Saturday
Jan232010
UPDATED Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad
Saturday, January 23, 2010 at 10:10
URGENT UPDATE 1240 GMT: The Next Move in the Plot? Abdolhossein Ruholamini has given another interview about the crimes in Kahrizak Prison, including the abuse and death of his son Mohsen.
Ruholamini repeated the information, mentioned in our main article about his speech to a student organisation, that he has more than 3500 pages of evidence against the people in charge of Kahrizak. And he reiterated that there is independent evidence of the attempted murder of Kahrizak doctor Ramin Pourandarjan, who died last autumn. Ruholamini again singled out Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi as the main suspect, saying the former Tehran prosecutor should accept the charges and resign instead of issuing political statements.
Ruholamini added the new claim that forces "behind the scenes" have been trying to get the families of victims to agree to silence, but he declared that he and some other families would "stand till the end".
These claims, however, are only the set-up for Ruholamini's political hammer blow: in a meeting with the Supreme Leader, "Ayatollah Khamenei supported my cause".
And guess where the interview has been reprinted? Well, it is in two publications linked to the central plotters against President Ahmadinejad: Tabnak, linked to Mohsen Rezaei, and in Farda, which supports Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf.
UPDATE 1000 GMT: There has been no high-profile media coverage, to our knowledge, of our news of the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting. The closest intersection has been a blog post by Babak Dad, who is now writing outside Iran, and his interview on Voice of America Persian yesterday. Dad's blog considered in detail the more general story of the manoevures by Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf against the Ahmadinejad Government, while his interview but so far he has not connected this to the specific claim of a plot to curb or remove the President from power.
UPDATE 23 JANUARY, 0700 GMT: 24 hours later, how does the plot story hold up?
Well, there was no explicit confirmation --- given the sensitivity of any attempt to depose the President, that would be unlikely --- there were no development pointing away from the possibility. Indeed, the one piece of circumstantial evidence, Ali Larijani's statement before Friday Prayers in a city southwest of Tehran, gave implied support. The Speaker of Parliament made a veiled invitation to opposition leaders to join a move, and he continued the attack on the Government's management of the economy.
(Someone is also starting some pretty wicked rumours. Notable amongst these on Friday was the "Iran banks will fail on Wednesday" story.)
EA readers maintained a healthy scepticism about the day throughout the day. Some points can be answered quickly --- because of the way we received the information and checked it, I am certain it is not regime disinformation or a pretext to move against irritants like Larijani. Other questions are far trickier, such as the role of the Supreme Leader in these manoeuvres and the process by which the plotters could pull the trigger and oust Ahmadinejad.
An EA correspondent picked up on some of these issues in "A Response to the Plot Against Ahmadinejad", and this morning we have a sharp, valuable discussion between Chris Emery and another EA Iran specialist on not only the complications of deposing the President but the uncertainties of what would follow.
UPDATE 0810 GMT: In last night's debate on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a member of Parliament and fervent Ahmadinejad supporter, alleged that "some people in charge want to overthrow" the Government with the help of the Parliament.
---
For months we have reported on the challenge to President Ahmadinejad, not just from the Green movement but from conservative and principlist members of the Iranian establishment. Since Ashura (27 December), we have noted a rising intensity in criticism, for example, from member of Parliament Ali Motahhari and his brother-in-law, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, as well as the Parliamentary report on detainee abuses charging Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi with responsibility.
The question still remained. Were these criticisms being made by high-profile individuals or were they part of an organised effort to limit Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly even remove him from office?
Here is what we can now report from reliable sources:
1. THE MEETING MAKES A PLAN
Sometime after the demonstrations of Ashura (27 December), three well-placed Iranian politicians met to discuss current events. The protests, with their scenes of violence and, in some cases, the retreat of Iranian security forces before the opposition, had been unsettling, raising fears not only that the challenge would persist but that the authority of the Government might collapse.
The three men were 1) Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament; 2) Mohsen Rezaei, former head of the Revolutionary Guard, former Presidential candidate, and Secretary of the Expediency Council; and 3) Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mayor of Tehran.
The meeting reached agreement on a general two-step strategy. First, the crisis with the opposition would be "solved", either through a resolution with its leaders or by finally suppressing it out of existence. Then, there would be a political campaign to get rid of the unsettling influence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Each of the three men brought not ideas but key groups to the table. Larijani, of course, commanded a good deal of backing in Parliament and was close to the Supreme Leader. Rezaei not only had the background in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps but also, in the Expediency Council, worked with Hashemi Rafsanjani. Qalibaf, although mostly quiet during the post-election crisis, had the base of support from his solid reputation overseeing Tehran.
(It is likely, according to sources, that Rafsanjani knows of the plan, especially given the connection with Rezaei. It is unclear whether the Supreme Leader knows its details.)
The plan, however, soon ran into trouble with its first objective. The group was unable to get the support of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Despite the sustained wave of post-Ashura arrests, striking at the top levels of the Green movement, the prospect of large demonstrations on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, remains. And it is that prospect that was reportedly worrying the Supreme Leader when he spoke last week to ask the "elites" to choose sides and stop being "ambiguous".
So the possibility arose that the second step --- the removal of Ahmadinejad --- would take priority over the first. Newspapers connected to the three men stepped up their articles criticising the Government over the post-election crisis, over the Kahrizak Prison scandal, and over the economy. Larijani went public in statements alleging mismanagement by the Ahmadinejad administration and referring to the dangers of "extremism" within, as well as outside, the Government.
Meanwhile, a key distinction was being made at every opportunity. While the Government could and should be criticised, Ayatollah Khameini should not be challenged. Larijani in particular set out the line: velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical authority, is beyond dispute.
The immediate goals are the downfall of two men in Ahmadinejad's camp: former Tehran Prosecutor General Mortazavi, who is vulnerable because of the detainee scandal, and former First Vice-President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, whose management skills as well as his character are being attacked across a range of issues.
It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him. Victory over Rahim-Mashai, however, would be a major blow to the President. After all, this was the fight of the summer, where Ahmadinejad had to give way over his relative and friend as First Vice-President --- notably because of pressure from the Supreme Leader --- but then brought him back as his closest aide.
To lose Esfandiar once is misfortune; to lose him twice political calamity. Ahmadinejad's authority would be open to further attack, and the post-election crisis could be brought upon him personally. Which brings us to....
2. THE FATHER EXPRESSES HIS ANGER.
"It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him."
Abdolhossein Ruholamini is a prominent Tehran University professor who was the chief advisor to Mohsen Rezaei. He is also the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died from abuse this summer in Kahrizak Prison. That death was instrumental in prompting both the closure of Kahrizak, by personal order of the Supreme Leader, and the Parliamentary enquiry into events there.
Abdolhossein Ruholamini, however, is still campaigning. Last week he met with the student movement, Islamic Community from European Countries to Iran. In a forceful speech, he declared his anger with Ahmadinejad and the Government. He made clear that he and others had decided to "claim and appeal" over the authorities at Kahrizak, Saeed Mortazavi, the police, and the judiciary: (I paraphrase) "We have much evidence against Mortazavi, against police, against some judges. (Ruholamini said that, in one case, a single judge had condemned 700 people to jail in one day.) We even have phone conversations over the killing of the doctor [Ramin Pourandarjan] in Kahrizak.”
Ruholamini made clear that his claim and appeal is also against President Ahmadinejad. And he has also said that he met the Supreme Leader over the matter and Khamenei said (paraphrasing), "Go ahead. The way is clear for you."
3. THE OUTCOME?
EA sources report the sentiment of those in and around the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting and the statements of Ruholamini: “We have decided to replace Ahmadinejad”. At the same time, the group is insisting that the removal has to done within the framework of law. It is notable, for example, how Mohsen Rezaei --- in an extended interview with Press TV last week --- insisted repeatedly that the difference between him and other Presidential candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) in the post-election conflict was that Rezaei had always made his complaints within Iran's system, rather than on the streets.
The most likely path for that campaign is Parliamentary removal of Ahmadinejad --- similar to the US process of impeachment and conviction of a President --- for negligence in carrying out his duties and leading the country in a good direction. This was the process used to oust the first President of the Islamic Republic, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, in 1981.
That case, however, raises a question and possible complication. In 1981 Ayatollah Khomeini was behind the removal of Bani-Sadr. In this case, it is still not clear if the current Supreme Leader, and those close to him such as his son Mojtaba, are fully aware of or in line with the campaign against Ahmadinejad.
Which in turn brings us back to the earlier disputes of summer 2009, when the Supreme Leader --- after protracted battles with Ahmadinejad including not only Rahim-Mashai but also control of key ministries --- proceeded with the President's inauguration. This time, given the mounting fears over 22 Bahman, which way does he turn? Does he intervene or stand aside, letting others play out this political showdown?
Ruholamini repeated the information, mentioned in our main article about his speech to a student organisation, that he has more than 3500 pages of evidence against the people in charge of Kahrizak. And he reiterated that there is independent evidence of the attempted murder of Kahrizak doctor Ramin Pourandarjan, who died last autumn. Ruholamini again singled out Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi as the main suspect, saying the former Tehran prosecutor should accept the charges and resign instead of issuing political statements.
Iran Discussion: How Would Ahmadinejad Fall? (And What Would Come Next?)
Iran: A Response to “The Plot Against Ahmadinejad”
The Latest from Iran (22 January): Breaking News
Ruholamini added the new claim that forces "behind the scenes" have been trying to get the families of victims to agree to silence, but he declared that he and some other families would "stand till the end".
These claims, however, are only the set-up for Ruholamini's political hammer blow: in a meeting with the Supreme Leader, "Ayatollah Khamenei supported my cause".
And guess where the interview has been reprinted? Well, it is in two publications linked to the central plotters against President Ahmadinejad: Tabnak, linked to Mohsen Rezaei, and in Farda, which supports Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf.
UPDATE 1000 GMT: There has been no high-profile media coverage, to our knowledge, of our news of the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting. The closest intersection has been a blog post by Babak Dad, who is now writing outside Iran, and his interview on Voice of America Persian yesterday. Dad's blog considered in detail the more general story of the manoevures by Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezaei, and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf against the Ahmadinejad Government, while his interview but so far he has not connected this to the specific claim of a plot to curb or remove the President from power.
UPDATE 23 JANUARY, 0700 GMT: 24 hours later, how does the plot story hold up?
Well, there was no explicit confirmation --- given the sensitivity of any attempt to depose the President, that would be unlikely --- there were no development pointing away from the possibility. Indeed, the one piece of circumstantial evidence, Ali Larijani's statement before Friday Prayers in a city southwest of Tehran, gave implied support. The Speaker of Parliament made a veiled invitation to opposition leaders to join a move, and he continued the attack on the Government's management of the economy.
(Someone is also starting some pretty wicked rumours. Notable amongst these on Friday was the "Iran banks will fail on Wednesday" story.)
EA readers maintained a healthy scepticism about the day throughout the day. Some points can be answered quickly --- because of the way we received the information and checked it, I am certain it is not regime disinformation or a pretext to move against irritants like Larijani. Other questions are far trickier, such as the role of the Supreme Leader in these manoeuvres and the process by which the plotters could pull the trigger and oust Ahmadinejad.
An EA correspondent picked up on some of these issues in "A Response to the Plot Against Ahmadinejad", and this morning we have a sharp, valuable discussion between Chris Emery and another EA Iran specialist on not only the complications of deposing the President but the uncertainties of what would follow.
UPDATE 0810 GMT: In last night's debate on Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, a member of Parliament and fervent Ahmadinejad supporter, alleged that "some people in charge want to overthrow" the Government with the help of the Parliament.
---
For months we have reported on the challenge to President Ahmadinejad, not just from the Green movement but from conservative and principlist members of the Iranian establishment. Since Ashura (27 December), we have noted a rising intensity in criticism, for example, from member of Parliament Ali Motahhari and his brother-in-law, Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, as well as the Parliamentary report on detainee abuses charging Ahmadinejad aide Saeed Mortazavi with responsibility.
The question still remained. Were these criticisms being made by high-profile individuals or were they part of an organised effort to limit Ahmadinejad's authority and possibly even remove him from office?
Here is what we can now report from reliable sources:
1. THE MEETING MAKES A PLAN
Sometime after the demonstrations of Ashura (27 December), three well-placed Iranian politicians met to discuss current events. The protests, with their scenes of violence and, in some cases, the retreat of Iranian security forces before the opposition, had been unsettling, raising fears not only that the challenge would persist but that the authority of the Government might collapse.
The three men were 1) Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament; 2) Mohsen Rezaei, former head of the Revolutionary Guard, former Presidential candidate, and Secretary of the Expediency Council; and 3) Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mayor of Tehran.
The meeting reached agreement on a general two-step strategy. First, the crisis with the opposition would be "solved", either through a resolution with its leaders or by finally suppressing it out of existence. Then, there would be a political campaign to get rid of the unsettling influence of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Each of the three men brought not ideas but key groups to the table. Larijani, of course, commanded a good deal of backing in Parliament and was close to the Supreme Leader. Rezaei not only had the background in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps but also, in the Expediency Council, worked with Hashemi Rafsanjani. Qalibaf, although mostly quiet during the post-election crisis, had the base of support from his solid reputation overseeing Tehran.
(It is likely, according to sources, that Rafsanjani knows of the plan, especially given the connection with Rezaei. It is unclear whether the Supreme Leader knows its details.)
The plan, however, soon ran into trouble with its first objective. The group was unable to get the support of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Despite the sustained wave of post-Ashura arrests, striking at the top levels of the Green movement, the prospect of large demonstrations on 22 Bahman (11 February), the anniversary of the 1979 Revolution, remains. And it is that prospect that was reportedly worrying the Supreme Leader when he spoke last week to ask the "elites" to choose sides and stop being "ambiguous".
So the possibility arose that the second step --- the removal of Ahmadinejad --- would take priority over the first. Newspapers connected to the three men stepped up their articles criticising the Government over the post-election crisis, over the Kahrizak Prison scandal, and over the economy. Larijani went public in statements alleging mismanagement by the Ahmadinejad administration and referring to the dangers of "extremism" within, as well as outside, the Government.
Meanwhile, a key distinction was being made at every opportunity. While the Government could and should be criticised, Ayatollah Khameini should not be challenged. Larijani in particular set out the line: velayat-e-faqih, the system of ultimate clerical authority, is beyond dispute.
The immediate goals are the downfall of two men in Ahmadinejad's camp: former Tehran Prosecutor General Mortazavi, who is vulnerable because of the detainee scandal, and former First Vice-President and current Chief of Staff Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, whose management skills as well as his character are being attacked across a range of issues.
It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him. Victory over Rahim-Mashai, however, would be a major blow to the President. After all, this was the fight of the summer, where Ahmadinejad had to give way over his relative and friend as First Vice-President --- notably because of pressure from the Supreme Leader --- but then brought him back as his closest aide.
To lose Esfandiar once is misfortune; to lose him twice political calamity. Ahmadinejad's authority would be open to further attack, and the post-election crisis could be brought upon him personally. Which brings us to....
2. THE FATHER EXPRESSES HIS ANGER.
"It may be possible for Mortazavi to be removed and for Ahmadinejad to survive, assuming that none of the Kahrizak scandal sticks to him."
Abdolhossein Ruholamini is a prominent Tehran University professor who was the chief advisor to Mohsen Rezaei. He is also the father of Mohsen Ruholamini, who died from abuse this summer in Kahrizak Prison. That death was instrumental in prompting both the closure of Kahrizak, by personal order of the Supreme Leader, and the Parliamentary enquiry into events there.
Abdolhossein Ruholamini, however, is still campaigning. Last week he met with the student movement, Islamic Community from European Countries to Iran. In a forceful speech, he declared his anger with Ahmadinejad and the Government. He made clear that he and others had decided to "claim and appeal" over the authorities at Kahrizak, Saeed Mortazavi, the police, and the judiciary: (I paraphrase) "We have much evidence against Mortazavi, against police, against some judges. (Ruholamini said that, in one case, a single judge had condemned 700 people to jail in one day.) We even have phone conversations over the killing of the doctor [Ramin Pourandarjan] in Kahrizak.”
Ruholamini made clear that his claim and appeal is also against President Ahmadinejad. And he has also said that he met the Supreme Leader over the matter and Khamenei said (paraphrasing), "Go ahead. The way is clear for you."
3. THE OUTCOME?
EA sources report the sentiment of those in and around the Larijani-Rezaei-Qalibaf meeting and the statements of Ruholamini: “We have decided to replace Ahmadinejad”. At the same time, the group is insisting that the removal has to done within the framework of law. It is notable, for example, how Mohsen Rezaei --- in an extended interview with Press TV last week --- insisted repeatedly that the difference between him and other Presidential candidates (Mousavi and Karroubi) in the post-election conflict was that Rezaei had always made his complaints within Iran's system, rather than on the streets.
The most likely path for that campaign is Parliamentary removal of Ahmadinejad --- similar to the US process of impeachment and conviction of a President --- for negligence in carrying out his duties and leading the country in a good direction. This was the process used to oust the first President of the Islamic Republic, Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, in 1981.
That case, however, raises a question and possible complication. In 1981 Ayatollah Khomeini was behind the removal of Bani-Sadr. In this case, it is still not clear if the current Supreme Leader, and those close to him such as his son Mojtaba, are fully aware of or in line with the campaign against Ahmadinejad.
Which in turn brings us back to the earlier disputes of summer 2009, when the Supreme Leader --- after protracted battles with Ahmadinejad including not only Rahim-Mashai but also control of key ministries --- proceeded with the President's inauguration. This time, given the mounting fears over 22 Bahman, which way does he turn? Does he intervene or stand aside, letting others play out this political showdown?
tagged Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr, Abdolhossein Ruholamini, Ali Larijani, Ali Motahhari, Ashura, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Babak Dad, Esfandiar Rahim-Mashai, Farda, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hojatoleslam Ruhollah Hosseinian, Iran, Iran Elections 2009, Islamic Republican Party, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, Kahrizak Prison, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mehdi Karroubi, Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, Mohsen Rezaei, Mohsen Ruholamini, Pouran, Ramin Pourandarjan, Saeed Mortazavi, Tabnak, Velayat-e-Faqih, Voice of America Persian in Middle East & Iran
Reader Comments (53)
Scott,
Re: Bobak Dad on VOA
No, Bobak Dad did not talk or hint about the plot. The discussion was about the Nuke, China and Russia’s roles and in his view misstep by U.S. (I do not have time now but later this evening I will summarized it for EA) and Role of Internet in Iran Movement.
The so-called plot seems to be EA exclusive so far. Elsewhere, there are more chatter about deal made between Khamenei, Khatami, and Rafsanjani. I sent EA a summary of that on Jan. 21 update. I do not know if you had time to verify credibility of that chatter.
Arshama
22 Bahman won't be destabilized; iranian people are not fool to fall down in the trap; everyone will fight untill the minimum, I have said above, be realized because; in Iran , they have suffered a lot and there is no choice !
Between Galibaf and all the others, even in green movement, I take galibaf ! why ? I don't know ! I find he's not "pedar soukhte", he's not malicious and crafty, he's " young", without any" dirty" blood (killing iranian people) on his hands,of course he was sharing the war Iran Irak to defend his country but it's noble, he's pilote of airbus and doctor , and he looks like us because I find the pro AN 's shapes and figures are completely different as if they were from an other planet; I think he will fight for" justice", trying to be a good president for" all " the people of Iran; perhaps I am wrong, I don't know; perhaps I had an "Elham", voice of God !! :-); but I reassure you, I WILL fight untill the end, untill iranian people succeed to have what they want and don't worry !
I would like to say to all of you that I will be absent for one week and already I miss you ! I will be able to read but not to share; hugs and take care
Out of topic ... but please watch :
Sardar Ghasemi Confesses about Kahrizak Crimes and Fear of Iranian surge http://bit.ly/8dmHOK
Barry,
>Are we able to “define” in any way, what we mean when we use the word “Regime”.<
Thanks, that is a good question, and I would be a rich man, if I knew. I have really no idea what "Regime" means. Perhaps it is that amorphous amoebic creature you mention ;-)
For the moment regime means to me the inner circle around the SL, but don't ask me who belongs to this circle. According to Dad the Larijanis are not part of it, and they have no strong backing in general. At the moment the hardliners are favourized or parts of it belong to this circle, but I am not an expert at all. In any case Dad speaks of "nezam" or "hokumat", which can vaguely be translated with regime. Others believe it is controlled by the IRGC by now, the SL being only a puppet, which does not convince me. He has managed to control this bunch for 20 years, and now it is probably his son Mojtaba, who has taken over a part of his duties (mere guessing). This anti-democratic republic has never revealed its structures, so we sit around here and try to interpret their vague and multi-layered statements. Perhaps Greeny knows it better ...
Ange,
Thanks for your explanation. I don't believe a police chief is a good option for starting democracy in Iran (beware of "strong" men), but if he is as 'clean' as you say, he should exert some function in our future Iran. Didn't you have an Elham, when "they" go, yaani shareshan ra kam mikonand ;-)
Have a nice week and don't forget us! I will be glad to see you back.
safar be kheyr
Scott, Arshama,
I did not think VOA necessarily referred to the so-called Plot as presented by EA. VOA asked Bobak Dad to comment on his assertion in his blog that regime has been, for a while, trying to create its own- managed opposition for the purpose of creating public trust . Bobak Dad replied by focusing on Larijani as troublesome actor that had been up to this game for a long, etc., etc.
I may have misunderstood the portion of the interview At 56 minute mark at VOA. I will have to read Bobak Dad blog to find out if he has written about a “plot” and if so I will change/ modify my post at 21:01. Bobak Dad in his interview of Jan. 22 with VOA did not believe the plan to create a regime-created and managed opposition was anything new that was manufactured after bloody Ashura as EA source had described. We, therefore, may or may not be talking about the same thing.
Arshama, however, may be correct that the PLOT, the Deal (as I wrote about on EA) all may be to confuse and break resolve of Iranians and to diffuse/ manage 22 Bahman.
Scott, I am beginning to think IR intelligence may be taking all of us for ride.
[...] The Plot Against Ahmadinejad Iran: The Plot Against President Ahmadinejad | Enduring America [...]
Barry, Arshama,
Re. term “regime”...
I agree with you that the term regime is confused and at times misleading.
This is what IRI has seemed to me, at least until June 09:
To me IRI is a collection of groups who have mutual interests (you can call them gangs, but I’ll stick to groups).
As time goes by some individuals or groups see that their interests are not served by the IRI and start causing problems or other groups and are eventually kicked out of the regime (this one has been very rare until recently).
Also at other times another groups or groups gang up on one or more groups and throw them out.
I think a lot of this goes back to the way IRI was first created: it was born out of a popular revolution. The revolution involved groups from across the political and ideological spectrum, but one by one other groups where gotten rid of by groups that remained in IRI.
Recently the “filtration” has got to the reformists (which BTW used to be the hardliners of the early days of the revolution).
Since the June elections, IRI has become very divided. And now it seems that all groups are trying to get rid of the others; like a free for all.
You can technically say that Mir Hossein Mousavi is still part of the “regime”: he has bodyguards provided by IRI, lives in a house in the security zone close the Presidential Palace and Supreme Leaders home and stresses that he accept the IRI constitution “not one word more, nor one word less”. Having said this, most people these days tend to think of him as the “opposition”. A lot of the Western media refer to him as opposition too. I suppose he is the “opposition”, but from within the “regime”. The nature of IRI (as explained above) is such that Mousavi is able to keep a foothold (a weak one perhaps, but still a foothold) within the regime, and still represent the strongest challenge to IRI over the past 30 years.
I suppose this is what makes the current challenge so powerful: it is not just the man on the street. It includes many (the majority, if the reformists are to be believed) of the “regime” too. Just look at the list of the people who have been arrested, banned, sacked by the “regime” since June and you’re looking at the who’s who of 1979 to 2005 of the “regime”. Perhaps the only correct statement Khamenei has made since June, was when he said this is a family row!
Slack-jawed Yokel
No Twitter I’m afraid.
Four months later, this reminds me of the piece that appeared in the German publication Deutsche Welle back in September. The piece alleged that a "special committee of experts" was looking into the possibility of replacing Ahmadinejad with Qalibaf." Interesting that after all this time, Qalibaf's name has reemerged.
(link: http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4724976,00.html)
Greeny,
Many thanks.... Will catch up with this on Saturday.
S.
Scott,
I now have had time to read Babak Dad blog and his post of January 22 http://www.babakdad.blogspot.com/ that he was by VOA to clarify.
Babak Dad in his blog talks about long standing power struggle and food fight among two groups of Principlist; one group led by Larijani and the other by Ahmadinejad. Babk Dad is very critical of Larijani, Rezaei, and Ghalibaf. He dismisses them as power hungry and opportunist with personal agenda. He believes these three will be next in line to be sacrificed.
Babak Dad does not follow the story line EA source has provided. He does not mention specific plan for removal of AN. He believes regime has tried to create opposition under its control for the purpose misguiding people that opposition is tolerated. And he says people have known about this trick and have dismissed it.
Scott, I leave it to you to determine if Babak Dad is prescribing to the claim by EA source.
@ (Someone is also starting some pretty wicked rumours. Notable amongst these on Friday was the “Iran banks will fail on Wednesday” story.)
Jaras reports on government's efforts to get through a bill to furnish the banking system with 15 million $ cash: http://www.rahesabz.net/story/8476/
Unconfirmed report from Tehran: quarrels and closure of Bank-e Mellat's branch in bazar because of people's run on their assets: http://www.peykeiran.com/Content.aspx?ID=12554
Barry, Arshama, Green,
Re: Regime
I have been using regime in place of government. Regime, therefore, is the central (Tehran) and local governments (provinces) that include the three branches of government, governor (ostandar) of each province and the related staff as well as security and military personnel.
Almost all government officials in Iran use the word Nezam instead of Dolat when they refer to the system of government. Dolat means government. Nezam means military infrastructure. The use of word “Nezam” instead of the word “government” and referring to court as “revolutionary court” 31 years after the take-over by Khomeini tells a great deal about the system and the people work in it.
I refuse to call them Dolat (government) because they are not. I n my view Dolat or government works within the frame of law, the law of the land or constitution. This bunch does not. Instead, they act as lawless military systems in constant state of war with its own citizens. I, therefore, believe the word regime (regiment) is the more descriptive of this pathetic bunch.
Soctt,
Great analysis.
I’m sold on the facts that the story of this plot is neither regime misinformation or wishful thinking on behalf of the Green Wave or others within regime.
This question has been and still is nagging me: what is the regime hoping to achieve by getting rid of Ahmadinejad at this stage?
By regime I am talking about the collection of Khamenei, Larijani’s, Motalefeh, Rafsanjani, elements of the Gaurds, etc (this excludes Mousavi, Karoubi, Khatami, other reformists/Greens and Ahamadinejad supporters and senior Guards commander).
To me it seems that Babak Dad, in his blog post, is actually referring to the same plot you are referring to, without explaining the details for some reason.
Dad says that Ali Larijani is the “nezam”’s sacrificial lamb. I think by “nezam” here he is referring to Khamanei (a lot of Green, reformers and hardliners use the term nezam when meaning Khamenei. He himself in fact may have used it to describe himself when asking the elite to clarify their support for the nezam). Does Dad mean that:
Larijani is being pushed forward by SL to confront Ahmadinejad, knowing that the latter’s violet supporters will kill or assassinate Larijani?
Or does he mean that Larijani is being pushed forward by the SL to face the people and defend the “nezam” (and may be in the process bring down Ahmadinejad via a Majles impeachment vote), and then (the SL) having Larijani gotten rid of and perhaps blaming the Greens for it and using that as an excuse to crackdown even harder on them?
Or is Dad just staring some rumours to cause rifts within the conservative groups?
I am also wondering if this plot may have anything to do with the succession plans for SL. As you know under IRI constitution if SL dies, resigns or is removed a temporary leadership council formed which will include the president. Could it be that some people within the establishment don’t want Ahmadinejad to be part of such a leadership council, if such a situation arose? (by establishment I mean clerics loyal to IRI but not supportive of the election coup, parts of military and intelligence, Rafsanjani, member’s of SL’s office and even Khamenei himself).
Also could it be that members of Assembly of Experts who appoint the SL are reluctant to move against Khamenei while Ahmadinejad is president, both or the above reason and also because they know that at this stage people like Mesbah Yazdi are still powerful with in the regime (what is left of the establishment that it)? And they don’t want to move against Khamenei while there is a chance of Mesbah Yazdi or one of his allies could become SL. Under such a scenario, Ahmadinejad would actually be a good shield for Khamenei: while Ahmadinejad is still president, no one will move seriously against Khamenei. In such a case Khamenei will not be moving to remove Ahmadinejad.
Also could the plot against Ahmadinejd be the pretext of a fully fledged military coup by the hardliners within the Guards? Get rid of the pawn (Ahmadinejd), to weaken the king (Khamenei). Then take control of levers of power and install a military dictatorship.
Sorry for asking so many questions.
@ Arshama post 23
RE "The topic of today’s VOA discussion was the question, if China by itself would be able to save Iran from its inner and exterior crisis."
Do you remember anything from this part of the discussion? Here are 2 interesting articles on the subject which essentially warn against depending too much on help from China:
Goods and Bads of Anti-Iran Sanctions for China, by Mohammad Hossein Malaek,
Iran’s Former Ambassador to China
http://www.iranreview.org/content/view/5256/41/
China: A Short-Term Solution for Iran, by Dr. Kayhan Barzegar
University Professor, International Relations Analyst, and Iran-US Affairs Expert
http://www.iranreview.org/content/view/5262/36/
Re. URGENT UPDATE 1240 GMT: The Next Move in the Plot? Abdolhossein Ruholamini has given another interview about the crimes in Kahrizak Prison, including the abuse and death of his son Mohsen.
In this interview Ruholamin says that there is a fourth Kahrizak victim by the name of Rahim Aghazadeh Gahramani who died from his wounds after release from Kahrizak. He says his name was not in the Kharizak death report in order not to cause more public outcry
Greeny, good questions! I guess my question is, what's to stop Ahmadinejad from ordering his goons to arrest Larijani on the parliament floor if he tries to use the legal means of impeachment? It seems clear the IRGC and Basiji will obey any kind of lawless order, they don't care anything about the constitution, so why should Larijani be allowed to use his legal options when nobody else has been allowed to do so thus far? So does it really matter if we figure out the details of the articles of impeachment and what they all connect to? The reply will be a baton to the head anyway!
I just would not blink an eye at all at a headline like, "Speaker Larijani arrested after attempting articles of impeachment. Supreme Leader declares Zionists have infiltrated the Majlis with treasonous liars."
I really wonder whether these career politicians understand what is actually happening, and the situation they are in, or if they're just bumbling along like pre-election times, thinking if they can get negotiate something, get certain pieces of paper voted on in a certain hall by certain men, that would be enough to contradict the will of the men with the guns who've been torturing and killing everyone who disagrees with them.
If the plotters are realists, they must have some kind of backup, someone who would physically intervene to protect them, in order to try a move against Ahmadinejad. If they have that backup then this could drastically impact the situation on the ground. If they don't, this is basically the story of how three high profile political prisoners wound up in solitary confinement.
[Poster also known as Fantasy Check/Reality Check/Carpe Diem/Fantasist]
Gee, don't you anti-Iran raving fringe lunatics ever take a break? Nothing is happening or will happen in Eye-ran.LOL. I suggest buying an Atlas and finding Eye-ran on a map first. Will check back to see the progress on this comedic site in a few weeks. The sky is falling.
An outsider's take:
The way to maintain the IRI would have to be this "counter-coup". Rezaie and Qalibaf were the wartime leaders of the IRGC, they know how to fight. In fact it would probably benefit them if Ahmadinejad's supporters fought back so they could deal with them directly instead of afterwards in court. One of our commentators in Iran mentioned a couple of months back that the current rank and file in the IRGC are upset with what is going on therefore they would probably support this move.
The importance of taking out Ahmadinejad first coincides with Greeny's post 38 1/23/10 12:03, in that the next step is allowing Khamenei to leave with diginity by resigning due to "health" reasons and, if he won't, relieve him in the next Assembly of Experts meeting. In the end, Khamenei will have to go sooner than later.
Iran needs to move forward with growing the economy and completing modernization of its infrastructure. 7 months have already been wasted and this group realizes that. Granting the necessary freedom and space, the country can take advantage of the latent talent of its people to accomplish the goal.
What will happen? Ulitmately time will tell.
Catherine,
As far as I remember in yesterday's VOA discussion Babak Yektafar mostly agreed with Dr. Barzegar on the assessment that the China card is not a permanent solution for Iran. Making the same difference between short-term and long-term interests, he pointed to short-time interests like oil supply and possibilities of investment in Iran (South Pars field etc.).
In the long term however China would never sacrifice it's trade relations with the USA (270 $ of exports in 2009) for those with Iran (exports 27 billion $):
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2009
Sadegh Kharrazi, former Iranian embassador in France, said mostly the same on Jaras last Friday, criticizing the ambiguous policies of Russia and China in relation to sanctions in the past: http://www.rahesabz.net/story/8404/
Mentalist, aka Carpe Dime aka Reality Check aka Fantasy Check, aka numerous other names with which he tries to inject his nonsense on this blog, on January 22, 2010 at 2:44 said ” I will return to check on your mental state in a few months. Long live the Islamic Republic of Iran. http://enduringamerica.com/2010/01/20/iran-analysis-supreme-leader-warns-rafsanjani-the-sequels/#comments
It appears that his promises are empty like his words. I hope he keeps his promises and stay the hell out. I also found the following breaking news which I would like to share with you.
Breaking News:
A mentally disturbed individual has escaped the metal institution in which he was hospitalized and was being treated for schizophrenia and identity disorder. He changes his name frequently and blabbers incoherently. This man is a danger to himself and people around him. Please do not approach him or engage him in a conversation. Please call authorities immediately so he can be returned to the hospital for treatment.
Coincidentally this individual who today calls himself Mentalist has escaped the same Timarestan (mental institution) in which Mahmoud Ahamdinejad was being treated. Mahmoud suffered from grandiosity disorder, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. He spoke incoherently and due to his very limited vocabulary he referred to people as peaches, weeds, dust, etc. He believed he was divine with halo around his head and had been sent to earth to hasten the return of a fictional hidden Imam. He, like the patient Mentalist, believed he was an academician. Later when Mhamuod mental illness advanced he believed he was president of the great nation of Iran and ordered rape, torture and killing of people who said he was a fraud. Later we found out that villagers in the village of Aradan (located in Semnan province in Iran) were looking for one of their idiots whom they knew as Mahmoud Sabourjian. That confirmed Mahmoud was also suffering from identity disorder.
We are not sure which village is missing one of its idiots who currently calls himself Mentalist. We have alerted all villages and will issue an update once we learn. Interpol is also on alert and is tracking Mentalist IP address.
Barry,
Please search Youtube for videos of Mentalist. You did a good job locating video of the other mental patient, Mahmoud Looninejad.
@ Arshama
Thanks once again. This puts Iran in a much more difficult position that they admit in public. It means that ultimately China (and perhaps Russia as well?) would not firmly stand in the way of a military strike on Iran as long as the targets were purely military-nuclear in nature and not the petro-industry and related infrastructure.
Cool icon, btw.
I've been spending the past 2 days reading all your amazing analysis and fascinating "what-if's" and must conclude, however, that there is a bit too much presupposition of a functioning rule of law behind them. Rule of law in Iran is and has been for quite some time a mere simulacrum. If people are languishing in jail as we speak charged with sedition for having criticised AN or shouted 'Down with the dictator' during a protest, what crime wouldn't it be to initiate an impeachment procedure against him, no matter who you are?
I must agree with Rev Magdalen when she says, "what’s to stop Ahmadinejad from ordering his goons to arrest Larijani on the parliament floor if he tries to use the legal means of impeachment? It seems clear the IRGC and Basiji will obey any kind of lawless order, they don’t care anything about the constitution, so why should Larijani be allowed to use his legal options when nobody else has been allowed to do so thus far?"
This may also be what Dad alluded to when he called Larijani a 'sacrificial lamb' - a convenient excuse for a military take-over, which I believe is one of Greeny's scenarios as well. However, I'm sure the MPs know the score and wouldn't even contemplate being present at an impeachment hearing. Larijani must also realise that he'd be arrested on the floor of Parliament. I think the plot - if real - will take some other of the labyrinthian paths suggested in previous posts.
Catherine,
“This may also be what Dad alluded to when he called Larijani a ’sacrificial lamb’ – a convenient excuse for a military take-over, which I believe is one of Greeny’s scenarios as well. However, I’m sure the MPs know the score and wouldn’t even contemplate being present at an impeachment hearing.”
Many so called MPs are military people installed as MP in rigged or controlled elections. What if they are ordered to carry out the plot to set up Larijani?
BTW I am not saying that this is going to happen. I am just stating the fact that a lot of these MP take orders from people outside of Majles. 36 of them proposed a bill that would execute people in 5 days as opposed to the 28 days now in Iranian law. If the law were to be passed the appeal process for political executions would have been just 5 days: sentenced to death and 5 days later killed. It bill has been abandoned for now.
This whole plot sounds strange at best. I looks to me that the regime is really rattled and there is a lot of arguments going on behind closed doors. Getting rid of Ahmadinejd may be one of the many things that are being considered. As is probably a military take-over; I am not sure if they’ll have enough boots on the ground to do this and to be able to defend the country in case of a foreign attack. As is probably the possibility of starting a war with someone, anyone.
Greeny - good points as usual. I didn't know that about many MPs actually being (ex?) military people. I always wondered where that draft bill you mentioned came from - it sounded extreme even for hardline MPs.