Iran: How Big is the Green Wave?

The Latest from Iran (31 July): And Now….?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

In light of yesterday's rush of events --- some tense, some moving, some confusing, all demonstrating that the issues in Iran have moved beyond a challenge over a disputed Presidential election --- how significant is the pressure for "something to be done" about the Iranian system? And what exactly is to be done?

Borzou Daragahi and Ramin Mostaghim of the Los Angeles Times, who excelled in their coverage of the "40th Day" memorial, offer one dramatic answer:

Protesters swarmed Tehran's main cemetery and fanned out across a large swath of the capital Thursday, defying truncheons and tear gas to publicly mourn those killed in weeks of unrest, including a young woman whose death shocked people around the world....Thirty years ago, such commemorations helped build momentum for the Islamic Revolution that overthrew the shah. The resilience of the thousands of protesters this time set the stage for more clashes next week, when hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is to be inaugurated for a second term.

"Momentum" for "the overthrow" of the regime? Hmm....

Understandably, Daragahi and Mostaghim, who was in Tehran, were caught up in the excitement of an extended moment, both at Behesht-e-Zahra cemetery and then across the capital as demonstrations continued late into the night. It's the next morning, however, and excitement gives way to reflection and a view of a murkier political situation. The assessment we offered on 18 July, the day after Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday prayers in Tehran, still seems apt:

Given the expectations of the Movement, and the realities that political manoeuvre vs. a hostile President and legislative action (not to mention the Supreme Leader’s endorsement) take time, is [a new political front] enough?....[These events are] a reminder, in an Iran of “gradual revolution”, of marathon not sprint.

This caution should not overshadow the symbolic and political power of yesterday's memorial. There will never be a result in the numbers game --- viewing footage and carefully reading reports, the CNN figure of 3000 at Behest-e-Zahra cemetery seems far too low while the estimate of 40,000, offered by Mardamak, Norooz, and the Los Angeles Times may be optimistic --- but the precise figure is not that important. Thousands, maybe tens of thousands, responded to the call to show up in tribute to the martyrs of 20 June. They did so despite confusion over the exact plans, concern over the response of security forces, and warnings from the regime, both in rhetoric (see the statement of the chief prosecutor Mortazavi yesterday in anticipation of Saturday's first trials of demonstrators) and in further arrests.

And we will never know how many thousands, maybe tens of thousands, were scattered across Tehran and beyond in further marches and shows of support for the Green Movement. The Government's restrictions on the alternative media are crumbling, which meant that video came out at a rate which overwhelmed our attempts to post the best footage of the day. And that video, while of course only a partial view of 30 July, showed a determination and an enthusiasm to make both anger and hope heard.

The Government's efforts to limit, if not shut down, both mourning and protest yesterday were fumbling. There was, thankfully, fewer reports of violence and injuries than on previous occasions, including the cause for the memorial, the deaths of 20 June. While dramatic images emerged, such as a clash between demonstrators and police using batons in Vanak Square (see yesterday's video, Part 1), that incident apparently ended in tear gas rather than gunfire. A scattering of arrests were reported but even some of those taken were later freed, such as the filmmaker Jafar Panahi

At the same time, the security forces probably caused further difficulties for the regime with their ham-fisted efforts to keep opposition leaders away from the memorial. They were successful in turning back Mir Hossein Mousavi, but it appears that Mehdi Karroubi and the supporting crowd were defiant, not only saving Karroubi from being man-handled (as had happened on 17 July) but ensuring that he spoke to the gathering. We have footage of Karroubi's arrival at the cemetery (yesterday's video, Part 1); if any images of this show of resistance emerges, I suspect they may be a powerful symbol for the strength of the Green Wave.

Yet, on the morning after, those incidents can also be turned around to pose questions for the opposition. If one was to be crude, the more-than-symbolic question could be put, "Where is Mousavi now?" It is not just the fact that, minutes after crowds were chanting "Ya Hossein! Mir Hossein!", he was rebuffed in his attempt to pay respects; it is that he never resurfaced on the day, despite rumours that he like many of the crowd moved to the Grand Mosala.

Less crudely, dramatic protest has to be followed by less dramatic political planning and manoeuvring. And that in turn highlights that, two weeks after the 17 July moment, there is still no political front, let alone a well-developed set of proposals for what should be done with Iran's political, religious, and judicial system. We are back to the difficult, sometimes grubby, details of not only the Presidency and Iranian security forces, including the Revolutionary Guard but also of institutions like the Guardian Council and of the powers of the Supreme Leader. It is a difficult challenge beyond the spirit and success of yesterday, and seen in these terms, one which poses questions which cannot be answered at this point.

There is another twist, however. The Green Wave's persistence does not depend on those unanswered questions because of more immediate issues. Foremost among these are detention and interrogation. It is notable that the sustained pressure that has been brought by both clerical and political opposition, symbolised by the Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi letter and the response of some Ayatollahs, has been concerned with the abuses of detainees and demands that someone take responsibility for the violation of law, humanity, and Islam.

A pragmatic move by the Government, to ease that pressure, would be to give way on the detentions, and it did so to an extent with the announced release of 140 prisoners and the promised closure of the Kahrizak facility. This, however, appears to be a concession offset by the prospect of further punishment. Tomorrow, only 48 hours after the memorial, the trials of about 20 detainees are scheduled to begin. Foreshadowed by yesterday's announcement by Mortazavi, the court proceedings will probably be marked by more strident rhetoric about foreign manipulations and even the evil direction of opposition leaders within Iran. All of this is likely to re-raise the questions of the Government's system of "crime" and punishment and, more importantly, to create new martyrs for the cause.

The second immediate issue is the diminishing but still pivotal figure of President Ahmadinejad. Yesterday, in the face of the high-profile challenge to his authority, he disappeared, going to Mashaad to meet academics and scientists. That's his second flight in two weeks; he made the same trip to Mashaad on 16 July, the day before Rafsanjani's Friday prayers.

This is a political leader without authority, yet ironically, we are only six days away from the supposed re-confirmation of his authority when Ahmadinejad is inaugurated. And that saves the Green Wave from the longer-term questions about the political system. For the opposition, which is not only "reformist" but now those "principlists" and "conservatives" whom the President has alienated, can agree that longer-term questions can be put aside for criticism of an immediate target.

Waves ebb and flow. Yesterday, after a week of confrontation within the system, the tide came dramatically in, to demonstrate that protests remains strong and defiant. Today, it goes out, to make way again for those day-to-day manoeuvres challenging the current President of Iran. And next week, it comes in once again, as 5 August brings the symbolic clash of an official inauguration and an unofficial denial of that ceremony.

Beyond that? It's not "the overthrow of the Shah". It's an Iran 30 years later --- this Wave is already in uncharted waters for the Islamic Republic, and I doubt any of us have the map to indicate where it goes.

Beyond the Wave: Why the US Still Engages with Iran

The Latest from Iran (31 July): And Now….?

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

I suspect this extended article by Roger Cohen, formally published in this Sunday's New York Times Magazine, will cause a few media fireworks. Cohen has been criticised for a series of recent pieces, based on a visit to Iran, which have provided complexity beyond the image of an anti-Western, anti-Israeli country. This essay combines Cohen's sympathy with the Green Movement with an incisive examination of the Obama Administration's approach to the Government that is still in power. His conclusions echo our own analysis on Enduring America: the baseline for Washington's policy is that it has to deal with an Iranian regime which may or may not be developing nuclear weapons and which is definitely a key player in regional politics, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and the rest of the Middle East.

The Making of an Iran Policy

The silent protest began in Imam Khomeini Square in front of the forbidding Ministry of Telecommunications, which was busy cutting off cellphones but powerless to stop the murmured rage coursing through Tehran. Six days had passed since Iran’s disputed June 12 election, but the fury that brought three million people onto the streets the previous Monday showed no sign of abating. “Silence will win against bullets,” a woman beside me whispered. Her name was Zahra. She wore a green headband — the color adopted by the campaign of the defeated reformist candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi — and she held a banner saying, “This land is my land.” The words captured the popular conviction that not only had President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stolen votes, but he also had made off with Iran’s dignity. Slowly the vast crowd began to move north. No chant issued from the throng, only distilled indignation. A young man asked me where I was from. When I told him New York, he shot back: “Give our regards to freedom. It’s coming right here!”

In those giddy postelectoral days, anything seemed possible, even the arrival of liberty, or at least more of it, in the 30-year-old Islamic Republic. Through the swirl of events — the huge crowds, the beatings and the sirens, the tear gas and black smoke — the core issues were simple. Iranians felt cheated. They wanted their votes to count. They knew that no genuinevictor with two-thirds of the vote need resort to brutality or fear a recount. Sometimes they asked me if the United Nations would help them; often they asked if America would. It was their way of saying, with fierce emotion, that the morality of the Iranian story, its right and wrong, was plain.

But it was precisely emotion, and notions of good and evil, that the Obama administration had spent the previous months trying to drain from the charged U.S.-Iranian relationship. Sobriety dominated the ideas of the president’s Iran team, as I’d learned before I left in conversations with senior officials at the State Department and the National Security Council. The Bush administration’s ideologically driven axis-of-evil approach to Iran had failed. Tehran had prospered by expanding its regional influence and was accelerating its nuclear program. The Obama administration believed it was time to seek normalization through a new, cooler look at a nation critical to U.S. strategic interests — from advancing Israeli-Arab peace negotiations to a successful withdrawal from Iraq.

“Who they select as leader in Iran is their prerogative, and there’s nothing we can do to control that,” Ray Takeyh, an Iranian-born adviser to Dennis Ross, the veteran Mideast negotiator who has been working on Iran for the Obama administration, told me before the election. “We’re trying to deal with Iran as an entity, a state, rather than privileging one faction or another. We want to inject a degree of rationality into this relationship, reduce it to two nations with some differences and some common interests — get beyond the incendiary rhetoric.” Takeyh’s words reminded me of Ross, who in his book “Statecraft” defined the term’s first principles as, “Have clear objectives, tailor them to fit reality.”

But now, as the crowd streaming before me demonstrated, Iran’s reality had changed. In his inaugural address, President Obama said: “To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” Seldom had a fist been clenched more unequivocally, dissent silenced more harshly or deceit practiced with more brazenness than in Iran after June 12.

Still, Obama’s Iran team — Ross; the courtly under secretary of state William Burns; the dapper deputy national security adviser Tom Donilon; the studious senior N.S.C. official Puneet Talwar (the only one, other than Takeyh, who has been to Iran); the hard-charging organization man Denis McDonough, who controls strategic communication at the White House — faced a difficult choice between sticking with strategic outreach to the regime and questioning its legitimacy in the name of human rights. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose instincts on Iran have always been more hawkish than the president’s, “was pushing for a harder line sooner after the June 12 vote,” a Mideast expert close to her told me last month. She was supported by her friend Joe Biden, the vice president. They did not prevail. The tone was cautious; although Obama’s denunciations of the clampdown grew stronger as it worsened, the extended hand, which had proved more unsettling to Iran than all the Bush administration bluster, was not withdrawn.

When I returned from Iran, I went to see one of these senior officials to ask what it had been like making that call. Painful, was the response. Every day, in the election’s aftermath, the team met and conference-called. “It is difficult to weigh all the different considerations,” this official told me. “But given the profoundly serious consequences of an Iranian regime that acquires a nuclear-weapons capability, the judgment in the end was that it was important to follow through on the offer of direct engagement.” He noted that this offer had been “signaled clearly in the course of the campaign” by Obama, and developed since. In other words, this goes deep with the president. He’s driving Iran policy. The Iran gambit lies close to the core of his refashioned global strategy, America’s “new era of engagement.”

Read rest of article....

Media Mischief: The Return of #CNNFail on Iran?

The Latest from Iran (30 July): Memorial Day

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis



UPDATE 1033 GMT: Our closing question has been answered. CNN has just gotten a feature in ahead of the 1130 GMT memorial, although it has reduced the political and religious significance of the story from a rally for all martyrs of the 20 June demonstrations to "Iran: Memorials planned to mark Neda's death".

We mentioned in our first update today that, while the BBC was featuring the story of today's memorial, CNN had yet to wake up to it. (Al Jazeera also was asleep, but now has the story as its website lead.) This is what subsequently happened via Twitter:

0726 CNN iDesk: "Checking on latest reports from inside Iran that some Iranian Opposition Leaders plan to attend a memorial demonstration today" [Those reports, of course, first appeared on Monday. The latest could be checked within five minutes by glancing at websites linked to Mousavi or Karroubi --- see 0745 GMT.]

0840 sayahCNN "Karoubi's website: Both Karoubi & Mousavi to be at Neda's gravesite 4pm Iran time." [Reza Sayah, who covers Iran for CNN, figures out how to discover the news.]

0747 SaeedCNN "Ghalamnews.ir (Moussavi's website) confirms: Both Moussavi & Karroubi plan to attend today's mourning ceremonies for #iranelection victims" [Saeed Ahmed, CNN's wire editor in Atlanta, figures it out as well.]

0843 CNN iDesk: "We'll be on the #iranelection #neda story all day on CNN International." [Oh, you teases. Still nothing on the CNN website.]

0956 SaeedCNN "Here's the story about Iran's opposition leaders' plan to attend ceremonies for #Neda." [And there it is, posted at 0953 GMT: "Iran’s opposition leaders to attend ceremonies for Neda". Except it's not a story on CNN's main page. Or its World page. It's a blog entry on the CNN Wire, "Latest Update on Top Stories". Which is kinda funny since, as we have just noted, this is still not even a Bottom Story.]

So half-joking, half-serious, we ask: Will CNN actually get around, being "on the story all day", to noting the memorial service before it begins at 1130 GMT?

Iran: Ayatollah Montazeri and Others on the Khatami-Mousavi-Karroubi Letter (29 July)

The Latest from Iran (30 July): Memorial Day

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

UPDATE 0705 GMT: Ayatollah Bayat-Zanjani has also responded to the letter of Mousavi-Karroubi-Khatami. He echoed Ayatollahs Montazeri and Sanei in their denunciation of the Government's disregard of the vote of the people, the mass arrests and detentions of protesters, and the torture of prisoners. Calling these actions a "horrific evil". The Ayatollah asked all of those concerned about the future of the establishment, including politicians and higher-ranking officials and judges "to take a stand against this horrific evil and try to purify society from this evil"; otherwise, "the most corrupt of you shall rule upon you".


UPDATE 0645 GMT: Mohammad Motahari, the son of Ayatollah Motahari, a prominent religious figure in the Revolution who was assassinated in 1980, has written a lengthy article assessing Islam and the treatment of protestors and detainees. He concludes, "Whether there was foreign interference or not, whether a velvet revolution was or wasn’t planned, whether the ruling system was in danger or not, no matter who the primary or secondary culprits may have been, none of this gives an infinitesimal right to tyranny and oppression." (hat tip to the "Pedestrian" blog)

---

Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, the one-time successor to Ayatollah Khomeini and a long-time challenger to the current regime, has responded to Saturday's letter from opposition leaders Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, and Mohammad Khatami asking for Grand Ayatollahs to intervene on the issue of detainees and on the legitimacy of the Government.

What have the rulers gained from the crisis that they have caused? Have they gained anything other than making an absolute majority of our beloved people angry and discontented, placing a huge distance between themselves and the people, weakening the prestige of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the world, and inflame the suspicions and sensitivities of many citizens of other countries and human rights organizations throughout the world? Have those who decided to perpetuate these recent horrific events forgotten the fate of the Shah and other totalitarian regimes? Was the Shah able to resist the wave of people's protest and discontent by using [methods such as] brutal suppression of freedom movements, media censorship, imprisonment and torture of political activists and protesters, coerced confessions and false propaganda?

Why have the "wise men of the tribe" given a mandate to a bunch of fanatical individuals who lack rationality and are enslaved to paranoid fancies and cabalist tendencies, individuals whose behavior casts serious aspersions upon the legitimacy of this establishment that is the result of so much investment, leading the young to doubt the principles of the revolution and religious governance?

Why are you inducing the security forces and the basij to commit fratricide and brutally suppress the people? Was this the goal of establishing these forces? What crime have those dear detained individuals committed that you are imprisoning and forcing confessions out of them and consequently deliver their dead bodies to their families? Have they done anything other than protest calmly and peacefully the multitude of irregularities, crimes, misdemeanors, fraud and illegal actions observed in the election and demanding their rights? These coerced confessions are absolutely worthless from the viewpoint of Islamic Law and those who perpetuate these acts are committing mortal sins and must be tried in a just, impartial and open court so the people sincerely believe that their rights are considered.

I warn all decision makers, before the crisis gets deeper and gets out of hand, they should act sensibly, logically and according to Islamic Law, and prepare a sensible and satisfactory reply to the demands of the people. They must bear in mind that the Iranian public are wise and sensible and will find it unacceptable if the culprits are not punished....

[I ask God to grant] health and prosperity for the dear and noble people of Iran, glory for our dear Islamic religion, power to reinstate the the ignored rights and freedom for the prisoners detained under false pretenses.

Iran: The "40th Day" Memorial and the Inauguration

The Latest from Iran (29 July): Challenges Outside and Inside the Government

Receive our latest updates by email or RSS SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FEED
Buy Us A Cup of Coffee? Help Enduring America Expand Its Coverage and Analysis

The political scene in Iran is always shifting, but an hour last night brought dramatic evidence of the trends, not only in Opposition v. Government but also within the shaky Ahmadinejad Administration.

The news emerged, first through Mir Hossein Mousavi's websites, then through the Iranian press, that the "40th Day" memorial would proceed on Thursday at the Grand Mosala in Tehran. For the activists, this was not a case of defying the authorities; rather, they claimed that there had been no denial of permission. There was only a "low-level" Ministry of Interior official, making a personal statement, trying to stop the gathering.

As with the last high-profile organised rally, the march to Hashemi Rafsanjani's Friday prayers, the challenge is very clever.

Any attempt by the Iranian Government to ban or disrupt the memorial will be upheld as a restriction on Shia Muslims carrying out religious duties in their remembrance of the dead. So what may happen is that Iranian security forces, "maintaining order", do not confront those in the Mosala but try to prevent people getting there. That too has its risks: attention will then be given not only to the memorial (which is designed not only to be political but, on the surface, apolitical with readings from the Koran) but to a series of scattered confrontations around the city.

Those confrontations will produce video; it has been notable that on both 17 July, the day of Rafsanjani's prayers, and 21 July, the last occasion of scattered rallies throughout the capital, far more footage has gotten out of Iran. And if those confrontations produced more arrests, the regime only magnifies the current problem it faces over the issue of detentions.

Since 20 June, when dozens died in demonstrations, there seems to be a pattern to keeping opposition not only alive but visible. Eight days later, there was the limited but still notable gathering of thousands at Qoba mosque. It was then 11 days to the 18 Tir rallies, and another eight days to the Friday prayer march. Tomorrow's memorial comes nine days after the 21 July rallies. President Ahmadinejad thus may want to take note: his inauguration is a week from now, offering a logical occasion for another public show of opposition.

In the same hour last night, another series of revelations emerged about the battle within the Government. The clerical opposition grew throughout the day, with the Assembly of Experts now fragmented into a series of pro-Ahmadinejad and anti-Ahmadinejad (and pro- and anti-Rafsanjani) groups, but in the evening, it was the political criticism of the President that took over. While the majority of Parliament have come out strongly for the Supreme Leader, Ahmadinejad now faces the hostility of "Principlists" and even some "conservatives".

That hostility has had an effect beyond the symbolic. Parliamentary pressure appears to have contributed to the Supreme Leader's decision to close one prison and the Judiciary's order to release 140 detainees. It will be interesting to see if that pressure continues --- there are still hundreds, including prominent politicians, held and the question of an enquiry into the deaths of detainees (remembering that one victim was the son of a high-profile "conservative" activist) is unanswered so far.

Meanwhile, the Ahmadinejad Administration faces its own battles within. We'll post later on an extraordinary story of the convulsions within the Ministry of Intelligence, which have led to the departure of several high-ranking officials, and tales of a political war between the Revolutionary Guard and those who do not want to blame the post-election conflict on a "velvet revolution". The President's declaration yesterday that he, rather than the Supreme Leader, will supervise the Ministry only adds to the intrigue.

Inside the Cabinet, the President is living with three Ministers who he tried to fire. The furour over the First Vice President has overshadowed any political and economic programme --- Ahmadinejad's televised attempt a few weeks ago to set out his policies (and thus his authority) seems very distant.

A week before he is supposed to be inaugurated, "President Ahmadinejad" seems to be little more than a label. Some are paying more attention to the Green Movement, some to the leadership of the Supreme Leader, some to Hashemi Rafsanjani, some even to the notion of a de facto assertion of power by the Revolutionary Guard.

Forty days after the death of the 20 June demonstrators, who will be remembered tomorrow, this is no longer a single "Green Wave". Rather, there are waves crashing all round, outside and the Government. And, even if Ahmadinejad is swept away by the political undertow, there will be no return to still waters.