And on the Eighth Day: Hopes and Fears over The Obama Foreign Policy

Whatever else is said about Barack Obama, you cannot accuse him of being slow off the mark. A day after the Inauguration, he issued the order closing the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and CIA “black sites” and ending torture by American agencies. Two days later, he revoked the Reagan directive banning funding for any organisation carrying out abortions overseas. On 26 January, he ordered a new approach to emissions and global warming, as the State Department appointed Todd Stern to oversee policy on climate change.



Last Monday, Obama launched his “reach-out” to the Islamic world with a televised interview, his first with any channel, with Al Arabiya. Two envoys, George Mitchell for the Middle East and Richard Holbrooke for Afghanistan and Pakistan, have been appointed; Mitchell is already in the region searching for diplomatic settlements. All of this has occurred even as the Administration was pushing for approval of its economic stimulus package and engaging in fierce inter-agency debates over Iraq and Afghanistan.

The media, rightly but ritually, hailed Obama's symbolic renunciation of his predecessor George W. Bush. Much more substantial was this Administration's attention to methods. The American global image would not be projected and its position assured, as in the Dubya years, through military strength; instead, the US would lsucceed through a recognition of and adherence to international cooperation, a projection of tolerance, and a desire to listen. While the term “smart power”, developed over the last two years in anticipation of this Administration, is already in danger of overuse, it is the right expression for the Obama approach.

Yet, even in Obama's more than symbolic announcement, there were seeds of trouble for that “smart power”. The President had hoped to order the immediate, or at least the near-future, shutdown of Camp X-Ray, but he was stymied by political opposition as well as legal complications. The interview with Al Arabiya was a substitute for Obama's hope of a major foreign policy speech in an Arab capital in the first weeks of his Administrat. The Holbrooke appointment was modified when New Delhi made clear it would not receive a “Pakistan-India” envoy; Mitchell's scope for success has already been constrained by the background of Gaza.

Little of this was within Obama's power to rectify; it would have been Messianic indeed if he could have prevailed immediately, given the domestic and international context. The President may have received a quick lesson, however, in the bureaucratic challenges that face even the most determined and persuasive leader.

Already some officials in the Pentagon have tried to block Obama initiatives. They tried to spun against the plan to close Guantanamo Bay, before and after the Inauguration, with the claims that released detainees had returned to Al Qa'eda and terrorism. That attempt was undermined by the shallowness of the claims, which were only substantiated in two cases, and the unexpected offense that it caused Saudi Arabia, who felt that its programme for rehabilitation of former insurgents had been insulted. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates finally and firmed quashed the mini-coup by declaring on Wednesday that he fully supported Obama's plans.

On other key issues, however, the President faces tougher, higher-ranking, and more persistent opposition. Within a day of Obama's first meeting on Iraq, Pentagon sources were letting the media know their doubts on a 16-month timetable for withdrawal. And, after this Wednesday's meeting, General Raymond Odierno, in charge of US forces in Iraq, publicly warned against a quick transition to the Iraqi military and security forces. This not-too-subtle rebuke of the President has been backed by the outgoing US Ambassador in Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and I suspect by the key military figure, head of US Central Command General David Petraeus.

The future US strategy in Afghanistan also appears to be caught up in a battle within the Administration, with a lack of resolution on the increase in the American military presence (much,much more on that in a moment). And even on Iran, where Obama appears to be making a overture on engagement with Tehran, it's not clear that he will get backing for a near-future initiatives. White House officials leaked Obama's draft letter to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to a British newspaper, but State Department officials added that such a letter would not be sent until a “full review” of the US strategy with Iran had been completed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Still, all of these might be minor irritants, given the impact both of Obama's symbolic steps and of other quieter but important steps. For example, after the outright Bush Administration hostility to any Latin American Government that did not have the proper economic or political stance, Obama's State Department immediately recognised the victory of President Evo Morales in a referendum on the Bolivian constitution, and there are signs that the President will soon be engaging with Havana's leaders with a view to opening up a US-Cuban relationship. In Europe, Obama's phone call with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was quickly followed by Moscow's announcement that, in return for a more productive US stance on missile defence (i.e., Washington wasn't going to roll out the system in Eastern Europe), Russia would not deploy missiles on the Polish border. There are even signals of an advance in the Middle East through a new US-Syrian relationship, although this is probably contingent on some recogntion or acceptance of Hamas by Washington.

So why am I even more concerned about the Obama foreign-policy path than I was a week ago, when I wrote of my conflicted reaction to the Inauguration? Let me introduce to the two elephants in this room, one which he inherited and one which he seems to have purchased.

Unless there is an unexpected outcome from George Mitchell's tour of the Middle East, Obama's goodwill toward the Arab and Islamic worlds could quickly dissipate over Gaza. The military conflict may be over, but the bitterness over the deaths of more than 1300 Gazans, most of them civilians, is not going away. And because President-elect Obama said next-to-nothing while the Israeli attack was ongoing, the burden of expectation upon President Obama to do something beyond an Al Arabiya interview is even greater.

Whether the Bush Administration directly supported Israel's attempt to overthrow Hamas and put the Palestinian Authority in Gaza or whether it was drawn along by Tel Aviv's initiative, the cold political reality is that this failed. Indeed, the operation --- again in political, not military, terms --- backfired. Hamas' position has been strengthened, while the Palestinian Authority now looks weak and may even be in trouble in its base of the West Bank.

And there are wider re-configurations. Egypt, which supported the Israeli attempt, is now having to recover some modicum of authority in the Arab world while Syria, which openly supported Hamas, has been bolstered. (Those getting into detail may note not only the emerging alliance between Damascus, Turkey, and Iran but also that Syria has sent an Ambassador to Beirut, effectively signalling a new Syrian-Lebanese relationship.)

Put bluntly, the Obama Administration --- with its belated approach to Gaza and its consequences --- is entering a situation which it does not control and, indeed, which it cannot lead. The US Government may pretend that it can pursue a political and diplomatic resolution by talking to only two of the three central actors, working with Israel and the Palestinian Authority but not Hamas, but that is no longer an approach recognised by most in the region and beyond. (In a separate post later today, I'll note a signal that even Washington's European allies are bowing to the existence of Hamas.)

The Israel-Palestine-Gaza situation is not my foremost concern, however. As significant, in symbolic and political terms, as that conflict might be for Washington's position in the Middle East and beyond, it will be a sideshow if the President and his advisors march towards disaster in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On Wednesday, the New York Times had the red-flag story. White House staffers leaked the essence of the Obama plan: increase US troop levels in Afghanistan, leave nation-building to “the Europeans”, and drop Afghan President Hamid Karzai if he had any objections. On the same day, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told Congressional committees that the US would continue its bombing of targets in northwest Pakistan. (Not a surprise, since the first strikes of the Obama era had already taken place , killing 19 people, most of them civilians.)

So much for “smart power”. Leave aside, for the moment, that the rationale for the approach to Afghanistan --- Gates saying that the US had to defeat “Al Qa'eda” --- is either a diversion or a flight for reality, since the major challenge in the country (and indeed in Pakistan) is from local insurgents. Consider the consequences.

What happens to Obama's symbolic goodwill in not only the Islamic world but worlds beyond when an increase in US forces and US operations leads to an increase in civilian deaths, when America walks away from economic and social projects as it concentrates on the projection of force, when there are more detainees pushed into Camp Bagram (which already has more than twice as many “residents” and worse conditions than Guantanamo Bay)? What happens to “smart power” when Obama's pledge to listen and grasp the unclenched fist is replaced with a far more forceful, clenched American fist? And what has happened to supposed US respect for freedom and democracy when Washington not only carries out unilateral operations in Pakistan but threatens to topple an Afghan leader who it put into power in 2001/2?

This approach towards Afghanistan/Pakistan will crack even the bedrock of US-European relations. In Britain, America's closest ally in this venture, politicians, diplomats, and military commanders are close-to-openly horrified at the US takeover and direction of this Afghan strategy and at the consequences in Pakistan of the US bombings and missile strikes. Put bluntly, “Europe” isn't going to step up to nation-build throughout Afghanistan as a mere support for American's military-first strategy. And when it doesn't, Obama and advisors will have a choice: will they then criticise European allies to the point of risking NATO --- at least in “out-of-area” operations --- or will it accept a limit to their actions?

Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe the lack of agreement in the Obama Administration so far on a defined number of US troops means the President might not be in accord with the approach unveiled in the New York Times. Maybe the Administration will pursue an integrated political strategy, talking to groups inside Afghanistan (and, yes, that includes “moderate Taliban”) and to other countries with influence, such as Iran. Or maybe it won't do any of this, but Afghanistan won't be a disaster, or at least a symbolic disaster --- as with Iraq from 2003 --- spilling over into all areas of US foreign policy.

Sitting here amidst the grey rain of Dublin and the morning-after recognition that “expert thought” in the US, whatever that means, doesn't see the dangers in Afghanistan and Pakistan that I've laid out, I desperately hope to be wrong.

Because, if the world was made in six days, parts of it can be unmade in the next six months.

The Latest from Israel-Palestine-Gaza (24 January)

Latest Post: How Israel Spawned Hamas
Earlier Updates and Links to Stories: The Latest from Israel-Palestine-Gaza (23 January)

8:35 p.m. After a long and busy week, we're taking the night off. We'll be back in the morning with all the overnight developments fit to notice.

8:30 p.m. Just to make sure that no one forgets his country's emerging position amidst the Gaza conflict, Syrian President Bashir al-Assad has congratulated Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal on the "victory" over Israeli forces.

7:23 p.m. Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal has followed up his criticism of US policy on Israel and Palestine, and an Obama phone call to Saudi King Abdullah, with a more muted warning in an interview with CNN. While welcoming Obama's Friday statement and the appointment of envoy George Mitchell, Turki said: "We've heard this before. We need to see implementation. We need to see facts on the ground change. We need to see rhetoric change. We need to see presence on the ground."

7:15 p.m. Hamas is not backing down in the face of Israel's attempts to cut off aid unless it is distributed by other organisations. The Gazan leadership has announced the formation of a committee of senior officials as "the only body to oversee and supervise the rescue. We will be in contact with all other bodies, whether local, national or international, to organise the relief."

7:10 p.m. While Lebanon has not been in the front line of Arab debate over Gaza, it is still worthwhile to note the statement of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora on Saturday. Speaking of a Day of Solidarity with Gaza, Siniora called on all Lebanese "to support the Palestinian brethren in Gaza in any way possible and according to the individual's capability".

5:50 p.m. Word is being leaked that President Obama's envoy George Mitchell will visit Israel and the West Bank next week. The sharp-eyed amongst you will already note that he is not going to Gaza.

5:35 p.m. ITV and Channel 4 have broken with the BBC and will now air a Disaster Emergency Committee appeal for Gaza. The same article also carries Tony Benn's prediction that the BBC will back down and agree to air the appeal, "Before the sun sets in London tonight."



5:05 p.m. A must-see article in The Wall Street Journal: "How Israel Helped Spawn Hamas". We've reprinted and analysed it in a separate post.

2:55 p.m. Interesting counter-move in Cairo: Hamas is meeting with Egyptian officials to discuss a possible swap of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, held by Hamas since 2006, for Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.

Equally, Hamas is suggesting that members of the Palestinian Authority can assist in the monitoring of the Rafah crossing, as long as they are residents of Gaza and not the West Bank. Hamas is also proposing that European Union and Turkish peacekeepers supervise the border.

These are quite clever proposals.  Hamas is trying to separate the Shalit issue from the question of reopening the crossings, and their proposals for the border are very close to the Mubarak-Sarkozy plan pressed by Cairo soon after the initial Israeli attacks. If Cairo agrees, Egypt has effectively dismissed its earlier hopes of removing Hamas from power, and the diplomatic ball will be in  Tel Aviv's court.

2:50 p.m. Schools have reopened in Gaza, but teachers are having to deal with the "psychological trauma" suffered by children in recent weeks.

12:50 p.m. In Case You're Still Thinking About That Regime Change Idea. Washington Post reporters finally get into Gaza and report:

In dozens of interviews across Gaza on Friday, ...Palestinians generally expressed either unbridled support for Hamas or resignation to the idea that the group's reign in Gaza will continue for the foreseeable future. No one suggested that the group is vulnerable.

12:30 p.m. The New York Times has a long profile on the quick rebuilding of Gazan tunnels, damaged by Israeli airstrikes: "The tunnels are the principal livelihood for many people here, and as soon as the bombing stopped, they were right back in them with their shovels."

The best quote? “This will give us greater skills,” said one digger. “We’ll become artists.”

11 a.m. Interesting revelations in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz: Obama envoy George Mitchell will arrive in the Middle East before 10 February. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni has gone on the offensive and set out Israel's preconditions in any negotiations, telling US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that Israel will "not open the Gaza crossings without progress toward the release of kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit".

10 a.m. Israel/Gaza time: The Israeli Government has appointed an inter-ministerial legal defense team to defend officials and soldiers against any war crimes charges.

Olmert's War: How the Prime Minister Took Israel Further into Gaza

In today's Ha'aretz, Aluf Benn has a stunning analysis (reprinted in full below), supported by a wealth of inside information, of the battles within the Israeli Cabinet over the ground offensive in Gaza:

[Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert and [Defense Minister Ehud] Barak detest each other and both of them have only contempt for [Foreign Minister Tzipi] Livni, whom they view as inexperienced. Olmert supposedly respects Barak's security record but is actually using it against him. In the prime minister's narrative, Barak was hesitant, did not want to launch the operation, placed obstacles before each stage and was ready to stop it a while ago. Before every decision, Barak and the Israel Defense Forces' top brass presented lengthy timetables and warned of heavy losses among the soldiers, on the home front and among Palestinian civilians. In Olmert's view, all their assessments were wrong.

The only problem with Benn's analysis is that it is incomplete. He attributes the difference in positions to Olmert's focus on Gaza while Barak and Livni had an eye on February elections. Fair enough, but he might have also mentioned that Olmert is trying to wipe away the stain of his failure in the 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Even more important, it should be noted that it is Olmert, the politician, who is pressing the military campaign while it is Barak, heading the military, who is looking at political considerations and urging a more restrained Israeli position. While Olmert may revel in the short-term military success, it is the politics of occupation that may ultimately prove Barak right.



Unlike Livni and Barak, Olmert is focusing on Gaza, not elections

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert this week likened Israel's situation in the confrontation with Hamas to that of a mountain climber. "When the Guinness Book of Records enters the record set by someone who conquered a peak, he must have been on the peak for a certain amount of time before the record is registered," Olmert explained to his interlocutor. "Israel has a hand on the peak, the slope is slippery, but the goal is within reach. When we get there, we have to stay there for a while."

This is the narrative Olmert is formulating as the Gaza operation seems to near its end. He maintained his determination and tenacity even when the troika's two other members, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, wanted to stop. The successful, highly popular war was his. They were bothered by next month's elections, and this influenced their approach, while he, who is not running for anything, concentrated on running the war.

Olmert and Barak detest each other and both of them have only contempt for Livni, whom they view as inexperienced. Olmert supposedly respects Barak's security record but is actually using it against him. In the prime minister's narrative, Barak was hesitant, did not want to launch the operation, placed obstacles before each stage and was ready to stop it a while ago. Before every decision, Barak and the Israel Defense Forces' top brass presented lengthy timetables and warned of heavy losses among the soldiers, on the home front and among Palestinian civilians. In Olmert's view, all their assessments were wrong.

Olmert has no doubt that the one who was right about it all was Yuval Diskin, the head of the Shin Bet security service, who, together with Mossad espionage agency chief Meir Dagan, presented a tough line in the troika meetings and pressed for the operation to continue. Both of them backed Olmert, who talked about "a success strategy and not an exit strategy." Some gained the impression that Diskin has a "magical influence" over the prime minister. He opposed the earlier cease-fire with Hamas, he evaluated the balance of forces correctly, he was not moved by the pressures.

During Monday night's troika meeting, Olmert, after listening to the proposals made by Barak and Livni, produced an intelligence document stating that Hamas was drawing encouragement from the comments of the defense and foreign ministers and discussing the possibility that if they manage to hold out a little longer, they might secure a victory over Israel. A "senior security figure" supported Olmert: "We are closest to and farthest away from the achievement: close on the ground, but far away because of what is going on in the political echelon, because we are busy pressuring ourselves and being afraid of ourselves."

An irresponsible adventurer?

As early as last week, Barak and Livni reached the conclusion that the Gaza operation had accomplished all it could and that continued military pressure would only harm Israel and heighten the chance of military and international complications. Despite their political rivalry, Barak and Livni presented a similar approach, which brings to mind the similarity of their election slogans on billboards. Barak was afraid of an operational glitch that would cause the deaths of numerous civilians in Gaza; Livni was upset by the humanitarian crisis in the Strip and by the diplomatic and legal price Israel would pay after the war.

From their perspective, Olmert looked like an irresponsible adventurer, who had, in the course of the war, become addicted to glory and lost touch with reality. It happened in Lebanon in 2006 and now again in Gaza. Once again he was leading Israel into a collision with a wall. They, too, do not understand what Olmert means by "the continuation of the operation." After all, he knows as well as they do that Barack Obama will take the oath of office as president of the United States next Tuesday, and that the last thing he wants to see after his inauguration ceremony is a map of Gaza on his desk in the Oval Office. And that if the war does not end by Tuesday, Obama will mercilessly bring down the curtain on it. Barak spoke this week with his counterpart and friend Robert Gates, the U.S. secretary of defense, who will stay on under Obama. It is a safe guess that he picked up the spirit of the new commander-in-chief from him.

Internally, too, Olmert found himself increasingly isolated. The army joined Barak's call for a cease-fire. The GOC Southern Command, Yoav Galant, who came across as an activist pushing for more, said the conquest of Gaza was within reach - if the military echelon could promise him "a year" to mop up the occupied area. Even Diskin, according to another account, asked for five months to conclude the preventive operations. It is the wont of officers and officials to show determination and tenacity, ostensibly, while leaving it to the political echelon in charge to curb them - to restrain stallions, as Moshe Dayan put it. Of them it will not be said, as Olmert said of the IDF senior officer corps in 2006, that they "did not present plans" to the political echelon.

The wily politician?

On Monday the troika held a lengthy meeting, which ended well after midnight. As usual, there are conflicting versions about what transpired. Olmert's impression was that Barak and Livni were speaking softly, with the tape recorder documenting their remarks, and then shouting aloud to the reporters outside. Their impression was that behind the prime minister's talk about determination and courage lay the wily politician Olmert, who maneuvered them into a decision to continue the operation under the guise of "waiting for answers from Egypt." They are two and he is one, but he has the power.

The next day, things took a different turn. Olmert became entangled in an unnecessary and stupid incident with the U.S. administration after boasting of getting President Bush to interrupt a talk he was giving so that Olmert could tell him to order Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to change her intended vote on a cease-fire resolution in the Security Council. Rice supposedly emerged "shamefaced." The administration responded brutally, presenting Olmert as a teller of tales. There has been no love lost between Olmert and Rice since the Second Lebanon War, and he often complained about her to the president. But until this week's incident, he did so discreetly. His verbal blundering during a visit to Ashkelon strengthened Barak and Livni's claims that Olmert was losing it.

Olmert did not convene the troika on Tuesday and apparently was in no hurry to return phone calls from the defense minister and the foreign minister. The result was a wave of wicked rumors that he had disappeared or had been hospitalized. His office managed to allay reporters who called to ask about the prime minister's whereabouts. Olmert gained another day, but Barak lost his patience; his call for a cease-fire was the main headline in Haaretz the next day.

In the meantime, Hamas' determination also faltered, from a perspiring Ismail Haniyeh on television on Monday, to the announcement that the organization had accepted the Egyptian initiative for a cease-fire on Wednesday evening. Yitzhak Rabin once said that there is generally no military decision in Israeli-Arab wars. So how does one know who won? Simple: The side that requests a cease-fire first is the loser.

During the troika's next meeting, on Wednesday, the atmosphere was far more conciliatory. The discussion focused on the preparation for Amos Gilad's visit to Cairo the following day, to conclude the cease-fire terms. In a parallel move, Livni worked out a draft agreement with the U.S. administration for cooperation in preventing arms smuggling into Gaza. The final decision on ending the operation awaited Gilad's return, yesterday evening.

Problematic successes

What can we learn from this story? First, that it is impossible to explain the Israeli leadership's decision-making on the basis of a theoretical model formulated by a committee of inquiry, or proposals made by strategic experts and consultants. No model can factor in the passions, the personal rivalries, problems of character and political constraints faced by decision makers, all of which can decisively affect the outcome.

Second, every investigation focuses on what happened and not on what might happen in the future. The Winograd Committee, which examined the conduct in the Second Lebanon War, emphasized the "process," the need for prior preparation and the examination of alternatives before entering battle. It looked at the failed battles in Lebanon but did not consider the question of how to pull out of an operation that appears to be successful. The events of the past week show that successes, too, sometimes cause problems.

Gaza: It's Not Necessarily All About Tehran

Latest Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza (16 January)

Last week, we noted --- via the wisdom of William Kristol --- the litany of comment setting out the fight in Gaza as a de facto fight against Iran. Israel had to triumph over Hamas, the argument runs, or Hamas' sponsors in Iran would win a big victory in their drive for regional supremacy.

Trita Parsi, in our opinion one of the best analysts of Iranian politics and US-Iranian relations, has offered the following dissection of the Hamas = Iran narrative:

Israel, Gaza and Iran: Trapping Obama in Imagined Fault Lines

In talking about the assault on Gaza, neo-conservative pundits and Israeli hardliners have relied on a familiar frame. The fighting in Gaza, they say, is a struggle between Israel and so-called "moderate" Arab states (namely, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia) on the one hand, and Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas on the other. In reality, Israel is fighting Iran in Gaza, the argument reads.
These imagined Manichean fault lines defy logic and reality. This conflict is the last thing Tehran would have wished for in the last few weeks of the Bush administration. It increases the risk of a US-Iran confrontation now, and reduces the prospects for US-Iran diplomacy once President elect Obama takes over - neither of which is in Iran's national interest. Rather than benefiting from the instability following the slaughter in Gaza, Iran stands to lose much from the rise in tensions. And so does Obama.



To Iran, Hamas is no Hezbollah

While there certainly is an underlying rivalry between Israel and Iran that has come to fuel many other otherwise unrelated conflicts in the region, not every war Israel fights is related to Iran. In this specific case, the parallels to the 2006 Lebanon war are inaccurate. Iran's ties to Hamas are incomparable to the much deeper relationship Iran enjoys with Hezbollah. Iran's close relationship with Hezbollah is rooted in the Iranian view that Shiite minorities in Arab countries are Iran's most likely allies and agents of pro-Iranian sentiment; consequently, backing Hezbollah is viewed to be in Iran's core national interest. In contrast, Iran's relationship with Hamas is a marriage of convenience at best.

In spite of its ardent pro-Palestinian rhetoric, Iran's relationship with Palestinian groups -- including Hamas -- has often been strained. Tensions with Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization were mostly rooted in Arafat's insistence on defining the Israel-Palestinian conflict as a secular Arab nationalist cause -- leaving non-Arab Iran with no opening to play a leadership role in the Muslim world's cause célèbre. Differences with Hamas, however, derived from a mix of politics and ideology. Hamas' intellectual roots go back to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni fundamentalist movement. Furthermore, during the Iraq-Iran war, both the PLO and Hamas expressed support for Saddam Hussein.

Throughout the 1980s, Iran was better at offering rhetoric than practical support to the Palestinian cause, due to Iran's immediate security concerns. This changed in the mid-1990s, when Iran feared that the Oslo peace process was partially aimed at securing Iran's prolonged isolation and political exclusion. But even after the outbreak of the second Intifada, the Iranians took the lead in making grandiose speeches about Iranian backing of the Palestinian cause, but seldom tried to live up to the standards set in its statements. As I describe in Treacherous Alliance: The Secret dealings of Israel, Iran and the United States (Yale University Press), European diplomats in contact with representatives of Islamic Jihad and Hamas visiting Iran after fighting between Israelis and Palestinians had broken out reported back that both groups were utterly disappointed with their Iranian hosts whom they accused of making empty promises -- Tehran neither provided them with money nor weapons. A joke in the streets of Tehran reflected Iran's pretense: "Why aren't there any stones left to stone the adulteress? Per the order of the Supreme Leader, all the stones have been shipped to Palestine as Iran's contribution to the Intifada."

Again, history seems to be repeating itself. After daily demonstrations in Tehran in favor of the Palestinians, including a six-day sit-in at Tehran airport by hard-line students demanding government support for sending volunteers to fight in Gaza, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei contained the protesters by thanking them - while pointing out that Iran was not in a position to go beyond rhetorical support since "our hands are tied in this arena." Other Iranian officials have reinforced that message. General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, declared that Hamas does not need military support to defend itself. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's brother indicated to the demonstrators at Tehran airport that Iran's support for the Palestinians would be limited to "spiritual support for the victimized people of Gaza."

Why Israel's offensive in Gaza should worry Obama

Tehran's complex, if not conflicted, response to the assault on Gaza can best be understood in the context of its broader strategic aims. By rejecting any material Iranian support or involvement in the Gaza battles, Iran's strategic imperatives trumped its ideological concerns and pretenses once more. Khamenei's statement regarding Iran's hands being tied resembles Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to support the Lebanese Shiites by directly entering into war with Israel in 1984 through his edict that the road to Jerusalem goes through Karbala. That is, until Iran has defeated Saddam Hussein, it will not be sucked into a conflict with Israel, regardless of Tehran's ideological opposition to the Jewish state.

Contrary to the neo-conservative narrative that the fighting benefits Iran, Tehran seems to view the Israeli assault on Gaza as highly problematic for several reasons. First, there are suspicions in Tehran that Israel's offensive is a trap with the aim of drawing both Hezbollah and Iran into the fighting. With only weeks left till President Elect Obama takes office, any direct conflagration between Iran and Israel would significantly reduce Obama's ability to deliver on his campaign promise of opening talks with Tehran without preconditions.

Second, increased tensions and polarization in the Middle East undermines Obama's ability to pursue a new policy towards this region, including a shift in America's 30-year old policy of isolating Iran. In fact, polarization along the imagined Gaza fault lines - and a misleading equation of Hamas with Tehran - traps the incoming Obama administration in an involuntary continuation of the Bush policies that contributed to the increased instability in the Middle East in the first place. From the vantage point of Israeli hardliners, this may be a welcomed outcome since it will make compromise with Tehran more difficult and pressure on Israel less likely. Hence, Tehran seems poised not to help reduce Obama's maneuverability.

Third, the conflict is creating unwelcome tensions between Iran and key Arab states. Arab dictatorships fearing that the rise of Iran would weaken America's position in the Middle East and that the survival of Hamas would embolden Islamic nationalist opposition groups throughout the region - both of which would undermine these Arab governments' undemocratic rule - initially sided with Israel by remaining silent or explicitly putting the blame on Hamas. But as the casualties rose and the images of slaughter spread on Arab satellite TVs, the anger of the Arab streets reached the Arab palaces and courts. A similar pattern was seen in 2006 when many Arab governments initially welcomed Israel's air assault on Hezbollah in Lebanon. There, the change of heart had less to do with the images of Lebanese casualties and more to do with Hezbollah's surprising resilience and fighting power.

Though it is true that increased tensions enables Iran to score propaganda victories on the Arab streets, since many Arab states have either remained silent or secretly collaborated with Israel to defeat Hamas, this does carry a great risk for Tehran. If the fighting in Gaza goes on for too long, the spillover effects will be felt in increased Arab-Iranian tensions at a time when Tehran is more interested in soothing ties with the Arabs in order to minimize Arab disruption to any potential US-Iran opening.

The neo-conservative narrative and its imagined fault lines may temporarily add fuel to the US-Israeli alliance, but it will neither bring stability nor order to the region. Rather, it will push the Middle East further into endless conflict and restrict America's next president to a mindset and a policy framework that risks making the promise of change a dream unfulfilled.

The Israeli Invasion of Gaza: Rolling Updates (14 January)

Latest Post: Gaza Diaries --- Dying and Awaiting Death
Latest Post: Alive in Gaza Audio and Written Blogs --- "We Do Not Know What Tomorrow is Holding for Us"
Earlier Updates: The Israeli Invasion of Gaza (13 January --- Evening)

7:20 p.m. Sky News in Britain is claiming that Hamas has agreed "in principle" to Egyptian proposals. Unclear, however, if Sky report is based on an earlier announcement by Spanish Foreign Ministry, now retracted. Hamas spokesman Osama Hamdan said earlier to Al Jazeera that "points of difference" remained over the Egyptian proposals, while Hamas spokesman in Syria said agreement had been reached.

More when we get out of a bloggers' gathering in Birmingham.

6:30 p.m. The long-term effect of the Israeli invasion? From today's Washington Post:

A cornerstone of Israel's strategy in Gaza is to crush Hamas's will to fight, especially its determination to fire rockets into southern Israel. But in interviews here with wounded supporters of the Islamist militia, Israel's assaults appear to be breeding more recruits and more popular support for Hamas.

Men who say they have never fought before or were not Hamas loyalists now vow to join the struggle against Israel when they return to Gaza. They include policemen and other professionals who form part of the backbone of Gazan society.

6:05 p.m. While awaiting developments, I found the opening to this report in The New York Times gets to the heart of the political/military matter:

Despite heavy air and ground assaults, Israel has yet to cripple the military wing of Hamas or destroy the group’s ability to launch rockets, Israeli intelligence officials said on Tuesday, suggesting that Israel’s main goals in the conflict remain unfulfilled even after 18 days of war.

The comments reflected a view among some Israeli officials that any lasting solution to the conflict would require either a breakthrough diplomatic accord that heavily restricts Hamas’s military abilities or a deeper ground assault into urban areas of Gaza. 

5:30 p.m. We've just posted an update on two Gaza accounts, the words of a four-year-old girl in a hospital and the extraordinary "Gaza Diary" of Safa Joudeh.



5 p.m. The latest update from the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, current to 5 p.m. yesterday:

Civilians, notably children who form 56 percent of Gaza’s population, are bearing the brunt of the violence. As one of the most densely populated places in the world, more civilians risk being killed or injured if the conflict continues. The parties to conflict must respect the norms of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), in particular the principles of distinction and proportionality.

4:45 p.m. The Gazan death toll, according to medical services, has passed 1000. Beyond the morbid symbolism of passing that mark, a colleague at lunch has offered the following: given the Gaza population of 1.5 million, this is the equivalent in US of 200,000 dead.

3 p.m. So here's the statement from Ban Ki-Moon in Cairo:

I repeat my call for an immediate and durable cease-fire. I've been urging in the strongest of possible terms all sides must stop fighting now. We don't have any time to lose.

A statement which, I fear, is spitting into the wind: no evidence of any advance from Ban's talks with the Egyptians.

Afternoon update (2 p.m. Israel/Gaza time): No significant word from Ban Ki-Moon's talks in Cairo. Periodic gunfire and bombings in Gaza City.

Peripheral news: a chap named Osama bin Laden has issued a statement on Gaza, calling for "jihad".

11:05 a.m. Juan Cole considers one of the important effects of the conflict, a souring of relations between Turkey and Israel.

11 a.m. Gazan death toll now 978 with more than 4500 wounded.

10:45 a.m. Huge development which effectively means no advance in the diplomatic process.

Ha'aretz reports on the split in the Israeli Cabinet: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who wants to press ahead with military operations, is refusing to meet with Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, both of whom support a cease-fire: "On Wednesday, he will not convene the political-security cabinet to discuss whether the operations should go on."

10:40 a.m. Watching an extraordinary "Inside Story" from Al Jazeeera on protests and the Gaza conflict. Joshua Muravchik of the American Enterprise Institute is close to screaming at the other participants and making statements such as "The Hamas leadership is in a bunker underneath al Shifa hospital" (hmmm.....), "There was not a daysince the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza that went by without a Hamas rocket fired into Israel" (false --- for example, official Israeli figures show only one rocket fired into Israel in July 2008) and "There was no blockade" (I leave that one up to you).

It's simple for Muravchik: Israel and Hamas are "morally unequal".

10:25 a.m.  Global Voices has just posted the heart-felt but disturbing reflections of a Tel Aviv construction worker who worked alongside six Gazans for 18 months in 1996-97. Despite the passage of time, it is well worth a read:

I and most other non-Gazans would break down after a week of such a schedule, but our Gazans lived like this for decades. Up until the day the [Gaza Strip] was shut down once and for all, and the life of people there grew even worse. […] Having seen all this, I understood even then that it was impossible to defeat these people or break them down. They can either be eliminated, or we can learn to live together with them. There are no other options.

(Hat tip to Lisa Goldman.)

10 a.m. This from The Independent of London:

At least three Palestinians in Gaza were shot dead yesterday after Israeli soldiers fired on a group of residents leaving their homes on orders from the military and waving white flags, according to testimony taken by the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem. The testimony was rejected by the military after what it said was a preliminary investigation.

9:50 a.m. Our colleagues at "Alive in Gaza" have posted their first audio despatch, from photojournalist Sameh Habeeb in Gaza City.

Morning update (9:30 a.m. Israel/Gaza time): The overnight military pattern continued. Israeli airstrikes on more than 60 targets, as well as naval and land bombardment. Fighting as Israeli forces further secured their positions around Gazan cities, while in southern Gaza, Israeli planes used bunker-busting bombs on tunnels near Rafah.

The headline development is on the other side of Israel. Three rockets from Lebanon, in the second launch in recent days, landed in northern Israel. The "National Front" has claimed responsibility,but worryingly CNN is already putting out the line that "nothing happens without the wink and nod of Hezbollah".

In what is likely to be a depressing diplomatic sideshow, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon visits the region today, seeing Egyptian and Arab League leaders on Wednesday and Israeli leaders on Thursday. Without visible support from another international entity, such as the United States or the European Union, or a parallel effort by the Arab League, I am afraid the trip will be publicity without substance (although if Ban can use the trip to get some movement on the humanitarian front, it may not be without value).

Meanwhile, the United Nations General Assembly will convene, offering its own symbolism of a denunciation of Tel Aviv. The President of the General Assembly, Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann. has condemned the Israeli attacks as "genocide" against the Palestinian people.