Iran Election Guide

Donate to EAWV





Or, click to learn more

Search

Entries in Taliban (3)

Friday
Jul312009

Transcript: Obama Envoy Holbrooke on Afghanistan and Pakistan

HOLBROOKERichard Holbrooke, President Obama's special envoy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, returned from a trip to those countries to give a press briefing on Wednesday. There is a lot here on a changing US approach to fighting the wars in the region through a combination of military and non-military measures. As The Cable notes incisively, Holbrooke effectively announced that the Bush Administration policy of destroying Afghanistan's poppy production has been scrapped. The bigger question remains, however: can Holbrooke really overtake the perception of a military-first approach by Washington?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Thank you. I’ll be happy to take your questions. Just identify yourself, please.

QUESTION: Dan Dombey, Financial Times. Following the funding commitments that the U.S. and its partners received for the Afghan national security forces expansion at the NATO summit, how well are you –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: What were the what commitments?

QUESTION: Funding commitments for the Afghan national –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: From who?

QUESTION: I – well, you had, I think, a couple of hundred million from Germany.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: You’re talking about new commitments?

QUESTION: The commitment for – to fund the expansion of the forces. I thought Germany made –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I didn’t go to Europe to get more commitments. We – an expansion of the armed services and police of Afghanistan is obviously necessary. That’s hardly a secret. But my job on this trip wasn’t to go around getting new commitments.

QUESTION: No, it’s just a general question, which is how sustainable is the expansion of the ANSF that is envisaged in the strategy, and where do you foresee the main part of the funding for that expansion to come from?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: It’s – okay, sorry, I misunderstood because you – I thought you were talking about prior. It’s absolutely essential that over time Afghanistan assume responsibility for its own security and combat troops draw down. Of course, economic assistance, training, advisory work will continue for quite a while. The current force levels of police and army are clearly going to have to be increased.

But we’re in the middle of an election campaign in Afghanistan, and that election campaign has been going on, basically, in one form or another, since this Administration took office. When we came into office, there was a constitutional crisis impending, a question of legitimacy, no certainty as to when the date would take place, opposition people talking about mass demonstrations. And this Administration focused first on helping the Afghans stabilize their political situation, set a date for the elections. Our military forces and those of our allies then picked up the ball and began working closely with the Afghan Government to assure the best possible election under extremely difficult circumstances.

As that progressed, we’ve started to put in place some of our programs, and we continue to support extensive training of the army and the police. But it’s apparent that the current level of the national security forces of Afghanistan are not going to be sufficient in the long run. After the election, this will be a subject we will look at in conjunction with the new government. We’ll see what the needs are, and then we’ll see how we can support them.

So forgive me if I’m not too specific, but I do wish to draw your attention to a couple of facts which I don’t think get enough public attention. First of all, Japan has not given – been given sufficient credit for their extraordinary act of paying the police salaries for the entire country during this present time phase. The exact amount my colleagues can give you, if you’re interested.

Secondly, the European gendarmerie force is sending police in to train. And the gendarmerie of the European – this is not an EU organization, the European gendarmerie. It’s a collection of about six countries that do gendarmerie work headquartered in Italy. That’s a tremendously positive development.

Third, the reorganization now taking place within ISAF is going to seek to consolidate the police training, which has been scattered in so many different places that it has lacked a certain coherence.

So in answer to your question, this is a very high priority, and once we’re past the election, it will get even higher.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Ambassador Holbrooke, if I may ask a question on Pakistan.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: All identifications --

QUESTION: Mark Landler with The New York Times.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Even if I know you and wish I didn’t, but --

QUESTION: Right. Well said. On Swat – and tell me if I’m right in this – I heard that you were interested in visiting Swat –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: That’s right.

QUESTION: -- and that the Pakistanis said that they couldn't arrange security for you.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: That’s correct. You heard because it’s in today’s New York Times.

QUESTION: Exactly. (Laughter.) Do you – does that tell you something about the state of security in Swat? And maybe just to put it more straight, what do you make of the state of security in Swat?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I want to be very frank with you. I asked to go to Swat or Buner, knowing that I wasn’t going to be able to go to Mingora, but I wanted to establish the limits of the – of what was possible here because, as any of you who have traveled with me know, we’d like to go as far forward as we’re allowed to. That’s the way you learn.

And the military said they really would prefer we didn’t do it now. And “prefer” means no. So we didn’t. And then I was – then we picked another refugee camp, which was a good one, and then we got weathered out so we never went. My colleague, Eric Schwartz, the Assistant Secretary of State for Refugees, was able to go the next day, and I hope that – I hope you’re going to make him available to the press because Eric --

QUESTION: He’s testifying today.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Yeah. And I think I would recommend Eric come down here and talk to you more.

So, Mark, what you said is exactly true, and I hope to visit on the next trip because I think it’s a way of finding out how they feel. Now, there are international aid workers in Buner, so it isn’t that nobody could go in, but they felt that if somebody went in high-profile, heavy security, tons of journalists, including some of my friends in this room, that would have been a problem for them. So I don’t want to become a burden on people, so it wasn’t a big issue.

QUESTION: Laura Rozen from Foreign Policy. Can you talk about the scheduling complications that led to you postponing the trip to India this last week?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: There were no complications. I have the four – three or four people in India who are my main policy interlocutors. All but one of them were going to be out of the country, so --

QUESTION: And you weren’t aware of that before you scheduled going to –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: No, we got – I think we were in the air. Ashley, when did we find out that the Indians weren’t going to be available?

STAFF: Yeah, it was basically when he was en route to Pakistan we found out.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: So, but I’m going back --

STAFF: But you’re going back.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I’m going to go back in mid August. And within the limits of Indian independence, they – I would – they all are looking forward to my coming.

QUESTION: Raghubir Goyal from India Globe and Asia Today. First of all, do you see there is a rift between you and India, because there were some reports in India that that’s why maybe you did not visit India? And also –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I just answered that question.

QUESTION: Yes.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Really. I mean, you know, if there’s a rift between me and India, it would be the first rift between me and India since I was seven years old. You know, India was the first country in the world I was ever aware of. I have a very special feeling for it. And if there’s a rift, you’ll have to ask the Indians. I didn’t see any rift. The four people I usually see, all but one of them were out of the – was out of the country. I talked to the Indians on the phone. Bob Blake was there with the Secretary of State. Bob Blake had some talks which were very helpful. There’s no issue here.

QUESTION: And second, sir, as far as your visit to – main question was, as far as your visit to Pakistan, can you give little highlights how Pakistan is doing as far as security concerns, and also if you are going to get ever Usama bin Ladin, which is the most wanted person on this earth and most famous.

(Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: The trip to Pakistan was very valuable, as they all are. I talked to the leadership of the civilians in the military and private citizens. I was – this is a country facing a staggering number of front-page story problems at one time. The number one subject in Afghanistan among the people on this trip that I talked to was the energy crisis and the electricity. And while we were there, there were demonstrations of textile workers protesting the reductions in electricity. It’s reducing their output. All of you can see the enormous danger that poses. President Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani and I talked a lot about that.

I would draw your attention to the fact that the President of the United States asked that his senior international economic – one of his senior international economic experts, David Lipton, to go out ahead of me. And Lipton and I are friends and we coordinated closely.

The other main subjects, of course, were the internal refugees and the military offensive. And then, of course, in addition, the situation in Afghanistan. I want to underscore a point, separate from my trip. Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal, the top two people in Afghanistan, have been traveling to – have been traveling to Pakistan fairly regularly – sometimes public, sometimes not – just to consult with the government, including the Pakistani army, about making sure that this time around, as the ISAF offensive picks up steam, the Pakistanis are ready for it. So they know – the Pakistanis know where the military operations are happening and they can prepare for any spillover effects. Similarly, we talked to the Pakistanis about if their military operations push people the other way into Afghanistan.

So the military-to-military discussions are helping to harmonize this most explosively dangerous area. Hard to imagine a more dangerous area on the face of the earth today than an area which contains, as you pointed out, al-Qaida, Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban, two and a half million refugees. It’s just extraordinary how difficult it is.

And so we’re spending a lot of time working on that. And each trip, I think we deepen the relationships. And we also announced the disbursement of $165 million worth of American aid. I want to caution you here because it was – some of the journalists got confused about this on our trip. We didn’t announce $165 million of new aid. We announced the disbursement and release of existing aid, aid we’d already announced. It wasn’t new, but it was very important because it had been held up.

QUESTION: Usama bin Ladin, sir?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Hmm?

QUESTION: Usama bin Ladin?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Usama bin Ladin – we didn’t see him on this trip.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Are you still interested to get him?

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: What?

QUESTION: Nothing.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I don’t know what your question is. When are we going to capture or eliminate him?

QUESTION: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: If I knew, I wouldn't tell. But I don’t know.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) welcome back. I’d like, if you could, to expand a little bit on the first answer you gave talking about the need for more Afghan national army troops.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: And police.

QUESTION: And police, exactly, security forces. And as you know, there’s been a lot of pressure on the Congress and there’s been discussions, apparently, among the top military brass in the U.S. about the need for more ANSF. And I’d like to get your take on what you think the total number should be, what the U.S. is capable of supporting, and also to comment somewhat on this talk about whether there should be more U.S. forces sent to Afghanistan as well as a sort of supplement to that.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I can’t give you an exact figure for several reasons. One, it’s under study and review. Two, there are various numbers being thrown around. Three, the Afghan Government has to be a central part of these discussions and there are elections coming up in a few weeks and we’ve got to talk to them.

On the second part of your question, you’ll have to address that to the Pentagon.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about the drug trade and your efforts to kind of shift to more of an alternative livelihood, because as you said while you were on your latest trip, it seems now that the Taliban is getting more money from the drug trade than it is from its outside kind of funding around the world. And do you see support among the Afghan people for this new effort, and do you think it’s sustainable?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I’m sorry, you say that I said they’re getting more from the drug trade?

QUESTION: Well, no, we –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I said the reverse.

QUESTION: No, they’re getting more from –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: From outside. Right. That’s – but I’ve said that many times.

One of the most interesting things I saw on the trip down in Helmand and Kandahar was the first tangible evidence that one of the most important policy shifts of the United States since January 20th is beginning to show results. As you know because we’ve announced it several times, and it finally got picked up about the fourth or fifth time we said it, ironically, when I was in Trieste, not here in Washington, we have phased – we are phasing out crop eradication. The United States and the ISAF forces are not going to go around assisting or participating in the destruction of poppy fields anymore. The United States has wasted hundreds of millions of dollars doing this. A per-hectare cost has been estimated at $44,000 a hectare to destroy the poppy seeds. You can buy real estate for that in most of the – in many places.

If the Afghans wish – I mentioned this to Governor Mangal in Helmand, and he laughed. He – and he said, “I can eliminate – I can destroy poppies for $150 a hectare.” And I said, “Governor, that’s up to you, but we’re – if you want to – but we’re not going to get in that business.” All we did was alienate poppy farmers who were poor farmers, who were growing the best cash crop they could grow in a market where they couldn’t get other things to market, and we were driving people into the hands of the Taliban.

Now, this flies in the face of a lot of conventional drug enforcement doctrine. Why did – why was it wrong? Because in other countries – Mexico, Colombia, the Golden Triangle in Thailand – that was the purpose of our policy. Here, of course, our policy is to strengthen the government and help defeat the Taliban, and we were not doing it. And the amount of hectarage we were destroying was inconsequential and the amount of money we were denying the Taliban was zero. They got everything they needed anyway.

So after consulting a lot of experts, we – and having an internal debate in the U.S. Government, because a lot of people were doctrinally addicted, if you’ll pardon the pun, to that concept – we did this. And then we started out – and we said, okay, no more crop eradication, we’ll phase that out, we will increase our efforts in interdiction, and third, we’re going to increase agriculture.

On this trip, we saw the first indications that it might work. And those indications came from the British and American forces in Helmand, where they targeted interdiction and made interdiction their goal and they went after drug dealers. And using modern technologies, they located what they called drug bazaars, marketplaces which sold drug paraphernalia, precursor chemicals, laboratory equipment, poppy seeds and there were vast amounts of opium, nice fluffy poppy, to buy and sell, and they destroyed them.

And CNN wrote a – ran a very good piece on this, which showed the poppies. I don’t know if it was run domestically, but it was shown all over the world repeatedly. And Ambassador Tony Wayne, our number-three ambassador out there, who all of you know, former ambassador to Argentina, was in the middle of this area and the poppies were blowing up and burning. And we don’t – it’s hard to figure out what the equivalent was, but there probably was, in one week, several years of useless crop eradication – in fact, counterproductive. To me, in all the trips I made out there, this was the most gratifying thing, because it’s nice to have theories and policies, but you got to see how they work on the ground.

The second thing is I – okay, so ground and crop eradication, I explained that. Interdiction seems to be working. They’ve got some other targets ahead of them which I think will be equally effective.

Agriculture; the most well-received change in American policy has been our dramatic upgrade of agriculture. I would simply note that both Senators Obama and Clinton proposed things like this last year when they were campaigning. So it was a pleasure to take a – something proposed during the campaign and see it converted into a reality on the ground. Everywhere I went, the realization was just beginning to dawn that we were going to put hundreds of millions of dollars into agriculture from the agricultural development teams in some of the provinces run by the national guards or states like Texas. I spent some time with the Texas agricultural development team in Ghazni province – and they’re doing all these terrific projects – to the more formal agricultural efforts that we have, which are a combined integrated AID-U.S. Department of Agriculture team.

Now that is just beginning to get rolling, but it was remarkable to me how every candidate we called on, every Afghan in the provinces, everyone had heard about it already. So I – forgive the long answer, but I see this all interconnected – getting rid of crop eradication, increasing interdiction, which is what really hurts the drug kingpins, the corrupt police, and the Taliban, and finally, addressing what – after all, it’s an agricultural country, 80 percent of the people in agriculture.

It was a great export country until the Soviet invasion in 1978, and it exported pomegranates and most of the world’s – over half the world’s raisins. It even exported wine, pistachios. And all that died. And the Afghans are great, great farmers, but they need help, and we’re going to do an overall effort. And Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack will go out there in October, and he will lead a group. And I would encourage some of you to consider going with him. It’s going to be a terrific trip.

Way in the back.

QUESTION: Thank you, Ambassador. Ali Imran from Associated Press of Pakistan.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: From where?

QUESTION: Associated Press of Pakistan.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Oh, APP.

QUESTION: During your visit to Brussels, you said that the European countries and under – other powers should help more Pakistan to deal with the issue of IDPs and their return, rehabilitation and reconstruction of –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: You mean what I said yesterday in Brussels?

QUESTION: Yes. I mean, what –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Did I have any reaction?

QUESTION: No. I mean, what – do you find the European powers and the other partners of international community to – committed to help Pakistan at this critical hour?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: The Europeans – there are 41 nations, most of them European, participating in the international efforts in Afghanistan. But the Europeans are quite quick to admit that they hadn’t paid enough attention to Pakistan in the past. I would argue that perhaps we didn’t either.

But in any case, I made the case, just as you cited, in closed meetings and in public. I met yesterday with the NATO Council, with the European Commission, and with the Belgian foreign minister. And in all these cases, I raised this issue. When you go to people and you say, you ought to do more, they can’t say yes in the room. They have their own processes, they have their budgets, they have their parliaments, just like we do. And I just wanted to get the ball rolling on a very public discussion. Why? Because two reasons: Pakistan is critically important to the rest of the world, and it has very serious challenges right now, starting with the energy sector and the refugees and the insurgency and the overall economy; and secondly, because what happens in Pakistan has a direct effect on Afghanistan.

QUESTION: Ambassador, you seem to be discriminating against the front row, but I’ll forgive you for that. Bob Burns from AP. A question about the so-called civilian surge in Afghanistan. I’m wondering if you’re satisfied with the pace at which that’s happening. And I ask that having heard Tony Cordesman of CSIS this morning talking about his several weeks in Afghanistan recently. In his view, it’s been insufficient and he doesn’t foresee it reaching a – sort of a critical mass for at least another year. Is the timeline stretching out? What do you –

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Is he volunteering to go out there? Because we could use someone with his talents. He’s going to do agriculture or –

QUESTION: No, he says you don’t have enough people to do those things.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I have no idea what he’s talking about. We have a very sustained plan. This is not like taking an existing military unit out of Fort Bragg and training them and then sending them out. Even the military takes some time. Our training groups have not yet gotten there.

But I just don’t agree with him. We have a – we have a separate, dedicated personnel staff here in my office under presidential waiver authority. We have hundreds of people in the pipeline. Many people have already arrived. I saw a mission which was showing much more energy than I’d ever seen before on previous trips going back three or four years. And most importantly, you can’t have civilians go out unless there’s security. And we are actually out of billets in Kabul to put people. And we want to get people out in the field.

Am I – your initial question was, was I satisfied? Quite honestly, and speaking personally, I’m never satisfied in this job, because the pressures are so great. And you know that. We’ve traveled together. You understand what my job is. And my job is to try to make the system work faster and better.

But the way you describe this criticism – and I haven’t talked to him – I don’t think it’s – it sounds to me like it’s based on taking an issue out of perspective. You come – tell you what: come down to our offices, talk to our personnel people, get every detail you want, there’s nothing classified about it, and reach your own conclusions. We’ll get you on our side here (inaudible). (Laughter.)

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Hi, Colin Campbell of Atlantic Television News Press TV. How is the United States working with Afghanistan’s IEC to ensure the most fair elections possible? Could you go over that?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Well, first of all, Secretary Clinton sent Ambassador Tim Carney, who many of you know, out there to head a special election unit. Tim is a very experienced election official. This morning, he reported by closed-circuit television to the National Security Council staff and team, and I was there for that meeting. Actually, Ambassador Eikenberry was there, too. That group is our primary interface with the election commission.

There are two others commissions. There’s a complaints commission and a media commission. And we – and I met with all three.

One of the most dramatic things that I did on this trip was to go out to the IEC and go to this large – like a warehouse or an airplane hanger. And you go in and there are about 200 to 300 young Afghans in blue jeans, t-shirts, whatever, sitting behind computer terminals registering voters. And they’ve registered over a million new voters. They have a backlog of 3 million. They’re a little behind, only 20 days to go, 22 days, and they’re rushing to register at least three or four million additional voters.

I think that since the registrants from last election remain on the rolls, you had about 17 million names on the chart. But we don’t know how many of those people are still alive or are still in the country. So we will never have an exact number of how many people could have voted – in other words, one of the figures that you’ll all ask, what percentage of the eligible electorate voted, is probably not going to be attainable. But what we will know is how many people vote. And we know how many people voted last time.

Now, we’re working very closely with these three commissions. Everybody’s complaining about the elections. It happens in our country, too. People have charges of this and that. But my view is that the election – it’s an extraordinary thing to hold an election in the middle of a war. And this is the first contested election in Afghanistan history. So while I saw many – I heard complaints from every side, I wasn’t unduly upset by those.

We are working very closely with the election commission. The head of it, Dr. Lodin, and I had two different meetings, one private and one in a group. And I don’t know what else I can say about it. But it is our main focus right now.

QUESTION: Warren Strobel with McClatchy newspapers. Two questions about Swat. First, can you give us your general assessment of how well the Pakistani Government is doing – and not the clearing phase, but the holding and building, the reconstruction?

And secondly, our correspondent in the region, or in the country, reported this morning that Pakistani authorities have found that the Taliban abducted about a hundred teenage boys and sent them to a – some sort of indoctrination camp to train them to be suicide bombers with a terrorism curriculum. I was just wondering if you knew anything further. I had heard that while you were there.

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: On the first question, I really can’t answer your question, because I wasn’t able to get there. And of course, you’re asking the key question. We don’t know exactly to what extent the Pakistani army dispersed or destroyed the enemy. And the test of this operation is, of course, when the refugees return, can they go home? Are they safe? And we’re just going to have to wait and see.

But I do want to stress something here. This is the first – the Pakistanis have moved a very large number of troops from their eastern border to their western border, and those – that’s a historically and significant redeployment.

Secondly, on your second question, I haven’t – I’m not aware of the details of the story, but I will check it. We’ve heard these stories many times in the past, and some – you remember a while ago the kids escaped in a similar situation. And so I’d like to know more about it and I’ll look at the story.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: To what extent – (inaudible) from Press Trust of India. To what extent do you think the resolution of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan will help you in achieving your three goals – dismantle, disrupt, and defeat al-Qaida and Taliban in the --

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: That issue is outside my area of ability to discuss.

QUESTION: And secondly, sir, in the last two weeks, Pakistani leaders have said – have given public statement about India’s involvement in Baluchistan. Have Pakistani leaders brought this to your notice? Have they given you any credible evidence of India’s involvement in Baluchistan?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Have they?

QUESTION: Have they given you any credible evidence of India’s involvement in Baluchistan?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I would be misleading if I said it didn’t come up, but the narrow answer to your question is no.

Yeah.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) for the broad region of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistani forces have been fighting in Swat and the tribal area, but they haven’t yet caught any militant leader; for example, Baitullah Mehsud or Maulana Fazlullah. Have you talked with Pakistani leaders that they are yet to get any one of those militant leaders?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: That’s a constant subject, and – but they did arrest Sufi Mohammad. Now, some people say he’s an old guy and it’s meaningless. I don’t agree with that. He’s the father-in-law of Fazlullah. He’s one of the leading lights. He’s a guy who negotiated that truce which turned out to be a surrender disguised as a truce, which led to the crisis.

But the Pakistani army is, I think, anxious to bring these people to justice. And we would – we hope that will happen.

QUESTION: You mentioned that you feel under a lot of pressure all the time in this job. Are you feeling that with British support seems to be dwindling for their troops to stay in Afghanistan and also in the buildup to midterms in the U.S., it would appear that U.S. support in this – the body bags – more body bags start coming in and you lose more of your own forces, are you feeling that your own time clock is ticking on this and that you have a limited amount of time in which to get what you need done before the public sort of turns against you?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I don’t want to comment on the British side of it, particularly with David Miliband in the building right now. And I wasn’t able to hear his press conference with Secretary Clinton.

And on the timeframe issue, I think we want to show a visible, tangible progress. But we don’t have a timetable, but we want to show progress to the world and the American public by next year. But don’t – people should not interpret that, as some have, as some kind of deadline or arbitrary timetable.

MR. CROWLEY: We can take two more questions.

QUESTION: Just – Sebastian Walker from Al Jazeera. Just quickly again on the counternarcotics issue, why do you think the U.S. pursued a policy that you’ve described as totally ineffectual for so long? And with this new strategy, how does that actually play out on the ground? So for example, with the U.S. Marines combing Helmand province, if they come across a field being cultivated for opium poppy production, what do they do? Do they just leave it?

And then on another issue, you’ve been talking about this flow of money from sympathizers to the Taliban from Gulf countries. Would you describe that as coming from all Gulf countries? Could you be more specific about where you think this money is actually coming from?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: On the first part of your three-part question, the – you’ll have to ask the people that did this, none of whom are in this room right now. And you’ll have to ask the people who thought this was the right way to spend American taxpayer dollars. They got nothing for it.

On the second part of your question, I’m not going to know the tactical operational orders to the troops, but their mission is not to support or assist crop eradication. And General McChrystal and I are absolutely – and General Petraeus are absolutely united on that.

On the third part of your question, I do want to clarify something. I am not – repeat, not accusing the governments of the region. This comes up all the time because in the past – last year, the year before that – there were accusations made by government officials of the previous administration. I’m not doing that. But there’s very strong evidence that money flows from that area unregulated, very hard to regulate, and we care a lot about that.

And that’s why I visited every member of the GCC except one already, and plan to go back as often as possible. That’s why one of the members of our nine-agency interagency staff is from the Treasury Department, and why we have set up a task force under Treasury’s leadership coordinated by us on this important issue, which involves so many elements of the U.S. Government that it’s extraordinary. We know how tough this is, but if money flowing from that area contributes to the use of force which results in casualties to our forces and those of our allies, we owe it to the troops to do some – to try to do something about it.

QUESTION: So you’d include all – sorry, you’d include all Gulf countries within that?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: No, I didn’t say that. I’m not going to specify the countries because it’s just not fair to them. But I did want to specify that I’m not holding the governments responsible.

Last question.

QUESTION: Depending on who wins the election in Pak – in Afghanistan, will the U.S. policy towards the country – will it be redefined or not?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: Depending on who wins, will the U.S. policy be what?

QUESTION: Will be redefined?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: I don’t want to speculate about what happens after the election. I just want to be clear on what we hope to see in the election, which is an election whose outcome is accepted as legitimate by the Afghan people and the world, which reflects the desires of those who vote.

Not everyone’s going to vote. There’ll be areas where the polling places will be – will not be able to open because of security. Everybody understands that. A perfect election in this situation is not possible. There have been occasional problems in our elections, you might notice, through – I think it was only a few weeks ago we finally found out who the senator from Minnesota was, right, P.J.?

MR. CROWLEY: That’s right. (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: And – but I did want to clarify that let’s focus on the election and its immediate aftermath, and then we’ll move on. But we – our commitment to Afghanistan, and I need to underscore this – the President has said repeatedly our commitment to Afghanistan stands not only because it’s in our own national interest to do so, but because it’s important to the entire region that stretches from the Mediterranean all the way east through the subcontinent.

Now I – there was – I was going to – actually going to call on you, so I’ll give you the last question.

QUESTION: Very nice, thank you. Mina al-Oraibi, Sharq al-Awsat newspaper. Ambassador, I wanted to raise the issue of detainees and the process of, you know, detainees that are in Bagram at the moment, how they’re being actually, you know, dealt with, the judicial process, transparency, and so forth. With General Stone there, how much progress are you seeing on the detainee issue? And how important is it to deal with the issues of the detainees?

AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE: General Stone performed a great service to all of us with his study. We now have to review its recommendations and move towards implementation of whatever parts we feel are appropriate.

Secondly, the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State Harold Koh, who I’m sure many of you know because he was formerly the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights in the Clinton Administration, came with us to Afghanistan, stayed on, and went to Bagram.

So I would prefer, in the fairness to that process – I have not been able to connect with him yet. I’d prefer to just direct your questions through P.J. to Harold when he gets back on the detainee issue. It’s a very important issue, and we’re looking at it very carefully.

Thank you very much.
Wednesday
Jul152009

UPDATED Video, Transcript, and Q&A: Hillary Clinton Speech at Council on Foreign Relations (15 July)

The Clinton Speech: An Immediate Reaction

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS- SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED



CLINTON: Shortly before I started at the State Department, a former Secretary of State called me with this advice: Don’t try to do too much. And it seemed like a wise admonition, if only it were possible. But the international agenda today is unforgiving: two wars, conflict in the Middle East, ongoing threats of violent extremism and nuclear proliferation, global recession, climate change, hunger and disease, and a widening gap between the rich and the poor. All of these challenges affect America’s security and prosperity, and they all threaten global stability and progress.

But they are not reason to despair about the future. The same forces that compound our problems – economic interdependence, open borders, and the speedy movement of information, capital, goods, services and people – are also part of the solution. And with more states facing common challenges, we have the chance, and a profound responsibility, to exercise American leadership to solve problems in concert with others. That is the heart of America’s mission in the world today.

Now, some see the rise of other nations and our economic troubles here at home as signs that American power has waned. Others simply don’t trust us to lead; they view America as an unaccountable power, too quick to impose its will at the expense of their interests and our principles. But they are wrong.

The question is not whether our nation can or should lead, but how it will lead in the 21st century. Rigid ideologies and old formulas don’t apply. We need a new mindset about how America will use its power to safeguard our nation, expand shared prosperity, and help more people in more places live up to their God-given potential.

President Obama has led us to think outside the usual boundaries. He has launched a new era of engagement based on common interests, shared values, and mutual respect. Going forward, capitalizing on America’s unique strengths, we must advance those interests through partnership, and promote universal values through the power of our example and the empowerment of people. In this way, we can forge the global consensus required to defeat the threats, manage the dangers, and seize the opportunities of the 21st century. America will always be a world leader as long as we remain true to our ideals and embrace strategies that match the times. So we will exercise American leadership to build partnerships and solve problems that no nation can solve on its own, and we will pursue policies to mobilize more partners and deliver results.

First, though, let me say that while the ideas that shape our foreign policy are critically important, this, for me, is not simply an intellectual exercise. For over 16 years, I’ve had the chance, the privilege, really, to represent our country overseas as First Lady, as a senator, and now as Secretary of State. I’ve seen the bellies of starving children, girls sold into human trafficking, men dying of treatable diseases, women denied the right to own property or vote, and young people without schooling or jobs gripped by a sense of futility about their futures.

I’ve also seen how hope, hard work, and ingenuity can overcome the longest of odds. And for almost 36 years, I have worked as an advocate for children, women and families here at home. I’ve traveled across our country listening to everyday concerns of our citizens. I’ve met parents struggling to keep their jobs, pay their mortgages, cover their children’s college tuitions, and afford healthcare.

And all that I have done and seen has convinced me that our foreign policy must produce results for people – the laid-off auto worker in Detroit whose future will depend on global economic recovery; the farmer or small business owner in the developing world whose lack of opportunity can drive political instability and economic stagnation; the families whose loved ones are risking their lives for our country in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere; children in every land who deserve a brighter future. These are the people – hundreds of millions of them here in America and billions around the world – whose lives and experiences, hopes and dreams, must inform the decisions we take and the actions that follow. And these are the people who inspire me and my colleagues and the work that we try to do every day.

In approaching our foreign policy priorities, we have to deal with the urgent, the important, and the long-term all at once. But even as we are forced to multi-task – a very gender-related term (laughter) – we must have priorities, which President Obama has outlined in speeches from Prague to Cairo, from Moscow to Accra. We want to reverse the spread of nuclear weapons, prevent their use, and build a world free of their threat. We want to isolate and defeat terrorists and counter violent extremists while reaching out to Muslims around the world. We want to encourage and facilitate the efforts of all parties to pursue and achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We want to seek global economic recovery and growth by strengthening our own economy, advancing a robust development agenda, expanding trade that is free and fair, and boosting investment that creates decent jobs. We want to combat climate change, increase energy security, and lay the foundation for a prosperous clean-energy future. We want to support and encourage democratic governments that protect the rights and deliver results for their people. And we intend to stand up for human rights everywhere.

Liberty, democracy, justice and opportunity underlie our priorities. Some accuse us of using these ideals to justify actions that contradict their very meaning. Others say we are too often condescending and imperialistic, seeking only to expand our power at the expense of others. And yes, these perceptions have fed anti-Americanism, but they do not reflect who we are. No doubt we lost some ground in recent years, but the damage is temporary. It’s kind of like my elbow – it’s getting better every day. (Laughter.)

Whether in Latin America or Lebanon, Iran or Liberia, those who are inspired by democracy, who understand that democracy is about more than just elections – that it must also protect minority rights and press freedom, develop strong, competent and independent judiciaries, legislatures and executive agencies, and commit for democracy to deliver results – these are the people who will find that Americans are their friends, not adversaries. As President Obama made clear last week in Ghana, this Administration will stand for accountable and transparent governance, and support those who work to build democratic institutions wherever they live.

Our approach to foreign policy must reflect the world as it is, not as it used to be. It does not make sense to adapt a 19th century concert of powers, or a 20th century balance of power strategy. We cannot go back to Cold War containment or to unilateralism.

Today, we must acknowledge two inescapable facts that define our world: First, no nation can meet the world’s challenges alone. The issues are too complex. Too many players are competing for influence, from rising powers to corporations to criminal cartels; from NGOs to al-Qaida; from state-controlled media to individuals using Twitter.

Second, most nations worry about the same global threats, from non-proliferation to fighting disease to counter-terrorism, but also face very real obstacles – for reasons of history, geography, ideology, and inertia. They face these obstacles and they stand in the way of turning commonality of interest into common action.

So these two facts demand a different global architecture – one in which states have clear incentives to cooperate and live up to their responsibilities, as well as strong disincentives to sit on the sidelines or sow discord and division.

So we will exercise American leadership to overcome what foreign policy experts at places like the Council call “collective action problems” and what I call obstacles to cooperation. For just as no nation can meet these challenges alone, no challenge can be met without America.

And here’s how we’ll do it: We’ll work through existing institutions and reform them. But we’ll go further. We’ll use our power to convene, our ability to connect countries around the world, and sound foreign policy strategies to create partnerships aimed at solving problems. We’ll go beyond states to create opportunities for non-state actors and individuals to contribute to solutions.

We believe this approach will advance our interests by uniting diverse partners around common concerns. It will make it more difficult for others to abdicate their responsibilities or abuse their power, but will offer a place at the table to any nation, group, or citizen willing to shoulder a fair share of the burden. In short, we will lead by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multi-polar world and toward a multi-partner world.

Now, we know this approach is not a panacea. We will remain clear-eyed about our purpose. Not everybody in the world wishes us well or shares our values and interests. And some will actively seek to undermine our efforts. In those cases, our partnerships can become power coalitions to constrain or deter those negative actions.

And to these foes and would-be foes, let me say our focus on diplomacy and development is not an alternative to our national security arsenal. Our willingness to talk is not a sign of weakness to be exploited. We will not hesitate to defend our friends, our interests, and above all, our people vigorously and when necessary with the world’s strongest military. This is not an option we seek nor is it a threat; it is a promise to all Americans.

Building the architecture of global cooperation requires us to devise the right policies and use the right tools. I speak often of smart power because it is so central to our thinking and our decision-making. It means the intelligent use of all means at our disposal, including our ability to convene and connect. It means our economic and military strength; our capacity for entrepreneurship and innovation; and the ability and credibility of our new President and his team. It also means the application of old-fashioned common sense in policymaking. It’s a blend of principle and pragmatism.

Smart power translates into specific policy approaches in five areas. First, we intend to update and create vehicles for cooperation with our partners; second, we will pursue principled engagement with those who disagree with us; third, we will elevate development as a core pillar of American power; fourth, we will integrate civilian and military action in conflict areas; and fifth, we will leverage key sources of American power, including our economic strength and the power of our example.

Our first approach is to build these stronger mechanisms of cooperation with our historic allies, with emerging powers, and with multilateral institutions, and to pursue that cooperation in, as I said, a pragmatic and principled way. We don’t see those as in opposition, but as complementary.

We have started by reinvigorating our bedrock alliances, which did fray in recent years. In Europe, that means improved bilateral relationships, a more productive partnership with the European Union, and a revitalized NATO. I believe NATO is the greatest alliance in history. But it was built for the Cold War. The new NATO is a democratic community of nearly a billion people stretching from the Baltics in the East to Alaska in the West. We’re working to update its strategic concept so that it is as effective in this century as it was in the last.

At the same time, we are working with our key treaty allies Japan and Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines and other partners to strengthen our bilateral relationships as well as trans-Pacific institutions. We are both a trans-Atlantic and a trans-Pacific nation.

We will also put special emphasis on encouraging major and emerging global powers – China, India, Russia and Brazil, as well as Turkey, Indonesia, and South Africa – to be full partners in tackling the global agenda. I want to underscore the importance of this task, and my personal commitment to it. These states are vital to achieving solutions to the shared problems and advancing our priorities – nonproliferation, counterterrorism, economic growth, climate change, among others. With these states, we will stand firm on our principles even as we seek common ground.

This week, I will travel to India, where External Affairs Minister Krishna and I will lay out a broad-based agenda that calls for a whole-of-government approach to our bilateral relationship. Later this month, Secretary Geithner and I will jointly lead our new strategic and economic dialogue with China. It will cover not just economic issues, but the range of strategic challenges we face together. In the fall, I will travel to Russia to advance the bi-national presidential commission that Foreign Minister Lavrov and I will co-chair.

The fact of these and other meetings does not guarantee results, but they set in motion processes and relationships that will widen our avenues of cooperation and narrow the areas of disagreement without illusion. We know that progress will not likely come quickly, or without bumps in the road, but we are determined to begin and stay on this path.

Now our global and regional institutions were built for a world that has been transformed, so they too must be transformed and reformed. As the President said following the recent G-8 meeting in Italy, we are seeking institutions that “combine the efficiency and capacity for action with inclusiveness.” From the UN to the World Bank, from the IMF to the G-8 and the G-20, from the OAS and the Summit of the Americas to ASEAN and APEC – all of these and other institutions have a role to play, but their continued vitality and relevance depend on their legitimacy and representativeness, and the ability of their members to act swiftly and responsibly when problems arise.

We also will reach out beyond governments, because we believe partnerships with people play a critical role in our 21st century statecraft. President Obama’s Cairo speech is a powerful example of communicating directly with people from the bottom up. And we are following up with a comprehensive agenda of educational exchanges, outreach, and entrepreneurial ventures. In every country I visit, I look for opportunities to bolster civil society and engage with citizens, whether at a town hall in Baghdad – a first in that country; or appearing on local popular television shows that reach a wide and young audience; or meeting with democracy activists, war widows, or students.

I have appointed special envoys to focus on a number of specific challenges, including the first Ambassador for Global Women’s Issues and an ambassador to build new public-private partnerships and to engage Diaspora communities in the United States to increase opportunities in their native lands. And we are working at the State Department to ensure that our government is using the most innovative technologies not only to speak and listen across borders, not only to keep technologies up and going, but to widen opportunities especially for those who are too often left on the margins. We’re taking these steps because reaching out directly to people will encourage them to embrace cooperation with us, making our partnerships with their governments and with them stronger and more durable.

We’ve also begun to adopt a more flexible and pragmatic posture with our partners. We won’t agree on every issue. Standing firm on our principles shouldn’t prevent us from working together where we can. So we will not tell our partners to take it or leave it, nor will we insist that they’re either with us or against us. In today’s world, that’s global malpractice.

Our diplomacy regarding North Korea is a case in point. We have invested a significant amount of diplomatic resources to achieve Security Council consensus in response to North Korea’s provocative actions. I spoke numerous times to my counterparts in Japan, South Korea, Russia and China, drawing out their concerns, making our principles and redlines clear, and seeking a path forward. The short-term results were two unanimous Security Council resolutions with real teeth and consequences for North Korea, and then the follow-on active involvement of China, Russia, and India with us in persuading others to comply with the resolutions. The long-term result, we believe, will be a tougher joint effort toward the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Cultivating these partnerships and their full range takes time and patience. It also takes persistence. That doesn’t mean procrastinating on urgent issues. Nor is it a justification for delaying efforts that may take years to bear fruit. In one of my favorite observations, Max Weber said, “Politics is the long and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion and perspective.” Perspective dictates passion and patience. And of course, passion keeps us from not finding excuses to do nothing.

Now I’m well aware that time alone does not heal all wounds; consider the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That’s why we wasted no time in starting an intensive effort on day one to realize the rights of Palestinians and Israelis to live in peace and security in two states, which is in America’s interests and the world’s. We’ve been working with the Israelis to deal with the issue of settlements, to ease the living conditions of Palestinians, and create circumstances that can lead to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. For the last few decades, American administrations have held consistent positions on the settlement issue. And while we expect action from Israel, we recognize that these decisions are politically challenging.

And we know that progress toward peace cannot be the responsibility of the United States – or Israel – alone. Ending the conflict requires action on all sides. The Palestinians have the responsibility to improve and extend the positive actions already taken on security; to act forcefully against incitement; and to refrain from any action that would make meaningful negotiations less likely.

And Arab states have a responsibility to support the Palestinian Authority with words and deeds, to take steps to improve relations with Israel, and to prepare their publics to embrace peace and accept Israel’s place in the region. The Saudi peace proposal, supported by more than twenty nations, was a positive step. But we believe that more is needed. So we are asking those who embrace the proposal to take meaningful steps now. Anwar Sadat and King Hussein crossed important thresholds, and their boldness and vision mobilized peace constituencies in Israel and paved the way for lasting agreements. By providing support to the Palestinians and offering an opening, however modest, to the Israelis, the Arab states could have the same impact. So I say to all sides: Sending messages of peace is not enough. You must also act against the cultures of hate, intolerance and disrespect that perpetuate conflict.

Our second policy approach is to lead with diplomacy, even in the cases of adversaries or nations with whom we disagree. We believe that doing so advances our interests and puts us in a better position to lead with our other partners. We cannot be afraid or unwilling to engage. Yet some suggest that this is a sign of naiveté or acquiescence to these countries’ repression of their own people. I believe that is wrong. As long as engagement might advance our interests and our values, it is unwise to take it off the table. Negotiations can provide insight into regimes’ calculations and the possibility – even if it seems remote – that a regime will eventually alter its behavior in exchange for the benefits of acceptance into the international community. Libya is one such example. Exhausting the option for dialogue is also more likely to make our partners more willing to exert pressure should persuasion fail.

With this in mind, I want to say a few words about Iran. We watched the energy of Iran’s election with great admiration, only to be appalled by the manner in which the government used violence to quell the voices of the Iranian people, and then tried to hide its actions by arresting foreign journalists and nationals, and expelling them, and cutting off access to technology. As we and our G-8 partners have made clear, these actions are deplorable and unacceptable.

We know very well what we inherited with Iran, because we deal with that inheritance every day. We know that refusing to deal with the Islamic Republic has not succeeded in altering the Iranian march toward a nuclear weapon, reducing Iranian support for terror, or improving Iran’s treatment of its citizens.

Neither the President nor I have any illusions that dialogue with the Islamic Republic will guarantee success of any kind, and the prospects have certainly shifted in the weeks following the election. But we also understand the importance of offering to engage Iran and giving its leaders a clear choice: whether to join the international community as a responsible member or to continue down a path to further isolation.

Direct talks provide the best vehicle for presenting and explaining that choice. That is why we offered Iran’s leaders an unmistakable opportunity: Iran does not have a right to nuclear military capacity, and we’re determined to prevent that. But it does have a right to civil nuclear power if it reestablishes the confidence of the international community that it will use its programs exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Iran can become a constructive actor in the region if it stops threatening its neighbors and supporting terrorism. It can assume a responsible position in the international community if it fulfills its obligations on human rights. The choice is clear. We remain ready to engage with Iran, but the time for action is now. The opportunity will not remain open indefinitely.

Our third policy approach, and a personal priority for me as Secretary, is to elevate and integrate development as a core pillar of American power. We advance our security, our prosperity, and our values by improving the material conditions of people’s lives around the world. These efforts also lay the groundwork for greater global cooperation, by building the capacity of new partners and tackling shared problems from the ground up.

A central purpose of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review that I announced last week is to explore how to effectively design, fund, and implement development and foreign assistance as part of a broader foreign policy. Let’s face it. We have devoted a smaller percentage of our government budget to development than almost any other advanced country. And too little of what we have spent has contributed to genuine and lasting progress. Too much of the money has never reached its intended target, but stayed here in America to pay salaries or fund overhead in contracts. I am committed to more partnerships with NGOs, but I want more of our tax dollars to be used effectively and to deliver tangible results.

As we seek more agile, effective, and creative partnerships for development, we will focus on country-driven solutions, such as those we are launching with Haiti on recovery and sustainable development, and with African states on global hunger. These initiatives must not be designed to help countries scrape by – they are a tool to help countries stand on their own.

Our development agenda will also focus on women as drivers of economic growth and social stability. Women have long comprised the majority of the world’s unhealthy, unschooled, and underfed. They are also the bulk of the world’s poor. The global recession has had a disproportionate effect on women and girls, which in turn has repercussions for families, communities, and even regions. Until women around the world are accorded their rights – and afforded the opportunities of education, health care, and gainful employment – global progress and prosperity will have its own glass ceiling.

Our fourth approach is to ensure that our civilian and military efforts operate in a coordinated and complementary fashion where we are engaged in conflict. This is the core of our strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, where we are integrating our efforts with international partners.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, our goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies, and to prevent their return to either country. Yet Americans often ask, why do we ask our young men and women to risk their lives in Afghanistan when al-Qaida’s leadership is in neighboring Pakistan? And that question deserves a good answer: We and our allies fight in Afghanistan because the Taliban protects al-Qaida and depends on it for support, sometimes coordinating activities. In other words, to eliminate al-Qaida, we must also fight the Taliban.

Now, we understand that not all those who fight with the Taliban support al-Qaida, or believe in the extremist policies the Taliban pursued when in power. And today we and our Afghan allies stand ready to welcome anyone supporting the Taliban who renounces al-Qaida, lays down their arms, and is willing to participate in the free and open society that is enshrined in the Afghan Constitution.

To achieve our goals, President Obama is sending an additional 17,000 troops and 4,000 military trainers to Afghanistan. Equally important, we are sending hundreds of direct hire American civilians to lead a new effort to strengthen the Afghan Government, help rebuild the once-vibrant agricultural sector, create jobs, encourage the rule of law, expand opportunities for women, and train the Afghan police. No one should doubt our commitment to Afghanistan and its people. But it is the Afghan people themselves who will determine their own future.

As we proceed, we must not forget that success in Afghanistan also requires close cooperation from neighboring Pakistan, which I will visit this fall. Pakistan is itself under intense pressure from extremist groups. Trilateral cooperation among Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States has built confidence and yielded progress on a number of policy fronts. Our national security, as well as the future of Afghanistan, depends on a stable, democratic, and economically viable Pakistan. And we applaud the new Pakistani determination to deal with the militants who threaten their democracy and our shared security.

In Iraq, we are bolstering our diplomacy and development programs while we implement a responsible withdrawal of our troops. Last month our combat troops successfully redeployed from towns and cities. Our principal focus is now shifting from security issues to civilian efforts that promote Iraqi capacity – supporting the work of the Iraqi ministries and aiding in their efforts to achieve national unity. And we are developing a long-term economic and political relationship with Iraq as outlined by the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement. This Agreement forms the basis of our future cooperation with Iraq and the Iraqi people, and I look forward to discussing it and its implementation with Prime Minister Maliki when he comes to Washington next week.

Our fifth approach is to shore up traditional sources of our influence, including economic strength and the power of our example. We renewed our own values by prohibiting torture and beginning to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. And we have been straightforward about our own measure of responsibility for problems like drug trafficking in Mexico and global climate change. When I acknowledged the obvious about our role in Mexico’s current conflict with narco-traffickers, some were critical. But they’re missing the point. Our capacity to take responsibility, and our willingness to change, to do the right thing, are themselves hallmarks of our greatness as a nation and strategic assets that can help us forge coalitions in the service of our interests.

That is certainly true when it comes to key priorities like nonproliferation and climate change. President Obama is committed to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and a series of concrete steps to reduce the threat and spread of these weapons, including working with the Senate to ratify the follow-on START agreement and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking on greater responsibility within the Non Proliferation Treaty Framework and convening the world’s leaders here in Washington next year for a nuclear summit. Now we must urge others to take practical steps to advance our shared nonproliferation agenda.

Our Administration is also committed to deep reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, with a plan that will dramatically change the way we produce, consume and conserve energy, and in the process spark an explosion of new investment, and millions of jobs. Now we must urge every other nation to meet its obligations and seize the opportunities of a clean energy future.

We are restoring our economy at home to enhance our strength and capacity abroad, especially at this time of economic turmoil. Now, this is not a traditional priority for a Secretary of State, but I vigorously support American recovery and growth as a pillar of our global leadership. And I am committed to restoring a significant role for the State Department within a whole-of-government approach to international economic policy-making. We will work to ensure that our economic statecraft – trade and investment, debt forgiveness, loan guarantees, technical assistance, decent work practices – support our foreign policy objectives. When coupled with a sound development effort, our economic outreach can give us a better form of globalization, reducing the bitter opposition of recent years and lifting millions more out of poverty.

And finally, I am determined to ensure that the men and women of our Foreign and Civil Service have the resources they need to implement our priorities effectively and safely. That’s why I appointed for the first time a Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources. It’s why we worked so hard to secure additional funding for State and USAID. It’s why we have put ourselves on a path to double foreign assistance over the next few years. And it’s why we are implementing a plan to dramatically increase the number of diplomats and development experts.

Just as we would never deny ammunition to American troops headed into battle, we cannot send our civilian personnel into the field underequipped. If we don’t invest in diplomacy and development, we will end up paying a lot more for conflicts and their consequences. As Secretary Gates has said, diplomacy is an indispensable instrument of national security, as it has been since Franklin, Jefferson and Adams won foreign support for Washington’s army.

Now all of this adds up to a very ambitious agenda. But the world does not afford us the luxury of choosing or waiting. As I said at the outset, we must tackle the urgent, the important and the long-term all at once.

We are both witness to and makers of significant change. We cannot and should not be passive observers. We are determined to channel the currents of change toward a world free of violent extremism, nuclear weapons, global warming, poverty, and abuses of human rights, and above all, a world in which more people in more places can live up to their God-given potential.

The architecture of cooperation we seek to build will advance all these goals, using our power not to dominate or divide but to solve problems. It is the architecture of progress for America and all nations.

More than 230 years ago, Thomas Paine said, “We have it within our power to start the world over again.” Today, in a new and very different era, we are called upon to use that power. I believe we have the right strategy, the right priorities, the right policies, we have the right President, and we have the American people, diverse, committed, and open to the future.

Now all we have to do is deliver. Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

MR. HAASS: Well, thank you for delivering a truly comprehensive talk that was broad and deep. So really, thank you for that, and for doing it here.

I’m going to go straight to our membership and let them ask some questions. I ask them only to wait for a microphone, and to keep their questions as brief as they can be, so we can get as many in as possible. And just let us know your name and your affiliation when we do call on you.

I see zillions of – this is the part of the meeting where I alienate 70 percent of our membership. I may let you call on people before –

SECRETARY CLINTON: Oh, no, no. That’s your job, Richard. (Laughter.)

MR. HAASS: Odeh Aberdene.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, in 1999, I saw you in Gaza with President Clinton altering the PLO charter. There was a great deal of hope. Do you think by 2010 – by the end of 2010, we will have a peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians? And can you say something about Syria?

SECRETARY CLINTON: I well remember that occasion in Gaza and the hope that was generated. And I still carry that hope very much with me, both personally and on behalf of the position I now hold. And it’s one of the reasons why I urged the President to appoint a skilled negotiator as a special envoy, and George Mitchell gratefully accepted. And we have been working literally non-stop to set up the conditions for such negotiations.

But as I said in my speech, we don’t think it is just the responsibility of the Israelis, nor even just of the Palestinians. We expect the entire region, particularly the Arab states, to assist us by stepping up and making clear that they are truly going to support the two-state solution.

We intend to pursue our efforts as vigorously as we possibly can. I’m not going to make any predictions, but I can only tell you that our commitment is deep and durable. And I don’t get easily discouraged, and I don’t want anybody else to, because this is a very difficult undertaking, especially because of the ten years between where we were in Gaza in ’99 and where we are today in 2009. But I have actually been heartened by what I’ve seen in the last six months.

With respect to Syria, we have made it very clear to the Syrians, including with the offer to return an ambassador, that we do want an engagement, but we expect it to be reciprocal, and there are certain actions that we would like to see the Syrians take as we begin to explore this with them. I think Syria is a critical player in whatever we do in the Middle East. I’m hoping that the Syrian calculation of where they should be positionally with respect to their relationship with Iran and their support for extremist and terrorist activities will be changing so that we can pursue a two-way engagement that will benefit both us and the larger region.

MR. HAASS: You mentioned in your speech the potential role of the Palestinian Authority in that context. You did not mention specifically Hamas. Do you see any conceivable situation in which Hamas could play a role in the peace process?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, right now, we are firmly committed to the Quartet principles. And we have made it clear, both publicly and privately, through all kinds of pronouncements, that we would expect Hamas to recognize Israel and renounce violence and agree to abide by prior agreements. And we’ve been very pleased that the Quartet members – the EU, Russia, the UN – have stood very firm with us on that.

And in the efforts to try to work out a unity government between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, the Palestinian Authority has also stood firmly because, of course, they are committed to a two-state solution, something that Hamas has not yet committed to. So at this stage, what we want to do is to get the negotiations going between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority.

And as I said with respect to the Taliban, those who are willing to lay down arms, renounce al-Qaida, be willing to participate in a society that is free and open, they are welcome. And I think that’s true for people in other organizations who may realize that rejectionism and resistance hasn’t really given them or their children the kind of future that they would hope for. And so I’m very committed to working to encourage as many people as possible to be part of the two-state solution, but there are certain entry requirements that have to be paid.

MR. HAASS: Trudy.

QUESTION: Trudy Rubin, the Philadelphia Inquirer.

SECRETARY CLINTON: How are you, Trudy?

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, I wonder if you could elaborate a little on the Administration’s willingness to engage with Iran at this point?

First, could you tell us has there been any response from Ayatollah Khamenei or the Iranian Government to the letter that was sent in May? And if the Iranians should show interest in engagement, what if they stonewall? How long could this go on if there was absolutely no give? And finally, could you clarify, after Vice President’s Biden’s remarks, has there been any green, yellow, or red light given to Israel about an attack on Iran?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, those are three easy questions, Trudy. (Laughter.)

With respect to Iran, I’m going to stay within the boundaries of what I said in my speech. We are well aware that the situation after the election puts a different complexion on both the Iranian Government – we really don’t know what their intentions might be at this point in time. We’re very troubled by the repressive actions that they took in the aftermath of their elections, as well as what are most likely a certain amount of electoral irregularities.

But as I said, we have no path that has opened up right now. But we have made it clear that there is a choice for the Iranian Government to make. And we will wait to see how they decide, whether that choice is worth pursuing. If they were to choose to pursue it, we’ve made it very clear that this is not an open-ended engagement. This is not a door that stays open no matter what happens. And I think that until there is some decision on their part, we really won’t know what to expect.

With respect to the Vice President’s remarks, I think that the President and the White House clarified those the next day.

MR. HAASS: We’ve now had a two-part question and a three-part question. Can we please limit future questions to one part? (Laughter.)

Ambassador Schaffer?

QUESTION: Thank you, and it’s nice to see you, Madame Secretary.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you.

QUESTION: I last saw you in Colombo when you were First Lady.

SECRETARY CLINTON: I remember that.

QUESTION: You’re about to go to India, and I wanted to ask you about what you expect to get out of the trip. Presumably, a lot of it will be on the bilateral side. But I wanted to ask if you could focus a little bit on the foreign policy and global part of your agenda. Are there issues where you see a real prospect of working together with India? Are there others that are tougher? And what do you see as the entry point there?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Ambassador, we are delighted that our two countries will be engaging in a very broad, comprehensive dialogue. It’s the most wide-ranging that I think has ever been put on the table between India and the United States. It has six pillars to it, one of which, of course, is foreign policy, strategic challenges, along with other matters, like health and education and agriculture and the economy.

So I don’t want to prejudge, but it is clear that everything is on the table to discuss. We believe India has a tremendous opportunity and a growing responsibility, which they acknowledge, to play not just a regional role, but a global one as well. How they choose to define that, we will explore in depth during the course of our discussions. But obviously, there are a number of areas where we would welcome Indian leadership and involvement that are difficult.

There’s nothing easy about nonproliferation. Anybody who ever read Strobe Talbott’s book, Engaging India, knows that it’s a very difficult issue. But we want to look at new ways for global and regional regimes on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear. We’re very interested in the role that India sees for itself in the immediate area. You mentioned Sri Lanka. What are the military and particularly naval implications of decisions that India is making going forward? The economic actions that India is taking – they weathered the beginning of the recession better than many places – what are they going to do keep generating growth, lifting people out of poverty? The Congress party made a number of important campaign promises to their poor, particularly the rural poor.

When I’m there, I will visit the first LEED certified building in India to talk about climate change and clean energy. We know that India and China have understandable questions about what role they should be expected to play in any kind of new global climate change regime. Our Special Envoy for Climate Change Todd Stern will be with me. And it is our hope that we can, through dialogue, come up with some win-win approaches. And this LEED-certified building is a perfect example of what India would be capable of doing.

I will also be visiting an agricultural facility because India is really hoping to continue to expand agricultural productivity, but then they have to create an infrastructure so that the crops get to a market. We have to have farm-to-market roads. You have to have storage and refrigeration facilities. So I think that this is an extremely rich area. I’ve just touched the surface of it. So I’m excited. I’m very much looking forward to my meetings with the prime minister and certainly with Minister Krishna and others in India, and we’re going to do everything we can to broaden and deepen our engagement.

MR. HAASS: You mentioned Ambassador – Senator Mitchell and Todd Stern. I want to make sure that – are there any members of your staff who want to ask a question here?

SECRETARY CLINTON: They’d better not.

(Laughter.)

MR. HAASS: I don’t want to deny them – in case the morning staff meeting wasn’t sufficiently long. I wanted to – let’s – in the back, all the way – I see in the third to last row or so, but I can’t see that far who it is. I see one or two hands up there.

QUESTION: Jonathan Broder from Congressional Quarterly. Madame Secretary, there have been reports that in the discussions between George Mitchell and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, that a certain number of settlements – or houses in the settlements that have already begun, the construction has begun on them already, that there has – was some agreement to allow the construction on these houses to go forward. Can you confirm that?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I’m certainly not going to step on the negotiations in any way. I think that any decisions that are made will be announced officially. And it’s only fair to the Israeli Government, as well as to our own, that we wait until decisions have been made.

MR. HAASS: Hattie Babbitt.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Hi, Hattie.

QUESTION: Hi. I wanted to ask you to talk a little bit more about the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. It’s – I understand from your speech on Saturday – modeled in – a little bit after the Defense QDR, but in many ways more complicated because of the numbers of departments and agencies that have a stake or are stakeholders in the process. And could you talk more about how you envision that happening?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thanks, Hattie. I served on the Armed Services Committee for six years. And the Quadrennial Defense Review, it seemed to me, was a very important discipline and tool for the Defense Department. It forced the Defense Department to take a hard look at itself, put forward priorities and the means to achieve them. And I thought it was one of the many reasons why Defense had increasingly taken a paramount position in our foreign policy. So among the many steps we’re taking, I decided we would do the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, because I think it requires us to think hard about what it is we’re trying to achieve, to be as specific as possible, to match our mission with the resources we need, to justify what we believe we are doing and to demonstrate results.

Especially in a global economic downturn, I feel a real responsibility to be able to explain to people who are not currently employed or hanging on by their fingernails, why am I asking for more money for something called diplomacy and development? I’m not asking for the money to build tanks or airplanes. I’m asking to send people to represent the United States, to engage in important negotiations, to be early warning signals. I’m asking to send experts into the field who can work with other nations, achieve sustainable results for the investment we make, lift the standard of living, which we believe then helps to sow the seeds of stability and, hopefully, democracy. And we have to make that case.

So we have embarked upon this. I think it is extremely complicated. I have no illusions about that. It is also, as Hattie said, something where we have to coordinate with a number of other agencies. Defense does work that you could call diplomacy and development. Treasury and the multilateral financial institutions are certainly engaged, at least in development. You’ve got USDA. You’ve got the U.S. Trade Rep. You can go down the list. And we want to try to explain the whole-of-government approach. And so in addition to what we will be doing internally, we will be working with the White House to bring together all the other stakeholders in diplomacy and development.

Now, it won’t surprise you to learn that I am also deep into discussions both with the Pentagon and with the Congress about bringing back some of the authorities and some of the money that went with them that has been used by the military for diplomacy and development. And the migration of those authorities and those resources is one of the many reasons why the State Department and USAID have had a challenging – a more challenging time than usual in the last years.

So this is both a policy tool as well as an attempt to explain and justify what it is we believe we can accomplish. And I want it institutionalized. I think Howard Berman may put it into legislation, so it’s not just a one-shot deal, it’s not just because I’m Secretary of State, but it will require the same level of rigor and analysis every four years by State and USAID.

MR. HAASS: I’m going to do serious – all the way in the back there. I can’t see who it is. The gentleman – yes, sir.

QUESTION: This is Stephen Flanagan from CSIS.

MR. HAASS: Oh, Stephen.

QUESTION: Madame Secretary, I had a question about your – the question of the dividends that are being – receiving – the Administration is receiving from its recommitment to alliances and alliance relationships. Many of our NATO allies definitely welcomed the shift in strategy and the recommitment to alliance relationships generally that the Administration put forward, but frankly, the response at Strasbourg-Kehl was little bit tepid, both on the military and the civil side. Now, President Obama characterized that as a down payment and that there would be more forthcoming, but yet we also still hear some allies hiding behind the complaint that, well, we haven’t yet seen the full development of the civil side of the Administration’s strategy.

So I wanted to ask you: Where do you see – do you see the second and third payments coming from our allies? And also, if you could give us a brief sense of where you are. You mentioned the recommitment of additional personnel to Afghanistan, civil personnel on the U.S. side. What about some of our allies and other partners in the world?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I agree that it was a down payment. And I guess I was more impressed by what we got than perhaps some were, because I know how difficult it was to make the convincing case to allies who felt like they had been either shut out of the process or had a feeling that their contributions were not adequately appreciated. So we had a lot of catch-up work to do, and it was part of our overall strategic review. Richard Holbrooke is here, and he has put together an interagency team as well as an international team. We have intense ongoing discussions with our ISAF allies and with others who want to play a part in promoting the strategy that the President put forth.

Now, it’s challenging because of the global economic crisis that everybody faces. It’s also difficult, as it is in our own country, to understand – well, wait a minute, you’ve been there for nearly eight years and now you’re adding more troops and you’re asking for more funding and you’re going to send more civilians? So, I mean, we have to answer these questions in our own country. And you saw where Prime Minister Brown in Great Britain – they lost eight soldiers. And the government went out and began talking about why it was important to stand with the United States and others in Afghanistan, and got, from what I could glean, a more positive response than people anticipated. Because you have to be willing to try to assuage the fears and anxieties and paint a picture of where you’re going.

Now, on the civilian side, this has been one of the areas that Jack Lew, my Deputy for Resources and Management, working with Ambassador Holbrooke and his team and USAID and everybody involved – we’ve actually been heartened by the numbers of people who have volunteered to go. But we’ve limited the areas that the United States is going to focus on. For example, you heard me say agriculture. Seventy percent of the people of Afghanistan live in rural areas. Afghanistan used to be, in some descriptions, a garden of Central Asia and South Asia. And because of the Soviet invasion and the resistance to that and then the warlords, I mean, now it is so eroded and dry and – the whole agricultural base has to be reinvigorated. So we’re really focused on that. We’re not promising to be all things to all people. And in fact, we’re working with our allies so that they will focus on areas that we are not able to any longer.

So look, this is very complicated. And the whole idea is to be able to clear and hold, which is what our Marines are doing in the south right now, and to provide security for people and to begin to see life return to markets and other means of common activity, and then to go in and work with local people: on their police force, which we will be focusing on; on agriculture; and obviously, since I’m Secretary of State, on women and women’s roles and opportunities.

And I’m not here to say, we know exactly everything to do and every one of our allies is going to come through, but I am encouraged by those who feel the political pressure or the economic pressure to shift from military resources to civilian and development resources. And I think we’ve put together something which has a direct relationship to the strategy that we’re now following.

MR. HAASS: Professor Lieber.

QUESTION: Bob Lieber, Georgetown. After the easy questions, let me ask you one a tad more challenging. The previous presidents, from Jimmy Carter through Ronald Reagan through Bill Clinton, have sought to reach out to Iran and been rebuffed. Frankly, every president has had that experience. Iran, for 20 years, has been cheating on its obligations under various treaties. If Iran fails to respond positively to these initiatives, and if our friends and allies and others, including Russia and China, are unprepared to countenance really significant sanctions, what happens then? President Obama, either during the campaign or shortly after, said that the U.S. would not be willing to see Iran with a nuclear weapon. And therefore, I have to ask the question: If these other efforts don’t work, is the Administration prepared to live with a nuclear Iran or not?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, as I said in my speech, as you rightly quoted the president, we have consistently stated that we do not accept a nuclear-armed Iran. We think it is a great threat to the region and beyond.

But as you might guess, I’m not going to negotiate with Iran sitting here. And in most negotiations I’ve ever been a part of, either as a lawyer or as a senator or in any other capacity, I think if you have a clear set of objectives and you begin the process, you have a better idea of what might or might not be possible. We have no illusions about this. I believe, though, that the absence of the United States for much of the last eight years in these negotiations was a mistake. I think we outsourced our policy to Iran and, frankly, it didn’t work very well. That’s how I see it. I want to be in the middle of it, to be able to make our own judgments, to figure out what we know and don’t know, and then to be in a stronger position with respect to other nations.

I think part of the attractiveness of engagement, direct engagement, is not only to make our own judgments, but also to demonstrate to others that we’ve done so, and to make clear what kind of reaction we’ve gotten, which I think lays the groundwork for concerted action. And certainly, in just the last six months in our efforts in talking with other partners, I’ve noticed a turn in attitude by some, a recognition that it’s not just the United States that should be concerned about what Iran is doing, but that there are implications for others who are much closer than we are to Iran.

So I think that, as I said in the speech, our policy is one that we believe makes the most sense for our interests, and we intend to pursue it but we obviously have exits along the way depending upon the consequences of the discussions.

MR. HAASS: We probably have time for about one last question. Stan Roth.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Hi, Stan.

QUESTION: Hi, good to see you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Good to see you.

QUESTION: I just wanted to ask you to expand on –

SECRETARY CLINTON: Oh, here comes the microphone.

QUESTION: Stanley Roth with The Boeing Company. I wanted to ask you to expand on one of the points you made towards the end of your speech, the State Department’s whole-of-government approach to economic issues. Particularly as you work on the economic recovery of the U.S., the role for trade, beyond just the reference you made to free trade agreements, where would you like to see us end up on the trade side? But also, exports obviously are going to be part of the recovery plan. What role do you see for yourself and the State Department in terms of commercial advocacy? It’s sometimes tough, the environment faced by American business overseas.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, commercial advocacy is part of our list of responsibilities, as you know, and it’s one that I take very seriously. But I’d like to just take a step back and look at the broader picture of the State Department’s role in economic aspects of foreign policy.

From my perspective, trade is a foreign policy tool as well as an economic one. And we’re in the midst of looking hard at our trade policy, trying to determine how we can be more effective in making the case to the Congress and the American people about trade, but also making it clear to the rest of the world that we’re a trading nation and we want to be.

But we’re at a point where the economic implications of foreign policy are now very heavily seen as part of the intersection of nations. I mean, the G-20 is assuming greater and greater importance. I mean, you remember it started in 1998 as a result of the Asian financial crisis, and it has stayed as a player because it serves a very useful purpose. You have people at the table who, before, were not welcome or were not even thought of in the same breath as the United States or Great Britain or someone else.

So I think that the role of the economic agenda of the State Department needs to be strengthened. We work closely with Treasury. We work closely with the National Economic Council. But I’ll give you a quick example: David Lipton, who works with Larry Summers in the White House, just went to Pakistan for us to do an assessment of Pakistan’s capacity to meet the IMF requirements and what it needed and how it was doing. Well, was that an economic analysis? Was that a strategic, security, political – ? I would argue it’s all of that. So why would we say, oh, well, no, we’re not going to be part of the economic mix, when it’s critical as to how we’re dealing with other countries? Part of the reason that I worked to have our dialogue with China be inclusive and comprehensive is because strategic and economic concerns cannot be divorced.

So on all of these issues, the State Department has to play a role on the economic front. And we’re working very collegially with everybody. I mean, obviously, you have different perspectives, different jurisdiction. We know all of that. But there is a recognition inside this Administration that it’s an all-hands-on-deck, whole-of-government time. Everybody’s being required to get up and do your part and redefine what it is and expand it so that you can be the most effective player possible. So I think this is just part of our responsibility now.

QUESTION: So after six months, what has most struck you about this? Here you are; what’s surprised you the most?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, I’m really impressed by the quality of the people I work with at both the State Department and USAID, just the level of passion and intense commitment, the willingness to work long and all hours; you know that from your own experience. The excitement of being part of the new Administration, which has meant so much to so many people around the world and has certainly caused people to rethink who we are as Americans and maybe give us a break, cut us some slack as we get organized and get going.

I still think it’s hard to justify not having our full government in place six months after we started. That’s something that we’ve got to do something about, I think. (Applause.) I mean, we are trying to get our political leaders in place to work with our very dedicated Foreign Service and Civil Service employees, but we’re still not there yet. And I had no idea when I was in the Senate asking a million questions of every nominee – (laughter) – how really shortsighted that was. (Laughter.)

It’s amazing; the other thing I didn’t realize is that when all else failed, if there was a problem that had a foreign policy implication, write a letter when you’re in the Congress – Ellen Tauscher, who is our new Under Secretary for Arms Control and Nonproliferation – so I probably, in my eight years, wrote hundreds of letters, and now I have to read them. (Laughter.) And it just depends upon which side of the table you’re sitting.

But it’s been a real privilege and an honor, and I think we’re making a difference, and obviously, we’re going to work as hard as we can to translate that into the results that the American people deserve.

MR. HAASS: Everybody here wishes you a successful and safe trip, as you know, to India and Thailand, and it’s been a privilege and an honor, to quote your words back at you, for us to have you here today. Thank you.

SECRETARY CLINTON: Thank you, Richard. Thank you. Thank you so much. (Applause.)
Sunday
Jul122009

Afghanistan: The Irresistible Illusion of an Unobtainable Victory

AFGHAN INSURGENCY MAPRory Stewart, who served as a British Government official in Iraq and Afghanistan, has written eloquently of the difficulties of intervention. However, his latest article, in The London Review of Books, is exceptional. It is a lengthy examination both of the impulse to expand the current political and military approach and of the difficulties, if not futility, of doing so: "After seven years of refinement, the policy seems so buoyed by illusions, caulked in ambiguous language and encrusted with moral claims, analogies and political theories that it can seem futile to present an alternative."

The Irresistible Illusion


We are accustomed to seeing Afghans through bars, or smeared windows, or the sight of a rifle: turbaned men carrying rockets, praying in unison, or lying in pools of blood; boys squabbling in an empty swimming-pool; women in burn wards, or begging in burqas. Kabul is a South Asian city of millions. Bollywood music blares out in its crowded spice markets and flower gardens, but it seems that images conveying colour and humour are reserved for Rajasthan.

Barack Obama, in a recent speech, set out our fears. The Afghan government is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency . . . If the Afghan government falls to the Taliban – or allows al-Qaida to go unchallenged – that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can . . . For the Afghan people, a return to Taliban rule would condemn their country to brutal governance, international isolation, a paralysed economy, and the denial of basic human rights to the Afghan people – especially women and girls. The return in force of al-Qaida terrorists who would accompany the core Taliban leadership would cast Afghanistan under the shadow of perpetual violence.

When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. ‘There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.

It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. None of the experts in 1988 predicted that the Russian-backed President Najibullah would survive for two and a half years after the Soviet withdrawal. And no one predicted at the beginning of 1994 that the famous commanders of the jihad, Hekmatyar and Masud, then fighting a civil war in the centre of Kabul, could be swept aside by an unknown group of madrassah students called the Taliban. Or that the Taliban would, in a few months, conquer 90 per cent of the country, eliminate much corruption, restore security on the roads and host al-Qaida.

It is tempting to assume that economic growth will not make Afghanistan into Obama’s terrorist haven or Brown’s strong democracy but rather into something more like its wealthier neighbours. Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan were at various points under the same Muslim empires. There are Persian, Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik populations in Afghanistan, and the Afghan Pushtun are only arbitrarily divided by the Durand Line from their Pakistani kinsmen. The economies are linked and millions of Afghans have studied and worked in Iran or Pakistan. There are more reasons for Afghanistan to develop into a country like one of its neighbours than for it to collapse into Somalian civil war or solidify into Malaysian democracy. But Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan present a bewildering variety of states: an Islamist theocracy, a surreal mock-tribal autocracy, a repressive secular dictatorship, a country trembling on the edge of civil war, a military dictatorship cum democracy. And it will be many years before Afghanistan’s economy or its institutions draw level with those of its neighbours.

Read rest of article....