The Latest from Iran (10 June): Mousavi-Karroubi Withdraw Request to March

1950 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Iran Focus reports that activist Mehdi Farahi Shandiz was detained on Wednesday.

1900 GMT: Tonight's Rooftop "Allahu Akbar" (God is Great) and "Marg Bar Dictator" (Death to the Dictator) Chants:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AqqqbdY0Yso[/youtube]

NEW Iran Urgent: Mousavi-Karroubi Statement on 22 Khordaad Protest (10 June)
NEW Iran Interview: Ahmad Batebi “People’s Movement Will Stay Alive with Knowledge and Information”
NEW Iran Document: Karroubi “In the End, the Wiser Ones Will Take Over Iran” (9 June)
Latest Iran Video: Obama Statement on Sanctions…and Rights (9 June)
Iran Analysis: What’s Most Important Today? (Hint: Not Sanctions)
Iran Analysis: 4 June “The Day the Regime Will Regret” (Verde)
The Latest from Iran (9 June): Paying Attention

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zj3IAX369J0&feature=youtu.be[/youtube]

1450 GMT: We have posted the English text of the Mousavi-Karroubi statement.

Dissected News evaluates:

"One way to look at this move by Moussavi and Karroubi is that they did the only thing they could. Neither leader can risk being arrested and having no legitimate and legal means to pursue reform. As was alluded to in the official statement, if large numbers of protesters show up for a rally that has been called off, it will appear as though the Green Movement is larger than its public leadership (this is true, anyway). If few numbers show up, then the Green Movement will still be able to say that the absence of large numbers was due to the backing off of the leaders of the movement."

1355 GMT: 22 Khordaad. Agence France Presse have picked up on the Mousavi-Karroubi statement, "Iran opposition leaders call off demos for vote anniversary".

1340 GMT: It's Official: Green Movement Bigger Threat than Saddam. The head of the Revolutionary Guard, General Mohammad Ali Jafari has pronounced, "Although last year's sedition did not last more than around eight months, it was much more dangerous than the imposed war which Saddam began against us through the support of the international community."

Jafari continued, "Because of the grace of God and the prophet-like guidance of the supreme leader and people's vigilance, we put this bitter incident behind us and the enemies found out the revolution cannot be diverted through these methods."

1230 GMT: New Mousavi-Karroubi Statement. As we still await the final word from the Ministry of Interior on requests for permits to march on 12 June, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi have issued another statement, via both Karrroubi's Saham News and Mousavi's Kalemeh. In view of the threat to people's safety, they are withdrawing their request to march; however, they note the turnout on 25 Khordaad (15 June) last year, which was also in an "undeclared" protest. They continue, "In the great nation of Iran, it is not possible to block people on the way they have chosen and their creative role in making this path will appear....It is simplistic to think you can suppress the opposition with lies, threats, and humiliation."

1000 GMT: 22 Khordaad MediaFail. Reuters puts in an early candidate for worst pre-12 June "analysis": "Iran's Reformers Discouraged a Year after Vote".

On the basis of interviews with four --- count 'em, four --- Iranians, the comment of a political scientist, and an absence of any consideration of the latest developments in the political situation, the article assures us, "A year after Iran's disputed presidential vote, hardliners are firmly back in charge of a country where economic challenges and the nuclear dispute with the West now loom larger than a once-vibrant reform movement."

0843 GMT: Labour Front. Peyke Iran claims Saeed Torabian, the spokesman for Tehran bus workers, has been assaulted at home and taken away by security forces.

0839 GMT: Blood Money Will Make It All Go Away. Fereshteh Ghazi, speaking with the families of those killed in the post-election crisis reports: "Rather than conducting investigations to identify those who ordered and carried out the murder of protesters, the Iranian government has been pressuring the families of murdered protesters to forego holding memorials for their loved ones. One family member was told that “because the murderer was not identified, the case has been sent to the implementation division for payment of blood money from the public budget.”

0835 GMT: The Detained Journalists. More information on the status of imprisoned reporters and editors: a new list from the Committee to Protect Journalists has 37 currently imprisoned, but Reporters and Human Rights Activists of Iran counts 47 in jail, e.g.. Sousan Mohammadkhani Ghiasvand from Kurdistan, who does not appear on the CPJ list.

0830 GMT: A Solution. Rah-e-Sabz posts a long analysis from the Council of National-Religious Activists and its suggestion of five ways out of the crisis: 1) a free and protected rally on 22 Khordaad/12 June; 2) release of political prisoners and an end to executions; 3) restoring the political freedoms laid down in Constitution to the Iranian people, especially freedom of assembly, speech, and media; 4) an end to restrictions on political parties, non-governmental organisations and human rights organisations; 5) correction of election laws and free elections under impartial supervision.

0820 GMT: Larijani v. Ahmadinejad. Despite the attempts by the Supreme Leader to referee the Parliament's dispute with the President, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani presses on. At a lecture, Larijani warned, "If legislative and judiciary branches become subordinated to executive branch, it might accelerate the process of following [the President's] plans. But it would lead to dictatorship." Larijani continued, playing up to Ayatollah Khamenei and putting down Ahmadinejad:

Centralization of the Supreme leader's power won't lead to corruption since the leader should possess special qualifications which are not taken into account when the parliament speaker and the president are elected. Therefore the executive branch must adhere to the laws defining its authority. The government is not allowed to interfere with the duties of the legislative branch and disagree what passed by the Majlis.

Khabar Online also features the statement of Larijani ally, MP Ahmad Tavakoli: "Although in observing the bills, the Majlis may not be flawless, the government is not authorized to disobey the laws ratified by the legislative branch. Even if the statesmen believe that a law can not be executed, they should formally request the Majlis to revoke that and help the lawmakers to ratify the bills with the least amount of mistakes."

0815 GMT: 4 June Follow-Up "The Shadow Man". Earlier this week, Mohammad Ali Ansari, the coordinator of the commemoration for Ayatollah Khomeini last Friday, wrote Seyed Hassan Khomeini about the disruption of the event with the heckling of Hassan Khomeini's speech. Ansari mentioned, amidst discussion of possible organisation of the sabotage, a "Commander Vahid".

Rooz Online does some investigating to find out who Commander Vahid is and how he might be connected to the Supreme Leader.

0733 GMT: 22 Khordaad. The number of cities around the world holding rallies on 12 June is now 79.

0723 GMT: Rafsanjani Trashes the Election (and Criticises the Supreme Leader)? Yesterday we passed on reports that the office of Hashemi Rafsanjani had put out a tough letter denouncing President Ahmadinejad's behaviour over the election and challenging Ayatollah Khamenei for remaining silent on the issue.

We've had a look at the letter on Rafsanjani's website and, despite the former President's normal caution, it seems quite challenging. Could it be that Rafsanjani, just before 22 Khordaad (12 June), is going to make a public stand against the President --- and ask the Supreme Leader to make a stand as well?

0720 GMT: Hanging Judges. Omid Memarian profiles "hardline" judges --- Abolghasem Salavati, Mohammad Moghiseh, and Pir-Abbasi --- of the Revolutionary Court.

0710 GMT: Winning With Information. We have posted an interview with activist Ahmad Batebi, "The People's Movement Will Stay Alive with Knowledge and Information".

0625 GMT: Larijani Strikes A Nuclear Pose. He may be at odds with President Ahmadinejad on political issues, but Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani is making sure he's alongside the Government in defiance of the latest UN sanctions on Iran's nuclear programme.

Larijani said at a press conference, "We are regretful that the US is playing a naive game in New York these days," adding that this game was being led by the "Zionist lobby".
0615 GMT: No More Nedas? Rumour of the day comes from The New York Times, citing a pro-Government website:

A factory in Iran has been closed down after trying to mass produce statuettes of people who were killed in the protests that followed last year’s disputed presidential election, among them, Neda Agha-Soltan....

The pro-government Aty News Web site, reported on Wednesday that the factory, located in the eastern province of Semnan, was shuttered after just one month, though officials denied the closure.

The Web site....also states that the factory’s 40 female employees were discovered working without hejabs...and that they were mixing freely with the male members of the staff.

0545 GMT: 22 Khordaad. Yet another invitation to show up on 12 June comes from the students of Azad University of Tehran.

0530 GMT: First, a reminder of Iran just over 48 hours before the anniversary of the elections --- last night's rooftop Allahu Akhbars (God is Great):

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B073FkNZdDQ&playnext_from=TL&videos=4udYKWS5xNc[/youtube]

We have also posted yet another interview by Mehdi Karroubi in the run-up to 12 June. He reviews the development of Iran from the Revolution to today and, despite much pessimism, asserts, "In The End, The Wiser Ones Will Take Over Iran".

Of course, the headline story in non-Iranian media is yesterday's UN Security Council resolution for a new set of sanctions on Tehran. Even that, however, could not completely escape the internal situation in Iran: we have posted the video of President Obama's comments, with his reference to the "repression" of the Iranian people, and a snap analysis in yesterday's updates.

Dave Siavashi of Iran News Now evaluates the developments and puts out this warning: "The sanctions lend an air of legitimacy to the regime’s claim that nefarious outside forces, or Doshman (the all encompassing enemy), as [Ayatollah] Khamenei likes to refer to them, have it in for Iran; thereby giving the hardcore Islamist radicals of the regime a pretext and excuse for continued harsh repression of the opposition."

Iran Analysis: 4 June "The Day the Regime Will Regret" (Verde)

Mr Verde writes for EA:

When the history of this post-election conflict is written, the events of Friday, 4 June 2010, may be as significant as last year’s Qods Day and Ashura. They may be even more important.

The regime is trying to pretend that there is no crisis of confidence/legitimacy and that the post-election protests are over. But last Friday, at what was supposed to be the commemoration of Ayatollah Khomeini's death, President Ahmadinejad was still talking about last year’s elections and the Supreme Leader was still threatening former (and possibly even current) regime officials –-- this time with execution. Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the Ayatollah, was shouted down during his speech.

Events like the 4 June commemorations are planned well in advance, tightly controlled, and well-choreographed. We can therefore dismiss with great confidence any suggestion that the hecklers were ordinary people acting in the moment. They were thugs organized by regime officials.

Whatever the true intentions of the organizers,these events have and will continue to damage Ayatollah Khamenei. The reason?

There are two possibilities: either the thugs were organized on the order of Khamenei, or the heckling was carried out without his permission.

If Khamenei was kept out of the loop, then he is losing his grip on the Islamic Republic. When a group of regime thugs can barrack Hassan Khomeini with impunity right in front of the Supreme Leader and the world media, when Khamenei cannot even control his audience for a few minutes during an important ceremony. how can one expect him to have control over the actions of other regime officials? (Which, looking backward, raises the question: how can the Supreme Leader claim so confidently that there was no fraud during the June 2009 elections?)

If the thugs were carrying out Khamenei’s orders, then the Islamic Republic is gripped by such a dangerous crisis that its highest official is forced to sacrifice the reputation of his regime in an attempt to embarrass and humiliate another regime insider. If this is the case, then Khamenei’s warm embrace of Hassan Khomeini after the latter’s abandoned speech also points to the nasty, duplicitous personality of the Supreme Leader.

In either case, the events of 4 June have provided a rallying point for Khamenei’s detractors within the regime –-- whose numbers, by the way, seem to be growing by the week. It not only Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, but alsoother reformists and even principlists like Ali Motahari have used these events as an excuse to criticise Khamenei personally.

If the intention of the regime's show on 4 June was to weaken the opponents of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the scheme appears to have backfired.

One may argue that the Supreme Leader is trying to wipe out any reference to Ayatollah Khomeini and replace Khomeini’s legacy with his own. The problem is that, since last June, Khamenei’s reputation as a religious and political leader has been damaged. He has not been able to make repairs and all high-profile regime manoeuvres, including last Friday, have brought more damage.

Let’s not forget that the June ceremonies were cut back from 3 days to 1 day this year; despite all the preparations the numbers attending were far less than what he regime had claimed and hoped for; 15 Khordaad (5 June), the day which marks the beginning of the uprising in the 1960s that eventually led to the 1979 Revolution, was completely forgotten this year.

Ayatollah Khomeini is the main pillar of the Islamic Republic. The regime owes its existence to him, and all of its officials claim his approval for their ideas and actions. doing. His burial site, where the 4 June ceremonies were taking place, is similar to the shrines of Shia Imams. The failure of regime officials to capitalise on this --– and by their actions disrespecting his memory –-- points to serious problems within the Islamic Republic.

In February, I mentioned that, because of the crisis in the Islamic Republic, the regime will be forced into display that will come back and haunt them. Add the events of 4 June to that growing list.

Iran Election Anniversary Special: The Power of the "Gradual"

This morning, I drafted this contribution to a new project for the anniversary of Iran's election. (More details soon, I hope.) I decided to post this after reading a series of high-profile analysis in Foreign Policy magazine which try to define Iran One Year Later for us. Ironically, given that the title of the collection is "Misreading Tehran", I found some of the pieces misleading, misguided, and even at times --- although I know this was not the intention of the authors --- belittling in their representation of Iranians.



So, in part, this is my response to those unhelpful definitions. But, in larger part, it is a Thank You to those who have been my instructors during this past year.

On 12 June 2009, I was enjoying a night out in London. My wife, who patiently puts up with the daily demands of my website on international affairs, had asked if I could risk trading an evening with Iran's Presidential election for dinner and the theatre. I assured her that it was clear that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his leading challenger Mir Hossein Mousavi would move to a second round of voting.


At 7:30 the next morning, the BBC rang to ask for an urgent comment: Ahmadinejad had won in the initial ballot with 63% of the vote. After I gave them a remark based more on surprise than insight, I realised two things: 1) I would be covering this story every day until there was a resolution; 2) to do so, I would have to become a student, seeking a variety of teachers to give me a crash course on the dynamics of Iranian politics, economics, religion, and society.

It is a year later. There is no resolution, and I am still learning.

I had had the good fortune, in the years before the 2009 election, to be introduced to Iran. I had worked with Iranian colleagues and students, and eventually --- despite my US passport --- had been able to visit the country to teach, participate in seminars, and give interviews to the Iranian media. I had even become an Adjunct Professor at a leading Iranian university.

Those opportunities had given me a glimpse of an Iran which was one of the most political environments I had ever encountered. There was constant discussion --- even as there were limits on that discussion --- of what the country was and what it might become. There was consideration, beyond the simplicities of the US v. Iran, of Tehran's role in the region and in the world, there were concerns about an economy facing both internal challenges and external restrictions, and there were glimpses of debates on social and cultural issues. Inevitably, given that I was working with students, there was much attention to the “Third Generation” that had grown up after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. I was told often --- by both critics and defenders of the Government --- that 30 years after the 1979 introduction of an Islamic Republic, this was a “Gradual Revolution”.

In the weeks before and after the 2009 election, however, change did not seem “gradual”. Even watching from a distance, I was swept up in the excitement that surrounded a campaign which, with its televised debates as well as its well-attended speeches, appeared to offer a louder political voice to Iran's people. That fervour continued after the election when President Ahmadinejad's victory speech, with its description of opponents as “dust and tumbleweeds”, was met by millions on the streets of Tehran. It crackled when the Supreme Leader's Friday Prayer vindicating the vote encountered more demonstrations of anger, tragedy, and hope. It would be resurgent when there were more public encounters: in mid-July after former President Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday Prayer, on Qods Day in September, from 13 Aban (4 November) to 16 Azar (7 December) to the funeral of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri to the commemoration of Ashura on 27 December.

These were dramatic, still vivid events, yet I wonder if they misled us into forgetting about the “gradual”. Narratives were written as if a knockout blow would be landed either by the Green Movement or by the defenders of President Ahmadinejad. Predictions were uttered about the imminent fall or unshakeable permanence of the Islamic Republic. Each public occasion, while important, was given the aura of the defining incident that would finally conclude the inconclusive outcome of 12 June 2009.

Prize fights are settled within 15 rounds of 3 minutes each; the quest for civil rights is not. The election, after all, was just the public apex of a larger, ongoing climb for political, economic, and social recognition, respect, and justice. The Green Movement, as significant as it would become, did not displace the movements for women's rights, student rights, labour rights, legal rights, economic rights, religious rights, and the rights of Iran's many ethnic groups. (Indeed, one of the ongoing, “deeper” issues of this past year has been how the Green Movement --- if it is more than a symbolic entity --- interacts with the activism of these other movements.)

This post-election contest, which rested upon years of discussion and challenge within the Islamic Republic, was always destined to be a marathon and not a sprint.

But marathons are hard to cover. And, in the immediate aftermath of 12 June, that coverage --- at least by “mainstream” media --- would be complicated as Iranian authorities cracked down on domestic and foreign correspondents. The “mainstream” non-Iranian press was effectively blinded within weeks as reporters were expelled or fled because of intimidation and threats of detention, camera crews were restricted to offices and hotel rooms, and bureaus were shut. Iranian journalists persisted, but many of them --- eventually more than 100 --- would wind up in jail. By September, even the most prominent reformist newspapers and websites were being shut down, their offices raided and ransacked, their editors behind bars.

Unsurprisingly, some non-Iranian outlets --- deprived of their “normal” capacity for effective reporting --- would thus look for the big event rather than the gradual shifts. There would be weeks of silence or muted coverage of internal events, often as headlines were devoted to Iran's nuclear programme, and then a sudden burst of attention to a gathering such as the Ashura demonstration or the rallies on 11 February, the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. Then, when that high-profile event did not produce a clean, final “victory”, the mainstream media might retreat into somnolence, sometimes after a benediction that the Green Movement had been vanquished.

Well, here's the paradox: amidst and even beyond these big events, the “gradual” has triumphed in media as well as politics.

Ultimately, it is not the speed of technology that --- despite the repression of the Iranian Government and despite the retreat of the “mainstream” media --- has ensured that Iran's post-election story is still ongoing in June 2010. Rather, it is the “gradual” efforts of those who, each day, often at risk to themselves, have persisted in telling their tales or passing on the information from others.

They are not the international correspondents with news programmes named after them, they are not the anchormen and anchorwomen with weekly talk shows to define the news, they do not even have by-lines. Sometimes their names are not even their own but are the pseudonyms and usernames that have to be adopted to ensure that they can report again.

However, it is they who remove our blindness by giving us a glimpse of the day-to-day. It is they who break up the deafening noise of State propaganda and pronouncements with sounds of what has occurred in their neighbourhoods. It is they who give form to the meaning --- not in the abstract, but in the real --- of “rights” and “justice”.

Ironically and somewhat sadly, I write this --- four days before the anniversary of the election --- as yet another set of articles by analysts tries to define all that we have experienced. One headline blares, “The Green Movement was a historic success. Too bad no one was watching.” (No. We are still watching, still writing, still learning.) A commentator proclaims, "Getting the real story out of Iran today is virtually impossible." (Difficult, yes. Impossible, no --- thanks to those whom the commentator, focused on mainstream media, never notices.) A journalist declares, “There was no Twitter Revolution inside Iran.” (No, but that was never the issue. Twitter is a tool, a powerful tool that allows us to ensure that the “gradual” does not disappear --- we are still reporting, still writing, still learning --- as those in power try to shut down information into and out of Iran.)

[An important caveat: the collection also includes a redemptive piece by Nazila Fathi which avoids the dismissive generalisations and assesses, "Despite those all the obstacles put in its way, the media has done a remarkable job in properly identifying the enormity of the past year's events. The Green Movement has, indeed, shaken the very core of the Islamic Republic. The country is polarized and the regime's legitimacy has been compromised. All of this, the Western media -- at least, those of us who had any real experience covering Iran -- got largely right."

My one suggestion is that Fathi's "media" be considered as not only "Western media" but many Iranian journalists and Iranians who report even if they do not carry official press credentials.]

But, as I write this, irony rebounds and sadness turns back to hope. For I read these edicts from those analysts and journalists who try to define, once and for all, what has happened. Then I read the contributions in this book, contributions which come not from anointed experts or the by-lined professionals, and I realise that the story of “what has happened” is in these essays.

And it is not just “what has happened” but “what may happen”. There are no proclamations of the final outcome in these pages, no ringing of the bell to say that all is complete. Instead, the victory is in the process, the pursuit of the “gradual”. As long as the search for rights is persistent in these words of sorrow or hope, then rights cannot be denied. As long as the vision of fairness is offered in these reflections, then others have not succeeding in making us --- inside or outside Iran --- blind.

The power of the vote may have been taken away on 12 June 2009. Some may try to pronounce that Iranians --- repressed by their Government, bedazzled by false hopes of Twitter --- are reduced to the powerless. But As long as the power to express is put in the simple but effective phrases by these authors, then the power of expression remains.

A marathon, not a sprint.

The Latest from Iran (6 June): The Fallout from Friday

2150 GMT: More on That Rumour. We've checked with correspondents, who assess that the claim that Seyed Hassan Khomeini hit Minister of Interior, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, should be treated as "flimsy". They can find no corroborating evidence for the story from Javan.

(We should have noted in the post below that Javan is connected to the Revolutionary Guard, and it could be in its interest to portray the opposition --- and Hassan Khomeini --- as violent and irrational. My apologies for the omission, and my thanks to readers for pointing this out.)

1955 GMT: And Now The Rumour of the Day. Javan reports that the Interior Minister, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, is currently in hospital after being hit by Seyed Hassan Khomeini, the  grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, during Friday's ceremony.

According to "multiple sources", Hassan was upset that in a TV interview last week, Najjar referred to him as "Seyed Hassan Mostafavi" --- a "secondary" surname of the Khomeini clan --- to minimise his ties with his grandfather. (Javan also refers to Hassan as "Hassan Mostafavi".)

Najjar already had stitches on his face when he arrived at the Khomeini shrine on Friday, due to surgery for sinusitis. His face was bloody again after being hit by Hassan.

NEW Iran Document: Mehdi Karroubi on Khomeini, the Rule of Law, and Protest in 2010 (4 June)
NEW Iran Document: The Supreme Leader’s Speech (4 June)
Iran Special: The Regime Disappoints, So It’s Over to the Opposition
Iran Document: Detained Filmmaker Nourizad Writes the Supreme Leader
The Latest from Iran (5 June): Is That All There Is?

1625 GMT: Friday Fall-Out. Mehdi Karroubi has written Seyed Hassan Khomeini, “You know very well that the account of these few trained and organized individuals [who shouted down Khomeini during his Friday speech] is separate from the account of the massive number of the devotees of Imam [Khomeini], his children and relatives, and especially you.”


1545 GMT: Reports are coming in that high-profile member of Parliament Ali Motahari has been summoned by his "principlist" party for his criticism of President Ahmadinejad over Friday's events.

1540 GMT: More Fall-Out. Ayatollah Sane'i has phoned Seyed Hassan Khomeini to express his regret over Friday's incident, directing his criticism at authorities: "If they were not politically insane, they would have not prevented the freedom of speech and people’s right to hear the speech in front of hundreds of national and international reporters and while this event was broadcast live. This act is a sign of their weakness and is the sign that the will and desire of God is that their plans would be ruined.”

Sane'i added: “Those how plan these incidents be it those who order it or who execute it or who provoke it are incapable of solving country’s social, economic, political and foreign problems and therefore commit such acts to divert the public mind".

1305 GMT: Friday Fall-Out. Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili has added his voice to the chorus condemning the sabotage of Seyed Hassan Khomeini's speech at the commemoration ceremony for the death of his grandfather.

1300 GMT: Karroubi Watch. The US magazine Newsweek has published the text of an interview by e-mail with Mehdi Karroubi, which follows the line of the discussion with Masih Alinejad that we posted on EA on 27 May: "My family and myself, we are all ready to pay any price for our struggle for the people of Iran."

1243 GMT: The Executed. The families of Farzad Kamangar,Farhad Vakili, and Ali Heydarian,,three of five Iranians executed on 9 May, have met with the Governor of Kurdestan Province to ask for help in getting the return of their bodies.

The Governor told the families that their children were buried at a place that cannot be disclosed for "security reasons".

1239 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. Labor activist Alireza Akhavan has been arrested by security forces. Farhad Fathi, the director of the Reformist Organization of Qazvin's International University, has also been detained.

Human Rights Activists News Agency claims Reza Malek, former deputy of Research and Investigation in the Intelligence Ministry, has been severely beaten by prison guards.

1228 GMT: Economy Watch. Iran is 94th out of 104 countries on the 2009 Legatum Prosperity Index, between Cambodia and Kenya.

1224 GMT: We Don't Need No Women's Studies. Hossein Naderi-Manesh, the Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education, has allegedly said that it is "no problem to eliminate women's studies from universities as the Quran is full of subjects about them".

1220 GMT: Mousavi Challenges Regime on "Foreign Threat". In a statement on Kalemeh, Mir Hossein Mousavi has thrown the allegation of subversion by foreigners and "terrorists" back at the Iranian regime: "It should be asked who has presented a golden opportunity to the US, Israel, the hypocrites, and the monarchists with all these destructive, non-transparent and misleading policies. Is it those who seek freedom and justice or dubious cults which have devastated the lives of laborers, teachers and farmers?"

1119 GMT: Friday Follow-Up. The denunciations of the treatment of Ayatollah Khomeini's grandson, Seyed Hassan Khomeini, are piling up. The reformist Islamic Iran Participation Front, joining politicians from Mir Hossein Mousavi to conservative MP Ali Motahari, has written an open letter to clerics in Qom declaring that Friday's hecklers are against an independent clergy.

1115 GMT: 22 Khordaad. Daneshjoo News carries a call by Green Movement students for demonstrations across Iran on 12 June, the anniversary of the Presidential election.

1045 GMT: Political Prisoner Watch. There is still uncertainty over the supposed 81 pardons handed out by the Supreme Leader. Tehran Prosecutor General Abbas Jafari Doulatabadi said that "a series of prisoners" have already been released, with repentance as a requirement for amnesty. Still, there are no names of those who have supposedly been freed.

0620 GMT: We are in Warwick this morning, so the latest news from Iran will be posted around midday British time.

0610 GMT: Some inside and outside Iran are pondering what they claim is a relatively low turnout for the regime's ceremonies and speeches.

Could one possible reason be a lack of faith in Government? Fazel Mousavi, a member of Parliament's Article 90 Commission, has declared, "In our country, no party in the real meaning of the world, is active."

Reformist Mohammad Reza Khabbaz adds that, in the last year, 122 Government declarations contravened Majlis legislation, "a new record".

0555 GMT: Friday's Controversies. The political thunder rumbles on over the speeches at the ceremony for Ayatollah Khomeini's death. Rah-e-Sabz claims that, by citing Imam Ali, the Supreme Leader has compared himself to Shia's first Imam.

Regime supporter Hojatoleslam Hossein Sobhani-Nia has given indirect approval of the shout-down of the Imam's grandson, Khomeini: "People are alert, when someone deviates from Imam's path."

Meanwhile, some Iranian sites are taking aim at former President Mohammad Khatami, claiming he went to the Caspian Sea for "fun and vacation" while millions were mourning for Ayatollah Khomeini.

0525 GMT: We have posted two documents: there is a key extract from the Supreme Leader's speech on Friday and Mehdi Karroubi's lengthy consideration of "Khomeini, the Rule of Law, and Protest".

Iran Document: The Supreme Leader's Speech (4 June)

An excerpt from the Supreme Leader's remarks at the Tehran Friday Prayers commemorating the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. Translation by Iran Focus:

Today, in the first part of the sermon, I will share some points about the esteemed Imam [Khomeini]. We will study the Imam as a symbol or a criterion. This is important because the main challenge of all sizeable social developments, including revolutions, is to safeguard the principal course of action offered by the said revolution or development. This is the most important challenge for any powerful social change, in the sense that such a change embodies certain goals and is geared to move towards those goals, inviting others to join in. This sense of direction towards the goals of a revolution or social movement must be preserved. Otherwise, that revolution will turn into its complete opposite and operate against its own goals.

Iran Special: The Regime Disappoints, So It’s Over to the Opposition
Latest Iran Video: Pro-Regime Crowd Shouts Down Khomeini Grandson (4 June)
Iran Snap Analysis: The Meaning of Today’s Khamenei-Ahmadinejad Show

The sense of direction for any revolution serves as its fundamental identity. If the sense of direction were to change and attention is diverted from the main path, then the revolution will not achieve its ends. This is significant because such change is gradual and intangible. It is not as if a 180 degree turn would take place right at the outset. Rather, it starts from smaller angles, and as it continues, the distance between the main path, which is the right one, will increase with such deviations on a daily basis.


Usually, those who seek to alter the identity of the revolution will not have an official flag or will not label themselves as such. They do not act in a way that shows their opposition to the [main] path, and sometimes, they even perform an action or make a statement to show support for the path of the revolution. They are creating a divergence to make the revolution move away from its direction and ultimately bring it down. In order to prevent this wrong direction or deviation from taking hold, there must be certain criteria. If such criteria are in place, and if they are clear and readily observed by the people, then a deviation would never take place. Moreover, if someone were to move in the direction of that deviation, they will be identified by the masses of people. But, if such criteria were absent, then the threat will become serious. Now, what is the criterion for our own revolution?

There is a threat. The enemy, the enemy of the revolution and the enemy of the Imam will not stand by. The enemy is trying to uproot this revolution. How? Through deviations from the path of the revolution. So, we must have a criterion, and the best criterion is the Imam himself and his path.

We must explicitly make reference to the Imam, along with his stance against the arrogant powers, against reactionary movements, against western liberal democracy, and against hypocrites and charlatans. One must make a direct reference to the Imam with regards to such matters. Those who were influenced by the Imam’s outstanding personality, and those who heard his positions, surrendered themselves. We cannot cover up or hide the Imam’s positions, or diminish the power of the ones we deem as too radical, so that certain people would appreciate it.

Those who follow the Imam must know that the Imam would not have joined a coalition that explicitly waves the flag of opposition against the Imam and Islam. It cannot be accepted that the US, Britain, CIA, Mossad, monarchists, and the Monafeqin [pejorative term used by the regime to refer to the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran] are all in agreement about an axis, and then the same axis claims to follow the Imam’s path. This is not acceptable.

Another fundamental point about the path of Imam is that he repeatedly stated that judgment about people must take place using their current circumstances as a criterion. The individuals’ past actions are not of concern. The past comes into play when the current situation is not clear. That is when we would resort to the past to discover how it was in order draw a line to the present. But, if the individuals’ current situation is the complete opposite of their past, then the latter would be irrelevant. This is the judgment that Imam Ali made in the case of Talhe and Zobeyr. You should know that Talhe and Zobeyr were not insignificant figures. Zobeyr had a glowing history, which very few of Imam Ali’s followers shared. After Abu Bakr became the caliph, during the very first days, a number of Muslims rose up during Abu Bakr’s sermon and opposed him. They told him, ‘you are wrong. Ali is right.’ The names of these people have been recorded in history, and it is not just recounted by the Shiites. It is all recorded in history books. One of the people who had risen up to defend Ali’s right was Talha bin Ubaidullah. Such was his background. Twenty-five years separate that day from the day Zubayr pulled out a sword against Ali. Now, our Sunni brothers want to excuse Talhe and Zubayr ibn al-Awwam and say their knowledge could only lead them to that point. Anyhow, whatever the case was, we are not in a position to say what their situation is as they face God. But, what did Ali do with them? He fought against them. He took an army from Medina to Kufa and Basra to fight against Talha and Zubayr. This means that their pasts simply vanished.

This was Imam’s criterion. [In 1979] there were some people who were on the plane alongside Imam and came to Iran from Paris. There were executed during the Imam's time for treason. There were also some who had contacts with Imam during the periods he was in Najaf and later in Paris. They were treated cordially by the Imam at the beginning of the revolution. But, later, their positions and deeds led Imam to reject them....