The Latest from Iran (31 January): No Backing Down

2240 GMT: We close tonight by posting a video of the comments of Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, defending the regime's approach in the Presidential election and against subsequent protests, on CNN.

2155 GMT: News from Evin Prison. Another demonstration tonight by families of detainees and their supporters --- Peyke Iran reports hundreds present. The website claims 23 detainees have been released to the cheers of the crowd.

2020 GMT: All is Well! All is Well! Today's award goes to a Brigadier General Hassan Firouzabadi, who offered this assessment of the current situation:

The Islamic Republic of Iran is looking at a bright future under the aegis of the visionary leadership of Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei and the support of a considerable number of devotees inside and outside the country...

“Ceremonies marking the 31st anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution will kick off this year at a time when Iran has made great progress in various fields of science and technology. The global powers, along with their supporters inside the country, desperately sought to undermine the principles of the Islamic Revolution.

So, Mr Firouzabadi, we pass over to you the EA All is Well Trophy Video:

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zDAmPIq29ro[/youtube]

NEW Latest Iran Video: Foreign Minister Mottaki on Elections & Protests (31 January)
NEW Iran Analysis: Mousavi and Karroubi Answer the Regime — “Defiance”
NEW Iran From the Outside: Helping Through “Active Neutrality”
Latest Iran Video: Defending the Executions (30 January)
Iran Document: Mousavi-Karroubi Declaration on Rights and 22 Bahman (30 January)
Iran’s Executions: The Reformist Participation Front Questions to Sadegh Larijani
Iran Patriotism Special: Wiping the Green From The Flag
The Latest from Iran (30 January): Threat

2015 GMT: The speaker of the reformist minority group in Parliament, Mohammad Reza Tabesh, resigned to protest restricitons such as the filtering of the party's website Parleman News and the banning of its reporter from the Parliament and preventing guests of MPs from entering the Parliament. (Those guests include family members of political prisoners. One delegation was turned away today.)

The Deputy Speaker and members of the party intervened and requested Tabesh to remain in his post.


1920 GMT: Mahmoud, They Haven't Forgotten You. Just in case anyone was wondering if the "conservative" opposition to the Government had gone quiet, a refresher on a story from yesterday....

High-profile member of Parliament Ahmad Tavakoli, in a letter to Ahmadinejad through the website Alef News, has criticised the warnings handed out to newspapers by the Press Supervisory Board: "In most of the cases the reasons mentioned were very unsound and unbelievably unjustified." Tavakoli also derided the Ministry of Intelligence's list of 60 international organisations, involved in "soft war" with whom Iranians were to have no contact: "In the spheres of politics and media, it is the duty of the government to enhance freedom and to ban illegal limitations and narrow-minded restrictions."

1915 GMT: On the Economic Front (cont.): The Central Bank has issued a gloomy report about Iran's economic performance in recent months, with declining investment, output, and exports. The report has appeared in both the Green movement's Rah-e-Sabz and the pro-Rafsanjani Ayande News.

1800 GMT: On the Economic Front. The Swiss engineering group ABB AG has stopped taking new orders in Iran with a view to ending operations in the country.

1755 GMT: Iranian Labor News Agency reports that 218 members of Parliament have signed a motion calling on "prominent figures" to support the Supreme Leader:

“We must give stern warning to the enemies and bullying powers that their conspiracies will be thwarted by Iranian wise and vigilant nation as before. We advise the prominent figures who fanned the flames of dispute to make good on their mistakes and remain committed to rule of law."

1745 GMT: Detainee News (cont.). Dr. Alireza Beheshti, Mir Hossein Mousavi’s top advisor (not to be confused with Alireza Beheshti Shirazi, another Mousavi advisor) and son of the late Ayatollah Beheshti, has complained about unacceptable prison conditions in a short telephone call to his family. Beheshti's wife said that the regime is still searching for charges against her husband; one of the possibilities is that he has multiple mobile phone numbers.

Beheshti, detained in the new wave of arrests after Ashura, has suffered a heart attack while in custody. He reportedly has not been able to meet his lawyer or study his file.

1645 GMT: Larijani, Tough Guy. An English translation of the remarks of Sadegh Larijani (see 1445 GMT), head of Iran's judiciary, from Rah-e-Sabz's original report:

Larijani, while defending the execution of a number of people, particularly those accused of being a Mohareb (enemy of God), said: "These people were Moharebs and members of terrorist groups, had weapons or were found with explosives when arrested."

Sadegh Larijani once again reiterated the resolve of the judiciary in dealing with Mohareb groups and said, "Legal criminal procedures were meticulously followed during every phase of the investigation with regards to the cases of these individuals."

With regards to those who seek to create an illusion that there was negligence by the judiciary system in dealing with the defendants and who suggest that they were arrested hastily and without respect for the law, Larijani said, "The criteria by which the judiciary addresses all judicial cases is based only on Sharia (religious and divine law)."

1615 GMT: Detainee News. Seyed Alireza Beheshti Shirazi, a senior advisor to Mir Hossein Mousavi senior advisors and the chief editor of his Kalemeh Sabz newspaper, is still in solitary confinement. Beheshti, detained in the Ashura demonstrations, has not been charged, has not been given a lawyer, and has not been allowed to contact his family.

Dr. Ali Arab Mazar, another imprisoned Mousavi advisor, has finally spoken to his family in a two-minute phone call.

1445 GMT: Defending the Executions. A quiet news day has been interrupted by a statement from the head of Iran's judiciary, Sadegh Larijani, justifying Thursday's executions of Mohammad Reza Ali Zamani and Arash Rahmanipour.

1015 GMT: Colleagues at Iran Review in Tehran have notified us of a series of analyses, from their staff and from the Iranian press, offering insight into Iranian positions on Afghanistan, on the West's approach to Tehran's nuclear programme and Russia's position, and on Iraq's forthcoming elections.

0935 GMT: Fist-Shaking of the Day. Officials in the Obama Administration use their favourite reporters at The Washington Post and The New York Times, to show they are getting very tough with Iran.

With further sanctions on Tehran complicated both by the resistance of other countries and by differing views of the White House and the US Congress, "military officials" have proclaimed that anti-missile defences are being accelerated in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait.

There are other motives in the posturing. An administration official declares, “Our first goal is to deter the Iranians” if Tehran gets a bit miffed about tougher sanctions. That's a pretty weak line, since Iran is unlikely to launch an overt military attack (to my knowledge, Tehran has not done so since the 1979 Islamic Revolution). The official's second aim, "to reassure the Arab states", is more a pointer to the ongoing political battle between Iran and the US for influence in the region. The third objective, however, may be the most significant, beyond the appearance of toughness, "There is certainly an element of calming the Israelis as well.”

0850 GMT: Spinning Hashemi. Iran's state outlet, Press TV, gives the "appropriate" reading for Hashemi Rafsanjani's cautious, balanced statement on the marches of 22 Bahman (11 February). Setting aside any notion of a challenge to the regime, the website headlines, "Hashemi-Rafsanjani: February 11 rallies will foil outside ploys".

0820 GMT: The website of the Holland-based Radio Zamaneh, a key location for news and analysis in the post-election crisis, has been attacked by the "Iranian Cyber Army", the same group that diverted traffic from the Green website Mowj-e-Sabz,   Twitter, and the Chinese service Baidu.

0805 GMT: Another Show of Defiance. More than 2000 people --- detainees' families, Mothers of Mourning, and supporters --- reportedly gathered outside Evin Prison on Saturday night to call for an end to executions.

After the killing of two detainees on Thursday and rumours of more hangings, the demonstrators demanded not only an end to executions but also the unconditional release of all political prisoners. The families of prisoners were told that 23 detainees would be freed, and a few were released, including a 23 year-old woman who expressed her thanks to the crowd.

0800 GMT: The biggest news story on Saturday was the statement of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, responding to the regime's threats, trials, and executions, as they maintained their criticism of the Government and called on followers to march on the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, 22 Bahman (11 February). We have posted a separate analysis.

Amidst our continuing discussions of the relationship between the Green movement and those outside Iran, we have also posted an incisive comment from Mahmood Delkhasteh, proposing the policy of "active neutrality".

And we have posted a video of a Tehran University academic, speaking on Al Jazeera English, defending last Thursday's executions of two political prisoners.

2009: The View from Inside Iran

In Iran Review, published in Tehran, Dr Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh considers the domestic and international landscape for Iran over the last 12 months. What struck me in particular is the careful, even coded, treatment of the post-election conflict: "What is important for an expert in Iranian affairs here is the capability to distinguish superficially changing trends from the profound and reflective developments within the establishment and the society."

The year 2009 was a very significant and decisive year for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, on the 30th birthday of the Iranian revolution (1979-2009) some kind of transformation or rebirth occurred in the scene of internal developments so that for the first time over the past three decades, domestic politics overshadowed foreign policy. In other words, the events before and after the June presidential elections caused many of the conceptual frameworks in the IRI establishment’s interactions with the internal and external environments to be revised, transformed or reconsidered. In the meantime, during the same period of time, Iran’s foreign policy faced its own ups and downs like the previous years.

Among Iran’s foreign policy priorities in 2009 mention can be made of the nuclear issue, relations with the US, relations with the EU, interactions with neighboring countries, continued hostility with Israel, regional role in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, expansion of ties with various corners of the world including Latin America, and efforts to play an effective role at international organizations through promotion of multilateral diplomacy.

The following report discusses some prominent points and significant events and interactions Iran went through and experienced in 2009.

Domestic Policy

The presidential elections began to overshadow all internal issues and developments in Iran from the early days of the spring 2009.



Nonetheless, no domestic analyst ever predicted that within a period of just two months the elections would become the hottest issue in the entire society. The kind of programs given by the candidates who had made their ways into the final stage, radio interviews and heated TV debates by the presidential hopefuls and their repercussions in the society which in turn caused street lineups by supporters of the candidates that sometimes continued until the early hours into the morning had brought a climate of excitement reminiscent of the early days of the 1979 revolution though it came as a big surprise and sounded very unusual to those who were too young to remember those days. The presence of nearly 85 percent of eligible voters in the polls demonstrated the great impact of the competition climate as well as the importance Iranian people attached to their inalienable right in the field of democracy.

However, the post-election days were not peaceful days and in fact marked the outbreak of incidents which continued towards the end of 2009 and well into the year 2010. This trend will most probably continue in the coming months.

Irrespective of all peaceful and violent protests and clashes, position-takings, commentaries, rifts, patch-ups, unifications, transformations and many other developments that have occurred in the domestic scene in Iran, the nation and the ruling establishment gained experiences which would take years to acquire under normal conditions.

In the meantime, it would be a superficial analysis to say that the IRI establishment has been shaken after the presidential elections and that its collapse is near. Likewise, it would be wrong to say that no changes have occurred in the IRI policies and approaches and that Iran is the same Iran before June 2009. If we leave behind the attractive media propaganda and spot news reporting, it would be possible to reach a deeper analysis of this trend.

Nowadays, although many state officials and experts, particularly those who have left behind the difficult years early after the revolution as well as the hardships of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) are not happy with the status quo yet they maintain that the revolution has gone through much more difficult days before. These officials and experts are convinced that despite the extremisms shown by certain individuals from the opposing camps after the presidential elections, the IRI establishment has displayed and will display high tolerance, forbearance and compatibility. They opine that all these incidents will eventually lead to a better and deeper understanding and more dynamism on behalf of the IRI system. In other words, by accepting criticisms from within, the IRI would identify and mend its vulnerable points, would have a more comprehensive and more thoughtful look at internal and international issues and take stronger strides in compliance with the conditions and requirements of the day with knowledge about the demands and potentials of the nation and civil society.

In reality, what is important for an expert in Iranian affairs here is the capability to distinguish superficially changing trends from the profound and reflective developments within the establishment and the society. As mentioned before, it is inevitable that the climate of Iran’s interactions with the internal society as well as the international community will be quite different from the past. But to expect Iran to turn into a bankrupt state engulfed with internal riots and become internationally weak is so inappropriate that even many of the current protest leaders would not agree with.

Foreign Policy

Although the scene of Iran’s international interactions was to a great extent influenced by domestic dynamism in the last months of 2009, the events and as a result Iran’s reactions fell mostly within the framework of the policies formulated by the Islamic Republic system. Some of the most important interactions and developments in key areas were as follows:

1. Nuclear Issue

On the whole, Iran received three reports from the former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency on June 5, August 28 and November 16, 2009. In all of these reports, as had been the case before, the IAEA chief adopted an ambiguous approach by saying there was no evidence to prove Iran’s intention to use nuclear energy for military purposes. At the same time he said Tehran had not suspended enrichment activities and failed to implement the Additional Protocol.

In his November report, Mohamed ElBaradei voiced concern over existence of other secret nuclear sites in Iran and took stance by adopting a harsher tone. Also in the last meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, the draft resolution proposed by P5+1 was reviewed and in the voting which took place on November 27, a resolution was passed under the pressure of Western countries against Iran’s peaceful nuclear activities.

The Iran-IAEA dispute over the way the news about Fordo nuclear installations (near Qom) was disclosed, was among issues which helped adoption of this resolution.
Failure of Iran and P5+1 to come to an agreement on ways of supplying fuel for Iran’s nuclear research reactor, which has not been finalized so far despite negotiations and fluctuations, also overshadowed Iran’s nuclear case and its interactions with the West.

2. Ties with the United States

Although some Iranian experts still believe that there is a better chance for interaction with Barack Obama than with George Bush, what happened in 2009 raised the number of advocates of the viewpoint in the Iranian society that Obama has an iron fist in a velvet glove. Increasing the number of US troops in Afghanistan, the little difference in the policies adopted by US administrations towards the Middle East peace process, and continuation of the US policy of “everyone except for Iran” in the political and economic interactions in the northern and southern spheres of Iran were among signs that further supported this perspective among Iranian experts.

Yet, the US position vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear case and the kind of stance Washington adopted towards the post-election events have further escalated the existing tension.

The Obama administration’s persistence on suspension of Iran’s nuclear activities including uranium enrichment, giving a month-long deadline (until January 1, 2010) to Iran to accept a plan on supply of fuel for Iran’s nuclear research reactor through uranium exchange (of course based on their conditions, that is first to send uranium out of Iran and then receive the fuel in intervals, which faced Iran’s opposition) prompted Iran to propose a simultaneous exchange of fuel inside its own territory or a third country. This made the complicated relations between the two countries to become even more complicated. Here, the adoption of Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act and the Iran Sanctions Enabling Act by the US Congress on December 15 targeting Iran’s oil products further aggravated the climate.

Meanwhile, the US administration’s position vis-à-vis Iran’s post-election events – considering the fact that based on historical experience, any foreign intervention in domestic issues is considered despicable and disagreeable -  is reminiscent of the bitter era of colonialist rivalry between Russia and Britain and later the United States in Iran. This has considerably reduced the possibility of improvement in Tehran-Washington relations and paving the way for an atmosphere of fair talks on issues between the two countries.

However, the increase in the number of American experts and researchers who have admitted in their Iran analyses that no interference should be made in this process indicates that the process of having a better knowledge about Iran is a process forward that can be used in creating better opportunities for acquaintance, interaction and fair relations between governments and communities of both sides.

3. Relations with Europe

Ties between Iran and the EU in 2009 were greatly influenced by human rights issues and post-election developments besides the nuclear issue. Release of numerous statements in condemnation of death sentences carried out in Iran, as well as objection to the existing procedures in the judicial system in probing into charges of some political activists during the election protests were among Europe’s interactions with Iran which escalated after the June presidential elections and arrest of a number of local staff of certain European embassies as well as that of a number of European nationals in street riots in Iran.

Although the Swedish prime minister, whose country took over the EU chair as of July 2009, called on his partners to show self-restraint and warned that Europe should refrain from pitting Iran against other world countries, yet 27 member states of the European Union summoned their ambassadors from Iran on July 3 in protest to the detention of staff of the British embassy in Tehran. The decision was made following a meeting of the EU member states in Brussels. According to an official affiliated to the EU, participants in the meeting agreed to take gradual punitive measures against Iran.

In continuation of these developments, an EU spokesperson said on August 6 while justifying these negative position-takings that Mr. Ahmadinejad’s victory in the elections was open to question and the Iranian people were suspicious about its authenticity. The spokesperson made these statements under conditions that some ambassadors of the EU countries such as France, Britain and Sweden had taken part in the swearing-in ceremony of Mr. Ahmadinejad after his reelection.

On the whole, ties between the two sides in 2009 were full of ups and downs and in fact nothing occurred to reduce future ambiguities in these relations.

4. Iran-China Ties

Stability and growth are among characteristics of mutual relations between Iran and China, which also continued in 2009. In fact, with respect to the vague prospects for improvement of relations with the United States and the European Union, and also the kind of interaction of China and Russia with issues related to Iran, Iranian officials are unintentionally more inclined to promotion of ties with China, particularly in economic fields. The conclusion of a three billion dollar contract between Iran and China to expand Abadan refinery, a five billion dollar deal to develop phase 11 of the South Pars gas field which led to the replacement of French Total Company with the Chinese National Oil Company in this project, increase in trade exchanges between Iran and China to more than 25 billion dollars, an agreement between the two countries to construct Tehran-Isfahan railway and turning Iran to the third biggest oil exporter to China were among important developments in Tehran-Beijing ties in 2009.

5. Iran-Israel Encounter

Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu announced during his election campaign that countering Iran’s nuclear program was on top of his priorities in case of coming to power. He even announced after formation of the new government that he might launch an air strike against Iran to destroy its nuclear installations because he called Iran the biggest threat against the Zionist regime ever since its inception. On the whole, not ruling out a military strike against Iran’s nuclear installations has been one of the most important conflicts in bilateral relations.

The regime in Israel follows this policy by intertwining the Middle East peace process with Iran’s nuclear issue and all-out efforts to show that Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is a threat and in return diverts public attentions from its tension escalating policies and nuclear arsenals, which are the main source of insecurity in the Middle East. Nevertheless, this policy seems to have lost its efficiency with respect to the current realities and its propaganda dimension has outdone its executive one.

Also, the Israeli regime’s use of psychological warfare tactics to create political crises against the Islamic Republic, such as accusing Iran of building A-bomb and magnifying the political events after the June 12 elections, has prompted Israel to intensify its media attacks to undermine the establishment and reduce public loyalty and acceptability. However, experience has shown that no matter how big the differences of Iranian people may be on domestic issues, they will certainly not be inclined towards two things: Israel and the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO).

6. Relations with Neighbors

Iran’s efforts to improve ties with the neighboring countries and restore calm and tranquility towards security of its borders continued in 2009. In this respect, relations with Afghanistan, Turkey and other Central Asian and Caucasus countries continued its growing trend at different paces. However, expansion of ties with the Persian Gulf countries experienced more ups and downs.

As for Iraq, along with some fluctuations in relations, termination of presence of MKO garrisons along Iran’s borders after 24 years was among important developments in Tehran-Baghdad bilateral ties.

On the whole, the ups and downs in international relations as well as domestic dynamism in Iran in 2009 were in some cases more than what was expected at the beginning of the year. In the meantime, the international dynamism has had its special impact on the way Iran has acted. The heavy recession in world economy, the fall in oil prices, the global impacts of environmental pollutions on the climate cycles in Iran and the world, the changing global trends in the area of armaments, human rights, globalization, internet media, etc. all left their impacts on the developments in Iran.
Therefore, it can be said that irrespective of their possible consequences, the year 2009 was a year marked with profound experiences for the Iranian society and the Islamic establishment.