Iran Special: Sanctions, "Analysis", and the Never-Ending Circle of Propaganda --- From NIAC to Neo-Cons

Thanks to Joanna Paraszczuk for editing:

Most of what passes in the US press and circles of influence as "analysis" of Iran is actually political posturing, trying to put forward self-interested opinion as the Truth.

This is a story of how that "analysis", caught up in a false "either-or" of Iran --- it is either menacing, or it is oppressed by the "West"; it is either pursuing a Bomb, or it has no such intention; there will be regime change or a dominant regime which will never be changed --- leads us,  again and again, to political dead-ends.

For example, here are David Albright, Mark Dubowitz, and Orde Kittrie in The Wall Street Journal on Wednesday -- insisting that Iran is on the verge of building the Bomb. Predictably, the piece exaggerates disparate facts and fragments of information that far from demonstrates the hypothesis.

We estimate that Iran, on its current trajectory, will by mid-2014 be able to dash to fissile material in one to two weeks unless its production of 20%-enriched uranium is curtailed. If the number or efficiency of Iran’s centrifuges unexpectedly increases, or if Tehran has a secret operational enrichment site, Tehran could reach critical capability before mid-2014.

Yet, while the immanence of the Bomb is the most popular posture, another common theme is Sanctions Are Having Little Effect on the Islamic Republic --- Or, At Least, The Regime.

This is the premise of the 30-page report that Trita Parsi and Reza Marashi of the National Iranian American Council, working with economist Bijan Khajehpour, put out this week, "Never Give In and Never Give Up".

The document sets out a mission (and a predictable conclusion):

No study has been conducted to assess the effect of sanctions on the Iranian government’s policies, decision-making process and psychology. Precisely because of their centrality, it is vital to provide a clear, informed picture of the impact of sanctions on Tehran’s calculations.

So the Iranian regime, far from bowing before sanctions, has not only maintained its defiant line on the nuclear issue but has been successful at home by maintaining a "resistance economy".

The report has gotten some love from journalists and pundits. Scott Peterson of the Christian Science Monitor, normally a shrewd dissector of any claim, gave himself over to promotion: "Report: Sanctions May Be Speeding Iran's Nuclear Advancement". Stephen Walt of Foreign Policy magazine found vindication for his opposition to sanctions: "Our Myopic Approach to Iran". Analyst Farideh Farhi endorses the report's hook line that "[the regime] has adapted the economy to bend but not break".

There's only this problem.

Neither the report nor its supporters offer a shred of credible evidence for the central claim that the regime has triumphed --- within itself, and by carrying the popular support of the Iranian people --- through the Resistance Economy. No evidence is given to show that the Resistance Economy is more than a propaganda concept and that it has successfully been implemented.

Here are four points why NIAC's report is propaganda rather than analysis, and an explanation of why this posturing over sanctions matters, with NIAC's stance only offering an inverted reflection of that of "neo-conservatives" on Iran.

1. REGIME OFFICIALS ARE NOT "ANALYSTS"

The report proclaims repeatedly that it is "relying on over 30 in-depth interviews with senior Iranian political officials, analysts and members of the business community".

But who are the sources that give authority to the claims that the regime is sustaining itself?

Unable to name them --- understandably, given the political and security situation --- the report teases the reader with examples like "senior [MP] who is relatively influential in the top layers of the regime", "former high-ranking minister who is still influential in the key foreign policy and national security circles", "[MP] who is close to [Speaker of Parliament] Ali Larijani", "senior Iranian diplomat", "well-positioned businessman with links to the security apparatus".

That's a bit vague, to say the least. So, to give this some precision over the key issue of the state of the economy, let's focus on specific examples. This is from "one influential parliamentarian":

“Those who are witnessing how Iran is managing its enormous challenges develop a new level of respect for Iran, and that has given Iran a new credibility. ran has become a role model for developing countries and there is a greater willingness among developing nations to work and trade with Iran on the international stage.

So NIAC's confirmation that the Iranian economy is not only withstanding pressure but is enhancing Tehran's position comes from a high-ranking MP --- just like MPs on a daily basis put out that message on State outlets like Press TV and the Islamic Republic News Agency.

Here's another source explaining that sanctions are hurting those who impose them, far more than they affect Tehran: "One senior decision-maker in Tehran spoke confidently of the belief that Europe cannot stomach a return to sanctions-based policies." And another:

A Majles deputy close to Speaker Ali Larijani [said]..."The Europeans have fallen into an American-Israeli trap and they don’t know how to come out of it. If they continue this way, they will lose more and more of their economic foothold in Iran.”

When you strip away the gloss of the report and the puffery about "more than 30 interviews", what you get is far from surprising --- officials connected to the regime are saying that the regime is doing fine.

2. DECLARING A "RESISTANCE ECONOMY" IS NOT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Using these sources would be fine if the report's authors critiqued the sources with information about Iran's economic situation.

But this is where a curiosity emerges --- almost all the "hard" evidence in the report points to weakness, not strength. This is not immediately evident, because that evidence is almost buried amidst the bigger, unsubstantiated claim of the regime's success. Instead, the reader has to pull the references together:

Representatives from the Iranian Chamber of Commerce have said that 50% of the current economic predicament is a direct consequence of sanctions and the other 50% is due to failed economic policies....In one calendar year, GPD per capita declined by nearly eight percent; inflation increased by over ten percent; and unemployment inched close to 20%....[The Minister of Oil] conceded that Iran’s crude oil export revenues fell by about 40%....Iran will have a growing budget deficit problem....Iranian industry is suffering extensively as a result of sanctions, mismanagement, corruption, and corresponding negative economic phenomena....Perhaps the most notable example of how Iran’s economy is suffering can be seen in the currency dive.

A truly valuable report could have examined these economic indicators. It could have investigated --- including with the use of material from Iranian media which gives away the level of concern --- an official inflation rate of more than 30%, with an unofficial rate likely to be far higher; the devastating fall in oil revenue; the near-choking of Iran's financial system in the international economy; the closure or reduction of a large portion --- some politicians and officials have claimed up to 60% --- of Iran's industrial base; the failure to establish a Government budget for 2013-14; the collapse of President Ahmadinejad's flagship subsidy cuts programme; the erosion of social services; and far more.

But that is not what this report wants to achieve. Instead, its goal is to proclaim, "Tehran's Response: Economy of Resistance". This is immediately followed by a series of optimistic assertions:

The economy as a whole is still producing a positive balance of trade.... Through privatizing government companies, the Treasury will generate revenues, so a financial collapse of the Iranian government in the short run appears unlikely....The government has managed to provide the basic needs of the Iranian economy with per capita oil export earnings of below $500....Iran is increasing its capability to export natural gas.

None of these assertions is backed up by investigation, for example, of the state of trade, the current approach --- and costs --- of privatisation, and the provision of "basic needs".

Instead, it is the simple proclamation of Resistance Economy --- introduced by the Supreme Leader as the only way to neutralise the threat of sanctions and continuously put forward ni the regime's domestic and international propaganda, irrespective of "reality" --- which is maintained.

Thus, convergence. Rather than having to go to the effort of actually investigating the economy, NIAC can just go back to its "sources":

Officials close to Petroleum Minister Rostam Qassemi" told NIAC that "the view inside the ministry is that the economy is far from collapsing, and efforts to circumvent the impact of sanctions have taken shape through increasing the domestic production of refined products and penetrating regional markets for petroleum products.

3. PROCLAIMING "REGIME UNITY" IS NOT POLITICAL ANALYSIS

NIAC's promotion is not limited to the declaration of the success of the "Resistance Economy". It also proclaims the political triumph of regime leaders over adversity:

Stark divisions among the Iranian elite are unmistakable. However, those divisions do not appear to have affected regime cohesion around the nuclear issue or on the response to sanctions. And if the testimony of elite insiders is to be believed, sanctions have helped strengthen cohesion rather than intensify rifts. Numerous Iranian decision-makers insisted --- Ahmadinejad’s belligerence notwithstanding --- that sanctions were uniting rather than dividing the Iranian elite. A current, senior minister articulated his view accordingly: “The main objective of these sanctions has been to impose regime change or at least to weaken the Iranian regime. They have failed in that objective and in fact, they are strengthening the core of the Iranian regime, because they have united regime constituents."

If NIAC really desired to examine the political situation --- rather than going to a "senior minister" to bolster its preferred notion --- by reading Iranian media, it could find daily challenges to "cohesion". A sample from the last two months alone:

Senior Revolutionary Guards commanders criticise President Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad accuses the Larijani family --- including Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and head of judiciary Sadegh Larijani --- of fraud. Ali Larijani calls Ahmadinejad "immoral".
The Supreme Leader's representatives express concern over Ahmadinejad's deviant current.
Ahmadinejad accuses Supreme Leader's representative of trying to manipulate June's Presidential election.
Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani says Supreme Leader's "Political and Economic Epic".
Ahmadinejad's senior advisor Saeed Mortazavi is put on trial.
The head of the Chamber of Commerce warns that the system is near collapse.

But this is so complex. It demands dedicated investigation. And it does not prop up NIAC's narrative. So instead, the authors go to a "former Deputy Foreign Minister":

It was obvious to us that the sanctions pressure will increase and it was also clear to us that the main target was to weaken the regime, but that compelled us to stay strong, work together and prove the Western strategy wrong.

4. ANALYSIS IS NOT JUST ABOUT "THE NUCLEAR ISSUE"

To be blunt: NIAC does not go into detailed investigation of the economic and political situation inside Iran because it is not concerned with that situation in itself.

Instead, that situation --- or rather, the authors' manufactured portrayal of that situation --- exists only to support NIAC's line about nuclear negotiations with Iran. The report concludes:

This study demonstrates that there is a clear disconnect between the stated goals of the sanctions policy (a change in the Iranian calculus in regard to its nuclear program) and what sanctions have actually achieved.

The preceding pages are merely to offer props for a stage that NIAC had set many months ago: Sanctions Will Not Force Iran to the Negotiations. They Will Not Bring Iranian Concessions. They Will Not Bring a Resolution. So Sanctions Should Be Lifted.

I have been critical of the negotiating strategy of the US and Europe, including their approach to sanctions, in EA analyses. In particular, I have argued that the "one-way" pursuit of Iranian concessions, before engaging in a "two-way" negotiation, is unlikely to succeed.

NIAC, however, is not reaching that judgement by assessing evidence and then working from it. Instead, it starts with a normative judgement --- Sanctions Are Bad --- and then fits the Iranian economy and politics to that through its interviewees.

AND WHY IT MATTERS --- THE FALSE "EITHER-OR" OF POLITICS OVER IRAN

At one level, my concern with NIAC's report is that of analysis. Facts and critqiue should not be sacrificed for pre-conceptions and polemic.

At a more important level, however, my worry is over the corruption of "analysis" only to take us into political dead ends.

Consider this: NIAC declares itself to be in opposition to "neo-conservatives" who portray the US defending itself --- and possibly needed to take aggressive military action --- against a menacing Islamic Republic. Yet the title of NIAC's report --- a portrayal of the regime's defiance --- could as easily be that of a "neo-conservative" declaration: "Never Give In, Never Give Up".

NIAC is sharply critical of those who have proclaimed a rapid advance of Iran's nuclear programme towards military capability. Yet this passage from its could easily fit into the narrative which it condemns:

The new IR2-m centrifuges can significantly reduce the time for any Iranian breakout option [for a nuclear weapon], and correspondingly, reduce the West’s ability to detect and react to such a breakout.

In the past, NIAC has countered those who have denounced the Islamic Republic as a supporter of "terrorism" and an imminent threat to Isarael. Here it all but repeats that allegation:

Tehran has further increased its support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad. When Israel attacked Gaza this past November, it was Iran that transferred technology for the construction of missiles that brought Israel’s major cities within range for the first time.

Of course, NIAC would not align itself with the "neo-conservatives" who advocate even more punishing sanctions or a military strike on Tehran. Nor would Trita Parsi ally with unmitigated advocates for the Iranian regime, such as Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett.

Yet, in its rhetoric, this report brings a convergence of these differing factions: all can unite --- for their agendas --- on the image of a resilient, still-powerful regime.

That is because much of US "analysis" on Iran posits a black-and-white, either-or binary position that -- likely deliberately -- overlooks the nuanced and complex situation on the ground.

Either Iran will build a Bomb or it does not want a Bomb.

Either Iran will resist a political agreement or it will be forced to its knees to accept one.

There will either be regime change in Iran or the Islamic Republic will vanquish all efforts for that regime change.

Of course, the "truth" lies on a vast nuanced spectrum between all of these "either-ors". Iran is not on the verge of a nuclear weapon --- it may or may not be pursuing breakout capability, but that cannot be established (at least not from open-source intelligence). Iran is not going to capitulate tomorrow over the nuclear issue, but neither is it going to ignore the effects of sanctions as it considers whether or not to negotiate and, more importantly, what will be its tactics and objectives in any negotiations.

There will not be regime change in Tehran in the near-future, but nor is the regime secure in its internal position.

All of this, however, is difficult to assess and requires real analysis and real research.

And it does not fit into an easy black-and-white narrative of political posturing --- be that from The Wall Street Journal or NIAC.

Meanwhile, the "real" stories --- the stories of the Iranian people --- are largely beyond notice or care, save when they can be used as pawns for both side's "Never Give Up, Never Give In" narrative.