Iran: View from Tehran "Changes within the System are Impossible"

A reliable EA source passes on these insights from a well-placed contact:

Today an Iranian friend called.

According to him, the Government did effectively scare the people by killing and arresting them and relentlessly summoning political activists or journalists to court. It also is promoting itself through intense propaganda.

Oppositional administrative structures are virtually destroyed, which was one of the reasons for the tohubohu [confusion] on 22 Bahman [11 February, the anniversary of the Revolution]. Nevertheless the people resist, and growing rifts are visible within the regime's body. The number of people, even very religious ones, who doubt the Government's pretentions, is growing day by day. Meanwhile many have realised that changes within the system are impossible, and even parts of the clergy favour a separation of state and religion.



He said "hormat-e hokumat shekast" (the ruler's honour is broken --- just think of people's reaction to the Supreme Leader's attempted fatwa on the ceremonies of Chahrshanbeh Suri). Apparently Ahmadinejad and his mafia possess documents relating to the Supreme Leader, which force Khamenei to abide by their wishes.

He deemed Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani's support for Rafsanjani as essential and favoured a tripartite tactic of oil sanctions, political challenge, and popular resistance to bring down this regime, even though it would be hard for the Iranian people. Without sanctions the govt would have enough income to maintain its pressure on dissidents, i.e., the Iranian majority.

This friend is very religious and has good contacts to the ruling classes. He reported also that Sepah [Revolutionary Guard] is smuggling money out from the country via Dubai.

The Latest from Iran (21 March): Happy New Year, Mr Ahmadinejad

1750 GMT: It's All About US and Us. A slowish news phase, so the media are focusing on Ayatollah Khamenei's Sunday speech. It's on the lines of the Twitter publicity put out by his office (1330 and 1420 GMT), but this extract is especially provocative:

The enemies wanted to divide the people... and to create a civil war, but the nation was alert. If they were able to do it, the US and Zionist regime would have sent troops to Tehran's streets, but they knew it would hurt them. Thus they spread propaganda and supported the rioters.

1730 GMT: We've posted Iranian New Year videos featuring defiant chants from the opposition.

1440 GMT: Parliament v. President. Islamic Republic News Agency is claiming a fight-back against Parliamentary resistance to Ahmadinejad subsidy reform and spending proposals, quoting Arsalan Fathipour, head of the Parliament's economic commission, "We believe it is not possible to implement the subsidy reform plan at 20,000 billion tomans ($20 billion). So delegates intend to raise the figure to 35-38,000 billion tomans ($35-38 billion)." That would be almost all the $40 billion demanded by the President.

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The Latest from Iran (20 March): Nowruz

1430 GMT: Obama and Iran. Edward Yeranian of the Voice of America claims that there was a "mized" reception amongst "Iranians inside and outside Iran" of President Obama's Nowruz message.


1420 GMT: "Rights" Annoys Khamenei. The emphasis in Barack Obama's Nowruz message on rights for Iran's people has annoyed the Supreme Leader. His office's Twitter barrage continues:

USA President sent letter and message to normalize relations, but his actions was against his words....USA President called distruptives "civil movement" and supported arsonists in recent events....Aren't you ashamed of killing in innocent people in Iraq and Afghanistan while talking about Human Rights?

1340 GMT: Winning on the Internet. The Guardian of London offers an interview with Austin Heap, the creator of the Haystack initiative to assist Iranians with access to the Internet, evading regime blocks and protecting their security.

1330 GMT: Everything Most Excellent Here. Really. The Supreme Leader's Twitter machine is extracting English quotes from his Nowruz message. My favourite so far: "Last Iranian year was the nation's year and their victory; a year of seeming presence in glorious arena."

1005 GMT: Speaking of Rights. Nooshabeh Amiri, writing in Rooz Online, considers "Women’s Movement [As] a Prelude to the Green Movement".

1000 GMT: US, Iran, and Rights. We've put our snap analysis of a possible shift in US policy on Iran into a separate ent

0900 GMT: The Ruling of the Umpire. The Iran-based blogger Persian Umpire is back after an absence with three entries: one on the events of 22 Bahman (11 February), one on waiting outside Evin Prison for a detained friend, and one on last week's Chahrshanbeh Suri (Fire Festival) ceremonies.

The summary of the festival offers one of the classic observations of this post-election crisis: "No one gave a certain rodent’s bottom for the fatwa [of Ayatollah Khamenei]. In fact it solidified people’s resolve to come out and celebrate."

0700 GMT: As Iranians celebrate Nowruz, they have been greeted by messages for the New Year. And there is more than a bit of politics behind the best wishes. The most pointed intervention may have come from Mehdi Karroubi, who derided the regime (a "small barge" not a "galleon") as illegitimate. We have the video and a summary.

President Ahmadinejad offered his own message, but the question is whether it has been overshadowed by events which do not point to 1389 as his happiest year. Consider....

As EA's Mr Verde predicted, the President got both a slap and a warning with the release of Hashemi Rafsanjani's relative and political ally Hossein Marashi from prison. Officially, the freedom is only temporary for Nowruz --- Marashi was jailed on Thursday after an appeals court upheld a one-year sentence for "propaganda against the regime". Beyond the official, the political significance will be whether Marashi goes back to prison; if not, it will be a dent in the authority of the Government.

Rooz Online echoes Mr Verde's assessment of an Ahmadinejad failure in his Thursday mission to Qom to get the support of senior clerics, claiming "the chief authorities refused his presence". (Rooz adds a name to those who did meet with Ahmadinejad: Ayatollah Makarem-Shirazi.)

In Tehran three lawmakers, prominent in economic discussions, criticised Ahmadinejad for his Friday suggestion of a referendum on his subsidy reform and spending plans, saying he is legally obliged to execute the economic reform plan approved by the Parliament. Gholam Reza Mesbahi Moqaddam, Ali Tavakkoli, and Elyas Naderan  said in ajoint statement, "The president does not have the right to disobey a law which has been approved by the Parliament."

Iran: Fire Festival 1, Khamenei 0 (Verde)

Mr Verde reflects on the triumph of Tuesday's Chahrshanbeh Suri celebrations over the Supreme Leader:

You get the feeling that some people (including a few journalists) who look into Iran from the outside seem to think they are watching a Hollywood movie: they are always looking for the next adrenaline rush of something “dramatic”. If no one is hurt or killed in the streets, then it is assumed that nothing of interest is happening in Iran. While the terrible footage of people being shot in the streets of Tehran or the sickening details of the torture and rape of detainees are important (very important) and relevant (very relevant), we have to understand that the struggle in Iran is not limited to being shot in the streets or raped in prisons. These sickening events are part of the regime’s mechanisms for trying to control and kill off the opposition (although it is obvious that it failed to do so), but they are surely not what we want to see happening in Iran on a daily basis.

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On one level this year’s Chaharshanbeh Suri was what it should really be: despite the annual attempt of authorities to crack down on the occasion, people celebrated an ancient tradition and enjoyed themselves.


On another level, this year’s Chaharshanbeh Suri was different from the previous years. It came nine months after June’s disputed elections, nine months of relentless oppression by the regime, nine months of indescribable brutality by the security forces.

It also came one month after the regime’s attempts to demonstrate its popularity on 22 Bahman (11 February) in Azadi Square. On that day the regime turned Tehran into a military camp and was forced to use tear gas against a 72-year-old cleric. But it seems that Ali Khamenei may have been fooled by the few close-angle shots that the official media provided from the half empty Azadi Square. Alternatively, he too was well aware of his regime’s inability to demonstrate real popular support on that day.

Whatever his reason --- pride or dejection or fear --- Khamenei gave a fatwa ruling Chaharshanbeh Suri outside religion and declaring that it made no sense. Even if, with his limited religious credentials, Khamenei has the right to issue religious fatwas, his views about Chaharshanbeh Suri say more about Khamenei than about the Fire Festival. Khamenei is in his 70s. He has lived in Iran all his life and has been exposed to Chaharshanbeh Suri for many years. If Khamenei cannot make sense of our culture, it is HIS problem not ours.

Ali Khamenei had no business sticking his nose into something that he himself admitted that he does not understand. And he got a bloody nose out of it. Just as in the case of his message of “condolence” for Montazeri’s death, Khamenei took on something that was much bigger than him and he was humiliated. Imagine telling people no barbeques or fireworks for the Fourth of July. Imagine ordering all bars and pubs to close for St Patrick’s Day. This is what Khamenei did with his fatwa about Chaharshanbeh Suri and he discredited himself further.

So why did he intervene so clumsily? Maybe the thinking was this:

The protests are over after 22 Bahman (obviously wrong). People are scared of the “power” of the regime (wrong --- if shooting people on the streets had not scared people, how could filling less than half of Azadi Square?). The authorities have warned people not to celebrate Chaharshanbeh Suri (people had ignored such threats before). There is going to be a heavy security presence everywhere (this has been the case for nine months).

So Khamenei and his advisors probably thought that people won’t celebrate Chaharshanbeh Suri and they tried to turn it into political capital. Khamenei would give the fatwa, no one would show up, and the conclusion would be that people accept whatever Khamenei says, even when it is the dismissal of of a millennia-old tradition.

Didn't turn out that way. The result is Chaharshanbeh Suri 1 (Khamenei own goal), Supreme Leader 0.

A non-Iranian friend asked me about Khamenei’s fatwa and why Iranians seemed to be upset about it. I replied:

“Why Chaharshanbeh Suri matters to me?"

Because it is part of my cultural heritage, as is has been part of the cultural heritage of my ancestors for a very long time.

I have no doubt that the way we celebrate Chaharshanbeh Suri today is different from its original form. I also have no doubt that denying Chaharshanbeh Suri as part of our culture is the folly of people who have either a limited understanding of being who we are, or of people who want to wipe the slate clean and make our lives all about them.

The onslaught we are witnessing on our culture is nothing to new. Our culture has withstood many a fierce attack in the past.

To borrow a phrase from a gentleman who himself is trying to deny this part of our culture, the efforts of the sect-like group is not even a “caricature” of the onslaughts that our culture has withstood in the past.

Iran Interview: Habibollah Peyman "Change Through Social Awareness"

Speaking to Rooz Online, Dr. Habibollah Peyman, leader of the banned party Jonbesh Mosalmanan Mobarez (Movement of Combatant Muslims), considers the future of the Green Movement in light of the events of 22 Bahman (11 February):

Rooz: Mr. Peyman, observers continue to analyze the events of February 11th.  In your opinion, what was the impact of what took place that day on the green movement and the government?

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Habibollah Peyman: On 11 February, after security and police forces filled the areas and rally location were filled with secure people, only two options remained: one was for some [Green Movement] forces to come forward and engage in clashes, which is essentially against its philosophy and strategy.  The second option was pretty much what actually took place. People who participated were not able to express their presence with green symbols.  Despite what is advertised however, February 11 was neither a defeat for the green movement nor a victory for the hardliners.


Rooz: So therefore nothing was accomplished?

Peyman: There were accomplishments! I actually wanted to say that events of February 11 had considerable accomplishments which must be examined as the green movement devises its future course. One important achievement was the understanding that a civil opposition movement should not remain limited to a few tactics. Many thought that the movement’s resilience and demands could be sustained through street protests alone. They have now realized that that tactic could be successfully blocked, and that they must find other tactics.  Secondly, the opposition movement’s growth had created the impression among many that it could accomplish its demands in the short term because the movement was backed by millions of people and it had opted to remain within the confines of the Constitution. Most people have now realized that the transition from a society grappling with various forms of dictatorship to a free, healthy and democratic body is a long-term and gradual transformation.

Rooz: How can this gradual transformation take place with tactics other than street protests?

Peyman: I have to clarify that what happened on 11 doesn’t negate street protests. This method should be used whenever permissible. But the Green Movement must undertake two fundamental tasks. One is to devise a strategy to reach out to social groups belonging to the lower social strata which are still disconnected from the movement, by addressing and promoting their social and economic concerns and demands. Members of this group which include laborers, teachers and farmers are the under-privileged and suffer the most from the government’s social and economic policies. The relationship between their problems and the government’s wrong economic policies must be brought to light for them.

Rooz: Let’s imagine that the Green Movement succeeds in this and takes this notion to these social strata too and even won their support, but how do you translate this discontent and protest into a movement?

Peyman:Our country is full of mediocre and poor foreign products. It has always been said that foreign sure is hoarded in the country, while the government has not done anything about it, and sugar produced by Khuzestan Sugar Company is wasted in silos. The Green Movement can invite the public not to buy or use sugar for a week, as a measure of solidarity to the workers of the sugar plant.

Our sugar producers are always loosing money while the market is full of imported sugar. The same is true for farmers that grow apples or oranges. The movement can call on the public not to buy foreign rice and not eat it. Such civil disobedience campaigns can be launched. This is what the green movement should do and through it the social groups and forces will strengthen their ties to it. Showing solidarity with deprived and hurting groups in society are not battles with the core of the regime, but civil battles with wrong policies of the government and at the same time exercises in civil disobedience and social solidarity.

Rooz: But importers too are part of the national economy and their loss will hurt the national economy as well.

Peyman: No. Importers are a very small minority of dealers who use government subsidies and because of the relations they have established go around paying their custom taxes and in fact inflict damage to all small domestic producers and sellers, and consequently to the whole national economy.

Rooz: You said there were two tasks. What is the other one?

Peyman: The other task, which is as important as the first, is to change the existing view of democratic change and transformation, and deemphasize the idea that democratization occurs only through regime change. A new type of hermeneutics must take shape which must take place in social awareness, among regular people and intellectuals. This type of thought is unfortunately alien in our society because of many years of suppression and despotism.

Rooz: But with the limitations that the green movement has, how does it plan to take these efforts to the people?

Peyman: By building social solidarity, the very thing that Mr. Mousavi has mentioned. What I can add is that this network should not be used just to organize street protests or the user of the Internet. Its most important role is to use it to engage in social debates on common social, cultural, etc issues based on democratic values and principles. This should be based on solidarity with the struggles and needs of people, both in the material and spiritual spheres. Through such debates and the establishment of such relations inside the groups, small groups with democratic, free and human relations will be established as models. This way, we shall prevent the repetition of failures of the constitutional movement, the nationalist movement and the 1979 revolution.

Rooz: But if the regime embarks on a widespread crackdown won’t that demoralize the public regarding its peaceful struggle, thus pushing some outside peaceful activism?

Peyman: If crackdowns were to demoralize the public, then nothing is going to take place. If this takes place, then only one way will be left, i.e. to meet violence with violence, and we know the results of such a course of action. So society must accept that this is a long-term battle. Europe too took hundreds of years to go through it and when it arrived at democratic life, the independent, reasonable and rationale man was born through the long process. The same must take place in our society, and this is the best opportunity for it. Forces of the green movement have this potential.

Rooz: In his talk this week, Mr. Mousavi again stressed the pursuit of demands within the confines of law and said that the demands can still be provided by the regime. Do you think the regime has this capacity?

Peyman: Yes, definitely. Any force that pursues its goals peacefully and gradually and is founded on social forces creates a negotiations bridge with those in power and authority. The communications between the two may be direct or indirect. IN all similar social movements, because of this type of relationship (peaceful and gradual), many inside the ruling establishment change their views and course of action in favor of people and even join the calls of the public. So the Green Movement too must keep the door of critical negotiations open. Furthermore, the ruling establishment attacks when it sees its existence or core in danger and is not willing to give any concessions. This is because of the fear that any concession may be interpreted as a weakness. But when the threats are not against its core or existence, it usually accepts to talk, remove some of the problems and even launch reforms.

Rooz: What examples do you have?

Peyman: The constitutional movement. When that movement took form and was organized, the king was prepared to talk and agreed to the Majlis. In those days too some of the ruling establishment changed positions and supported the calls for a national assembly, which all led to the decree agreeing to a constitutional monarchy. The same thing happened in the oil nationalization movement which resulted in the nationalization of oil and Mossadegh became the prime minister (in 1951). In Europe too, the same course was pursued.  As I said, long and gradual movements result in positive and solid results. It is only through this long process that ideas of freedom and democracy become institutionalized. What is important is a change in the type of relationships.

Rooz: How can the current regime come to this point?

Peyman: Protestors and dissidents can always find a common language to talk to the regime. National interest is an example. Both could believe and say that they are interested in preserving the national interest, the independence of the country, etc.

Once this common language is found, then issues can be discussed. Lets suppose we want to have a government that is strong and effective in the region, or internationally, talks could begin on this basis because both sides agree on it. Other common issues could be industrial development, economic growth, technical progress, etc.

Rooz: Are you concerned about a break in the organization of the movement among its leadership and damage to the movement?

Peyman: Yes, I am. There is now one trend that is moving towards a decentralized leadership that is spread out and diffused. But since our society has had a long history of centralized leadership, this new notion will need time to take form and be widely accepted and understood. This is why we are now in transition and have elements of both models. Every member of the movement must think for himself, while being a part of the movement and network. Still, I think today we still need a leader who has more experience and who is accepted by the public. This can exist in a relationship in which the leader consults and announces the results to the masses and civil activists. It is very important to have this now.


Rooz: Can you comment on the suggestions that the current leadership should move outside Iran or a new leadership should be formed there?

Peyman: I do not believe in either of these two. The leadership of any movement must remain within that society to have direct contact with realities in that society and its different strata. We are not following a secret society or movement like a guerrilla movement when leaders left the country because of threats and danger and led the movement from outside. This is a legal, massive and civil movement. Its leaders must definitely stay among the people. Those sincere individuals who have lived outside the country make suggestions which in most cases are not practical. Their ideas are not pursuable and have in fact created problems. This is what also happened on 11 February and some people made some recommendations which were absolutely wrong and had they been implemented, the movement would have suffered. So the leadership must be inside the country. Forces outside the country can and should provide ideas and participate in the exchange, but the final decisions must be taken inside the country by the current leadership and I do not believe there is any need leave the country. There is pressure, prison, arrest, release and those who are freed from prison return to activism. This is a civil movement, not a secret revolutionary one.

Iran Analysis: The Mousavi Strategy "We Are Still Standing"

My initial reaction, on reading the full text of Mir Hossein Mousavi's Saturday interview on the immediate past and immediate future of the Green Movement, was feeling let down. Mousavi had offered a lengthy dissection of the regime's "success" on 22 Bahman (11 February), mobilising the rally in Azadi Square and blocking any mass Green display. He had stated his determination, shared by others, to "express our emotions, aspirations, and concern as a nation".

Mousavi had declared, "The Green Movement has stood firm in its civil demands. The more people’s awareness of their rights increases, the bigger will be the force behind those demands."

Yes, I thought, but what would those demands be beyond the general assertion of freedom, justice, and rights? What endpoint for this people's force? In the end, was Mousavi's "Being green is a matter of behavior and morals" an evasion rather than a confrontation of the next phase of the post-election crisis?


Others shared this perception. Borzou Daragahi, one of the sharpest observers of the Iran situation, wrote over the weekend that not only Mousavi but Karroubi offered no measures for the way forward. Daragahi repeated this when he put forth Mohammad Khatami's Monday statement, "We should not retreat from our demands." Mahmood Delkhasteh writes in The Huffington Post of the "schizophrenic Green Movement".

But as Sunday gave way to Monday and then Tuesday, I looked back over the Mousavi statement and the Khatami declaration and, before them, Mehdi Karroubi's interviews with his website and with an Italian newspapers. I read them as I watched the regime scramble, perhaps coherently, perhaps not, between prisoner releases, suspension of newspapers, and propaganda.

And I realised I was very wrong.

My mistake, which I think is common, was to think in terms of a "grand strategy". Mousavi would lay out the Green Path not just as one of hope but as a well-marked political landscape on the future of the Supreme Leader, the institutions in the Islamic Republic, and indeed the Republic itself. He would offer a new set of tactics to replace the attempts at mobilisation on national holidays --- the opposition would not hijack the regime's occasions but come up with those which were solely Green. Mousavi's would liberate the detainees, free the press, silence the purveyors of untruths, remove Ahmadinejad and his cronies, and show Khameini that he was not above the Iranian system but one part of it.

My mistake was to forget that sometimes the way forward is just to ensure someone sees you are still standing.

On 1 January, Mousavi had put out a 5-point programme which is as close as he has come to a "grand strategy": Government accountability, free press, freed political prisoners, free assembly, new election laws. If the Government could not deliver this, it would be replaced. If the Supreme Leader could not assure this, his position would be questioned.

But conditions change, events intervene. 22 Bahman was a major disappointment for those in the opposition who thought it would mark the end --- maybe not on that day but soon, very soon --- of the regime. The Green movement had been present on that day but, with the confusion in tactics and facing the massed forces of the State, it had not been seen.

So Mousavi, while he referred to his 1 January in his interview, had more immediate tasks. He first took apart the idea of a "natural", overwhelming support for the regime, represented by the 22 Bahman turnout: these were "engineered rallies".

Where on the day, beyond Tehran, was the supposed effusive endorsement of the Government? Where, in the following three weeks, has that support been? Where, once the mobilisation for a few hours is over, is the "63%" that supposedly re-elected President Ahmadinejad last June?

Mousavi's harder job, however, was to assess his own camp, to find the rays of light amidst the "difficult conditions" and "damage" inflicted by the regime through detentions, violence, suppression, and abuse of laws? Re-presenting the tablets of his five points on 1 January would only bring the response: yes, and how exactly is this to occur?

So Mousavi's effort was not to elucidate the "civil demands", not at this moment, but to give the assurance that the the demands would continue to be made. Shut down the Green Movement's newspapers and journals, and we will work through social media. Berate us with propaganda, but we will persist in our "spread of awareness". Threaten us, jail us, bribe us with release for our silence, but we will not disappear.

And that is not just Mousavi's statement. It was Karroubi's last week, and Khatami's yesterday. Away from the headlines offered by those men, it is the message every hour of every day from those who continue to get word out that matters are not settled inside Iran.

So Mousavi and Karroubi made specific if not-so-limited demands to represent that persistence. You have crushed us? Then give us our freedom of assembly, since we are not that many. You have defeated us? Then give us a referendum on your supposedly respected institutions, let's say, the Guardian Council.

In his interview, Mousavi placed the key sentence, "If this crisis is not resolved, the legitimacy of the ruling establishment will plummet even faster."

At some point, having assured its survival, the opposition will need to make its resolutions over a strategy that goes beyond "We are still standing." But the lack of resolution at this moment and for the foreseeable future, is not "victory" for the regime. To the contrary, it is testimony that legitimacy has not been secured.

Just because the end of the path is not seen, does not mean that it has been obliterated....