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Entries in Lebanon (4)

Tuesday
Mar242009

UPDATE: The Killing of Kamal Medhat in Lebanon

Latest Post: The Assassination of Kamal Medhat in Lebanon
Related Post: Senior Fatah Official Assassinated in Lebanon

medhat-bombingThere is no new information on yesterday's assassination of Kamal Medhat (Kamal Naji), the Palestinian Liberation Organization's deputy representative in Lebanon, and three others in a bombing outside the Mieh Mieh camp near Sidon.

As we predicted, however, this is not stopping speculation and political point-scoring. For example, Hilal Khashaan, a professor at American University of Beirut, throws out the assertion, "All indicators seem to point in the direction of Iranian agents in Lebanon."

Much more substantial and more serious is the fear that Medhat's assassination may signal an escalation in intra-Palestinian fighting in Lebanon. Nabil Boumonsef of an-Nahar newspaper said yesterday, "I fear that this might be a sign of an expansion of Palestinian-Palestinian conflicts in Lebanon."

Sources are talking of Mehdat's attempt to mediate disputes within Fatah, a claim reinforced by Hamas spokesman Osama Hamdan's praise of Mehdat for "a very great role" in easing tensions. (It should also be noted that Hamdan put out his own allegation that Israel was behind the assassination.)
Monday
Mar232009

UPDATED: Senior Fatah Official Assassinated in Lebanon

Latest Post: The Assassination of Kamal Medhat in Lebanon
Latest Post: Update - The Killing of Kamal Medhat in Lebanon

medhatKamal Medhat (Kamal Naji), the deputy representative of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Lebanon and Fatah's former intelligence chief, Akram Daher, the head of the PLO's youth organisation in Lebanon, and two bodyguards have been killed in a bombing. The attack occurred outside Mieh Mieh refugee camp, near Sidon in southern Lebanon.

Abbas Zaki, the PLO chief in Lebanon, was visiting the camp at the time of the attack but was uninjured. Zaki and Mehdat were offering condolences to the families of two men killed in a family feud in the camp on Saturday.

The bomb, made up of more than 20 kilograms (44 pounds) of TNT, was detonated by remote control.

There are any number of possible suspects in the killing; on Saturday. Watch out for attempts to make political capital out of the assassination by pinning it on various groups --- Israel, Syria, Hamas, Iran, Hezbollah all jump to mind --- irrespective of evidence (or a lack of it).

The official in charge of security at the camp speculated that "a third party...got involved to create inter-Palestinian sedition and chaos," but a Fatah official in Lebanon, Edward Kattoura, said, "According to the style of the operation it seems that Israel is behind this, because it is a very highly professional execution."

Hamas official Osama Hamdan struck a conciliatory note, saying Naji had played a role in easing tensions among the Palestinian factions in the country, and cautioned, "It is not possible to speculate on who committed this crime."
Thursday
Mar122009

The US, Israel, and Charles Freeman: "A Chilling Effect" on Foreign Policy

freeman2One of the sharpest, strongest reactions to the withdrawal of the nomination of Charles Freeman (pictured) as head of the US National Intelligence Council has come from Stephen Walt in his blog on the Foreign Policy website. I generally share his views, but a reader offers further useful critique: "All good points, but a bit polemical. You know how this game works: I don't think Walt does Freeman any favours by framing the appointment as a victory over Zionists or as a balance to [the appointment of the State Department's Dennis] Ross. It would have been better to explain why Freeman was a worthy choice in the first place with his other experience and ability."

On Chas Freeman's withdrawal
STEPHEN WALT

First, for all of you out there who may have questioned whether there was a powerful "Israel lobby," or who admitted that it existed but didn't think it had much influence, or who thought that the real problem was some supposedly all-powerful "Saudi lobby," think again.

Second, this incident does not speak well for Barack Obama's principles, or even his political instincts. It is one thing to pander to various special interest groups while you're running for office -- everyone expects that sort of thing -- but it's another thing to let a group of bullies push you around in the first fifty days of your administration. But as Ben Smith noted in Politico, it's entirely consistent with most of Obama's behavior on this issue.

The decision to toss Freeman over the side tells the lobby (and others) that it doesn't have to worry about Barack getting tough with [past and future Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, or even that he’s willing to fight hard for his own people. Although AIPAC [American-Israeli Political Action Committee] has issued a pro forma denial that it had anything to do with it, well-placed friends in Washington have told me that it leaned hard on some key senators behind-the-scenes and is now bragging that Obama is a "pushover." Bottom line: Caving on Freeman was a blunder that could come back to haunt any subsequent effort to address the deteriorating situation in the region.

Third, and related to my second point, this incident reinforces my suspicion that the Democratic Party is in fact a party of wimps. I'm not talking about Congress, which has been in thrall to the lobby for decades, but about the new team in the Executive Branch. Don't they understand that you have to start your term in office by making it clear that people will pay a price if they cross you? Barack Obama won an historic election and has a clear mandate for change -- and that includes rethinking our failed Middle East policy -- and yet he wouldn't defend an appointment that didn't even require Senate confirmation. Why? See point No.1 above.

Of course, it's possible that I'm wrong here, and that Obama's team was actually being clever. Freeman's critics had to expend a lot of ammunition to kill a single appointment to what is ultimately not a direct policy-making position, and they undoubtedly ticked off a lot of people by doing so. When the real policy fights begin -- over the actual content of the NIEs [National Intelligence Estimates], over attacking Iran, and over the peace process itself -- they aren't likely to get much sympathy from [Director of National Intelligence Dennis] Blair and it is least conceivable that Obama will turn to them and say, "look, I gave you one early on, but now I'm going to do what's right for America." I don't really believe that will happen, but I'll be delighted if Obama proves me wrong.

Fourth, the worst aspect of the Freeman affair is the likelihood of a chilling effect on discourse in Washington, at precisely the time when we badly need a more open and wide-ranging discussion of our Middle East policy. As I noted earlier, this was one of the main reasons why the lobby went after Freeman so vehemently; in an era where more and more people are questioning Israel's behavior and questioning the merits of unconditional U.S. support, its hardline defenders felt they simply had to reinforce the de facto ban on honest discourse inside the Beltway. After forty-plus years of occupation, two wars in Lebanon, and the latest pummeling of Gaza, (not to mention [Israeli Prime Minister] Ehud Olmert's own comparison of Israel with South Africa), defenders of the "special relationship" can't win on facts and logic anymore. So they have to rely on raw political muscle and the silencing or marginalization of those with whom they disagree. In the short term, Freeman's fate is intended to send the message that if you want to move up in Washington, you had better make damn sure that nobody even suspects you might be an independent thinker on these issues.

This outcome is bad for everyone, including Israel. It means that policy debates in the United States will continue to be narrower than in other countries (including Israel itself), public discourse will be equally biased, and a lot of self-censorship will go on. America's Middle East policy will remain stuck in the same familiar rut, and even a well-intentioned individual like George Mitchell won't be able to bring the full weight of our influence to bear. At a time when Israel badly needs honest advice, nobody in Washington is going to offer it, lest they face the wrath of the same foolish ideologues who targeted Freeman. The likely result is further erosion in America's position in the Middle East, and more troubles for Israel as well.

Yet to those who defended Freeman’s appointment and challenged the lobby's smear campaign, I offer a fifth observation: do not lose heart. The silver lining in this sorry episode is that it was abundantly clear to everyone what was going on and who was behind it. In the past, the lobby was able to derail appointments quietly -- even pre-emptively -- but this fight took place in broad daylight. And Steve Rosen [of AIPAC], one of Freeman's chief tormentors, once admitted: "a lobby is like a night flower. It thrives in the dark and dies in the sun." Slowly, the light is dawning and the lobby's negative influence is becoming more and more apparent, even if relatively few people have the guts to say so out loud.  But history will not be kind to the likes of [Senator] Charles Schumer, Jonathan Chait [of the New Republic], Steve Rosen et al, whose hidebound views are unintentionally undermining both U.S. and Israeli security.

Last but not least, I cannot help but be struck by how little confidence Freeman's critics seem to have in Israel itself. Apparently they believe that a country that recently celebrated its 60th birthday, whose per capita income ranks 29th in the world, that has several hundred nuclear weapons, and a military that is able to inflict more than 1,300 deaths on helpless Palestinians in a couple of weeks without much effort will nonetheless be at risk if someone who has criticized some Israeli policies (while defending its existence) were to chair the National Intelligence Council. The sad truth is that these individuals are deathly afraid of honest discourse here in the United States because deep down, they believe Israel cannot survive if it isn't umbilically attached to the United States. The irony is that people like me have more confidence in Israel than they do: I think Israel can survive and prosper if it has a normal relationship with the United States instead of "special" one. Indeed, I think a more normal relationship would be better for both countries. It appears they aren't so sure, and that is why they went after Charles Freeman.
Sunday
Mar082009

New US, New Middle East? The Syria Initiative

feltmanThe major follow-up to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Middle Eastern trip has come not in Israel and Palestine, where there is too much uncertainty for any American move, but in Damascus. On Saturday two US envoys, Jeffrey Feltman of the State Department and Daniel Shapiro of the National Security Council, sat down with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem. They were accompanied by the senior American official in Damascus and two other Syrian advisors for 3 1/2 hours before Feltman and al-Moallem had a private discussion.

The meeting on its own is significant, as the US has no Ambassador in Syria. Expectations are even higher, however, because Damascus could be the lynchpin for an Obama strategy. The core success of Israeli-Syrian talks would be complemented by Syria's distancing from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, giving the US greater room for manoeuvre on the Israel-Palestine negotiations and an advantage over Tehran in Washington's conception of the new battle for the Middle East.

After the meeting, Feltman was kind in tone toward Syria, “The Syrians have concerns with us as well. I’m sure the Syrians will be looking at choices we will be making in the future just as we will be looking at choices Syria is making,”. However, he was non-committal on specifics beyond the platitude, “We found a lot of common ground today."

The Syrians also gave nothing away. In particular, there is no sign that Damascus, in return for economic aid and an American "balance" on direct discussions with Tel Aviv over issues such as the Golan Heights, offered up the concessions that Washington wants on the bad guys in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Tehran. So the most that can be said is that yesterday's event, while of symbolic importance, is only the opener in a long process.

There has been surprisingly low-key coverage of the meeting in the US press. CNN has a report, but The New York Times recycles a downbeat Associated Press story, "Amid Low Expectations, American Officials Hold Talks in Syria", and The Washington Post overlooks the event altogether.

Syrian specialist Josh Landis offers excellent coverage on his blog, featuring Rami Khouri's upbeat (overly upbeat, in my opinion) assessment of a fundamental shift in US policy:
What we have going on, I suspect, is that the two leading proponents of Western arrogance in the form of colonialism and neocolonialism - the United States and the United Kingdom - have recognized that their approach has failed, and that they are better off having normal diplomatic talks and negotiations with the three leading centers of resistance to them, namely Iran, Syria and Hizbullah.