government?
US-Israel: The Big Fight Within Obama Administration — Ross v. Mitchell, NSC v. State Department

Video sections are interspersed amongst the analysis:

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Peace talks with Israel

Stating that the recent proximity talks should be based on a generally agreed framework consisting of core issues, in particular borders, Erakat suggested a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders with agreed swaps of territory.



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Erakat outlined the counter proposal, in response to the December 2008 offer of the Olmert Government in Israel, on the border swaps (part  3 of the video). Although the satellite images show that 1.2% of the West Bank is occupied by Israeli settlements, the Olmert government provided a map in December 2008 annexing 6.5% of settlement land (in return of giving 5.8%). The Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas provided a counter-map approving an annexation of 1.9% of the total land. Erekat noted that no agreement was achieved, and the problem is yet to be solved.

The questions remains:  what is the purpose of Israeli settlements and their expansion in the Palestinian territories since 1967? The term "security" is constantly reproduced by Israeli advocates. The Palestinian Authority also invokes "security", but it does so to consolidate legitimacy not just within the eyes of Palestinians but also in the international arena, since interaction with a stateless, non-territorial Palestinian group is more problematic compared to that with Israel. In the absence of a level playing field between Israel and the Palestinian territories and of Israel accepting conditions for the end of settlement construction, there is little hope for both parties to understand each other’s needs.

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Erakat pointed out the cost of war must be greater than that of peace to achieve a peace settlement. Was this a subtle hint that Israel is hoping to benefit further from a lack of peace? Following US Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Israel, 1600 new housing units were approved by the Jerusalem municipality. Then, on 24 March, hours before the Obama-Netanyahu meeting in the White House, the Jerusalem municipality announced final approval for construction of 20 apartments in a controversial hotel in east Jerusalem.

That is where we come to the point of crisis. Despite Washington’s pressure on Israel to announce a moratorium in East Jerusalem if not a permanent freeze, the Israeli authorities are still ignoring calls to stop settlement expansion. Last week Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told  his ministers in the weekly Cabinet meeting: “As far as we are concerned, building in Jerusalem is like building in Tel Aviv.”

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This crisis came out in Erekat’s words: “If Israel does not want a two-state solution, if they want to call my home town Jericho in its Hebrew name Yeriho, if they want to call Nablus in its Hebrew Shechem, if they want to call al Quds, Yerushalayim... [it] is destroying the two-state solution.” (part 2 of video)

External influence

To achieve peace in a region of conflict, a mediator may be useful, but if the mediator is not effective or the peace process reaches a stalemate, then external influences and distant events can adversely affect the situation. Erekat commented, "When bombs are falling in Iraq and Afghanistan, bombs are falling in my home in Jerusalem....When bombs fall in Kandahar, it also falls in my home in Jerusalem."

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For the mediator to conduct their role effectively, they must be on good terms with the parties in conflict. The US has been that mediator with the 1993 Oslo process, but their position --- after a second intifada, the attack on Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, and now a potential third intifada  --- is now strained.

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Erekat noted the issue of "security" for the US,  "This is a wake up call....The US take bodies wrapped in the national flag back to the US daily... They do not need anyone to seek security for them." This "wake-up call" has arguably brought a renewed push for peace, with  talks much more regular under the Obama Presidency than under the previous Bush administration.

However, Erakat pointed out that the Palestinian government had chosen the EU for nation- building, security talks, and mediation, and it wasn’t because they "love them". According to Erekat, the EU have  credibility and can provide sufficient financial support to the Palestinian territories. In addition, the EU has relatively stable relations with the US as it faces its "wake-up call".

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTxKOFK5Bec[/youtube]

When one looks at the options available to the Palestinians, they have little choice Egypt and Jordan have arguably been effective as mediators; however, their financial contribution to nation-building as well as their credibility is on a par with the EU.

The United Nations, another option given their role in the Quartet (US-EU-UN-Russia) are not that close to Israel and the Palestinian territories. Moreover, it has failed on previous occasions to enforce the notion of the collective upon the action of a state, as in the ability to prevent the US-UK invasion of Iraq.

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Russia would be an interesting but highly unlikely choice as mediator. Russia has military links with Iran and thus with Syria and Hezbollah. That is a suspect list of alliances for the US, which would prefer the Palestinian government to choose the EU over Russian involvement.

For Erekat, democracy is the second pillar, after “just” solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, of the fight against “extremism”. He stated, "Anyone who says Arab world is not ready for democracy is a racist.”

That assertion faces the reality of governmental structures such as monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Oman, constitutional monarchies in Bahrain and Jordan; constitutional emirates in Kuwait and Qatar, a federation of emirates in United Arab Emirates, an authoritarian regime in Syria, and a “half-democracy” in Iraq.

Erekat says that “democracy is democracy”, regardless of how it arrives,  but that cannot guarantee social change and a political agenda for his outcome. Indeed, beyond the Arab world, does the US want this? Which country has been the closest ally of Washington? Israel or Saudi Arabia?

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r2exUU_IB3U[/youtube]

The Problem of Hamas

Dr. Erekat harshly criticized Hamas’s policy following its victory in the last Gazan elections. He described Hamas’s existence in the Gaza Strip as a coup d’etat and emphasized that “democracy in Palestine did not fail but Hamas failed”. Referring to the Quartet’s demands (recognition of the State of Israel, renouncing “terrorism”, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations including the "Road Map"), Erekat blamed Hamas for not acting as a responsible government.

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Yet, what is to be done? Erekat says that nations must go and tell Hamas to sign the reconciliation document. But how? In an aggressive manner? Erekat himself said that the peace talks had collapsed due to Israel’s Operation Cast Lead against Gaza in December 2008.

So, can Erekat mean that the only solution to peace is through dialogue in the region? Perhaps, given Erekat's reference to Tehran. Unlike his President, Mahmoud Abbas, who had blamed Iran for blocking reconciliation between his Fatah organization and Hamas, Erekat said that Iran should not be seen as a threat.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8aF86-iuAKQ[/youtube]

How is this possible? Israel’s Deputy Ambassador to the UK, Talya Lador-Fresher, in her own speech at Birmingham in March, said Israel’s official policy is not to help the Gazans develop themselves economically. West Jersualem's position is explicit: unless there is a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and Fatah, Israel will never intervene and talk to Hamas.

At a time when both Israel and Egypt show their teeth to Hamas, who is supposed to put pressure on the Israelis to show flexibility? The EU or the US? Given Israel’s “(in)security needs”, and its claim that it has suffered since the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, urging West Jerusalem to sit at a table with Hamas is more difficult than having Israel and the Palestinian Authority at the same table.

There is just one solution: instead of indirect pressure from Washington, the Obama Administration should start the same strategy they have pursued with Damascus to get a reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas as soon as possible. This would not only help institutions produce an antidote to “insecurity requirements” but also bring an increase in the pressure on the State of Israel to reconsider the extent of its “concessions” on core issues.

Iran Analysis: Politics and Subsidy Reform (Harris)

Kevan Harris writes in Middle East Report:

Although most Iranians forget it today, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005 on a platform of technocratic competence. The clique surrounding his rise to mayor of Tehran and beyond once called themselves Abadgaran, “the Developers.” In a column four months after Ahmadinejad’s election to the Iranian presidency, commentator Saeed Laylaz reminded readers of the sage advice of Deng Xiaoping, arguing that a hard-line conservative government could push through economic reforms where the reformist administration had failed. “The cat is finally catching mice,” Laylaz wrote, “and its color no longer matters.” After the exhaustion of the reform movement’s momentum, Ahmadinejad presented himself to the people as the intrepid engineering professor, the humble, principled and no-nonsense expert who could get things done. “Expert,” in fact, is one of the good doctor’s favorite words.

What occurred was instead second-rate. The network of clients enveloping the new president set its sights on capturing the money and resources controlled by the ossifying bureaucracy of the Islamic Republic. Abadgaran men and assorted hangers-on replaced the aging first generation of post-revolutionary technocratic cadres. No sweet plum remained unpicked in the state agencies and ministries, not even in provincial offices and the development projects they oversaw. The rebellious tone with which this turnover was presented—“throw the bums out”—resonated with the lower social strata, who have rarely benefited from state largesse.


In 2007, the president stuck a pitchfork of his own in the 60-year old Planning and Budget Organization, taking away its independent auditing power. But overall the Ahmadinejad administration has not exactly been distinguished by fiscal discipline and managerial efficiency. Ahmadinejad, for instance, has paid three rounds of highly publicized visits to the oft-neglected provinces. On his tours, he has been met with hundreds of thousands of handwritten letters asking for small favors—resolving a quarrel with a local official, helping a son lacking sufficient connections for a state post, defraying the cost of an upcoming wedding or paying an overdue bill. The supplicants received personalized replies, and a few dozen thousand-toman notes (1,000 tomans equal $1) were stuffed into the envelopes for good measure. Ahmadinejad’s political vehicle was nothing less than a new patronage machine. It is an administration charismatic in appearance, but inconsistent in policy and practice.

In the spring of 2010, with the country still in political tumult over the dubious election of the previous June, and in economic pain due to global recession, the reinstalled engineer-president announced a plan that drew out critics of his competence in droves. The government proposed to enact the most sweeping economic policy change in over a decade: a phasing out of price subsidies for nearly all staple commodities—bread, electricity, water and gasoline—starting in March and continuing until 2015, when they would cease entirely. The plan provoked immediate protest and predictions of chaos, prompting parliamentarians to chop half of the cuts out of the budget bill they passed on March 9

Easy Money No More

Ahmadinejad’s political opponents within the Islamic Republic, from reformists to pragmatic conservatives, and irrespective of their feelings about the Green Movement arising after the June election, were pleased to see the president on the economic hot seat at last. After 15 years of attempting to construct their own versions of a modernization project, they were aghast that this upstart had labeled them as the backward, out-of-touch cronies of an old elite. Whether they had sought to do so through a glasnost-style opening, like former President Mohammad Khatami, or through a top-down economic restructuring, like Khatami’s predecessor Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, they had been equally disparaged. Infuriating them more was that Ahmadinejad liberally stole from their policy playbook, just as President Bill Clinton was etched into the pages of US history though the use of softened Republican Party talking points. Politically, the Islamic Republic’s bêtes noires in the Bush administration gave the Iranian regime easy targets with which to justify their position: a region in conflagration and blatant enforcement of double standards in nuclear geopolitics.

For most of Ahmadinejad’s first term, the money poured in, in the form of oil rents inflated due to the same regional crises. The government rode the heady boom in land prices and resplendent construction projects. In 2006–2007, many Iranians with capital jumped into the housing market, seeing dizzy gains of 100 percent every year. The resulting real estate bubble temporarily concealed the lack of a coherent development policy. The benchmarks and proposals of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (2005–2009), passed in Khatami’s era, were discarded in favor of hundreds of bridges to nowhere, and most of these were not even completed. The economy entered a liquidity trap, where over-accumulation of capital and a lack of profitable outlets for investment drove down the rate of return while sending prices into an upward spiral. Finally, Iran’s central bank reined in the easy money in mid-2008, months before the collapse of global financial markets (with much resistance from the president, who forced the two largest state banks to continue to hand out loans, resulting in the large debt burdens of today, as borrowers default). Each block of every middle-class neighborhood in Tehran is now home to three or four real estate offices, all filled with jacketed agents listlessly huddled together.

The economic hangover allowed political competitors to pin the label of ineptitude on the president’s dwindling faction and make it stick. If any theme permeated the televised debates between presidential candidates before the June 2009 election, it was competent governance. The intra-elite bickering was so intense that it arguably burned through the electorate’s apathy and ignited mass participation in the balloting.

Into this environment the President introduced his subsidy reform law, whose provisions were as follows: The government spent around 40 percent of its 2006 budget ($40 billion) on such subsidies and even more during 2008’s oil price peak. Of the revenue gained from the lessening of subsidy levels, the state would keep 20 percent, ostensibly compensating for increased costs in the public sector. Another 30 percent would be allocated to industries that rely heavily on subsidies and development of more energy-efficient infrastructure. The remaining 50 percent would be given back to Iranians in direct cash transfers or indirect welfare benefits, “targeting” the poorest strata of the population. After five years, the prices of the staples were to be close to regional market levels. The parliament wrote into the law that the government should gain no less than $10 billion and no more than $20 billion during the first year, which would have meant increasing prices for subsidized goods on average between 2.5 and 4 times their current levels.

Debate over the law was heated, even a bit melodramatic, with parties for and against seeming to believe equally in the awesome power of unregulated markets. The president identified this single reform as the solution to the country’s many economic, social and perhaps even cultural woes. On March 9, amid reports that Parliament would approve only half of the cuts, state news agencies relayed that Ahmadinejad was praying in the chamber for passage of them all. Critics of the law, including stalwart conservatives in Parliament, predicted hyperinflationary catastrophe and industrial collapse. Green Movement supporters hoped that an intensification of economic grievances would keep middle-class Iranians, some of whom see the plan as a government attack upon their livelihoods, coming into the streets. Labor activists foresaw a new surge of working-class unrest to fuel the Green fire.

The drama of the subsidy debate was all the higher for playing out against the backdrop of the post-election turmoil and the fragmentation of the political elite into so many temporary chiefdoms, with the accompanying fleeting wars and alliances. In this climate, no policy initiative on the scale of subsidy reform would proceed without the express approval of Ahmadinejad’s patrons, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards. Why, given the hubbub, did they permit the president to move forward with the subsidy-cutting plan? Have they gone nuts?

Read rest of article....

Israel-Syria Dialogues: Hopes vs. Realities

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, who served in the CIA, the National Security Council and the State Department during the Clinton and Bush administrations, declare on their website that Syrian President Bashar Assad told them two weeks ago that the U.S. policy in the Middle East has been wrong for the past decade and has created a vacuum that improved the regional strategic standing for Iran, Syria, and Turkey.

Meanwhile, following Haaretz's report that Syria was prepared to make "gradual peace," the Israeli Prime Minister's Bureau said Wednesday that Benjamin Netanyahu is willing to meet with the Syrians immediately and without preconditions.

Haaretz columnist Gideon Levy responds: "Israel Does Not Want Peace":

Israel does not want peace with Syria. Let's take off all the masks we've been hiding behind and tell the truth for a change. Let's admit that there's no formula that suits us, except the ludicrous "peace for peace." Let's admit it to ourselves, at least, that we do not want to leave the Golan Heights, no matter what. Forget about all the palaver, all the mediations, all the efforts.

Let's face it, we don't want peace, we want to run wild, to paraphrase an Israeli pop song from the '70s. Don't bother us with new Syrian proposals, like the one published in Haaretz this week that calls for a phased withdrawal and peace in stages; don't pester us with talk about peace as a way to break up the dangerous link between Syria and Iran; don't tell us peace with Syria is the key to forging peace with Lebanon and weakening Hezbollah. Turkey isn't an "honest" broker, the Syrians are part of the axis of evil, all is quiet on the Golan - you know how much we love the place, its mineral waters, its wines - so who needs all the commotion of demonstrations and evacuating settlements, just for peace?

It's not only the current extreme right-wing government that doesn't want this whole headache, and it wasn't only all of its predecessors - some of which were on the very brink of withdrawing from the Golan and only at the last moment, the very last moment, changed their minds. It's all the Israelis - the minority that is really against it and the majority that doesn't give a damn. They'd rather pretend not to hear the encouraging sounds coming out of Damascus in recent months and not even try to put them to the test.

Everyone would rather wave the menacing picture of Bashar Assad alongside Hassan Nasrallah and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, his partners in the axis of evil, with the hummus and the bulgur. That on its own should have made Israel try 10 times harder to make peace. But in Israeli eyes, the picture of the banquet, as one Israeli paper termed the "modest meal," is worth more than a thousand words. After that, do you really expect us to give up the Golan? Don't make us laugh. We'll make peace with Micronesia, not Syria.

When the Syrians talk peace, it is all "empty words," "deception" and a wily way of getting closer to the United States. But when Assad poses with the president of Iran, that's the truth, that's Syria's real face. Even when he merely says, on the same occasion, that Syria must prepare for an Israeli attack, he is immediately accused of "threatening" Israel.

Do you want proof that we really don't want peace with Syria? Well, there has not yet been one Israeli prime minister who has said that we do. Because, after all, the order would have to be the opposite of the usual Israeli haggling. A prime minister who really wanted to achieve peace would have to say one terribly simple thing: We undertake in advance - yes, in advance - to hand back the entire Golan in exchange for a full peace. But no, not one prime minister has declared readiness to leave the Golan - right up to the last grain of sand, as we did in Sinai - in exchange for a peace like that which we have with Egypt.

Why on earth do we always have to hold onto this card so it can be played last? And what kind of a card is it, anyway? What kind of end does it ensure? After all, if the Syrian reply is negative, nobody will make us leave the Golan Heights. And what if the reply is positive? Why not start off with a promising, invigorating declaration, one that will give the Syrians hope and thereby at least put their intentions to the test.

But we are not the only ones who don't want peace. The United States has turned out to be a true friend that extricates us from every briar patch. It doesn't want peace enough either, praise the Lord. It's a fact: Washington is applying no pressure. Here's another marvelous pretext for doing nothing - America isn't pressing us and the redeemer will come to Zion, in the words of the prophet Isaiah. Yet we are the ones who have to stay in the dangerous and menacing Middle East, not the Americans; we should be more interested than anyone in preventing another war in the north, in creating a new relationship with Syria and then with Lebanon, and in weakening Iranian influence; in trying to integrate, at last. An Israeli interest, no? And what do we do to advance it? Half of nothing.

So what is there left to do? At least admit the truth: We do not want peace with Syria. That's all there is to it.

Middle East Inside Line: Palestine-Israel Dialogue?; Britain & Arrest Warrants for Israelis; China & Iran

Indirect Israel-Palestine Dialogue: On Wednesday, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, found political cover to enter into an indirect dialogue with Israel, as 14 ministers of the Arab League agreed in Cairo that the PA should engage in indirect negotiations with Israel for a preliminary four-month period. The Arab ministers also mentioned that no progress will be possible without a complete settlement freeze, indicating that the four months will be an assessment process.

"Despite the lack of conviction in the seriousness of the Israeli side, the committee sees that it would give the indirect talks the chance as a last attempt and to facilitate the US role," said Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa.

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Following the news from Cairo, a senior U.S. official said that special envoy for the Middle East George Mitchell will travel to the region over the weekend to see if Israel and the Palestinians are ready to begin indirect peace talks. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton added: "We were very pleased by the endorsement that came out of Cairo today. (We) are very committed to try to bring about the two-state solution and we hope the proximity talks will be the beginning of that process."

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the decision of the Arab league and said:

It seems that the conditions are ripening for the renewal of negotiations between us and the Palestinians.

In the Middle East you need two to tango, but it could be that we need three to tango and we might need to leapfrog at first but the obstacle isn't and never was Israel.

On Thursday, Haaretz learned that Mitchell will land in Israel on Saturday night and both parties will declare the beginning of indirect talks on Monday, as US Vice President Joe Biden arrives.

However, Haaretz reports that Israeli President Shimon Peres, in his private conversations with various political figures, has been saying that Netanyahu is restricted because of Israel's right wing in moving forward, so the Prime Minister should offer a good deal to the "centrist" Kadima opposition to join the coalition. In response, one of  associates said: "Even if [Avigdor] Lieberman is forced to resign, Bibi won't name a replacement as foreign minister."

Britain to Block Arrest Warrants Against Israel's Officials: On Thursday, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced plans to stop politically-motivated campaign groups from securing arrest warrants for visiting foreign officials. Brown wrote in The Daily Telegraph: 

Britain will continue to take action to prosecute or extradite suspected war criminals - regardless of their status or power... But the process by which we take action must guarantee the best results. The only question for me is whether our purpose is best served by a process where an arrest warrant for the gravest crimes can be issued on the slightest of evidence.

A statement from the office of former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who faced a British warrant, said:

The British legal system has been abused by cynical elements in the United Kingdom. This is important news for every country in the Free World which is fighting terror.

China Reject Sanctions on Iran: Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gan said on Thursday, "We've been making diplomatic efforts and we believe they have not been exhausted, and we will continue to work with other parties to push for a settlement to this issue."