Shanghai Power Politics: China Shuts Out Iran (Shan Shan)

Two weeks ago, the 10th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Council summit, held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, approved the SCO Rules of Procedure and the regulation on procedure for future membership expansion.

Before the summit, Chinese diplomats ritually pointed out that approval of the admission regulations was the first step in forming the basis for a future expansion of SCO membership and would serve as a cornerstone of the organization's rules for external links.

Behind this formality, however, was a more significant story: for now, Iran will not allowed to  join the organisation.

The ostensible reason was that the SCO's regulations proscribe that “any country under UN sanctions cannot be admitted”. At the time of the meeting, Iran was subject to a 4th round of restrictions; a few days after the meeting, the UN Security Council passed yet another resolution.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not attend the summit, although he visited the Shanghai Expo and took part in celebrations at the Iranian pavilion on June 11. The Chinese Foreign Ministry maintained that Ahmadinejad was only visiting the country to attend the Expo, but analysts said he “is here to seek more support from China to water down fresh sanctions”.

The rejection of Iran's membership is far from the entire story, of course. The relationship between China and Iran is still stable. "There is no reason to control or weaken the relationship (with China)”,  Ahmadinejad told a news conference after his visit to the Expo.
Moreover, this summit focused on economic cooperation and security issues in Central Asia, especially in Afghanistan, such as drug trafficking, terrorism ,and organized crime. Besides, the unrest in in Kyrgyzstan is another hot issue at this summit.

The fact remains, however, that Iran was kept at arm's distance. Zhang Xiao, deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry's department of European and Central Asian affairs, indicated that the SCO is only considering the legal basis for expanding membership, indicating that there is a long way to go before formal accession will even be contemplated.

Furthermore, Beijing is more cautious than Russia, the other main power of the SCO. According to China Daily, Chinese President Hu Jintao told his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev that SCO cooperation and exchange with outside countries should be done in a proper and stable manner, and on the basis of improving the strength of the bloc. "Blind expansion will spoil it (SCO) with excessive enthusiasm".

Pang Zhongying, a senior expert on world politics at Renmin University of China, assessed, "For a regional bloc, it is definitely not the more the better. Now the European Union has 27 members, and we can see more complex problems. The same reason also resulted in a loose APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum). One of the approaches to ruin a bloc is encouraging it to admit more members."

Add the complicated situation in central Asia and the main concerns of the SCO, and it appears that Iran will be observing the group from outside for some time to come.

Iran and Russia: The State of the "Alliance" (Sanaei)

From Tabnak via Iran Review, which translated the interview:

TABNAK: Given the double standard applied by Russia to its diplomatic relations with various countries, especially its duplicity in relations with Iran and the United States, and also due to noncompliance of Russia with its commitments toward Iran, experts have both warned Moscow and called on the Iranian government to revise diplomatic relations with Russia.

This issue has been discussed with Dr. Mehdi Sanaei, professor of University of Tehran and member of Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, in the following interview.

Q: Recent measures taken by our northern neighbor have opened a new chapter in Iran-Russia relations. What is your opinion about present conditions?

A: Russia’s cooperation with Iran under present critical circumstances will not only serve as an important determinant of bilateral relations, but also influence future international equations.

Independent countries are growing in power and new players have entered international political scene. Therefore, the existing structure of the United Nations Security Council and international relations, which has led to dominance of a hegemonic system on the world, cannot provide solutions to all problems as that structure was suitable for conditions of past decades and is no good for a modern world. For example, crises in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan cannot be solved within that framework. Many countries have owned up to this weakness and even the US President has stated that the United States will not tackle all international problems single-handedly as it is not able to solve all of them alone.

Therefore, five permanent members of the Security Council are not able to solve international issues on their own and they should not only respect the will of other countries, but also take advantage of their potentials in international relations. The recent Tehran meeting, which introduced Turkey and Brazil as new variables to Iran’s nuclear case, meant to tell the world that there are many independent players which are willing to do their part in international relations and the way should be paved for them. Russia is now at a crossroads. There are two eagles in the national symbol of Russia which connote that Russia simultaneously looks to the east and the west.

Russia owes its power to its position between east and west. Therefore, anytime looking to the west has dominated the Russian policy the country has forfeited part of its international political clout. Cooperation between Russia and Iran is a very determining factor for both countries’ policies and the Islamic Republic expects Russia to cooperate with it in international scene. On the other hand, those relations are also of high importance to Russia. There are two possible scenarios to be followed here. Firstly, the rift between independent countries and big powers will not widen anymore, but the big powers will accept to make structural changes to international system and avail themselves of potentialities of independent states in solving international problems. In this state, Russia’s friendly relations with Iran and the Muslim world will increase its weight in international power game. The second possibility is that the aforesaid rift will further widen in which case geo-strategic position and identity of Russia will not allow the country to become too inclined toward the west.

All in all, it is very important for Russia to act in a balanced way in its foreign relations and policy. Just in the same way that cooperation between Iran and Russia has promoted both countries’ positions in international scene, it can continue on the same track without being affected by various external factors. It is true that Russia’s relations with the European Union and the United States have changed and those countries are trying to attract Russia as a strategic partner to put pressure on Iran. Of course, pressures exerted on Russia by the Zionist and other internal lobbies should not be ignored. None of those factors, however, obviate the need for Russia to have friendly relations with Iran as it is to its own interest to have independent states on its side.

Q: Unfortunately, Iran has indicated its dependence on Russia and supported that country’s international positions and performance in an exaggerated way during recent years as a counterweight to the west. Don’t you think that such behavior has spoiled Russians prompting them to ignore their commitments toward Iran including commissioning of Bushehr nuclear power plant or delivery of S-300 missile system? They have also completely ignored Iran’s part in the legal regime of the Caspian Sea.

A: Like other countries, there is no doubt that Russia gives the highest priority to its own national interests. The Russians also want to have maximum level of relations with other states. This is also true about us. Two points should be born in mind here. Firstly, a win-win game should be defined in international relations by strengthening foreign policy leverages. Many Russia experts have noted that in its relations with Russia, Iran should take advantage of various leverages as well as regional and international issues. Part of the problem is rooted in our foreign policy apparatus. We should not make other countries think that we desperately need to work with them. Having more leverage to use under such circumstances will be of great help in this regard. Russia is a big country in the region and cooperation between Tehran and Moscow has been not only to the avail of both countries, but also beneficial to the settlement of international disputes.

Q: To what extent interactions with Russia have been a function of Iran’s maximum interests, not out of coercion?

A: Relations with Russia have been influenced by our foreign policy goals. Some anti-west politicians encourage Russian ties while others, opposed them as they damaged Iran’s relations with the west. Different viewpoints govern the two countries’ attitudes. The Russian foreign policy seeks to promote international standing of that country, which is also an objective for Iran’s foreign policy. However, Russian foreign policy is also pragmatic and interest-based and this has been frequently announced by the Russian foreign policymakers.

Perhaps, some ambiguity surrounding Iran’s relations with Russia stems from different perceptions which shape each side of this relationship. Here, some politicians still think that Russia is a superpower and see Moscow in the context of the Cold War. This is not true. Although Russia is still of great weight in international developments, its capacities are very limited. There has been another group which encourages relations with the west because it considers Russia a country riddled with domestic problems. This is also an erroneous analysis because Russia has banked on energy policy and taken various measures to improve its international standing during the past decade. Part of this ambiguity is, perhaps, the result of different perceptions in two countries. While relations with Russia have been considered strategic in Iran during the past decade, no Russian analyst has ever considered their country’s relations with Iran strategic.

Q: The History of Iran abounds with bitter memories of Russia including imposition of Turkmenchai and Golestan treaties on Iran which led to separation of peripheral lands. There is also bitter memory of Russia’s invasion of Iran during World War II. Don’t you think that existing conditions have once more elicited past memories. How Russia will suffer after losing a strategic ally?

A: Given the importance of bilateral relations and Iranian’s mentality of past relations with Russia and in view of future international political equations, Russia is expected to speed up implementation of projects it has undertaken in Iran in order to build confidence. Relations between two countries are of critical importance and it is needed for the sake of confidence building that Russia complete Bushehr nuclear power plant as soon as possible and have no doubt about delivery of S-300 missile defense system since the related contract has been already signed. In nuclear case, it should not leave Iran and independent countries alone and while maintaining relations with both sides, it should use its influence for peaceful settlement of this issue.

Q: Since Russia and the west have reached an agreement on economic issues, do you think that such a will exists in Russia?

A: I hope so. Not only due to importance of bilateral relations, but careful study of forthcoming international developments also dictates that Russia will need to have Iran on its side.

Iran Analysis: How Europe Can Help (Mamedov)

Eldar Mamedov, an international-relations analyst based in Brussels, writes for European Voice:

If the past is any guide, the UN Security Council's decision to impose new sanctions on Iran is unlikely to radically alter Iran's behaviour and its pursuit of its nuclear programme. Instead, the EU and US should shift their Iran policy toward increasing the prospects for political change in the country.

The emergence of the Green Movement a year ago as a broad-based opposition to what was perceived as an electoral coup in favour of the hard-line president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, provides an opportunity for such a change.

The Latest from Iran (18 June): Threats & Apologies

The movement, informally led by former presidential candidates Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, has proved itself to be resilient in the face of the ferocious repression by the regime during the last year. For example, to the shock of the establishment, Mousavi strongly and publicly condemned the execution in May of five Kurdish dissidents. This shows that he is reaching out to the broadest possible segments of the Iranian society, including the aggrieved ethnic minorities and populations outside the big cities of Teheran, Isfahan and Tabriz.

A few weeks ago, Mousavi blasted Ahmadinejad's erratic economic policies. These policies have led to an unemployment rate of 50% among the educated youth and inflation of over 20%. Both Mousavi and Karroubi called for demonstrations to mark the anniversary of the presidential elections on 12 June.

Even if the regime finally succeeds in crushing the Green Movement, the opposition in Iran will not disappear. Iran's young, well-educated and well-connected society has seen its desire for political and social freedoms and economic prosperity stifled for far too long. The government's fresh offensive to re-impose ultra-conservative social mores, including the restrictive dress code for women, and a massive purge from the universities of professors deemed too "liberal" or "secular", are further alienating the youth. There are deepening cracks within the system itself, with a growing number of conservatives realising that it is untenable in its current shape. Remarkably, the opposition to the regime also has religious legitimisation, since one of its fiercest critics was the late and very popular Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri.

All this makes the option of supporting the Iranian opposition not only morally right, but also politically feasible. The EU can do it in several ways.

First and foremost, it should put human rights at the core of its strategy towards Iran. Individuals and organisations implicated in human rights violations should be subjected to the EU travel ban and freezing of assets. Non-governmental organisations such as Iran Human Rights Documentation Centre have compiled a list of officials directly involved in murders, torture and rape of the protesters. Contrary to widespread belief, the regime does care about such revelations, since some of the accused, particularly members of the Revolutionary Guard, have business interests in Europe and travel to Europe for, for instance, medical treatment. The revelations of the atrocities also fly in the face of the Islamic Republic‘s attempts to promote itself internationally as a unique example of a ‘modern religious democracy'. Sanctions against the perpetrators would send a clear message that there is a cost attached to the repression. It may save lives.

The EU should increase its efforts to protect Iranian dissidents, by, for instance, granting asylum in Europe. Thousands of them are currently waiting in Turkey for their applications to the EU countries to be processed. Meanwhile, they are being harassed and intimidated by Iranian agents. The EU must put pressure on Turkey to rein in the Iranian agents and more EU countries should follow the example of Germany, which already offered asylum to some of the dissidents. This will help the Green movement find a foothold abroad and establish a connection between its leadership and the EU governments.

Second, the EU must do its utmost to facilitate the opposition's access to the internet and other electronic communications in the face of government interference. It should protest loudly any jamming of broadcasts from Europe, such as Iran's attempts to block the BBC's Persian TV, and it should find ways to retaliate. The export of surveillance technology by European companies to Iran, whose government could use it to violate freedom of expression, should be stopped.

Third, the EU can help the disparate groups that have coalesced into the Green movement to resolve their ideological differences and decide what comes next. The religious democrats, including Moussavi and Karroubi, want to work within the system and reform existing laws. By contrast, liberals and social democrats insist that the current constitution and political structure are unreformable and should be replaced by a secular republic. The EU can provide a platform for debate among these groups to work out a common strategy and evolve into an alternative political force capable of ruling Iran. Foundations under European political parties can be instrumental in this effort.

While the nuclear issue will remain on the agenda for the foreseeable future, the EU should see the big picture. For the first time in three decades there is an opportunity for popular-led political change in Iran. It will take time, but it is an opportunity not to be missed.